Works by Guillaume Fréchette
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- Descriptive Psychology: Brentano and Dilthey.Guillaume Fréchette -2020 -Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (1):290-307.Although Wilhelm Dilthey and Franz Brentano apparently were pursuing roughly the same objective—to offer a description of our mental functions and of their relations to objects—and both called their respective research programs ‘descriptive psychology’, they seem to have used the term to refer to two different methods of psychological research. In this article, I compare analyses of these differences. Against the reading of Orth but also against a possible application of recent relativist accounts of the epistemology of peer disagreement to (...) this case, I argue that their apparent shared objective is not enough to support an understanding of their views as two alternatives within a given historical or scientific context, or as a mutual peer disagreement. I show that the impression of a shared objective can be explained away as stemming from the influence of their teacher Adolf Trendelenburg, and I stress that the case of introspection strongly suggests that an account in terms of peer disagreement is not plausible. Finally, I conclude that the opposition between two traditions, Austrian philosophy and historicism, might be better suited to account for the dispute and its apparent common historical context. (shrink)
- Brentano's Thesis (Revisited).Guillaume Frechette -2013 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette,Themes from Brentano. New York, NY: Editions Rodopi. pp. 91-119.
- Why does it matter to individuate the senses: A Brentanian approach.Guillaume Fréchette -2023 -European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):413-430.How do we individuate the senses, what exactly do we do when we do so, and why does it matter? In the following article, I propose a general answer to these related questions based on Franz Brentano's views on the senses. After a short survey of various answers offered in the recent literature on the senses, I distinguish between two major ways of answering this question, causally and descriptively, arguing that only answers giving priority to description and to the classification (...) involved in it are on the right track for a general answer to the related questions. In the second part of the article, I argue that Brentano's descriptive psychology is an attractive candidate for such an answer. His descriptive psychology provides a plausible account of the classification involved in description, in particular regarding the classification of sensory qualities. I close the article by briefly explaining how Brentano spells out the priority of descriptive answers over causal ones. (shrink)
- Themes from Brentano.Denis Fisette &Guillaume Fréchette (eds.) -2013 - New York, NY: Editions Rodopi.Franz Brentano’s impact on the philosophy of his time and on 20th-century philosophy is considerable. The “sharp dialectician” (Freud) and “genial master” (Husserl) influenced philosophers of various allegiances, being acknowledged not only as the “grandfather of phenomenology” (Ryle) but also as an analytic philosopher “in the best sense of this term” (Chisholm). The fourteen new essays gathered together in this volume give an insight in three core issues of Brentano’s philosophy: consciousness (sect.1), intentionality (sect. 2) and ontology and metaphysics (sect. (...) 3). Two further sections of the volume deal with the posterity of his philoso¬phy: in section 4, the legacy of his account of sense perception and feeling is discussed, while the history of Brentano’s unpublished manuscripts is discussed in section 5. This section also presents an edition of a manuscript from 1899 on relations, along with the letters from Brentano to Marty which discuss this manuscript. The last part of section 5 contains the text of a public lecture given by Brentano on the laws of inference. (shrink)
- Marty on Abstraction.Guillaume Fréchette -2017 - In Hamid Taieb & Guillaume Fréchette,Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 169-194.
- The Origins of Phenomenology in Austro-German Philosophy. Brentano, Husserl.Guillaume Fréchette -2019 - In John Shand,A Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy). Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 418-453.The development of phenomenology in nineteenth‐century German philosophy is that of a particular stream within the larger historical‐philosophical complex of Austro‐German philosophy. As the “grandfather of phenomenology” resp. the “disgusted grandfather of phenomenology,” but also as the key figure on the “Anglo‐Austrian Analytic Axis”, Brentano is at the source of the two main philosophical traditions in twentieth‐century philosophy. This chapter focuses mainly on his place in nineteenth‐century European philosophy and on the central themes and concepts in his philosophy that were (...) determinant in the development of the philosophy of his most gifted student: Edmund Husserl. Despite the variety of stances which Brentano expressed on ontology, metaphysics, and psychology over the course of his career, the five general principles remain central to his whole philosophy throughout: they have an important place in what could be called Brentano's philosophical worldview or system. By extension, they also are essential to his conception of phenomenology. (shrink)
- The Origins of Phenomenology in Austro‐German Philosophy.Guillaume Fréchette -2019 - In John Shand,A Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy). Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 418–453.The development of phenomenology in nineteenth‐century German philosophy is that of a particular stream within the larger historical‐philosophical complex of Austro‐German philosophy. As the “grandfather of phenomenology” resp. the “disgusted grandfather of phenomenology,” but also as the key figure on the “Anglo‐Austrian Analytic Axis”, Brentano is at the source of the two main philosophical traditions in twentieth‐century philosophy. This chapter focuses mainly on his place in nineteenth‐century European philosophy and on the central themes and concepts in his philosophy that were (...) determinant in the development of the philosophy of his most gifted student: Edmund Husserl. Despite the variety of stances which Brentano expressed on ontology, metaphysics, and psychology over the course of his career, the five general principles remain central to his whole philosophy throughout: they have an important place in what could be called Brentano's philosophical worldview or system. By extension, they also are essential to his conception of phenomenology. (shrink)No categories
- Searching for the Self: Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness from Lotze to Scheler.Guillaume Frechette -2013 -International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (5):1-26.Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irre- ducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self- consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these (...) phenomenologists was not influenced as much by Husserl as by two important figures in the prehistory of phenomenology: their teacher Theodor Lipps, and – indi- rectly, through Lipps’ influence – Hermann Lotze. Second, I show that their account of self-consciousness takes the metaphysical realism underlying Lotze’s and Lipps’ views on the distinction between feeling and sensations seriously. I argue that this distinction played a central role in the development of many early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness. (shrink)
- Gegenstandslose Vorstellungen: Bolzano und seine Kritiker.Guillaume Fréchette -2010 - Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
- Essential Laws. On Ideal Objects and their Properties in Early Phenomenology.Guillaume Fréchette -2015 - In Bruno Leclercq, Sébastien Richard & Denis Seron,Objects and Pseudo-Objects Ontological Deserts and Jungles from Brentano to Carnap. Boston: de Gruyter. pp. 143-166.No categories
- Le legs de Brentano.Denis Fisette &Guillaume Frechette -2007 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Frechette,À l’école de Brentano. Paris: Vrin. pp. 7-161.Introduction à l'ouvrage: À l'École de Brentano, Paris, Vrin, 2007.
- Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty.Hamid Taieb &Guillaume Fréchette (eds.) -2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847–Prague, 1914) contributed significantly to some of the central themes of Austrian philosophy. This collection contributes to assessing the specificity of his theses in relation with other Austrian philosophers. Although strongly inspired by his master, Franz Brentano, Marty developed his own theory of intentionality, understood as a sui generis relation of similarity. Moreover, he established a comprehensive philosophy of language, or "semasiology", based on descriptive psychology, and in which the utterer’s meaning plays a central role, anticipating Grice’s (...) pragmatic semantics. The present volume, including sixteen articles by scholars in the field of the history of Austrian philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, aims at exposing some of Marty’s most important contributions in philosophy of mind and language, but also in other fields of research such as ontology and metaphysics. As archive material, the volume contains the edition of a correspondence between Marty and Hans Cornelius on similarity. This book will interest scholars in the fields of the history of philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries, historians of phenomenology, and, more broadly, contemporary theoretical philosophers. (shrink)
- Phenomenology as Descriptive Psychology.Guillaume Fréchette -2012 -Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 16 (2):150-170.Is phenomenology nothing else than descriptive psychology? In the first edition of his Logical Investigations (LI), Husserl conceived of phenomenology as a description and analysis of the experiences of knowledge, unequivocally stating that “phenomenology is descriptive psychology.” Most interestingly, although the first edition of the LI was the reference par excellence in phenomenology for the Munich phenomenologists, they remained suspicious of this characterisationof phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the reception of descriptive psychology among (...) Munich phenomenologists and, at the same time, to offer a re-evaluation of their understanding of realist phenomenology. (shrink)
- Deux aspects de l'intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano.Guillaume Fréchette -2012 - In Ion Tănăsescu,Franz Brentano's Psychology and Metaphysics. Zeta.
- Einführung.Guillaume Fréchette -2018 - In Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Thomas Binder,Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung. De Gruyter.No categories
- Actualité de Carl Stumpf.Guillaume Fréchette -2010 -Dialogue 49 (2):267-285.
- Brentano et la France.Denis Fisette &Guillaume Fréchette -2017 -Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 142 (4):459.Introduction au numéro spécial de la Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger en hommage au centenaire de la mort de Franz Brentano.
- Géométrie, fiction et discours sous hypothèse : Husserl et les objets intentionnels en 1894.Guillaume Fréchette -2009 -Philosophiques 36 (2):355-379.Dans l’essai Objets intentionnels de 1894, Husserl développe en réaction à Twardowski une théorie originale de l’assomption comme solution au problème des représentations sans objet. Après avoir examiné le détail de cette théorie et en avoir soulevé les difficultés, je montre dans cet article que la solution proposée par cette théorie doit être abordée de manière indépendante de celle qui sera développée plus tard dans les Recherches logiques et j’expose dans quelle mesure elle est ancrée dans la psychologie descriptive brentanienne (...) tout en mettant à profit certains outils de la logique de Bolzano. Enfin, j’indique que Husserl continuera à développer cette théorie après les Recherches logiques, confirmant ainsi qu’elle occupe une place de choix dans la théorie phénoménologique du jugement.In his essay Intentional Objects of 1894, Husserl develops in response to Twardowski an original theory of assumptions as a solution to the problem of objectless presentations. First, I analyze in this paper the main points of his theory and point out some of the difficulties it raises. I then suggest that the solution presented in this theory must be addressed independently of the one developed by Husserl later in the Logical Investigations and try to show in which extent his theory of assumptions is rooted in the brentanian descriptive psychology, although it makes good use of some logical tools from Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre. Since Husserl continues to work on this theory even after the Logical Investigations, it confirms the important place one should give to the theory of assumptions it the phenomenological theory of judgment. (shrink)
- Austrian Logical Realism? Brentano on States of Affairs.Guillaume Fréchette -2014 - In Guido Bonino, Greg Jesson & Javier Cumpa,Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 379-400.
- Bergman and Brentano.Guillaume Fréchette -2017 - In Uriah Kriegel,The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 323-333.
- The Given: Experience and Its Content, written by Michelle Montague.Guillaume Fréchette -2019 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):273-279.No categories
- Contenu et objet du jugement chez Brentano.Guillaume Fréchette -2011 -Philosophiques 38 (1):241-261.Logical realism is undoubtedly one of the central features which characterize many of the major works in Austrian philosophy from Bolzano to Husserl. Although this remark is true, as we believe, one must not forget the fact that some of the key concepts of Austrian philosophy are rooted in theories that reject realist principles. As an example, take the concept of state of affairs in Austrian philosophy, and more specifically, Franz Brentano's conception of judgement contents. By showing the motives which (...) led Brentano to introduce these judgement contents and by analyzing the arguments given to support his thesis, the present article aims to contrast the initial remark by illustrating, by means of the case of state of affairs, how the interrelations between realist and nominalist positions have shaped the development of Austrian philosophy. (shrink)
- Kant, Brentano and Stumpf on Psychology and Anti-Psychologism.Guillaume Fréchette -2013 - In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing,Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Boston: de Gruyter. pp. 727-736.
- L’intuition est-elle une attitude propositionnelle?Guillaume Fréchette -2017 -Philosophiques 44 (1):11-30.Guillaume Fréchette | : Il est généralement admis dans la littérature analytique sur l’intuition que celle-ci est principalement, ou même fondamentalement, une attitude propositionnelle. Partant de là, elle est aussi souvent caractérisée comme une croyance que P, comme la formation d’une croyance sans inférence que P, comme une impression que P, comme une impression intellectuelle que P, comme l’attitude consistant à être poussé, mu par P. Dans tous les cas, la spécificité de l’intuition reposerait au moins en partie sur les (...) propriétés doxastiques qui la distingue d’autres attitudes propositionnelles, comme savoir que P ou douter que P.Cette caractérisation de l’intuition semble à première vue incommensurable avec le concept d’intuition discuté dans la tradition phénoménologique, où l’intuition est caractérisée comme ce type d’expérience qui rend les objets présents, et peut certes être caractérisée en termes d’attitude propositionnelle, mais ne l’est pas essentiellement.Dans ce qui suit, je soulève quelques problèmes auxquels fait face la conception de l’intuition comme attitude propositionnelle. Partant de là, j’aimerais suggérer qu’en amendant cette idée, on peut développer une théorie de l’intuition qui peut employer de manière fructueuse les ressources de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique. Cette suggestion montre que l’incommensurabilité des conceptions analytiques et phénoménologiques de l’intuition est superficielle, plus superficielle que ne le laissent entendre ses défenseurs respectifs. | : It is generally acknowledged in the analytic literature on intuitions that these are generally, or even fundamentally, propositional attitudes. For this reason, intuitions are often characterized as beliefs that P, as seeming that P, as the intellectual seeming that P, or as the attitude of being pushed by P. In all cases, the specificity of intuitions would consist at least in part in the doxastic properties that distinguishes them from other propositional attitudes, such as knowing that P or doubting that P.At first glance, this characterization of intuitions seems incommensurable with the concept of intuition discussed in the phenomenological tradition, where intuition is characterized as the type of experience that make objects present to us. While intuitions in this sense may be characterized as propositional attitudes, it doesn’t imply that they fundamentally are propositional.In the following paper, I raise some problems which faces the conception of intuitions as propositional attitudes. I would suggest that amending this idea allows to develop a theory of intuition which can use fruitfully both the resources of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. As a consequence, the alleged incommensurability of analytical and phenomenological conceptions of intuitions appears to be more superficial than it is usually taken to be defenders of intuitions as propositional attitudes. (shrink)No categories
- L’intentionnalité et le caractère qualitatif des vécus. Husserl, Brentano et Lotze.Guillaume Fréchette -2010 -Studia Phaenomenologica 10:91-117.Lotze’s influence on the development of the XIXth and XXth century philosophy and psychology remains largely neglected still today. In this paper, I examine some Lotzean elements in Husserl’s early conception of intentionality, and more specifically in his rejection of the Brentanian concept of intentionality. I argue that Husserl and Lotze, pace Brentano, share a qualitative conception of experiences, what they both call the Zumutesein of experiences. Furthermore, I discuss other issues upon which Husserl and Lotze share common intuitions: the (...) perception of space, the theory of local signs, the realisations of thinking (Leistungen des Denkens) and phenomenology. (shrink)
- Essential Laws: On Ideal Objects and their Properties in Early Phenomenology.Guillaume Fréchette -2015 - In Bruno Leclercq, Sébastien Richard & Denis Seron,Objects and Pseudo-Objects Ontological Deserts and Jungles from Brentano to Carnap. Boston: de Gruyter. pp. 143-166.In the present paper, I try to shed some light on the Munich-Göttingen conception of essences, laws of essence, and ideal objects. I first start with a preliminary account of their conception of the synthetic a priori at the basis of their conception of essence (§2); I then offer a first characterization of this conception, which I label as metaphysical realism (§3), highlighting its key concept: foundation (§4). In the last four sections (§§5-8), I discuss different outcomes of this conception (...) of essences: the nature of laws of essences (§5), different categories of essences (§6) and anumericity (§7). (shrink)
- Descriptive Psychology: Franz Brentano's Project Today.Guillaume Fréchette &Hamid Taieb -2023 -European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):337-340.No categories
- Homeless Objects.Guillaume Fréchette -2023 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):207-230.In this article, I shed some light on Meinong’s motivations for the theory of objects. I argue that one of its basic principles, the principle of indifference, is driven by an intuition common to many Austrian philosophers, which is that something must first be somehow pre-given in order to simply address the issue of its being or non-being. Meinong’s way of spelling out this intuition, I suggest, is to show that there are homeless objects, that is, objects that are not (...) dealt with by any of the existing sciences. Therefore, the indispensability of the theory of objects lies in the plausibility of the thesis that there are such homeless objects. I analyse and evaluate two Meinongian arguments supporting this thesis, I explain how Meinong came to believe that they support the indispensability of the theory of objects, and I stress some advantages of this account over Brentano’s intentionality thesis. (shrink)No categories
- Einleitung / Introduction.Guillaume Fréchette,Janette Friedrich &Anton Hügli -2016 -Schweizerische Zeitschrift Für Philosophie 75 (StPh75).No categories
- L’école de Brentano et la réalité sociale.Guillaume Fréchette -2024 -Cahiers Philosophiques 179 (4):65-78.No categories
- (1 other version)Franz Brentano’s Philosophy After One Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism.Denis Fisette,Guillaume Fréchette &Hynek Janoušek (eds.) -2020 - Springer.This volume brings together contributions that explore the philosophy of Franz Brentano. It looks at his work both critically and in the context of contemporary philosophy. For instance, Brentano influenced the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong, the early development of the Gestalt theory, the philosophy of language of Anton Marty, the works of Carl Stumpf in the psychology of tone, and many others. Readers will also learn the contributions of Brentano's work to much debated (...) contemporary issues in philosophy of mind, ontology, and the theory of emotions. The first section deals with Brentano’s conception of the history of philosophy. The next approaches his conception of empirical psychology from an empirical standpoint and in relation with competing views on psychology from the period. The third section discusses Brentano’s later programme of a descriptive psychology or “descriptive phenomenology” and some of his most innovative developments, for instance in the theory of emotions. The final section examines metaphysical issues and applications of his mereology. His reism takes here an important place. The intended readership of this book comprises phenomenologists, analytic philosophers, philosophers of mind and value, as well as metaphysicians. It will appeal to both graduate and undergraduate students, professors, and researchers in philosophy and psychology. (shrink)
- Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy.Denis Fisette,Guillaume Fréchette &Friedrich Stadler (eds.) -2020 - New York: Springer.The book discusses Franz Brentano’s impact on Austrian philosophy. It contains both a critical reassessment of Brentano’s place in the development of Austrian philosophy at the turn of the 20th century and a reevaluation of the impact and significance of his philosophy of mind or ‘descriptive psychology’ which was Brentano's most important contribution to contemporary philosophy and to the philosophy in Vienna. In addition, the relation between Brentano, phenomenology, and the Vienna Circle is investigated, together with a related documentation of (...) Brentano's disciple Alfred Kastil. The general part deals with the ongoing discussion of Carnap's "Aufbau" and the philosophy of mind, with a focus on physicalism as discussed by Carnap and Wittgenstein. As usual, two reviews of recent publications in the philosophy of mathematics and research on Otto Neurath's lifework are included as related research contributions. This book is of interest to students, historians, and philosophers dealing with the history of Austrian and German philosophy in the 19th and 20th century. (shrink)
- Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook Volume 24.Denis Fisette,Guillaume Fréchette &Friedrich Stadler (eds.) -2020Export citation
Bookmark - Brentano on Sensory Intentionality.Guillaume Fréchette -2016 -Schweizerische Zeitschrift Für Philosophie 75 (StPh75).No categories
- Daubert et les limites de la phénoménologie : Étude sur le donné et l'évidence.Guillaume Fréchette -2001 -Philosophiques 28 (2):303-326.Johannes Daubert est la figure centrale du Cercle de Munich ainsi que le premier véritable lecteur et critique de Husserl. Ses manuscrits contiennent, en plus d'une critique de la phénoménologie husserlienne, une conception originale de la phénoménologie laissant notamment une place importante aux analyses perceptives. Le présent article s'intéresse d'abord aux thèmes du donné et de l'évidence en tant qu'ils sont des motifs centraux à la fois chez Husserl et Daubert, pour ensuite relever, à partir d'une étude des manuscrits pertinents, (...) la particularité des analyses daubertiennes concernant ces thèmes, ainsi que les contraintes ou limites que la phénoménologie doit s'imposer pour notamment se distinguer du rationalisme.Johannes Daubert is the central figure of the Munich Circle as well as the first real critical reader of Husserl. His manuscripts contain, in addition to a critique of the husserlian phenomenology, an original conception of phenomenology leaving a significant place to the perceptive analyses. This article is initially concerned with the topics of the given and of the evidence as they are central themes in Husserl's and Daubert's works, for then raising, starting from a study of the relevant manuscripts, the peculiarity of the daubertian analyses concerning these topics, as well as the constraints or limits that the phenomenology must impose itself to be distinguished from the Rationalism. (shrink)
- De l'intentionalité à la théorie de l'objet. Meinong et son école, ses critiques.Guillaume Fréchette -2014 - In C.-E. Niveleau,Vers une philosophie scientifique. Le programme de Brentano. Demopolis.Export citation Bookmark
- From Brentano to Mach. Carving Austrian Philosophy at its Joints.Guillaume Fréchette -2019 - In Friedrich Stadler,Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence. Springer Verlag.In many respects, Mach’s arrival in Vienna in 1895 marks the beginning of a new era in Austrian philosophy, paving the way for young philosophers and scientists like Hahn and Neurath and preparing the soil for the Vienna Circle. While this understanding of Mach’s contribution to the development of Viennese philosophy seems correct to an important extent, it leaves aside the role of Brentano and his school in this development. I argue that the Brentanian and Machian moments of Austrian philosophy (...) are jointed. I propose a description of the nature of these joints based on institutional, methodological, and philosophical aspects of these phases, and suggest a diagnosis that supports what I take to be the right carving between these two moments. (shrink)
- Introduction : Nature, rôle et importance des intuitions.Guillaume Fréchette &Jimmy Plourde -2017 -Philosophiques 44 (1):5-10.No categories
- Kevin Mulligan: Wittgenstein et la philosophie austro-allemande.Guillaume Fréchette -2014 -Schweizerische Zeitschrift Für Philosophie 73 (StPh73).No categories
- L'intentionnalité dans la Théorie de la science de Bolzano. Éléments d'une reconstruction.Guillaume Fréchette -2014 -Methodos 14.Dans la réception de Bolzano, et probablement depuis les Prolégomènes de Husserl, on insiste généralement sur le fait que la Théorie de la science (1837) de Bolzano vise à développer une théorie des représentations et des propositions qui fait de celles-ci des entités logiques de plein droit, indépendantes des actes de pensée, et seules porteuses des propriétés dont traite la logique (vérité, fausseté, objectualité, etc.) L’importance accordée à cette position, souvent appelée réalisme logique (Morscher), tend toutefois à masquer d’autres aspects (...) de l’ouvrage de Bolzano qui, sans contredire ce réalisme logique, montrent toutefois que la perspective développée par le philosophe de Prague visait aussi à rendre compte de la relation intentionnelle entre l’agent et ces entités logiques. Dans le présent article, je me penche sur les moyens mis en branle par Bolzano pour élucider cette relation. Dans un premier temps, j’examine le cas des représentations sans objet en soulignant le caractère intentionnel de certaines de leurs caractérisations. Dans un deuxième temps, je me penche sur le traitement réservé au jugement en relation à la proposition en soi. Dans la dernière partie de l’article, j’expose les grandes lignes de sa conception des intentions de signification sous-jacente à sa sémiotique. Pris comme un tout, ces trois cas montrent que le thème de l’intentionnalité n’est pas un épiphénomène dans la Théorie de la science, comme on pourrait le croire en partant de l’interprétation de Bolzano par Husserl, mais bien une partie constituante de l’entreprise du philosophe de Prague. (shrink)
- Le moment normatif dans la philosophie austro-allemande.Guillaume Fréchette -2015 -Philosophiques 42 (2):375-384.
- Phenomenology and Characterology. Austrian and Bavarian.Guillaume Fréchette -2023 - In Íngrid Vendrell Ferran,Else Voigtländer: Self, Emotion, and Sociality. Springer, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences. pp. 163-178.In this study, I discuss two main accounts of character traits within the phenomenological tradition: the so-called Austrian and Bavarian accounts. I present the first account with Franz Brentano’s views on character traits as dispositions (Sects. 9.2 and 9.3) and the second account with Else Voigtländer’s characterology, in which character traits are states of one’s person accessible through self-feelings (Selbstgefühle) (Sect. 9.4). I conclude with an evaluation of these views (Sect. 9.5), stressing their respective problems.No categories
- Two Phenomenological Accounts of Intuition.Guillaume Fréchette -2014 - In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl,Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 129-142.Phenomenological accounts of intuition are often considered as significantly different from, or even incommensurable with most of the conception of intuitions defended in analytical philosophy. In this paper, I reject this view. Starting with what I consider to be a relatively neutral phenomenological account of intuition, I first present the main features of Husserl’s and Brentano’s accounts of intuition, showing the structural similarities and differences between these two views. After confronting them, I finally come back to what unites the two (...) views in order to outline a map of the problem of intuition in which both traditions, the analytical and the phenomenological, appear as two complementary takes on one and the same problem. (shrink)
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion.Guillaume Frechette -2019 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler,The Philosophy of Perception: Proceedings of the 40th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 119-134.Brentano’s philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory of intentionality. If all and only mental phenomena are constitutively intentional, and if perceptual experience is mental by definition, then all perceptual experiences are intentional experiences. I refer to this conception as the “standard view” of Brentano’s account of perception. Different options are available to support the standard view: a sense-data theory of perception; an adverbialist account; representationalism. I argue that none of them are real (...) options for the standard view. I suggest that Brentano’s conception of optical illusions introduces a presupposition that not only challenges the standard view - the distinction between the subjectively and objectively given - but that also makes his account more palatable for a naive understanding of perception as openness to and awareness of the world. (shrink)
- Leibniz and Brentano on Apperception.Guillaume Frechette -2011 - In H. Breger, J. Herbst & S. Erdner,Natur Und Subjekt: Akten des Ix. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses. Hartmann.
- Sur le rôle de la psychologie en théorie de la connaissance. Kant à l’école de Brentano.Guillaume Frechette -2011 - In M. Lequan, S. Grapotte & M. Ruffing,Kant et les sciences. Vrin.Export citation Bookmark
- Anton Marty: From Mind to Language.Hamid Taieb &Guillaume Fréchette -2017 - In Hamid Taieb & Guillaume Fréchette,Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 1-20.As a Swiss-born Austro-German philosopher who taught in Czernowitz and in Prague, Marty was not only a cosmopolitan thinker; he had also an exceptional knowledge of the history of philosophy and well-informed inclinations towards specific branches of the discipline. He was influenced by Aristotle, the Scholastics, and early modern philosophers (both rationalists and empiricists), and was unsympathetic towards Kant and German Idealism. Yet his main intellectual inspiration came from his master Franz Brentano, whose conception of philosophy as a science—especially his (...) fourth habilitation thesis—made a lasting impression on many of his students, most prominently on Marty and Stumpf. By way of presenting the contributions to this volume, we offer here a general outline of Marty’s life and works, of his Brentanian upbringing, and we sketch some of his central ideas in philosophy—more precisely on mind, language, and their ontology, with regards to the themes discussed in the contributions. (shrink)
- Frontmatter.Hamid Taieb &Guillaume Fréchette -2017 - In Hamid Taieb & Guillaume Fréchette,Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. Berlin: De Gruyter.No categories
- List of Contributors.Hamid Taieb &Guillaume Fréchette -2017 - In Hamid Taieb & Guillaume Fréchette,Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 367-368.No categories
- Table of Contents.Hamid Taieb &Guillaume Fréchette -2017 - In Hamid Taieb & Guillaume Fréchette,Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. Berlin: De Gruyter.No categories
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
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