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Under what conditions is a group of scientists rational? How would rational scientists collectively agree to make their group more effective? What sorts of negotiations would occur among them and under what conditions? What effect would their final agreement have on science and society? These questions have been central to the philosophy of science for the last two decades. In this 2007 book, Husain Sarkar proposes answers to them by building on classical solutions - the skeptical view, two versions of (...) the subjectivist view, the objectivist view, and the view of Hilary Putnam. Although he finds these solutions not completely adequate, Sarkar retrieves what is of value from them and also expropriates the arguments of John Rawls and Amartya Sen, in order to weave a richer, deeper, and more developed theory of group rationality. (shrink)

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Perhaps the most famous proposition in the history of philosophy is Descartes' cogito 'I think, therefore I am'. Husain Sarkar claims in this provocative interpretation of Descartes that the ancient tradition of reading the cogito as an argument is mistaken. It should, he says, be read as an intuition. Through this interpretative lens, the author reconsiders key Cartesian topics: the ideal inquirer, the role of clear and distinct ideas, the relation of these to the will, memory, the nature of intuition (...) and deduction, the nature, content and elusiveness of 'I', and the tenability of the doctrine of the creation of eternal truths. Finally, the book demonstrates how Descartes' attempt to prove the existence of God is foiled by a new Cartesian Circle. (shrink)

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Within Robert Nozick's theory of Justice as presented in his Anarchy, State and Utopia, does the Lockean proviso dovetail with the theory of entitlement? The main burden of this paper is to establish that far from dovetailing, there is a serious conflict between the two.Nozick's theory of Justice consists of at least three principles, namely, the principle of Justice in acquisition, the principle of Justice in transfer, and the principle of rectification of injustice. These principles treat the topics of how (...) unheld things came to be held, how they came to be transferred, and how injustice in respect to them came to be corrected or rectified. Although Nozick does not provide a detailed philosophical picture of these principles of Justice, he says enough about each of them by way of examples and explanations to constitute a powerful, criticizable doctrine. (shrink)

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L’éthique de la vertu d’Annas est confrontée à l’objection de la circularité. Annas affirme qu’une âme juste est disposée à poser des actes justes. On contourne l’objection de la circularité si l’on ne définit l’âme juste ni en termes d’actes bons, ni en termes de règles. En m’appuyant sur les récents travaux de Korsgaard, je démontre que l’argument d’Annas se heurte de nouveau à l’objection de la circularité. Ensuite, j’examine de quelle façon Annas tente une fois de plus d’éviter l’objection (...) de la circularité en faisant appel à la communauté des vertueux. Je soutiens que cette démarche ne préserve sa théorie ni du relativisme, ni de l’objection de la circularité. (shrink)

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Jarrett Leplin in A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism (1997) argues that if the thesis of empirical equivalence is cogent, then the thesis of underdetermination cannot even get off the ground. Part of Leplin's argument rests on the claim that auxiliary hypotheses can be independently confirmed, thus enabling us to determine the epistemic worth of a theory. This, in turn, helps in determining about what we should be realists. Leplin's claims are demonstrated to be problematic. Leplin wants, inconsistently, to use (...) only those auxiliary hypotheses which dovetail with confirmed theories. Finally, a detail of Leplin's argument is found wanting. (shrink)

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Cet article est fondé sur deux principes : le principe de partialité et le principe d’impartialité. M’appuyant sur un argument relativement peu connu de Kant, j’énonce et je défends le second principe. Je démontre ensuite que le premier principe est lié à la thèse présentée par Annas dans sa théorie sur l’éthique de la vertu, selon laquelle aucun adulte mûr ne souhaite qu’on lui dise quoi faire, ainsi qu’à son récit sur l’enseignement et l’apprentissage de la vertu. Je soutiens que (...) la théorie d’Annas sur l’éthique de la vertu est susceptible, contrairement à celle de Kant, de donner prise soit à l’objection de la circularité, soit à l’objection du relativisme. (shrink)

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IN KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT, Allen W. Wood powerfully argues in defense of Kant’s alleged notion that we ought not to compare ourselves with others on the moral scale, however much such comparison may be meaningful and permissible with respect to our other skills and characteristics, such as the artistic, practical, or technological. Meaningful, permissible, comparable or not, those skills and characteristics have no inherent worth anyway. These have a market price or a fancy price but no dignity, and it is (...) only dignity which confers incomparable moral worth. A human being, says Kant, “possesses a dignity by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them.”. (shrink)

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Derek Parfit's On What Mattersis widely recognized as elegant, profound, and destined to change the landscape of moral philosophy. In Volume One, Parfit argues that the distinct--indeed, powerfully conflicting--theories of deontology and contractualism can be woven together in a way so as to yield utilitarian conclusions. Husain Sarkar in this book calls this, The Ultimate Derivation. Sarkar argues, however, that this derivation is untenable. To underwrite this conclusion, this book traverses considerable Parfitian terrain. Sarkar shows why Parfit hasn't quite solved (...) what Sidgwick had called "the profoundest problem in ethics"; he offers a reading of Kant, Rawls, and Scanlon that reveals Parfit's keen utilitarian bias; and he demonstrates why Parfit's Triple Theorydoes not succeed in its task of unifying conflicting moral theories. The final chapter of the book is about meta-ethics. It shows that Parfit's Convergence Principleis mistaken even though it unveils Parfit's utterly humane concerns: Moral philosophers are not, as Parfit thinks, climbing the same mountain. But for all that, Sarkar maintains, Parfit's book is arguably the greatest consequential tract in the history of moral philosophy. shows that Parfit's Convergence Principleis mistaken even though it unveils Parfit's utterly humane concerns: Moral philosophers are not, as Parfit thinks, climbing the same mountain. But for all that, Sarkar maintains, Parfit's book is arguably the greatest consequential tract in the history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

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One recent problem in philosophy of science is, “Ought a methodology be construed, not merely as an instrument of appraisal, but also as a source of advice to the practising scientist?” Imre Lakatos and John Worrall, among others, have answered the question in the negative. Alan Musgrave disagrees. In a section entitled, “Appraisals and Advice,” in [9], Musgrave attempts to give us a deductive argument in support of his claim that methodologies should be construed as giving advice. After briefly explaining (...) the plausibility of the claim, I shall present Musgrave's argument in full, and then examine each of his premises. I will try to show that his attempt to answer the above question in the affirmative raises some interesting questions, and which must be answered if his venture is to succeed. I should add, that if my objections are successful against Musgrave's attempt, it would be a Pyrrhic victory: I am neither an inductivist nor do I think that the answer to the question should be in the negative. (shrink)

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In the paper I examine (Section I) the best defense for the claim that methodologies shouldnot function heuristically (thesis-LW) as it appears in John Worrall. I then evaluate (Section II) his proposal of a criterion* M which is offered as a criterion for evaluating competing methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism, methodology of research programmes. etc. Finally, I consider (Section III) the consequences of arguments presented earlier (Section I and II) as they bear on the problem of selecting a historiographical model.I (...) argue, among other things, (I) that thesis-LW is defended on some very dubious assumptions; (II) that Worrall's criterion* M falters under three clear cases two of which at least*M should accomodate, and that part of* M's failure can be linked to its being hooked to thesis-LW. By arguments analogous to the ones which serve* M, I show thatcontra John Worrall and John Watkins, thesis-LW is testable; finally, (III) if we accept arguments for thesis-LW and* M we are left with a skeptical conclusion with respect to the choice of a historiographical model which Worrall by parity of reasoning should accept, but does not. (shrink)

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In Section 5 of his important paper, “Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Knowledge,”’ Karl Popper discusses the requirements for knowledge to grow. According to Popper, a scientist often finds himself in the following problem-situation: A theory T that he has been using so far, while it can explain some facts, cannot explain others, and is falsified by still other facts. Consequently, the scientist desires to come up with a theory T‘ that will explain everything that T could and at (...) least some things that T could not, especially those facts which falsified T. Would not such a success, if we could emerge with a T’, be enough? Not so, claims Popper. Given that our aim is more and more interesting truth, “the logic of the general problem-situation” demands that T‘ satisfy other requirements as well. If these added requirements are not met, our aim of approach- ing truth would be vitiated.2 These additional requirements are three in all. First, that every new theory proposed, such as T‘, should proceed from some “simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea.” Second, that every new theory should be independently testable, and third, each such theory should pass some new, and severe, tests.3 Popper believes that the third requirement is crucial for the growth of knowledge, and he discusses it in considerable detail. My primary aim in this paper is to show that Popper’s arguments in support of his third requirement do not stand up. I shall argue that if knowledge can grow at all on Popper’s other assumptions then it can grow even if every new theory subsequent to the initial theory should violate Popper’s third requirement. In showing how knowledge can grow even though the third requirement is never satisfied, I use assumptions and methods which Popper allows himself. Hence, I leave open the question of the legitimacy of these assumptions and methods which have, in fact, been severely criticized by Adolf Grunbaum, David Miller, Pave1 Tichy, and others. (shrink)

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If we first ask about the goals Machiavelli urges us to embrace as citizens, these all turn out to be feminine: wealth, liberty, and civic greatness. If we next ask about the type of community we need to sustain in order to realize these goals, we find that this is seen by contrast as masculine: it must be a vivere politico, a vivere civile, a vivere libero--terms usually translated as a 'free state.' If we go on to ask about the (...) qualities needed to uphold such a community, these again prove to be feminine, including virtu itself as well as the attribute of prudence, the greatest of political virtues. But if we ask finally about the institutions and arrangements we need to establish in order to promote civic virtues, we find that these--the most basic and shaping elements--are entirely masculine: not merely the term for the general condition of public life (lo stato), but also the words used to describe specific institutions (including the Senate and the various magistracies) and the ordini or ordinances that bind the whole edifice together. (shrink)

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