Works by Jane Heal
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- (1 other version)Replication and functionalism.Jane Heal -1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield,Language, mind and logic. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 135--150.
- Mind, Reason and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language.Jane Heal -2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.Recent philosophy of mind has had a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity between psychological judgments and those of natural science and has thus overlooked the fact that other people are not just objects whose thoughts we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom we talk and co-operate. In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts is (...) not knowledge of some theory of the mind but rather an ability to imagine alternative worlds and how things appear from another person's point of view. She then applies this view to questions of how we represent others' thoughts, the shape of psychological concepts, the nature of rationality and the possibility of first person authority. This book should appeal to students and professionals in philosophy of mind and language. (shrink)
- Functionalism and replication.Jane Heal -1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield,Language, mind and logic. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Moore's paradox: A Wittgensteinian approach.Jane Heal -1994 -Mind 103 (409):5-24.
- Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation approach.Jane Heal -1998 -Mind and Language 13 (4):477-498.It is generally assumed that the debate between theory‐theory and simulation theory is an empirical one, but this view of the structure of the debate is misleading. It is an a priori truth that theory‐theory is mistaken and equally a priori that simulation in one sense (here labelled ‘co‐cognition’) is central in thinking about the thoughts of others. Given this, it is a further question how our co‐cognitive powers are realized in sub‐personal machinery. Here simulation in quite another sense (that (...) involving such ideas as ‘pretend states’ and ‘off‐line’ mental processes) may provide one possible answer. (shrink)
- Simulation, theory, and content.Jane Heal -1996 - In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith,Theories of Theories of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 75--89.
- Social Anti-Individualism, Co-Cognitivism, and Second Person Authority.Jane Heal -2013 -Mind 122 (486):fzt052.We are social primates, for whom language-mediated co-operative thinking (‘co-cognition’) is a central element of our shared life. Psychological concepts may be illuminated by appreciating their role in enriching and improving such co-cognition — a role which is importantly different from that of enabling detailed prediction and control of thoughts and behaviour. This account of the nature of psychological concepts (‘co-cognitivism’) has social anti-individualism about thought content as a natural corollary. The combination of co-cognitivism and anti-individualism further suggests that, in (...) addition to the familiar first person authority with which we ascribe thoughts to ourselves, there may also be something deserving the name ‘second person authority’. (shrink)
- Common knowledge.Jane Heal -1978 -Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111):116-131.
- How to think about thinking.Jane Heal -1995 - In Martin Davies & Tony Stone,Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications - Reading in Mind and Language. Wiley-Blackwell.
- The Presidential Address: On First-Person Authority.Jane Heal -2001 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19.How are we to explain the authority we have in pronouncing on our own thoughts? A 'constitutive' theory, on which a second-level belief may help to constitute the first -level state it is about, has considerable advantages, for example in relieving pressures towards dualism. The paper aims to exploit an analogy between authority in performative utterances and authority on the psychological to get a clearer view of how such a constitutive account might work and its metaphysical presuppositions.
- Second person thought.Jane Heal -2014 -Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331.There are modes of presentation of a person in thought corresponding to the first and third person pronouns. This paper proposes that there is also thought involving a second person mode of presentation of another, which might be expressed by an utterance involving ‘you’, but need not be expressed linguistically. It suggests that co-operative activity is the locus for such thought. First person thought is distinctive in how it supplies reasons for the subject to act. In co-operative action there is (...) first person plural intending and judging. So there is a way of thinking of another, when openly co-operating with him or her, which plays the distinctive role of giving reason for contribution to the co-operative activity. In slogan form, ‘you’ is ‘we minus I’. The way children learn to use second and third person pronouns is naturally explained on this view. Contrasting less sophisticated kinds of co-operative activity with more sophisticated forms, and considering some issues about common knowledge and commo.. (shrink)
- Simulation vs. theory-theory: What is at issue?Jane Heal -1996 - In Christopher Peacocke,Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. British Academy.
- VI*—The Disinterested Search for Truth.Jane Heal -1988 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):97-108.Jane Heal; VI*—The Disinterested Search for Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 97–108, https://doi.org/10.10.
- Indexical predicates and their uses.Jane Heal -1997 -Mind 106 (424):619--640.Indexicality is a feature of predicates and predicate components (verbs, adjectives, adverbs and the like) as well as of referring expressions. With classic referring indexicals such as 'I' or 'that' a distinctive rule takes us from token and context to some item present in the content which is the semantic correlate of the token. Predicates and predicate components may function in an analogous fashion. For example 'thus' is an indexical adverb which latches onto some manner of performance present in its (...) context. 'John sang thus', said while indicating someone singing discordantly, claims that John sang discordantly. The phenomenon of predicatival indexicality is widespread in English and is expressed in a variety of idioms. Indexical predication plays important epistemological and psychological roles and the notion may have other interesting philosophical applications. (shrink)
- (2 other versions)Understanding other minds from the inside.Jane Heal -1998 -Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:83–99.Can we understand other minds ‘from the inside’? What would this mean? There is an attraction which many have felt in the idea that creatures with minds, people, invite a kind of understanding which inanimate objects such as rocks, plants and machines, do not invite and that it is appropriate to seek to understand them ‘from the inside’. What I hope to do in this paper is to introduce and defend one version of the so-called ‘simulation’ approach to our grasp (...) and use of psychological concepts, a version which gives central importance to the idea of shared rationality, and in so doing to tease out and defend one strand in the complex of ideas which finds expression in this mysterious phrase. (shrink)
- II–Jane Heal.Jane Heal -1998 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):95-109.[Michael Tye] Externalism about thought contents has received enormous attention in the philosophical literature over the past fifteen years or so, and it is now the established view. There has been very little discussion, however, of whether memory contents are themselves susceptible to an externalist treatment. In this paper, I argue that anyone who is sympathetic to Twin Earth thought experiments for externalism with respect to certain thoughts should endorse externalism with respect to certain memories. /// [Jane Heal] Tye claims (...) that an externalist should say that memory content invoking natural kind concepts floats free of the setting where the memory is laid down and is at later times determined by the context in which the memory is revived. His argument assumes the existence of 'slow switching' of the meaning of natural kind terms when a person is transported from Earth to Twin Earth. But proper understanding of natural kind terms suggests that slow switching (contrary to what is often presupposed) is likely never to be completed. Hence the situation of a person unknowingly transported to Twin Earth is not that his memories switch content but rather that he gets two natural kinds confused. (shrink)
- Joint Attention and Understanding the Mind.Jane Heal -2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler,Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 34--44.It is plausible to think, as many developmental psychologists do, that joint attention is important in the development of getting a full grasp on psychological notions. This chapter argues that this role of joint attention is best understood in the context of the simulation theory about the nature of psychological understanding rather than in the context of the theory. Episodes of joint attention can then be seen not as good occasions for learning a theory of mind but rather as good (...) occasions for developing skills of expressing and sharing thoughts. This approach suggests seeing language acquisition as learning how to focus and fine-tune joint attention already present in the normal basic relation of carer and infant. Philosophers in thinking about other minds have concentrated too much on the contrast of first and third person, I vs he/she, and forgotten the centrality of the contrast of first and second person, I vs you, and the related centrality of we. (shrink)
- Simulation and cognitive penetrability.Jane Heal -1996 -Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.: Stich, Nichols et al. assert that the process of deriving predictions by simulation must be cognitively impenetrable. Hence, they claim, the occurrence of certain errors in prediction provides empirical evidence against simulation theory. But it is false that simulation‐derived prediction must be cognitively impenetrable. Moreover the errors they cite, which are instances of irrationality, are not evidence against the version of simulation theory that takes the central domain of simulation to be intelligible transitions between states with content.
- II—Jane Heal: Illocution, Recognition and Cooperation.Jane Heal -2013 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):137-154.Moran rightly links performance of speech acts to instituting second‐personal normative relations. He also maintains that an audience's recognition of the speaker's intention in speaking is sufficient for the speaker's success in doing the speech act intended. The claim is true on some ways of understanding speech act verbs, but false on others. This complexity of speech act verbs can be explained by seeing how speech acts need to be understood in the context of shared life and cooperative action.
- XV*—Semantic Holism: Still a Good Buy.Jane Heal -19934 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:325-339.Jane Heal; XV*—Semantic Holism: Still a Good Buy, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 325–339, https://doi.org/10.10.
- On underestimating us.Jane Heal -2020 -Think 19 (54):9-20.Human beings are social animals. A solitary life would be horrible for most of us. What makes life worthwhile is being with others and engaging in shared projects with them. To do justice to these facts, philosophers need to pay more attention to the first-person plural, we/us, and to rethink their accounts of value and virtue.No categories
- Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy.Jane Heal -2000 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):1-19.Some see the co-cognitive view of how we arrive at judgements about others' thoughts as a version of the analogy approach, where I reason from how I find things to be with me to how they will be for others. These thinkers think it a virtue of the view that it need not accept any linkage between thought and rationality. This paper will, however, defend the view that a co-cognitive view is a natural ally of theories which link thought and (...) rationality. It will try to show that exclusive stress on analogy is unduly sceptical about our cognitive capacities and overestimates our similarity to each other. (shrink)
- Fact and meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on philosophy of language.Jane Heal -1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
- (1 other version)Language, Thought and Consciousness.Jane Heal -1999 -Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):553-555.No categories
- (2 other versions)Fact and Meaning.Jane Heal -1990 -Philosophy 65 (254):532-534.No categories
- Joint attention and understanding the mind.Jane Heal -2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler,Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 34--44.It is plausible to think, as many developmental psychologists do, that joint attention is important in the development of getting a full grasp on psychological notions. This chapter argues that this role of joint attention is best understood in the context of the simulation theory about the nature of psychological understanding rather than in the context of the theory. Episodes of joint attention can then be seen not as good occasions for learning a theory of mind but rather as good (...) occasions for developing skills of expressing and sharing thoughts. This approach suggests seeing language acquisition as learning how to focus and fine-tune joint attention already present in the normal basic relation of carer and infant. Philosophers in thinking about other minds have concentrated too much on the contrast of first and third person, I vs he/she, and forgotten the centrality of the contrast of first and second person, I vs you, and the related centrality of we. (shrink)
- Comments on Authority and Estrangement.Jane Heal -2004 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):440-447.First person authority, argues Moran, is not to be understood as a matter of having some especially good observational access to certain facts about oneself. We can imagine a person who can report accurately on her own psychological states, for example because she can perform, without conscious thought, extremely reliable psychoanalytic-style diagnoses of herself. But the ‘authority’ with which she produces her judgements resembles that which she could have about another person in that it can exist even when she does (...) not endorse or identify with the states she reports on. In imagining such a person we see that her speech about herself is very different from our more usual sort of psychological self-attributions and that something central to their authority, something we want to explain, has gone missing. Also the observational view does not illuminate why it is only psychological states to which one can have such privileged access, and only one’s own; nor does it explain why loss of such access is a serious matter. (shrink)
- Explicit performative utterances and statements.Jane Heal -1974 -Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):106-121.
- Thoughts and holism: reply to Cohen.Jane Heal -1999 -Analysis 59 (2):71-78.
- On speaking thus: The semantics of indirect discourse.Jane Heal -2001 -Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):433-454.Indexical predication is possible as well as the more familiar indexical reference. ‘My curtains are coloured thus’ describes my curtains. The indexical predicate expression it contains stands to possible non‐indexical replacements as a referring indexical does to possible non‐indexical replacements , in that it calls upon the context of utterance to fix its semantic contribution to the whole. Indexical predication is the natural resource to call upon in talk about skilful human performances, where we exhibit considerable know‐how but little explicit (...) know‐that. Speech is among such performances. Both direct and indirect speech reports may be illuminated by seeing them in the light of this thought. A corollary of the approach is that the prospects of providing a formal semantic treatment of indirect speech do not look good. (shrink)
- The early work of Martha Kneale, née Hurst.Jane Heal -2021 -British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (2):336-352.ABSTRACT This paper offers an account of the early career of Martha Kneale, née Hurst, and of the five papers she published between 1934 and 1950. One on metaphysical and logical necessity, from 1938, is particularly interesting. In it she considers the metaphysics of time and offers an explanation of ‘the necessity of the past’, which has some resemblance to Kripke’s ideas about metaphysical necessities, in that it assigns an important role to experience in how we come to know them. (...) But Kneale’s view is very different from Kripke’s, depending not on doctrines about rigid designation but rather on recognition of the failure of the atomist/empiricist account of ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ concepts. That account cannot deal with such things as the relations of the determinates of a determinable like colour. A plausible corollary of this, which Kneale exploits, is that some of our experience reveals to us that there are phenomena which are intrinsically complex in having multiple distinguishable aspects, but where those aspects are inseparable. Other of the papers show Kneale to have been pursuing interesting lines of thought about McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time and on the mind-body problem. (shrink)
- XII*—Insincerity and Commands.Jane Heal -1977 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):183-202.Jane Heal; XII*—Insincerity and Commands, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 183–202, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.
- (1 other version)‘Back to the rough ground!’ Wittgensteinian reflections on rationality and reason.Jane Heal -2007 -Ratio 20 (4):403–421.Wittgenstein does not talk much explicitly about reason as a general concept, but this paper aims to sketch some thoughts which might fit his later outlook and which are suggested by his approach to language. The need for some notions in the area of ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ are rooted in our ability to engage in discursive and persuasive linguistic exchanges. But because such exchanges can (as Wittgenstein emphasises) be so various, we should expect the notions to come in many versions, (...) shaped by history and culture. Awareness of this variety, and of the distinctive elements of our own Western European history, may provide some defence against the temptation of conceptions, such as that of ‘perfect rationality’, which operate in unhelpfully simplified and idealised terms. (shrink)
- Thought and Things.Simon Blackburn &Jane Heal -1979 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 53 (1):23 - 59.No categories
- Wittgenstein and dialogue.Jane Heal -1995 - In Heal Jane,Philosophical Dialogues: Plato, Hume, Wittgenstein. pp. 63-83.
- On Discussing What We Should Do.Jane Heal -2024 -Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 95:127-141.Many of the good things which make human life worthwhile are essentially social, cannot be enjoyed by one person unless they are enjoyed together with others. And it is obvious that thinking in terms of the first-person plural, we/us, plays a large part in everyday life as people consider puzzlements (‘What should we do?’) and remark on the success of what they decided on (‘That worked out really well for us!’). Analytic philosophers should accept this at face value, recognising that (...) human beings are often co-subjects with each other, that there is irreducible plural intentionality. The paper explores how the existence of plural intentionality manifests itself in our concepts and ways of proceeding and how attempted ‘analysis’ of what goes on as the assemblage of many interlocking instances of singular intentionality distorts and misleads. (shrink)No categories
- Radical Interpretation.Jane Heal -1997 - In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller,A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 299–323.To engage in radical interpretation is to set about investigating the meanings of utterances in some completely unknown language. It has been suggested that reflection on how such interpretation should proceed will throw light on the nature of meaning. This chapter concerns proposals of Donald Davidson and aims to locate his views in a broader context and to consider alternative approaches. Davidson's proposed radical interpretation starts in a place which is either not available or is not radical. The chapter discusses (...) the location of radical interpretation within the broader field of philosophy, and identifies some of the options and their presuppositions. It outlines the ideas of Davidson, and considers their contrasts with alternative views, seeking to identify the crucial issues. The chapter argues that the questions about the nature of meaning and the possibility of radical interpretation are linked with other fundamental philosophical questions. (shrink)No categories
- What are psychological concepts for?Jane Heal -2003 - In Denis McManus,Wittgenstein and Scepticism. New York: Routledge.
- Rule-following and its ramifications.Jane Heal -2009 -Analysis 69 (3):541-548.In the collection under review, Boghossian assembles 14 of his papers from the last 20 years. 1 They are presented in four groups. The first three groups are focused on, respectively, the nature of mental content, the links of content with self-knowledge and the links of content with a priori knowledge. The two papers of the last group, written with David Velleman, deal with colour and colour concepts. Each group of papers is followed by a bibliography, where responses and possible (...) further reading are listed. Since Boghossian has been a notable contributor on all the topics mentioned, at the very least this collection provides a useful entry point to worthwhile literature on good problems. But one can say much more. Boghossian writes with acuity and ingenuity and his style is clear and direct. He is prepared to challenge and rethink venerable doctrines and is also prepared to revise his own views when good arguments are brought against them. He shows admirable persistence, in returning to topics from different angles, bringing out more implications of the positions explored and the complexity of the issues. He does not at any point gloss over difficulties or pretends to more completeness or decisiveness than the material warrants. So we have here much rigorous and judicious discussion of a thought-provoking kind.The fourth group of papers, on colour, is not closely linked in theme to the rest of the collection. And although the issues merit further consideration we will not pursue them here. Let me just note that in these papers Boghossian and Velleman lay out two of the more attractive realist accounts of colour, dispositional and physicalist, and argue that no current version of such theories is acceptable.In the sections which follow, I shall first consider briefly the papers on content and …. (shrink)
- Précis of A Study of Concepts.Jane Heal -1996 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):407-411.In these comments I shall concentrate on one topic, namely Peacocke’s proposals concerning what is involved in possessing the concept of belief. The proposals are, of course, presented by him within the framework of a general theory of concepts, some parts of which are illuminating and others of which are more debatable. But differences about these issues are not germane to what follows and for our purposes I shall assume the correctness of the broad lines of his theory.
- Some Questions About Language.Jane Heal &Mortimer J. Adler -1977 -Philosophical Quarterly 27 (108):271.
- Ethics and the Absolute Conception.Jane Heal -1989 -Philosophy 64 (247):49 - 65.The purpose of this paper is to examine some contentions advanced by B. A. O. Williams in his books Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy . In particular I shall be concerned with the claims he makes about the nature of ethics—namely that it cannot be ‘objective’ or ‘realistic’ and that we may not hope for rational convergence in ethical judgments. My claims will be that Williams's case on these matters is importantly unclear (...) and incomplete and that we lack cogent reasons to accept the conclusions he offers us. But a good deal of scene-setting is necessary before we can pose the questions I wish to address. (shrink)
- Past, space and self.Jane Heal -1996 -Philosophical Books 37 (1):14-21.
- Review of P. F. Strawson:Scepticism and naturalism: some varieties. [REVIEW]Jane Heal -1986 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):523-525.
- Booknotes.Jane Heal -1990 -Philosophy 65:386.No categories
- Belief and Meaning. The Unity and Locality of Mental Content.Jane Heal -1993 -Philosophical Books 34 (1):30-31.
- Consciousness and content.Jane Heal -1998 - In Anthony O'Hear,Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.Export citation
Bookmark - Critical notice of Simulating Minds by Alvin Goldman.Jane Heal -2010 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):723-732.
- Critical notices.Jane Heal -1999 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):553.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Editorial: Down into Egypt.Jane Heal -1990 -Philosophy 65:395.No categories
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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