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As Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whetherreasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle ofinstrumental transmission and the principle thatreasons for ends are provided by (...) desires. Instead, they may say, there is just one principle, a principle of, if you will,instrumental transmutation: if one desires the end, then one has reason to take the means. See the discussion of General Production, in section 8, for a doubt about this. (shrink)

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In a series of recent articles, Jean Hampton has argued that the widely acceptedinstrumental conception of reason is no more metaphysically benign than non-instrumental, typically moral, theories of reason. The purpose of this article is to provide the beginnings of a defence ofinstrumental conception of reason against Hampton's charges. In the first part, I take up her claim thatinstrumental norms rest on the same notion of normative authority as that employed by non-instrumental, (...) or moral, theories. I argue in response that the normativity involved ininstrumental reasoning is no more problematic than that involved in deductive theoretical reasoning. In the second part of the article I take up Hampton's claim that the motivational force ofinstrumental norms can only be explained in the same nonnatural way as the motivational force of non-instrumental, or moral, norms. I argue in response that the motivational force ofinstrumental norms can be explained in a way analogous to the entirely naturalistic explanation of the "motivational force" of deductive theoretical norms. In sum, I argue thatinstrumental reasoning, unlike moral reasoning, is no more metaphysically problematic than deductive theoretical reasoning. (shrink)

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Epistemic instrumentalists think that epistemic normativity is just a special kind ofinstrumental normativity. According to them, you have epistemic reason to believe a proposition insofar as doing so is conducive to certain epistemic goals or aims—say, to believe what is true and avoid believing what is false. Perhaps the most prominent challenge for instrumentalists in recent years has been to explain, or explain away, why one’s epistemicreasons often do not seem to depend on one’s aims. This (...) challenge can arguably be met. But a different challenge looms:instrumentalreasons in the practical domain have various properties that epistemicreasons do not seem to share. In this chapter, we offer a way for epistemic instrumentalists to overcome this challenge. Our main thesis takes the form of a conditional: if we accept an independently plausible transmission principle ofinstrumental normativity, we can maintain that epistemicreasons in fact do share the relevant properties of practicalinstrumentalreasons. In addition, we can explain why epistemicreasons seem to lack these properties in the first place: some properties of epistemicreasons are elusive, or easy to overlook, because we tend to think and talk about epistemicreasons in an ‘elliptical’ manner. (shrink)

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The article examines the challenge of achieving sustainable mediational equilibrium within the Self–Other relationship. It argues that the mere pursuit of mutual understanding among dialogue participants is insufficient to guarantee productive communication, particularly in contexts where interactions are driven by competition for scarce resources and opportunities. Under such conditions, subjects risk becoming dependent oninstrumental reason – the logic of control and suppression – which transforms both the Self and the Other from fully-fledged personalities into functions of reified rationality. (...) The analysis introduces a distinction between two roles of the individual: the person as a bearer of unique values and meanings, and the individual as a subject of social relations, an actor immersed in practical interactions. It is demonstrated that the capacity of the former to exert control over the latter is limited, and that interactions are shaped not only by the personal qualities of the participants but also by the impersonal logic ofinstrumental reason. This logic is conceptualized as a kind of third subjectivity that mediates the dialogue between the Self and the Other. Achieving mediational equilibrium becomes possible through the development of autonomy among the parties, through their transformation, mutual recognition, and the search for a measure of compatibility. This approach is traced through examples from A.S. Akhiezer’s theory of sociocultural mediation, A.P. Davydov’s concept of inter-subjective dialogue, and R. Bush and J. Folger’s theory of transformative mediation. Key concepts in the latter include empowerment (strengthening participants’ ability to clearly recognize their goals and make responsible decisions) and recognition (willingness to hear and understand the Other’s perspective). The essence of transformative mediation lies in the transition from imposing one party’s position to a collaborative search for new possibilities, allowing the realization of both Self and Other’s interests through dialogue. In conclusion, the article asserts the importance of overcoming the logic of mutual accusations by shifting the focus from the opponent’s personality to the impersonal structures limiting the self-determination of all parties. (shrink)

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Often our reason for doing something is an "instrumental reason": that doing that is a means to doing something else that we have reason to do. What principles govern this "instrumental transmission" ofreasons from ends to means? Negatively, I argue against principles often invoked in the literature, which focus on necessary or sufficient means. Positively, I propose a principle, "General Transmission," which answers to two intuitive desiderata: that reason transmits to means that are "probabilizing" and "nonsuperfluous" (...) with respect to the relevant end. I then apply General Transmission to the debate over "detachment": whether "wide-scope" reason for a material conditional or disjunction implies "narrow-scope" reason for the consequent or disjuncts. (shrink)

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Since Aristotle it has been common among philosophers to distinguish between two fundamental types of reasoning, theoretical and practical. We do not only want to work out what is the case but also what we ought to do. This article offers a logical analysis ofinstrumental reasoning, which is the paradigm of practical reasoning. In the first section I discuss the major types ofinstrumental reasoning and show why the accounts of most authors are defective. On the basis (...) of this discussion, I demonstrate in the second section that different types of normative conclusions are derivable frominstrumental arguments and I show that it is an argument’s logical structure that determines what type of conclusion this is. (shrink)

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Argues for a "cognitivist" account of theinstrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle aboutinstrumental reason that plagues alternative views.

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In this article I argue that Adorno makes an internal critique ofinstrumental reason. I depict Adorno's notion ofinstrumental reason by showing how he combines Freud's materialistic epistemology with his own German Idealist inheritance. I outline his argument for the decline ofinstrumental reason into mythic 'animism'. Key Words: Adorno • animism • enlightenment • Freud •instrumental reason • myth.

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The paper analyses today partly forgotten Max Horkheimer’s conception ofinstrumental reason which presents this reason differently from the definition widespread today (claiming that it consists in adopting suitable means to set ends). Horkheimer relatesinstrumental reason to subjective one, seeing the former as a degenerate form of the latter. His theory is far more philosophical than the dominating today conceptions which do not consider the problem ofinstrumental reason philosophical any longer and instead move it step (...) by step to the domain of a nonphilosophical decision theory. The paper analyses in particular Horkheimer’s beliefs claiming that 1) it is science which foundsinstrumental reason, and therefore 2) it is science which is the main source of oppressiveness and degradation of the contemporary civilization. It is shown among other things that Horkheimer misunderstands some properties of science and its operations and this leads to his incorrect presentation of the role ofinstrumental reason. (shrink)

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Utility theories—both Expected Utility (EU) and non-Expected Utility (non-EU) theories—offer numericalized representations of classical principles meant for the regulation of choice under conditions of risk—a type of formal representation that reduces the representation of risk to a single number. I shall refer to these as risk-numericalizing theories of decision. I shall argue that risk-numericalizing theories (referring both to the representations and to the underlying axioms that render numericalization possible) are not satisfactory answers to the question: “How do I take the (...) (best) means to my ends?” In other words, they are inadequate or incomplete asinstrumental theories. They are inadequate because they are poor answers to the question of what it is for an option to beinstrumental towards an end. To say it another way, they do not offer a sufficiently rich account of what it is for something to be a means (an instrument) toward an end. (shrink)

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These essays, written between 1949 and 1967, focus on a single theme: the triumph in the twentieth century of the state-bureaucratic apparatus and ‘instrumental reason’ and the concomitant liquidation of the individual and the basic social institutions and relationships associated with the individual.

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The rationality of means-end reasoning is the bedrock of the Humean account of practicalreasons. But the normativity of such reasoning can not be taken for granted. I consider and reject the idea that the normativity ofinstrumental reasoning can be explained – either in terms of its being constitutive of the very notion of having an end, or solely in terms ofinstrumental considerations. I argue that theinstrumental principle is itself a brute norm, and (...) that this is consistent with a Humean account of practicalreasons. (shrink)

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This paper addresses some connections between conceptions of the will and the theory of practical reason. The first two sections argue against the idea that volitional commitments should be understood along the lines of endorsement of normative principles. A normative account of volition cannot make sense of akrasia, and it obscures an important difference between belief and intention. Sections three and four draw on the non-normative conception of the will in an account ofinstrumental rationality. The central problem is (...) to explain the grip ofinstrumental requirements even in cases in which agents do not fully endorse the ends they are pursuing. The solution I propose appeals to coherence constraints on the beliefs that condition the distinctive volitional stance of intention. (shrink)

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Technological development is accompanied by a paradox: while it often promises enormous benefits for humanity, it can also lead to inconceivable tragedy, including the instrumentalization of the individual, growing social inequality, environmental impact, etc. What causes this paradox? a) Could it be that the nature of technology generates this contradiction? b) Is it the agent that uses it? c) Or is it the circumstances in which technology is used that determine its suitability or disservice? My aim in this paper is (...) to revise nature, causes and political explanations of the paradox. To do so, the first section will give a historical overview of this phenomenon, the second will assess three proposals that attempt to explain its origin, and, finally, the paper will weigh such approaches from the view of the Frankfurt School. Evaluating the paradoxical conditions that surround technology allows us to better understand its role in our societies. (shrink)

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Thinking is a dynamic process resulting from practices of integration. Thought encounters in openness, wonder, receptivity, and contemplation confer upon us intellectual work that is uniquely our own. Digital patterns, however, distract us from these creative encounters. Our intellectual searching is weakened and fragmented by frenetic consumption of information. We miss out on reason's innate pull toward integration and concrete reality. This book is an invitation to enter into openness, wonder, receptivity, and contemplation with deeper understanding and intentionality. We can (...) do this by considering exemplars, persons who lived out the integrity of their hard-won beliefs, such as Thomas Merton, Eva Saulitis, Malcom X and St. Anselm. Each process of integration is applied also, so that practical knowledge and practice become a way into this intellectual restoration. We need deeper knowledge won in the slow orbit of encounters. Encounters in thought are precisely what each generation needs to apprehend the cosmos, nature, authority, truth, and moral action. Responsibility to this ecologic age requires a reform of reason; this book is just one attempt to convey a way toward this restoration. (shrink)

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There are, broadly speaking, two ways to think about rationality, as defined in the following passage: ‘Reason’ for a long time meant the activity of understanding and assimilating the eternal ideas which were to function as goals for men. Today, on the contrary, it is not only the business but the essential work of reason to find means for the goals one adopts at any given time. To use what Horkheimer called objective reason, and what others have called expressive or (...) non–instrumental reason, is to reflect on one's goals, to attempt to determine what preferences one ought to hold. On the other hand, to use what Horkheimer called subjective reason is to ‘be concerned with means and ends, with the adequacy of procedures for purposes more or less taken for granted’, that is, to be instrumentally rational. This contrast between non-instrumental andinstrumental reason is at the heart of many contemporary social and philosophical disputes. 1. (shrink)

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Philosophical folklore has it that David Hume endorsed aninstrumental conception of practical reason. He seems explicitly to support the key tenets of this view of reason, and also to share its key motivations. Yet Hume himself provides arguments which rule out the possibility of any sort of practical reason,instrumental or non-instrumental. A first look at his arguments reveals that they depend on assumptions about the nature of reason that a modern instrumentalist may want to reject. (...) A closer look, however, reveals that they may be recast on the basis of assumptions lying at the core of a modern instrumentalist's conception of reason. (shrink)

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Taking part in the broad contemporary effort of proposing an anticolonial and non-Eurocentric critical theory, this article sets out the dialogue between Aníbal Quijano's critique of coloniality, and Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's critique ofinstrumental reason. Firstly, we reconstruct the critique ofinstrumental reason, highlighting how it is enriched when associated with the binary objective reason and subjective reason as well as aspects of negative dialectics. Secondly, we revisit Quijano's texts immediately preceding his decolonial phase. These texts (...) allow us to see how the critique ofinstrumental reason is an integral part of and is enlarged by the concept of coloniality. Building on this double movement, we are able to map affinities, differences, and connections between the two critiques and their respective outlining of alternatives toinstrumental reason, especially the mediations between, on the one hand, objective reason and non-identical, and, on the other, historical/alternative reason and heterogeneous totality. (shrink)

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The Wide-Scope approach toinstrumental reason holds that the requirement to intend the necessary means to your ends should be understood as a requirement to either intend the means, or else not intend the end. In this paper I explain and defend a neglected version of this approach. I argue that three serious objections to Wide-Scope accounts turn on a certain assumption about the nature of thereasons that ground the Wide-Scope requirement. The version of the Wide-Scope approach (...) defended here allows us to reject this assumption, and so defuse the objections. (shrink)

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My paper argues that Jürgen Habermas’s transformation of critical social theory seriously weakens the potential of the concept ofinstrumental reason as a tool of social critique. I defend the central role of the concept ofinstrumental reason in both i) the critique of social injustice, and ii) the diagnosis of pathologies of meaning stemming from cultural modernization. However, I argue that the root of these problems cannot come into view from within the Habermasian paradigm. Contra Habermas, I (...) argue that the problem of a ‘loss of freedom’ is better characterized as a process of integration through power; the problem of a ‘loss of meaning’ must also be reconceived as a problem of moral disintegration. My claim is that a proper understanding of these processes requires an engagement with the understanding ofinstrumental reason in earlier critical theory as primarily a distortion of the relation of language and experience. This necessitates rethinking the task of critical social theory along the lines of the concept of Selbstbesinnung (self-awareness) rather than according to Habermas’s Kantianized version of self-reflection. (shrink)

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This paper criticizes two accounts of the normativity of practical principles: the empiricist account and the rationalist or realist account. It argues against the empiricist view, focusing on the Humean texts that are usually taken to be its locus classicus. It then argues both against the dogmatic rationalist view, and for the Kantian view, through a discussion of Kant's own remarks aboutinstrumental rationality in the second section of the Groundwork. It further argues that theinstrumental principle cannot (...) stand alone. Unless there are normative principles directing us to the adoption of certain ends, there can be no requirement to take the means to our ends. The familiar view that theinstrumental principle is the only requirement of practical reason is incoherent. (shrink)

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In this chapter I argue that the primary function of the current obsession with research funding is, like many extensions of neoliberalism into education, largely symbolic: it is symbolic of the hegemony ofinstrumental thinking and its ambition to expunge all other forms of reason from the academy and other areas of public life. Several brief case-studies illustrate and support my argument. UK academics are increasingly expected to secure external research funding, though often the amounts they must raise are (...) small. Against such insignificant sums the opportunity costs are clear, as academics are distracted from other kinds of research. The comparison with Mao Zedong’s ‘Great Leap Forward’ is irresistible: in 1958 every commune in China was required to set up small backyard furnaces to produce steel from scrap metal. Farmers, doctors, teachers and others had to neglect their regular work in order to join in. A second example: many academic research projects that secure substantial external funding actually cost the host university more than the funding brings in. Universities persist in supporting underfunded research because even inadequate external funding has value as ‘status capital’. As a symbol ofinstrumental reason the fixation on funding requires academics to speak the language of the new breed of pro-vice-chancellors and other senior officers who now make their career in management and administration rather than undertaking such tasks for a limited period before returning to their academic work. They speak a new language with the fluency and enthusiasm of converts. Its prominent words – transparency, accountability and performance management, show that the urge to control and discipline the academy is never far away. (shrink)

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Darrow Schecter explores the most important theoretical and political debates about the relation between reason and legitimacy.

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Many commentators hold that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant also posits an objective law of non-moral practical rationality, 'the' Hypothetical Imperative. On this view, the appeal to the Hypothetical Imperative increases the dialectical options that Kantians have vis-a-vis Humean skepticism about the authority of reason, and it allows for a systematic explanation of the possibility of non-moral weakness of will. I argue that despite its appeal, this interpretation cannot be sustained: for Kant the only objective, universally (...) valid a priori principle of practical reason that governs transcendentally free agents is the moral law. All non-moral practical rules are mere “precepts” that lack genuine objectivity, certainty, and intersubjective validity. I suggest that for Kant the rejection of the possibility of non-moral practical laws plays an important part in his argument for the supreme rational authority of moral norms over prudential precepts of happiness. (shrink)

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Instrumentalreasons play a central role in our practical deliberations because we apply the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable not only to beliefs, but to actions also. The question of what one has aninstrumental reason to do is an important substantive question that is relevant to the general theory of practical reasoning and to ethics, too. It will be my object in the present study to show that we have different kinds ofinstrumentalreasons, (...) which depend solely on their logical structure. To this end, I shall in the first section deal with the validity ofinstrumental reasoning in general. In the remainder of the paper I outline five types ofinstrumentalreasons and show how they depend on their logical structure. In so doing, I hope to shed some light on the concept ofinstrumentalreasons, which is not well understood. (shrink)

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This paper addresses some connections between conceptions of the will and the theory of practical reason. The first two sections argue against the idea that volitional commitments should be understood along the lines of endorsement of normative principles. A normative account of volition cannot make sense of akrasia, and it obscures an important difference between belief and intention. Sections three and four draw on the non-normative conception of the will in an account ofinstrumental rationality. The central problem is (...) to explain the grip ofinstrumental requirements even in cases in which agents do not fully endorse the ends they are pursuing. The solution I propose appeals to coherence constraints on the beliefs that condition the distinctive volitional stance of intention. (shrink)

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This book has been written primarily for the applied and social scientist and student who longs for an integrated picture of the foundations on which his research must ultimately rest; but hopefully the book may also serve philosophers interested in applied disciplines and in systems methodology. If integration was the major motto, the need for a method ology, appropriate to the teleological peculiarities of all applied sciences, was the main impetus behind the conception of the present work. This need I (...) felt a long time ago in my own area of analytical and empirical research in accounting theory and management science; later I had the opportunity to teach, for almost a decade, graduate seminars in Methodology which offered particular insight into the methodological needs of students of such applied disciplines as business administration, education, engineering, infor matics, etc. Out of this effort grew the present book which among other things tries, on one side, to illuminate the difference and relationship between methods of cognition and methods of decision and on the other, to sketch a framework suitable for depicting means-end relationships in a holistic setting. I believe that a systems methodology which incorporates recent endeavours of deontic logic, decision theory, information economics and related areas would be eminently suited to break the ground for such a future framework. Yet systems theory has two major shortcomings which might prevent it from evolving into the desired methodology of applied science. (shrink)

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This dissertation sets out Dewey's theory of society, as outlined in the lecture notes for his courses on social and political philosophy between 1923 and 1928. I argue that Dewey had tripartite theory of economic processes, political/legal structures and social-moral functions that focuses on the relationship between material/technological forces and the institutions established to direct them. ;The first section presents and then refutes the charge that pragmatic social thought reduces thought to sheer efficiency and is therefore unable to resist ideology. (...) The primary dispute was between the turn toward objectivist methodology in American social science, frequently attributed to Dewey's influence, and those who saw this turn as a decline into crude,instrumental reason. Unlike the objectivists, instrumentalism incorporated ideas of intersubjectivity, value, and reflexivity. He did not believe that democracy could be best served by a managerial elite who sharply divides facts from values and means from ends. ;The second section comprises the positive presentation of Dewey's social theory. Chapter three discusses economic processes. I set out the organic model that guides his early and late economic theory and how Dewey draws from J. A. Hobson's theory of underconsumption to organize a coherent set of specific economic proposals during the Great Depression. Chapter four presents Dewey's theory of political structures, laws, institutions and habits that shape the direction of material life. But these structures may come in time to restrain further economic and technological growth. The final chapter takes up the breakdown of traditional structures, the reconstruction of which Dewey believed to be the fundamental problem of modernity. There is a need for new customs and institutions that continue traditional ideals of liberalism while being grounded in modern material conditions. The need, Dewey believed, was for a social theory that would understand the interplay of forces and institutions and direct them toward a democratic culture. ;I end with an epilogue on uses of Dewey's thought within contemporary social theory. The cheerful pursuit ofinstrumental reason by the neo-pragmatists Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish and Richard Posner is contrasted with recent work in the communitarianism/liberalism debate. (shrink)

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Our analysis in this paper unfolds on two levels: a critique of the ‘realities’ of graduate nursing education and an argument to sustain its ‘ideals’. We open for discussion an aspect of graduate nursing education dominated byinstrumental reason, namely the research industry, using an internal critique approach developed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno of the Early Frankfurt School. As we explain, internal critique arises out of, and relies on, the mismatch between goals, or ‘ideals’, and existing realities. (...) Thinking about ‘ideals’ of the academy, we draw on Hans-Georg Gadamer's view of the university as a place to think freely, creatively, and critically. The contemporary realities of the university, on the other hand, that emphasize the market values of the research industry forcefully shape nursing academic scholarship in a particular direction. In our attempt to recognize and disrupt the forces of the research industry with itsinstrumental reason, we consider Judith Butler's writings on how norms operate in society. We show that our growing involvement in the research industry makes it very difficult to disentangle ourselves from that situation. The values of the research industry actually suppress the very ideals of education and scholarship that we would like to uphold. As a contra-force, the internal critique of the ‘existing realities’ in the graduate nursing education unmasks the tyranny of the research industry and makes visible the importance of sustaining the higher goals and ideals in nursing scholarship. (shrink)

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Allow me to rehearse a familiar scenario. We all know that which ends you have has something to do with what you ought to do. If Ronnie is keen on dancing but Bradley can’t stand it, then the fact that there will be dancing at the party tonight affects what Ronnie and Bradley ought to do in different ways. In short, (HI) you ought, if you have the end, to take the means. But now trouble looms: what if you have (...) dreadful, murderous ends? Ought you to take the means to them? Seemingly not. But fortunately, an assumption made by deontic logics1 comes to the rescue. Since ‘‘ought’’, according to this assumption, is a sentential operator, HI must really be ambiguous. It could be read either as (Narrow) You have the end ! O(you take the means) or as (Wide) O(you have the end ! you take the means). Now if Narrow is true, then you really ought to take the means to your murderous ends. But this doesn’t follow from Wide. All that follows from Wide is that you ought to either take the means to these ends or else give them up. Conclusions: (1) Since HI is on some reading true, but Narrow isn’t, Wide is true. (2) Wide accounts for the relationship between your ends and what you ought to do. This elegant scenario repeats itself in many other domains in which it seems like something can have a bearing on what some particular agent ought to do. Does what you know affect what you ought to do? Do your beliefs about what you ought to do affect what you ought to do? Do your promises affect what you ought to do? Do your beliefs affect what you ought to believe? On each of these counts, the intuitive answer is ‘‘yes’’. And so each of these questions leaves something for the moral philosopher or the epistemologist to investigate. On each count, it seems that what we all know, is that (Account) you ought, if p, to do A. But on each count, the Narrow-scope reading of the ‘‘ought’’ in this claim yields unintuitive consequences. So since Account is true, it must be true on the Wide-scope reading.. (shrink)

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Most people think of law as an instrument that can help us achieve human purposes that can themselves be adequately specified without reference to law or legal ideas. But a number of scholars, asso...

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In modern continental thought, natural science is widely portrayed as an exclusivelyinstrumental mode of reason. The breadth of this consensus has partly preempted the question of how it came to persuade. The process of persuasion, as it played out in Germany, can be explored by reconstructing the intellectual exchanges among three twentieth-century theorists of science, Heidegger, Habermas, and Werner Heisenberg. Taking an iconic Heisenberg as a kind of limiting case of “the scientist,” Heidegger and Habermas each found themselves (...) driven to place new constraints on their previously more capacious assessments of science, especially its capacity to reflect on its method. Tracing how that happened, through archival and historical contextualization and close readings of their texts, lets us make visible Heidegger and Habermas’s intellectual affinities and argumentative parallels, which derived not only from their shared grounding in earlier reactions against positivism, but also from confrontation with contemporary events. The latter included, for Heidegger, the rise of a technically powerful science exemplified by nuclear physics, and for Habermas, post-World War II controversies over science, technology, and their socially critical possibilities. (shrink)

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Resumen: Se sostiene que en la Ciencia de la Lógica Hegel distingue, mediante la categoría de “fin subjetivo”, una dimensión puramenteinstrumental de la actividad del concepto. Tras delinear una lectura de conjunto de la Doctrina del Concepto se reconstruyen sectores clave del capítulo dedicado a la Teleología con vistas a detectar tanto los rasgos fundamentales como las limitaciones de esta dimensión puramenteinstrumental del concepto. Se concluye que es posible verificar en el capítulo una “lógica de la (...) actividadinstrumental” e interpretar en dicha clave la posición sistemática del capítulo. Además, se subrayan los rasgos críticos del tratamiento hegeliano en vista del problema general de una mecanización y desgaste del mundo y de la vida, lo que proyecta el problema al tránsito desde el capítulo Teleología a la sección Idea.: This paper seeks to show that, in the Science of Logic Hegel, through the category of “subjective end”, distinguishes a purelyinstrumental dimension of the activity of concept. After delineating a general interpretation of the Doctrine of Concept, key aspects of the chapter dedicated of Teleology are re-constructed with the aim of detecting both the fundamental features and the limitations of this purelyinstrumental dimension of the concept. It is concluded that, in the chapter, it is possible to verify a ‘logic of the instrumentally activity’ and from this standpoint, to interpret the systematic position of the chapter. In addition, critical features of the Hegelian analysis are emphasized in regard to the general problem of mechanization and wear of the world and life, which projects the problem to the transit from chapter on Teleology to the Idea section. (shrink)

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This book offers a systematic and critical discussion of Peter Winch's writings on the philosophy of the social sciences. The author points to Winch's tendency to over-emphasize the importance of language and communication, and his insufficient attention to the role of practical, technological activites in human life and society. It also offers an appendix devoted to the controversy between the anthropologists Marshall Sahlins and Gananath Obeyesekere regarding Captain James Cook's Hawaiian adventures. Essential reading for those studying the development of philosophy (...) in the twentieth century, this book will also be of great interest to anthropologists, sociologists, scholars of religion, and all those with an interest in the relationship between philosophy and the social sciences. (shrink)

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The present work develops the concept ofinstrumental reason in order to elaborate the implications of the connection of formalistic theory and technical action. Through a critique of this concept it establishes the limitations ofinstrumental reason and the necessity for a deeper conception o.

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The article is built around the analysis of The critique ofinstrumental reason by Horkheimer, applied to issues connected with the philosophy of economics. Positive economics is under-stood as an example of a discipline where the pragmatic paradigm has been implemented. Therefore, economics functions within the boundaries of what Horkheimer calledinstrumental rationality. The starting point is the intellectual source shared by economics and the Frankfurt School, namely Kant’s philosophy of rationality. In the first part of the article, (...) three of Kant’s ideas that are fundamental to economics are presented, and then the development of their application in philosophy of science, as seen by Horkheimer in 1947, is laid out. The second part of the article consists of enumerating various distinctive features of economics that set it apart from other social sciences and which constitute factors for which it can be considered a realm of the reign of ‘instrumental rationality’, with all the threats such an approach provokes. The above-mentioned features concentrate on treating humans in economics as a means, not as a goal. This aspect of the philosophy of science of the Frankfurt School (unlike its critique of capitalism as an economic system) has not been widely received. (shrink)

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In this paper, I examine an account ofinstrumental reasoning recently put forth by John Broome. His key suggestion is that anyone who engages in reasoning about his intentions also believes that he will do what he intends to do and that combined with a belief about necessary means this creates rational pressure towards believing that one will take the necessary means. I argue that Broome’s model has three significant problems; his key premise is false—the sincere expression of an (...) intention does not entail the belief that one will successfully execute that intention; his account yields a model ofinstrumental reasoning that is uncomfortably reflective; he seems unable to explain the rational pressure towards taking necessary means that arises directly from having an end and aninstrumental belief. All three problems, I argue, are a consequence of Broome’s inadequate position on what it is to intend to do something. (shrink)

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The role of metaphysics in critique stands as a defining issue for the Frankfurt School theorists. Max Horkheimer himself claims that metaphysics serves as an instrument of domination, leading him to develop an interdisciplinary mate- rialism as a postmetaphysical alternative. Critics such as Georg Lohmann con- tend, however, that Horkheimer’s critique ofinstrumental reason is aporetic insofar as it undermines all metaphysical claims while implicitly making them. Since Horkheimer narrowly equates metaphysics with identity thinking, this article argues that his (...) appeal to nonidentity thinking as the foundation for critique is better understood as a form of antimetaphysics. This, however, leaves Horkheimer no better situated, since antimetaphysics remains a variant of metaphysics. While Horkheimer reproduces the techniques of domination he sought to avoid, this lapse into metaphysics warns of the difficult path that postmetaphysical thinking must navigate between the antipodes of metaphys- ical and antimetaphysical positions. (shrink)

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This volume, co-published with the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, presents the argument that a philosophy of technology is a central component of a contemporary political philosophy. It provides a theoretical groundwork for the encounter of phenomenology and critical theory. Written for courses in social and political theory, phenomenology and critical theory.

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