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This article discusses the notion that the invisibility of the animalness of the animal constitutes a fundamental obstacle to change within current production systems. It is discussed whether housing animals in environments that resemble natural habitats could lead to a re-animalization of the animals, a higher appreciation of their moral significance, and thereby higher standards of animal welfare. The basic claim is that experiencing the animals in their evolutionary and environmental context would make it harder to objectify animals as mere (...) bioreactors and production systems. It is argued that the historic objectification of animals within intensive animal production can only be reversed if animals are given the chance to express themselves as they are and not as we see them through the tunnel visions of economy and quantifiable welfare assessment parameters. (shrink)

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The concept of animal welfare in confinement agriculture—and an ethical theory based upon this concept—necessitates an idea of what kind of being it is that fares well and what “well” is for this being. This double-question is at the heart of understanding and adequately defining welfare as qualitatively embedded in the experiencing subject. The notion of telos derives (philosophically) from Aristotle and is a way of accounting for the good life of an animal from the unique speciesness of the animal (...) in question. The first part of the article will address the contemporary philosophical and ethical analysis of animals based upon this Aristotelian idea (Rollin in Animal rights and human morality (1st ed. 1981). Prometheus Books, New York, 2006b). Telos is here employed to illustrate the dimensions of what matters in welfare assessment and ethical evaluation. The second half of the article addresses some of the welfare problems in modern animal agriculture and how they relate to the telos concept. Two main examples are dealt with: Boredom (Wemelsfelder in Mental health and well-being in animals. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2005) is argued as being the suffering of choicelessness in animals that are inherently beings that choose—and loneliness is the suffering of social isolation in animals for whom standing in active relations to others is part of what they are. (shrink)

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In Animal Crisis: A New Critical Theory (2022), Alice Crary and Lori Gruen diagnose a crisis in human–animal relations, emphasizing its political nature and critiquing the limited scope of orthodox animal ethics. They propose an “ethics and politics of sight” to confront this crisis, drawing on Iris Murdoch’s philosophy of attention. This article argues that while Murdoch’s account of attention provides insight into the perceptual dimension of this crisis, it does not fully address its political and emotional aspects. Murdoch’s focus (...) on personal improvement ignores the structural roots of moral misperceptions, limiting its applicability to a collective politics of sight. Moreover, the lack of a systematic account of the emotional dimension of attention undermines her explanation of the latter’s transformative potential. Therefore, this article applies Gilles Deleuze’s concept of shame to extend Murdochian attention to include emotional and political dimensions. By analyzing the role of shame in moral perception, this article contributes to debates on how emotions affect ethical human–animal issues and moral thought and practice more generally. Specifically, we argue that shame provides a critical perspective on the normative infrastructure that determines society’s relation to animals by rendering visible aspects of the shameful and the intolerable behind a façade of normalcy. (shrink)

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