The reach of science.Henry Mehlberg -1958 - [Toronto]: University of Toronto Press.details"This monography is a study in the philosophy of science" - Preface.
Philosophical Aspects of Physical Time.Henryk Mehlberg -1969 -The Monist 53 (3):340-384.detailsI would like to present a partial account of an investigation into scientifically and philosophically significant changes which quantum physics has made necessary in our views of time. In some cases, these changes resulted from discoveries of new aspects of time, as illustrated by the so-called “T.C.P. Theorem” due to Schwinger, Pauli and Lüders. Their finding determines the transformation of the quantum state of any physical system resulting from a reversal of the direction of time, followed by a reorientiation of (...) the dimensions of space and the replacement of each particle in the system with its antiparticle. A relativistic interpretation of the T.C.P. Theorem in Section III will show that it amounts to the universal interrelatedness of time, space and matter. In other cases, the changes in the scientific concept of time follow from the availability of new methods provided by quantum physics rather than from discoveries of unknown aspects of time. These methods may be applied to issues which bothered philosophers and physicists obsessed with the enigma of time long before Planck’s quantum of action started our century. The quantum approach of von Neumann, Pauli, Fierz and Lüdwig to the second law of thermodynamics and the associated irreversibility or asymmetry of time illustrate the use of the new methods for the solution of old problems of time. The relevance of quantum physical methods to the problem of reality of time will be shown in the last section of this paper. (shrink)
Sur quelques aspects nouveaux du problème psychophysiologique.Henryk Mehlberg -1937 -Travaux du IXe Congrès International de Philosophie 9:77-84.detailsLes changements profonds apportés aux concepts fondamentaux de la science par la logistiepie, la relativité et la théorie des quanta ont fait apparaître de nouveaux aspects du problème psychophysiologique dont plusieurs nettement défavorables au parallélisme. Ces postulats concernant l’équivalence, l’identité, et l’indépendance causale des séries psychologique et cérébrale paraissent ébranlés si l’on tient compte des notions nouvelles d’identité numérique, de simultanéité relative et d’indétermination quantique.
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