„Newton, Hegel, Marx a problém miery.".Igor Hanzel -2003 -Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 10 (4):397-411.detailsThe paper deals with the concepts of measure and measurement from the point of view of philosophy as well as natural and social science. First, Hegel´s approach to these concepts is analysed. Then Hegel´s concepts are compared to Marx´s economic works where the concepts of external, inherent and manifest measure are exemplified. Finally, Newton´s Principia are compared with Marx´s economical works and their similarities and differences are outlined.
The Development of Carnap’s Semantics.Igor Hanzel -2009 -American Journal of Semiotics 25 (1-2):123-151.detailsThe paper reconstructs the three main stages in the development of Carnap’s semantics in the years 1935–1947. It starts with Carnap’s approach to metalogic in his Zirkelprotokolle (1931) and his Logische Syntax der Sprache (1934) from the point of view of one-level approach to the relation between metalanguage and its object-language. It then analyzes Tarski’s turn to semantics in his paper presented at the Paris conference in September 1935, as well as the implications of his view for Carnap’s approach to (...) semantics from 1935 until 1943. Finally, it analyzes Church’s rediscovery of Frege and its impact on Carnap’s shift to the extension/intension distinction in his semantics in the years 1943–1947. (shrink)
Idealizations and Concretizations in Laws and Explanations in Physics.Igor Hanzel -2008 -Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (2):273-301.detailsThe paper tries to provide an alternative to Hempel’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel’s approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of (...) scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, it compares this reconstruction with the approaches of J. Woodward and C. Hitchcock, C. Liu and with the views of M. Thalos on analytic mechanics. (shrink)
Beyond Blumer and Symbolic Interactionism: The Qualitative-Quantitative Issue in Social Theory and Methodology.Igor Hanzel -2011 -Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (3):303-326.detailsThe article analysis the views approaching quantitative and qualitative methods in social sciences as separable or irreconcilable. First, we characterize these views and show how they deal with this divide and how they view the aspects of the latter. Next, we identify the works of Herbert Blumer as the basis of that divide and subject them to an analysis. Finally, by means of categories like quantity, quality, and measure, we show that the qualitative-quantitative divide is based on a wrong approach (...) to these categories and the quantitative and qualitative methods. (shrink)
Carnap a jazyk: z Viedne do Santa Fé.Igor Hanzel -2007 -Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (4):470-497.detailsThe paper reconstructs three main stages in the development of Carnap’s approach to language in the years 1931 – 1947. It starts with Carnap’s approach to metalogic in his Viennese Zirkelprotokolle and his Logische Syntax der Sprache from the point of view of one-level approach to the relation between metalanguage and its object-language. It then analyzes Tarski’s turn to semantics in his paper presented at the Paris conference in September 1935, as well as the implications of his view for Carnap’s (...) approach to semantics from 1935 until 1943. Finally, it analyzes Church’s rediscovery of Frege and its impact on Carnap’s shift to the extension/intension distinction in his semantics in the years 1943 – 1947. (shrink)
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Carnap and Newton: Two Approaches to the Method of Theory Construction (Part II).Igor Hanzel -2009 -Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (3):304-316.detailsThe paper, as a continuation of the paper Hanzel , provides a methodological generalization of Newton’s method of theory construction as applied in Book I and Book III of his Principia. It reconstructs also the method of measures applied in those books. Finally, it shows how the term “harmonic law” changes its meaning in the Principia.
Carnap and Newton: Two Approaches to the Method of Theory Construction (Part I).Igor Hanzel -2009 -Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (2):183-213.detailsThe paper, as a continuation of the paper Hanzel , provides a methodological generalization of Newton’s method of theory construction as applied in Book I and Book III of his Principia. It reconstructs also the method of measures applied in those books. Finally, it shows how the term “harmonic law” changes its meaning in the Principia.
Causation, Principle of Common Cause and Theoretical Explanation: Wesley C. Salmon and G. W. F. Hegel.Igor Hanzel -2012 -Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):29-44.detailsThe aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon's concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his Science of Logic, and which can be applied to the issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the (...) author's contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon's philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science. (shrink)
Der Spracherwerb bei Menschenaffen. Sue Savage-Rumbaughs methodologische Wende.Igor Hanzel -2012 -Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (5):659-682.detailsThe aim of the paper is to investigate, from the point of view of philosophy of science and philosophy of social science, the turn in the ape language project (ALP) as accomplished in the works of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and her collaborators. In this project a highly interesting turn from the orientation of research on natural sciences to that on humanities took place. We shall analyze all the relevant works of Savage-Rumbaugh from the point of view of the three central levels (...) of ALP: its scientific, metascientific and methodological levels. (shrink)
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Ilyenkov and language.Igor Hanzel -2018 -Studies in East European Thought 70 (1):1-18.detailsThe article analyses the relation of E. V. Ilyenkov to the phenomenon of language. His approach, it is shown, had its roots in his explication of notion of ideal which led him to assign priority to work with respect to language at a general level as well as at the level ontogenesis of human infants. Two additional factors shaped his approach to the phenomenon of language. The first was his negative approach to disciplines investigating the structure of language: mathematical logic, (...) logical semantics, and philosophy of language. The second was his treatment of Hegel’s philosophy from which he took over only those features that were appropriated and further developed by Marx. The article gives an analysis of Ilyenkov’s view on the educational process of deafblind children and it shows that this view contradicted the views on that process presented in the works of Meshcheryakov and Sirotkin. Finally, the article provides a characterization of work, language and of their relation. (shrink)
McDowell and Hegel.Igor Hanzel -2016 -Idealistic Studies 46 (2):119-134.detailsI shall compare John McDowell’s Mind and World with Hegel’s later philosophy in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline. I begin by presenting McDowell’s epistemology. I then delineate the most important aspects of Hegel’s epistemology and, because McDowell claims that he draws on Kant’s views on the relation between receptivity and spontaneity, their relation to Kant’s epistemology. Here, I suggest that even if Hegel’s epistemology displays idealistic features which determine the construction of the category-clusters (...) in the Science of Logic and Encyclopedia, these clusters can make a valuable contribution to epistemology once subjected to a realistic reinterpretation. Next I compare Hegel’s epistemology with that of McDowell and show that under this reinterpretation Hegel’s epistemology can be used to overcome the limitations of the epistemology presented by McDowell. Finally I propose a return to the reconstruction of categories as the direction towards which the future development of epistemology should go. (shrink)
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Popperova moa: Prírodný zákon a prírodná nevyhnutnosť.Igor Hanzel -1998 -Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (4):354-363.detailsThe aim of the paper is to reconstruct the concept of natural necessity upon which the empirical causal type of a scientific law rests and to enlarge the notion of the conditions of a scientific law. According to regularity theory, what counts in the investigation of causation is the universality of causal proposition. So in this theory priority is given to the explication of the concept “scientific law”. Such an explication was provided by Popper in the first edition of his (...) Logik der Forschung. He defines here the concept “scientific law” by distinguishing between strictly universal propositions and numerical propositions. Later Popper, drawing upon W. Kneale´s criticism, proposed another definition of natural necessity. He expounds his revised view in Chapter X* of the new appendices of the Logic of Scientific Discovery by means of the famous moa-example. He views statement “All moas die before the age of fifty years” as not physically necessary because its truth depends on the presence of conditions different from singular initial conditions. Ba distinguishing between singular initial conditions and modification conditions I, contrary to Popper, claim that that statement can be viewed as naturally necessary. (shrink)
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Qualitative, or Quantitative Methods in Social Sciences?Igor Hanzel -2009 -Filozofia 64 (7):646-657.detailsThe aim of the paper is to discuss the views, which approach the qualitative and quantitative methods in social sciences as either separable, or irreconcilable. First, the author gives an outline of those views and shows, how they deal with various aspects of the qualitative/quantitative divide. Next, he tries to identify the roots of that divide in the works of Herbert Blumer. Further, his analysis of the categories of quantity, quality, and measure is designed to show that the divide in (...) question is based on a wrong, one-sided understanding of the qualitative as well as quantitative approaches, which in fact can neither be separated nor conceived of as contradictory. (shrink)
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Studies in the Methodolgy of Natural and Social Sciences.Igor Hanzel -2010 - Peter Lang.detailsAcknowledgements Several persons institutions and were helpful in writing this book. Chapter 3 was written at the University of Potsdam in Germany, ...
Studies in the methodology of science.Igor Hanzel -2016 - New York: Peter Lang Edition.detailsThe book discusses methodological issues relating to the philosophy of science and the natural and social sciences. It reconstructs the methods of measurement and scientific explanation, the relation of data, phenomena and mechanisms, the problem of theory-ladenness of explanation and the problem of historic explanation. From the sciences chosen for methodological analysis are those of early classical mechanics, early thermodynamics, Bohr's theory of atom, early quantum mechanics, research into great apes and political economy.
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Scientific laws and scientific explanations: A differentiated typology.Igor Hanzel -2008 -Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 15 (3):323-344.detailsThe paper tries to provide an alternative to C. G. Hempel’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel’s approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the (...) types of scientific laws appearing in it. The paper makes an attempt to provide a new approach to scientific laws and scientific explanations. Based on my paper Hanzel I give a brief overview of Hempel’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation, as well as of its failures and paradoxes. As a way out, I analyze the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstruct the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, I provide a differentiated typology of scientific laws and scientific explanations. (shrink)
Scientific law: On the history of one concept (CG Hempel).Igor Hanzel -2007 -Filozofia 62 (9):801-812.detailsThe aim of this paper is to show the incompleteness of the exclusively logico-syntactical and logico-semantical approaches to one of the core issues of philosophy of science, namely, scientific laws and scientific explanation in C. G. Hempel’s works. I start with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel’s approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and then analyze the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. Next, I trace these characteristics back to Hempel’s and Carnap’s attempts (...) to ground the concepts of scientific law and explanation exclusively on logic , which led to a highly normative approach alienated from the practice of real science. (shrink)
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Sue Savage-Rumbaugh's Research into Ape Language–Science and Methodology.Igor Hanzel -2012 -Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (2):201-226.detailsThe aim of the paper is to investigate, from the point of view of philosophy of science and philosophy of social science, the turn in the ape language project as accomplished in the works of Sue Savage- Rumbaugh and her collaborators. In this project took place a highly interesting turn from the orientation of research on natural sciences to that on humanities. We shall analyze all the relevant works of Savage-Rumbaugh from the point of view of the two central levels (...) of ALP: its scientific level and the methodological level. (shrink)
Wesley C. Salmon versus GWF Hegel on Causation, Principle of Common Cause and Theoretical Explanation.Igor Hanzel -2011 -Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (2):189-212.detailsThe aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon’s concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his Science of Logic and which can be applied to issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the author’s (...) contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon’s philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science. (shrink)