The early origins of goal attribution in infancy.Ildikó Király,Bianca Jovanovic,Wolfgang Prinz,Gisa Aschersleben &György Gergely -2003 -Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):752-769.detailsWe contrast two positions concerning the initial domain of actions that infants interpret as goal-directed. The 'narrow scope' view holds that goal-attribution in 6- and 9-month-olds is restricted to highly familiar actions (such as grasping) (). The cue-based approach of the infant's 'teleological stance' (), however, predicts that if the cues of equifinal variation of action and a salient action effect are present, young infants can attribute goals to a 'wide scope' of entities including unfamiliar human actions and actions of (...) novel objects lacking human features. It is argued that previous failures to show goal-attribution to unfamiliar actions were due to the absence of these cues. We report a modified replication of showing that when a salient action-effect is presented, even young infants can attribute a goal to an unfamiliar manual action. This study together with other recent experiments reviewed support the 'wide scope' approach indicating that if the cues of goal-directedness are present even 6-month-olds attribute goals to unfamiliar actions. (shrink)
3-Year-Old Children Selectively Generalize Object Functions Following a Demonstration from a Linguistic In-group Member: Evidence from the Phenomenon of Scale Error.Katalin Oláh,Fruzsina Elekes,Réka Pető,Krisztina Peres &Ildikó Király -2016 -Frontiers in Psychology 7:191432.detailsThe present study investigated 3-year-old children’s learning processes about object functions. We built on children’s tendency to commit scale errors with tools to explore whether they would selectively endorse object functions from a linguistic in-group over an out-group model. Participants ( n = 37) were presented with different object sets, and a model speaking either in their native or a foreign language demonstrated how to use the presented tools. In the test phase, children received the object sets with two modifications: (...) the original tool was replaced by one that was too big to achieve the goal but was otherwise identical, and another tool was added to the set that looked different but was appropriately scaled for goal attainment. Children in the Native language condition were significantly more likely to commit scale errors – that is, choose the over-sized tool – than children in the Foreign language condition (48 vs. 30%). We propose that these results provide insight into the characteristics of human-specific learning processes by showing that children are more likely to generalize object functions to a category of artifacts following a demonstration from an in-group member. (shrink)
If you presume relevance, you don't need a bifocal lens.Nazlı Altınok,Denis Tatone,Ildikó Király,Christophe Heintz &György Gergely -2022 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e250.detailsWe argue for a relevance-guided learning mechanism to account for both innovative reproduction and faithful imitation by focusing on the role of communication in knowledge transmission. Unlike bifocal stance theory, this mechanism does not require a strict divide between instrumental and ritual-like actions, and the goals they respectively fulfill (material vs. social/affiliative), to account for flexibility in action interpretation and reproduction.
Encoding third-person epistemic states contributes to episodic reconstruction of memories.Dora Kampis,András Keszei &Ildikó Király -2018 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41:e18.detailsWe propose an extension to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) theory. For successful episodic memory formation, potentially relevant aspects of a situation need to be identified and encodedonlineand retained for prospective interactions.To be maximally convincing, the communicator not only has to encode not justanycontextual detail, but also has to track informationin relation tosocial partners.
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Can group representations based on relational cues warrant the rich inferences typically drawn from group membership?Katalin Oláh &Ildikó Király -2022 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45.detailsPietraszewski's model – though promising in many respects – needs to be extended so that it can explain the multitude of rich inferences that people draw from group membership. In this commentary, we highlight some facets of group thinking, especially from the field of developmental psychology, that cannot be unambiguously accounted for by a model that is built solely on relational cues.
Some cognitive tools for word learning: The role of working memory and goal preference.Mihály Racsmány,Ágnes Lukács,Csaba Pléh &Ildikó Király -2001 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1115-1117.detailsWe propose that Bloom's focus on cognitive factors involved in word learning still lacks a broader perspective. We emphasize the crucial relevance of working memory in learning elements of language. Specifically, we demonstrate through our data that in impaired populations knowledge of some linguistic elements can be dissociated according to the subcomponent of working memory (visual or verbal) involved in a task. Further, although Bloom's concentration on theory of mind as a precondition for word learning is certainly correct, theory of (...) mind being a necessary condition does not make it a sufficient one. On the basis of our studies we point out the importance of a theory of mind related goal preference in acquiring spatial language. In general, we claim that more specific cognitive preferences and constraints should be outlined in detail for the preconditions of acquiring linguistic elements. (shrink)