Works by J. Levine
137 found
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| Joseph Levine [95] | James Levine [28] | J. Levine [8] | Joseph M. Levine [8] |
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- Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine -1983 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
- Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine -2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.In this wide-ranging study, Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the How does one explain the physical nature of an experience? This puzzle, the "explanatory gap" between mind and body, is the focus of this work by an influential scholar in the field.
- Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine -2001 -Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.No categories
- Consciousness Reconsidered.Joseph Levine &Owen Flanagan -1994 -Philosophical Review 103 (2):353.
- (3 other versions)On Leaving Out What It’s Like.Joseph Levine -1993 - In Martin Ed Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys,On Leaving Out What It’s Like. Blackwell. pp. 121-136.No categories
- Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint.Joseph Levine -2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter,Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.
- Demonstrative thought.Joseph Levine -2010 -Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.In this paper I propose a model of demonstrative thought. I distinguish token-demonstratives, that pick out individuals, from type-demonstratives, that pick out kinds, or properties, and provide a similar treatment for both. I argue that it follows from my model of demonstrative thought, as well as from independent considerations, that demonstration, as a mental act, operates directly on mental representations, not external objects. That is, though the relation between a demonstrative and the object or property demonstrated is semantically direct, the (...) mechanism by which a demonstrative acquires its referent involves mediation by a perceptual representation. Finally, I argue that so-called 'demonstrative concepts'—which I treat as type-demonstratives—cannot perform the various philosophical functions that have been assigned to them. (shrink)
- Conscious awareness and representation.Joseph Levine -2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford,Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 173--198.
- The modal status of materialism.Joseph Levine &Kelly Trogdon -2009 -Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.Argument that Lewis and others are wrong that physicalism is if true then contingently true.
- Logic and Truth in Frege.Thomas Ricketts &James Levine -1996 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1):121 - 175.
- On the Phenomenology of Thought.Joseph Levine -2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague,Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 103.
- (1 other version)Reduction with autonomy.Louise M. Antony &Joseph Levine -1997 -Philosophical Perspectives 11:83-105.
- Conceivability and the metaphysics of mind.Joseph Levine -1998 -Noûs 32 (4):449-480.Materialism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that the ultimate nature of the mind is physical; there is no sharp discontinuity in nature between the mental and the non-mental. Anti-materialists asser t that, on the contrary, mental phenomena are different in kind from physical phenomena. Among the weapons in the arsenal of anti-materialists, one of the most potent has been the conceivability argument. When I conceive of the mental, it seems utterly unlike the physical. Anti-materialists insist that from (...) this intuitive difference we can infer a genuine meta-physical difference. Materialists retor t that the nature of reality, including the ultimate natures of its constituents, is a matter for discovery; an objective fact that cannot be discerned a priori. In this paper I under take to provide an explicit analysis of the dialectic that surrounds the conceivability argument. My principal conclusion is that the materialist is right in resisting the reasoning that star ts from considerations of what is conceivable and ends with genuine metaphysical conclusions. However my approach is much more sympathetic to the anti-materialist position than is the standard materialist line, and I will provide a limited defense of some crucial aspects of the anti-materialist position. Materialism will emerge from this fight intact, but shaken. (shrink)
- Objectivism-subjectivim: A false dilemma?Joseph Levine -1992 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-43.
- Raw Feeling.Joseph Levine &Robert Kirk -1996 -Philosophical Review 105 (1):94.Kirk’s aim in this book is to bridge what he calls “the intelligibility gap,” expressed in the question, “How could complex patterns of neural firing amount to this?”. He defends a position that he describes as “broadly functionalist,” which consists of several theses. I will briefly review them.
- Materialism and Qualia.Joseph Levine -2003 - In John Heil,Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
- The Foundations of Knowing.Joseph Levine -1984 -Philosophical Review 93 (3):462.
- Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory.James Levine -2001 -Philosophical Review 110 (1):138-141.In his 1903 Principles of Mathematics, Russell holds that “it is a characteristic of the terms of a proposition”—that is, its “logical subjects”—“that any one of them may be replaced by any other entity without our ceasing to have a proposition”. Hence, in PoM, Russell holds that from the proposition ‘Socrates is human’, we can obtain the propositions ‘Humanity is human’ and ‘The class of humans is human’, replacing Socrates by the property of humanity and the class of humans, respectively. (...) Hence also, in PoM, Russell accepts the doctrine of the unrestricted variable: if we replace a logical subject of a proposition by a variable to yield a propositional function, the range of that variable includes absolutely every entity. For absolutely any entity can be taken as a value of that variable to yield a proposition, true or false. The doctrine of the unrestricted variable is thus incompatible with any type-theoretic metaphysics, according to which only entities of a certain restricted type can replace a logical subject of a given proposition so as to yield another proposition. (shrink)
- Experience and representation.Joseph Levine -2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith,Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Analysis and decomposition in Frege and Russell.James Levine -2002 -Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):195-216.Michael Dummett has long argued that Frege is committed to recognizing a distinction between two sorts of analysis of propositional contents: 'analysis', which reveals the entities that one must grasp in order to apprehend a given propositional content; and 'decomposition', which is used in recognizing the validity of certain inferences. Whereas any propositional content admits of a unique ultimate 'analysis' into simple constituents, it also admits of distinct 'decompositions', no one of which is ultimately privileged over the others. I argue (...) that although Russell accepts this distinction between analysis and decomposition, Frege does not. In particular, I consider claims which Dummett makes regarding how 'analysis' and 'decomposition' are related to two different models Frege at least suggests in discussing the composition of thoughts, the part/whole model and the function/argument model; and I argue that in each case, while Russell accepts views which Dummett attributes to Frege, Frege does not. (shrink)
- Out of the Closet.Joseph Levine -1994 -Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):107-126.
- Cool red.Joseph Levine -1991 -Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.
- Perspectives on socially shared cognition.A. N. Perret-Clermont,J. F. Perret,N. Bell,L. B. Resnick,J. M. Levine &S. D. Teasley -1991 - In Lauren Resnick, Levine B., M. John, Stephanie Teasley & D.,Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition. American Psychological Association.
- Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing.Joseph Levine -2006 -Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: (i) physicalism about the non-mental world, (ii) consistency with what is known from color science, and (iii) transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral reflectance, subjectivism, dispositionalism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet all (...) three constraints. By treating color as a relational property, a way of appearing, the three constraints can be met. However, serious problems for this view emerge when considering the relation between illusory color experiences (particularly hallucinations) and veridical color experiences. I do not propose a solution to these problems. (shrink)
- On the Meta-Problem.J. Levine -2019 -Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):148-159.According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. Unfortunately, I think there are still some serious mysteries lurking here, which I present briefly in this commentary. In particular, on the view of acquaintance I favour, it is unclear (...) how our acquaintance with the contents of experience can serve as data for our theory of conscious experience. I end with some speculations concerning how to address this mystery. (shrink)
- Perspectives on socially shared cognition.J. V. Wertsch,L. B. Resnick,J. M. Levine &S. D. Teasley -1991 - In Lauren Resnick, Levine B., M. John, Stephanie Teasley & D.,Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition. American Psychological Association.
- Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet.Joseph Levine -2008 -The Monist 91 (2):215-236.
- Conscious Awareness and (self-)representation.Joseph Levine -2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford,Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 173--198.
- (1 other version)Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what?Joseph Levine -1995 - In Thomas Metzinger,Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 277--292.
- The Q factor: Modal rationalism versus modal autonomism.Joseph Levine -2010 -Philosophical Review 119 (3):365-380.Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal autonomist. (...) The argument proceeds as follows. Modal rationalists claim that for all nonphenomenal macro properties, the appropriate supervenience conditional is both necessary and a priori. Hence, type-B materialists must engage in special pleading when they claim that the relevant supervenience conditional for phenomenal properties, expressing the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, is necessary but not a priori. However, what Chalmers and Jackson demonstrate, if anything, is that the conditional that includes all the microphysical plus the phenomenal in the antecedent, and nonphenomenal macro facts (such as facts about water and other natural kinds, among other things) in the consequent, is a priori. The question arises why, since facts about water and the like do not metaphysically supervene on the phenomenal facts, is it appropriate to include the phenomenal facts in the antecedent of the relevant supervenience conditional. This article argues for the following claims: First, that it's crucial to the general semantic framework Chalmers and Jackson defend that they do include the phenomenal facts in the supervenience conditional; without them, the conditional would not be a priori. Second, that the only way to argue from the a priori character of these conditionals to the applicability of modal rationalism to the nonphenomenal cases is to rely either on modal rationalism itself or on the denial of type-B materialism. Obviously, in the context of this argument, either way would beg the question. (shrink)
- Quality and Content: Essays on Consciousness, Representation, and Modality.Joseph Levine -2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.Joseph Levine draws together a series of essays in which he has developed his distinctive approach to philosophy of mind. He defends a materialist view of the mind against various challenges, and offers illuminating studies of consciousness, phenomenal concepts, mental representation, demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology.
- Ignorance and imagination: The epistemic origin of the problem of consciousness.J. Levine -unknown
- Two kinds of access.Joseph Levine -2007 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):514-515.I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state.
- Recent work on consciousness.Joseph Levine -1997 -American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):379-404.This paper surveys current theories on the nature of conscious experience, from traditional central state identity theories and functionalism, to more recent higher-order and representationalist theories. It is concluded that no current theory really solves the fundamental problem of how to incorporate conscious experience into the physical world, though much progress has been made.
- Modality, semantics, and consciousness.Joseph Levine -2014 -Philosophical Studies 167 (3):775-784.
- The nomic and the robust.Louise M. Antony &Joseph Levine -1990 - In Barry M. Loewer,Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Knowing what it's like.Joseph Levine -2003 - In Brie Gertler,Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
- Are Qualia Just Representations? A Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Ten Problems of Consciousness.Joseph Levine -1997 -Mind and Language 12 (1):101-113.
- Consciousness is Acquaintance and Acquaintance is Consciousness.Joseph Levine -2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh,Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.No categories
- A Quasi-Sartrean Theory of Subjective Awareness.Joseph Levine -2015 - In Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer & Clara Bravo Morando,Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. New York: Routledge.No categories
- On the “Gray’s Elegy” Argument and its Bearing on Frege’s Theory of Sense.James Levine -2004 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):251–295.In his recent book, "The Metaphysicians of Meaning" (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called "Gray's Elegy" argument (the GEA) in "On Denoting", Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects (...) of Makin's interpretation of the GEA, I differ with him regarding some significant details and present an interpretation according to which the GEA emerges as simpler, stronger, and more integrated. (shrink)
- Phenomenal access: A moving target.Joseph Levine -1995 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.Basically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
- Perspectives on socially shared cognition.Emanuel A. Schegloff,L. B. Resnick,J. M. Levine &S. D. Teasley -1991 - In Lauren Resnick, Levine B., M. John, Stephanie Teasley & D.,Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition. American Psychological Association.
- The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Acquaintance.Joseph Levine -2021 -ProtoSociology 38:15-34.Phenomenal consciousness comprises both qualitative character and subjectivity. The former provides the proprietary contents of conscious experiences – determining what they are like – and the latter is that feature that renders those contents “for the subject”, so there is something it is like at all. I have developed a theory of consciousness as “acquaintance” which I dub the “Cartesian Theater” model, on which there is a fundamental psycho-physical law that takes the output of cognitive and perceptual systems as input (...) and yields overall conscious experience as output. This model entails epiphenomenalism regarding phenomenal properties, which, I argue, presents a specific problem regarding our epistemic position with respect to this very theory. I develop a line of thought that seeks to disarm this challenge, relying to a large extent on a certain way of understanding both subjectivity itself and also cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)
- On Phenomenal Access.Joseph Levine -2018 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar,Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. new york: MIT Press.
- Phenomenal experience: A cartesian theater revival.Joseph Levine -2010 -Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.
- On what it is like to grasp a concept.Joseph Levine -1995 -Philosophical Issues 6:38-43.
- Perceptual Experience: Christopher Hill.Joseph Levine -forthcoming -Analysis.No categories
- Acquaintance, denoting concepts, and sense.James Levine -1998 -Philosophical Review 107 (3):415-445.In a recent article, Michael Kremer revisits Russell's "Gray's Elegy" argument—the argument in "On Denoting" in which Russell rejects "the whole distinction of meaning and denotation". Kremer argues that the Gray's Elegy argument is directed not at Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung but rather at Russell's own theory of "denoting concepts" in his earlier Principles of Mathematics. Furthermore, and more originally, Kremer argues that Russell's views of acquaintance play a central role in the argument. For Kremer, it is because (...) Frege does not share Russell's views of acquaintance that the Gray's Elegy argument succeeds against Russell's own earlier theory but not against Frege's position. (shrink)
- Demonstrating in mentalese.Joseph Levine -1988 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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