Results for 'Harold Barclay'
922 found
Order:
1 filter applied
- New Perspectives on Anarchism.Samantha E. Bankston,HaroldBarclay,Lewis Call,Alexandre J. M. E. Christoyannopoulos,Vernon Cisney,Jesse Cohn,Abraham DeLeon,Francis Dupuis-Déri,Benjamin Franks,Clive Gabay,Karen Goaman,Rodrigo Gomes Guimarães,Uri Gordon,James Horrox,Anthony Ince,Sandra Jeppesen,Stavros Karageorgakis,Elizabeth Kolovou,Thomas Martin,Todd May,Nicolae Morar,Irène Pereira,Stevphen Shukaitis,Mick Smith,Scott Turner,Salvo Vaccaro,Mitchell Verter,Dana Ward &Dana M. Williams -2009 - Lexington Books.The study of anarchism as a philosophical, political, and social movement has burgeoned both in the academy and in the global activist community in recent years. Taking advantage of this boom in anarchist scholarship, Nathan J. Jun and Shane Wahl have compiled twenty-six cutting-edge essays on this timely topic in New Perspectives on Anarchism.
- The emergence of everything: how the world became complex.Harold J. Morowitz -2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.When the whole is greater than the sum of the parts--indeed, so great that the sum far transcends the parts and represents something utterly new and different--we call that phenomenon emergence. When the chemicals diffusing in the primordial waters came together to form the first living cell, that was emergence. When the activities of the neurons in the brain result in mind, that too is emergence. In The Emergence of Everything, one of the leading scientists involved in the study of (...) complexity,Harold J. Morowitz, takes us on a sweeping tour of the universe, a tour with 28 stops, each one highlighting a particularly important moment of emergence. For instance, Morowitz illuminates the emergence of the stars, the birth of the elements and of the periodic table, and the appearance of solar systems and planets. We look at the emergence of living cells, animals, vertebrates, reptiles, and mammals, leading to the great apes and the appearance of humanity. He also examines tool making, the evolution of language, the invention of agriculture and technology, and the birth of cities. And as he offers these insights into the evolutionary unfolding of our universe, our solar system, and life itself, Morowitz also seeks out the nature of God in the emergent universe, the God posited by Spinoza, Bruno, and Einstein, a God Morowitz argues we can know through a study of the laws of nature. Written by one of our wisest scientists, The Emergence of Everything offers a fascinating new way to look at the universe and the natural world, and it makes an important contribution to the dialogue between science and religion. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Aristotle's criticism of presocratic philosophy.Harold Fredrik Cherniss -1935 - Baltimore,: The Johns Hopkins press.
- The nature of man and the meaning of existence.Harold Saxton Burr -1962 - Springfield, Ill.,: Thomas.No categories
- Introducing Persons.Harold Noonan &P. Carruthers -1988 -Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):123.This is an elegant and clear tour through many of the issues in philosophy of mind that have occupied philosophers of this century. The topics covered include the problem of other minds, arguments for and against the existence of the soul, a discussion of the bundle theory of the mind, behaviorism, functionalism, mind/brain identity, the argument against the possibility of private language, personal identity and the possibility of after-life, and the question of whether animals and computers can have minds. Carruthers (...) emphasizes arguments for and against the various theories considered, and encourages readers to actively evaluate these approaches as well. Written with clarity and directness, Introducing Persons will prove a useful text for the beginner while simultaneously providing original material of interest to the advanced student and professional philosopher. (shrink)
- Ethnomethodological Misreading of Aron Gurwitsch on the Phenomenal Field.Harold Garfinkel -2021 -Human Studies 44 (1):19-42.During the 1992–1993 academic year,Harold Garfinkel offered a graduate seminar on Ethnomethodology in the Sociology Department at the University of California, Los Angeles. One topic that was given extensive coverage in the seminar has not been discussed at much length in Garfinkel’s published works to date: Aron Gurwitsch’s treatment of Gestalt theory, and particularly the themes of “phenomenal field” and “praxeological description”. The edited transcript of Garfinkel’s seminar shows why he recommended that “for the serious initiatives of ethnomethodological (...) investigations […] Gurwitsch is a theorist we can’t do without”. Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological “misreading” is not a mistaken reading, but is more a matter of taking Gurwitsch’s phenomenological demonstrations of Gestalt contextures in phenomenal fields and transposing them for making detailed, concrete observations and descriptions of organizationally achieved social phenomena. Where Gurwitsch addresses the organization of perception as an autochthonous achievement, inherent to the stream and field of individual consciousness, Garfinkel extends and elaborates this field into the social world of enacted practices. The April 1993 seminar also is rich with brief asides and digressions in which Garfinkel comments about his use of Alfred Schutz, his attitude toward publishing, his relationship with Erving Goffman, and many other matters. (shrink)No categories
- First-person disavowals of digital phenotyping and epistemic injustice in psychiatry.Stephanie K. Slack &LindaBarclay -2023 -Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 26 (4):605-614.Digital phenotyping will potentially enable earlier detection and prediction of mental illness by monitoring human interaction with and through digital devices. Notwithstanding its promises, it is certain that a person’s digital phenotype will at times be at odds with their first-person testimony of their psychological states. In this paper, we argue that there are features of digital phenotyping in the context of psychiatry which have the potential to exacerbate the tendency to dismiss patients’ testimony and treatment preferences, which can be (...) instances of epistemic injustice. We first explain what epistemic injustice is, and why it is argued to be an extensive problem in health and disability settings. We then explain why epistemic injustice is more likely to apply with even greater force in psychiatric contexts, and especially where digital phenotyping may be involved. Finally, we offer some tentative suggestions of how epistemic injustice can be minimised in digital psychiatry. (shrink)
- Disability, Transition Costs, and the Things That Really Matter.Tommy Ness &LindaBarclay -2023 -Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (6):591-602.This article develops a detailed, empirically driven analysis of the nature of the transition costs incurred in becoming disabled. Our analysis of the complex nature of these costs supports the claim that it can be wrong to cause disability, even if disability is just one way of being different. We also argue that close attention to the nature of transition costs gives us reason to doubt that well-being, including transitory impacts on well-being, is the only thing that should determine the (...) wrongness of causing or removing disability. Non-welfare considerations also defeat the claim that it is always wrong to cause disability. The upshot of these conclusions is that closer attention to the nature of transition costs supports disabled people who strenuously contest the assumption that their well-being is lower than nondisabled people. It also suggests that, in addition, disabled people should contest their opponents’ narrow account of how we should make ethical decisions regarding causing or failing to prevent disability. (shrink)
- Concrete Ontology: Comments on Lauer, Little, and Lohse.Harold Kincaid -2021 -Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51 (1):40-47.I share with all the other authors the view that conceptual metaphysics without close ties to science is of minimal value, that this holds for much of current work on social ontology, and that if there is value in social ontology, it has to be in contributing to empirical social science. I do perhaps disagree with all three authors about making any blanket statements concerning either instrumentalism or realism about the social sciences and their ontologies. I argue and try to (...) show instead that if there are fruitful questions of social ontology, they are probably mostly local empirical issues raised by specific pieces of social science. Certain kinds of pluralism and instrumentalism may well make sense in some situations. I illustrate with debates over the need for psychological realism and revealed preference theory in economics. (shrink)
- There are More, or Fewer, Things than Most of us Think.Harold W. Noonan -2024 -Metaphysica 25 (2):193-203.In Chapter 12 of his book Material Beings (Van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press) van Inwagen argues that there are no artefacts, or very few, certainly fewer than most people believe. Artisans very rarely create, at least in the sense of causing things to come into existence. The argument in Chapter 12 is a very powerful one. I do not think that it establishes van Inwagen’s conclusion, but it does, I think, given its (plausible) premise, establish (...) that if there are not far fewer material things in the world than we ordinarily believe, then there are far more. In this sense it establishes, as Russell once said, ‘the truth about physical objects must be strange’. Furthermore, I argue at the end, we cannot avoid this conclusion even if we reject van Inwagen’s premise. Thus the defender of our common sense ontology is caught on the horns of a dilemma. So our commonsense ontology is indefensible. (shrink)
- Moderate monism and modality.Harold W. Noonan -2008 -Analysis 68 (1):88-94.
- Two difficulties in operational thinking.Harold E. Israel -1945 -Psychological Review 52 (5):260-261.No categories
- Goethe's Faust.Harold Jantz -1952 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (2):251-251.
- The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas.Harold Cherniss -1936 -American Journal of Philology 57 (4):445.
- Informed Consent Conversations: Neither the Beginning nor the End.Liza-Marie Johnson &Barclay R. Rogers -2021 -American Journal of Bioethics 21 (5):76-78.Informed Consent: What Must Be Disclosed and What Must Be Understood seeks to challenge the “standard view” of consent. It seeks to do so by segregating the “disclosure function” from the “understa...No categories
- Causation in the Social Sciences.Harold Kincaid -2009 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies,The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press UK.
- Deep-Sea Challenge: The John Murray/Mabahiss Expedition to the Indian Ocean, 1933-34A. L. Rice.Harold Burstyn -1992 -Isis 83 (2):356-357.
- Early Explanations of the Role of the Earth's Rotation in the Circulation of the Atmosphere and the Ocean.Harold Burstyn -1966 -Isis 57 (2):167-187.
- The effect of uniform and non-uniform illumination upon attention and reaction-times, with especial reference to street illumination.Harold E. Burtt -1916 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 1 (2):155.
- When Anti-Discrimination Discriminates.Harold Braswell &Rosemarie Garland-Thomson -2023 -American Journal of Bioethics 23 (9):35-38.An attempt to reduce disability discrimination can do more harm than the ostensible discrimination itself. Such is the case with Shavelson et al.’s (2023) argument for equal access to medical aid i...
- Persons, animals, and human beings.Harold W. Noonan -2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein,Time and Identity. Bradford.This chapter discusses the suggestion that a psychological approach must be mistaken, because, in fact, the correct account of personal identity is given by the biological approach, according to which we are human beings whose identity over time requires no kind of psychological continuity or connectedness whatsoever. A number of authors support this suggestion, including Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and Eric Olson. This also presumes that humans, i.e. members of the species Homo sapiens, are animals of a certain kind. (...) It does not rule out the possibility of persons that are not human beings or animals, but it insists that we are all human animals, possessing the persistence conditions of human animals. This biological approach is often rejected with the notion that it conflicts with human intuition, as can be seen in the transplant case. (shrink)
- (1 other version)The coming bravery--a Spencerian dream.Harold Goddard -1918 -Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (24):659-668.
- Recasting the Machine Age: Henry Ford's Village Industries.Harold J. Goldberg -2006 -Utopian Studies 17 (2):425-428.
- Edward Shils' beliefs about society and sociology.Harold Orlans -1996 -Minerva 34 (1):23-37.
- Sleep-Related Attentional Bias in Insomnia: Time to Examine Moderating Factors?Umair Akram,Nicola L.Barclay &Bronwyn Milkins -2018 -Frontiers in Psychology 9.
- Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kripke and Naming and Necessity.Harold W. Noonan -2012 - New York: Routledge.Saul Kripke is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. His most celebrated work, Naming and Necessity , makes arguably the most important contribution to the philosophy of language and metaphysics in recent years. Asking fundamental questions – how do names refer to things in the world? Do objects have essential properties? What are natural kind terms and to what do they refer? – he challenges prevailing theories of language and conceptions of metaphysics, especially the descriptivist account (...) of reference, which Kripke argues is found in Frege, Wittgenstein and Russell, and the anti-essentialist metaphysics of Quine. In this invaluable guidebook to Kripke's classic work,Harold Noonan introduces and assesses: Kripke's life and the background to his philosophy the ideas and text of Naming and Necessity the continuing importance of Kripke's work to the philosophy of language and metaphysics. The Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Kripke and Naming and Necessity is an ideal starting point for anyone coming Kripke's work for the first time. It is essential reading for philosophy students studying philosophy of language, metaphysics, logic, or the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)
- A flawed argument for perdurance – reply to braddon-Mitchell and Miller.Harold W. Noonan -2005 -Analysis 65 (2):164-166.
- Reply to Simons on Coincidence.Harold W. Noonan -1986 -Mind 95 (377):100-104.
- Reply to Spinks on Temporal Parts.Harold W. Noonan -1987 -Analysis 47 (4):187-188.
- Sortal concepts and identity.Harold W. Noonan -1978 -Mind 87 (346):267-269.
- The Great Western Railway.Harold W. Noonan -2020 -Philosophia 49 (2):741-744.In On The Plurality of Worlds Lewis presents the case of the Great Western Railway as a candidate counter-example, along with the usual suspects, to the thesis that two things cannot be in the same place at the same time. Typically, pluralists or many-thingers, i.e., those who reject the thesis, point to modal or historical or aesthetic differences to justify their judgement of non-identity. Lewis’s aim to is to show the inadequacy of this justification, at least as regards modal differences, (...) by considering a case in which it clearly fails, in which the judgement of non-identity so based is incredible, and hence to make it evident that in all such cases the appeal to modal differences is insufficient. What makes the case of the Great Western Railway special is that it is a purely spatial example, as Lewis emphasises. In what follows I set out the example and try to make it clear that, as Lewis says, for this reason a judgement of non-identity based on an appeal to modal differences is incredible. Then I give another example, easier to understand, I think, which makes the same point, inspired by Russell’s famous joke about the irate yacht owner. (shrink)No categories
- The Possibility of Reincarnation.Harold W. Noonan -1990 -Religious Studies 26 (4):483 - 491.Man has always hoped to survive his bodily death, and it is a central tenet of many religions that such survival is a reality. It has been supposed by many that one form such survival might take is reincarnation in another body. Subscribers to this view include Pythagoras, Plato sometimes, and a large number of Eastern thinkers. Other thinkers have, of course, disputed that reincarnation is a fact, and some have even denied that it is a possibility. But seldom has (...) it been claimed by its opponents that reincarnation is a logical impossibility. (shrink)
- Wiggins on identity.Harold W. Noonan -1976 -Mind 85 (340):559-575.
- Williams on 'The Self and the Future'.Harold W. Noonan -1982 -Analysis 42 (3):158-163.
- The complementarity of theology and cosmology.Harold H. Oliver -1978 -Zygon 13 (1):19-33.
- 3 Chakrabarty: Tempest in a Test Tube.Harold P. Green -1980 -Hastings Center Report 10 (5):12-13.
- Commentary: The Academic as Expert Witness.Harold P. Green -1986 -Science, Technology, and Human Values 11 (2):74-75.No categories
- Intrinsic values and the explanation of behavior.Harold Greenstein -1971 -Journal of Value Inquiry 6 (4):304-310.
- Das Gefühl und der Alter.Harold Griffing -1896 -Psychological Review 3 (6):699-700.No categories
- Explaining growth.Harold Kincaid -2009 - In Don Ross & Harold Kincaid,The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 455--475.No categories
- Mechanisms, good and bad.Harold Kincaid -2021 -Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 36 (2):173-189.The claim that mechanisms are essential good science is widespread. I argue, however, that these claims are ambiguous in multiple ways. I sort out different version of the mechanism idea: (1) mechanisms that are horizontal —between cause and effect— and mechanisms that are vertical —they realize in lower-level terms causal properties—: and (2) different purposes or uses mechanisms may have. I then focus on the claim that various senses of mechanism are necessary for the confirmation of causal claims. The paper (...) shows that mechanisms can be useful, essential, or harmful depending on context, using the now standard graphical causal structure framework. These conclusions also support the larger philosophy of science moral that methodological norms in science are often context specific and empirical, not a priori and universal. (shrink)No categories
- Some Introductory Notes on Altaic and Uralic Studies for Potential Contributors toUltimate Reality and Meaning.Harold R. Battersby -1984 -Ultimate Reality and Meaning 7 (1):34-49.No categories
- The "Family Wage" and Working Women's Consciousness in Britain, 1880-1914.Harold Benenson -1991 -Politics and Society 19 (1):71-108.No categories
- Urban law—I.Harold J. Berman -1983 -History of European Ideas 4 (3):275-297.The two parts of this article constitute a single chapter in H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition.
- Hoist by his own petard: A rejoinder to Contandriopoulos.Carole Rushton &ChrisBarclay -2021 -Nursing Inquiry 28 (2):e12404.No categories
- Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies.Harold Langsam -2024 -Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):74-85.The sensory colors that figure in visual perceptual experience are either properties of the object of consciousness (naïve realism, sense-data theory), or properties of the subject of consciousness (adverbialism) (Section 1). I consider an argument suggested by the work of A. D. Smith that the existence of certain kinds of perceptual constancies shows that adverbialism is correct, for only adverbialism can account for such constancies (Section 3). I respond on behalf of the naïve realist that naïve realism is compatible with (...) the existence of such constancies, so long as naïve realism adopts the view that sensory colors are relational properties of physical objects, not intrinsic properties (Section 4). In other words, the naïve realist should adopt the theory of appearing (Section 5). (shrink)
- (1 other version)Bolzano's logic.Harold R. Smart -1944 -Philosophical Review 53 (6):513-533.
- A naturalist approach to social ontology.Harold Kincaid -2024 -Synthese 203 (1):1-18.I argue that a certain kind of naturalist approach to social ontology is likely to be both philosophically fruitful and relevant to empirical social science. The kind of naturalism I employ might be called contextualism, which emphasizes the constant presence of assumed background knowledge, is suspicious of general inference rules and all or nothing claims about the ontology of the social sciences, and argues that Quine’s quantificational criterion for ontological commitment has to be supplemented with local interpretations and arguments about (...) what specific social science research is committed to. I look at three case studies employing this perspective, one on agent based models and individualism, a second on the reality of social class, and a third on the reality of race. In all three cases work is first needed to clarifying what empirical social science is claiming, what ontology or ontologies it seems to presuppose, and then description of the kinds of evidence that supports its commitments. (shrink)No categories
- Dr. Swabey's laws of thought.Harold R. Smart -1923 -Philosophical Review 32 (3):300-307.
- Logical Theory.Harold R. Smart -1926 -The Monist 36 (4):594-604.
| 1 — 50 / 922 |
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server or OpenAthens.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
 Email |  RSS feed |
Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Home |New books and articles |Bibliographies |Philosophy journals |About PhilPapers |API |Contact us |Code of conduct
PhilPapers logo byAndrea Andrews andMeghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see ourterms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).Use of this site is subject toterms & conditions.
All rights reserved byThe PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-54b44b69b7-cj6sj uwo