Science without reduction.Helmut F. Spinner -1973 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-4):16 – 94.detailsThe aim of this essay is a criticism of reductionism ? both in its ?static? interpretation (usually referred to as the layer model or level?picture of science) and in its ?dynamic? interpretation (as a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge), with emphasis on the latter ? from the point of view of Popperian fallibilism and Feyerabendian pluralism, but without being committed to the idiosyncrasies of these standpoints. In both aspects of criticism, the rejection is based on the proposal of (...) a global alternative. Hummell and Opp's research programme for the reduction of sociology to psychology is used as a starting?point and taken as the primary object of criticism. Following the introductory Section I, Section II analyses the three crucial notions of Hummell and Opp's research programme ? their explications of the notions of ?sociology?, ?psychology? and the concept of reduction itself ? and criticizes the authors? deficient ?logic of reduction?. Although the ?local? shortcomings of our authors? ?logic of reduction? do not affect reductionism as such, i.e. logically sound versions of reductionism as devised by Kemeny, Nagel, Oppenheim, Putnam, Woodger et al., it is argued that the logical soundness of sophisticated reductionism cannot compensate for its additional epistemological and methodological deficiencies. Section III analyses the ?dynamic? interpretation of reductionism as a particular developmental pattern of scientific growth. It is argued that even reductionism at its best can produce only cumulative progress, thus ?a priori? excluding scientific revolutions which are inevitably counter?inductive as well as counter?reductive. Section IV discusses the philosophical background of modern reductionism, and examines the effects both of reductionism and of anti?reductionistic pluralism on the autonomy of scientific fields. It is argued that pluralistic anti?reductionism undermines spurious claims for autonomy much more effectively than reductionism. As a ?local? improvement of the reductionistic research programme, the replacement of the predominant one?way reductionism by a less restrictive many?way reductionism is proposed. It is argued that the appropriate treatment for an allegedly backward science (say sociology) is not its reduction to an allegedly more advanced science (say psychology) but its non?reductive replacement by new theories (of the same or of another field) that do not incorporate the older ones. As a ?global? alternative to the reduction of sociology to psychology, the frontier?crossing direct application of psychological theories to sociological phenomena is proposed. A plea is made for a pluralistic science without reduction, based on intra? and interscientific criticism as the proper method for the advancement of knowledge. (shrink)
(1 other version)Die besteigung Des informationsberges AlS neue aufgabe der philosophie im verbund aller wissenswissenschaften.Helmut F. Spinner -1988 -Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (2):328-347.detailsDue to the exponential growth of science and, recently, the explosive expansion of the extrascientific information of computerized 'Data' of all sorts, a New Cognitive Order of Society comes into existence. The invalidation of the 'Old Order' with its classical conditions for the production, processing, application and fairly equal social distribution of knowledge is a result of technological developments, especially of the rise of Information Technology. What may be called the Cognitive-Technological Complex is rapidly developing. This causes a fundamental change (...) of the situation of knowledge in the Information Society so-called. It confronts philosophy with the task, 'to climb up' the growing information mountains and to analyse its contents and structures, i.e., old and new sorts of knowledge in huge quantities and mixtures, with different rationality-structures, etc. This cannot be done without new theories of knowledge and rationality. What is practically needed, involves a new philosopher's comprehensive competence for handling the whole information stuff, ranging from classical theory-knowledge to modern data-knowledge. Technical competence for computers is not enough. Thus, information technology opens philosophy and philosophers an unexpected, perhaps undeserved chance to keep pace with the most progressive cognitive and technological developments. To take advantage of the new situation of knowledge and to explore the constitutive conditions of the New Cognitive Order is the first task of contemporary philosophy, in close cooperation with all cognitive sciences. (shrink)
(1 other version)Ist der Kritische Rationalismus am Ende?: Auf der Suche nach den verlorenen Maßstäben des Kritischen Rationalismus für eine offene Sozialphilosophie und kritische Sozialwissenschaft.Helmut F. Spinner -1980 -Analyse & Kritik 2 (2):99-126.detailsMotivated by Drerup’s and Terhart’s stimulating contribution (Analyse & Kritik 1/80) to the notorious “Critical Rationalism and Contemporary Politics” -affair with its fatal repercussions on Popper’s original position. Part One of this paper discusses the development of Popperian philosophy of science and society from the hopeful beginnings to the rather unsatisfactory present state, with the main emphasis on the separate fate of his Social Philosophy in German speaking countries. A reconstruction and evaluation of this development is made in comparison to (...) Popper’s basic idea of an open-minded Social Philosophy and critical Social Science. The German mainstream development adds to Popper’s own radically liberal interpretation a positivistic, a normativistic and a conformistic phase, thus leading this degenerating research programme to the present philosophical stagnation and badly compensating political reideologization. The intellectual as well as the institutional causes and consequences of the deviant German case are analysed. − This exposition of the present state of reception is to be completed, in Part Two, by an analysis of the resulting state of problems with regard to the remaining chances for the realization of the original Popperian programme just-mentioned in contemporary rebuilding. (shrink)
Begründung, Kritik und Rationalität: zur philosoph. Grundlagenproblematik d. Rechtfertigungsmodells d. Erkenntnis u. d. kritizist. Alternative.Helmut F. Spinner -1977 - Braunschweig: Vieweg.detailsBd. 1. Die Entstehung des Erkenntnisproblems im griechischen Denken und seine klassische Rechtfertigungslösung aus dem Geiste des Rechts.
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Begründung, Kritik und Rationalität: zur philosoph. Grundlagenproblematik d. Rechtfertigungsmodells d. Erkenntnis u. d. kritizist. Alternative.Helmut F. Spinner -1977 - Braunschweig: Vieweg.detailsBd. 1. Die Entstehung des Erkenntnisproblems im griechischen Denken und seine klassische Rechtfertigungslösung aus dem Geiste des Rechts.
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