Movatterモバイル変換

Fogelin (2002 [1976]; 1992 [1981]; 1994) was the first one to speak about “Neopyrrhonism” to link Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus. To him, Pyrrhonism “combines philosophical scepticism with scepticism about philosophy, that is, to have doubts about philosophy on the basis of philosophical arguments” (1994, p. 3). Following this interpretation, Neopyrrhonism can be understood as a kind of scepticism that cancels philosophy using self-destructive arguments (peritrope). Both Sextus -with his proposal of suspension of judgment- and Wittgenstein -with his idea of the (...) dissolution of philosophical problems- are representatives of quietism. Neopyrrhonism as quietism can be conceived of as a therapeutic proposal mainly based on not postulating an argumentative-constructive philosophical theory. Against this perspective, I propose interpreting Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy, from which a performative proposal emerges. In this approach, Neopyrrhonism is an open-ended inquiry that implies the ability of using different philosophical argumentative strategies in a performative sense to encourage a new way of exercising philosophy. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

Fogelin (_Informal Logic_ 7:1–8, 1985) puts forth the notion of “deep disagreements” in the context of the discussion on informal logic and the scope and functions of argumentation. My aim is to contrast some of the assumptions that led Fogelin to a restrictive model about the uses of argumentation and deep disagreements, in order to offer an enriched alternative model. First, I will present the _resolution model_ based on some of Fogelin’s ideas: those in disagreement are interested in resolving differences; (...) arguments play the role of rational resolution by offering compelling grounds; persuasion is not part of the rational argumentative practices of resolution. Second, I will offer a Wittgenstein-inspired alternative, the _grammatical model_. This model is advantageous for distinguishing between different functions of disagreements -many of which do not seek resolution. This allows me to postulate the idea of _open_ disagreements. The model also points out the diverse purposes that argumentative practices can play, some of which include persuasion. The latter makes it possible to introduce the notion of _persuasive clarifications_ as rational argumentative practices that help us to see differences. Finally, I will propose that, in the contexts of moral disagreements, these clarifications more clearly show the world-picture that upholds our positions and encourage us to change the way of seeing and understanding the moral issue under discussion. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

1. La experiencia de lo cotidiano [se] nos brinda siempre con anomalías, incongruencias, contradicciones. Y, cuando intentamos explicarlas, explicaciones a primera vista razonables acaban por revelarse insatisfactorias después de un examen más cuidadoso. La naturaleza de las cosas y de los acontecimientos no nos parece fácilmente inteligible. Las opiniones y los puntos de vista de los hombres son difícilmente conciliables o, incluso, unos con otros inconsistentes. Consensos quizá emergentes se muestran provisionales y precarios. Quien siente la necesidad de pensar con (...) un espíritu más crítico e intenta comprender mejor, esa diversidad toda lo desconcierta. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Commented Article: MI, Chienkuo. Memory and Reflection. Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp journal of philosophy, vol. 44, Special issue in honor of Ernest Sosa, p. 151-168, 2021.

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

En la conferencia “Las lógicas y las cosas”, Alberto Moretti sostiene que los enfoques que se centran en el fenómeno de la interpretación para dar cuenta del problema del significado adolecen de un problema, a saber, no admiten las condiciones trascendentales que posibilitan la significatividad. Así, en el contexto de la interpretación, el hecho de distinguir a otros como hablantes es la posibilidad de distinguir a otros como objetos relacionados en el mundo. Esta distinción es posible porque los principios lógicos (...) específicos exponen la estructura básica para el discurso y el pensamiento pero también, la estructura elemental del mundo o realidad. En otras palabras, los principios lógicos que estructuran nuestro lenguaje son también principios de las cosas. Este argumento puede ser considerado un argumento trascendental por establecer, a través del señalamiento de ciertas condiciones necesarias, la íntima conexión lenguaje-mundo que da cuenta de la significatividad, y por insinuarse como una respuesta al problema del mundo externo. Me propongo discutir el alcance de este argumento a partir de la idea de la autonomía del lenguaje que Wittgenstein desarrolla en Sobre la Certeza, la cual conlleva una estrategia disolutoria alternativa frente al desafío escéptico. Para dar cuenta de dicha estrategia, me centraré en la distinción entre proposiciones lógicas y empíricas. También analizaré la distinción mostrar-decir que, en su relación con la noción de “formas de vida”, permite iluminar aspectos de su enfoque praxiológico sobre el lenguaje. Así, defenderé un enfoque que no omite, sino que rechaza, la posibilidad de un punto de vista externo, tanto para dar cuenta del lenguaje como para responder al escéptico. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

La preocupación por los modos de producción del discurso filosófico como inseparable de la práctica filosófica ha sido un rasgo distintivo del período helenístico, y desde nuestra perspectiva, adopta un rasgo novedoso en el escepticismo antiguo. El pirronismo incluye en su propuesta el tratamiento crítico sobre la tendencia aseverativa propia del lenguaje como fuente productora de dogmatismos. De esta manera, la terapéutica escéptica debe operar también sobre las propias expresiones y los tipos de escritura que adopta el pirrónico. Wittgenstein parece (...) cercano a algunas de estas preocupaciones en la medida en que las formas de expresar y escribir deben reflejar el enfoque no-teórico en el que se practica la filosofía - asociado a una reflexión filosófica sobre el lenguaje. Atendiendo a ciertos aspectos de la orientación pirrónica como clave de lectura, estudiaremos las reflexiones de Wittgenstein sobre sus propios escritos como quedan exhibidas en sus prólogos. Concern about modes of production of philosophical discourse as inseparable from philosophical practice has been a distinctive feature of the Hellenistic period and, from our perspective, it adopts a new feature in ancient skepticism. Pyrrhonism includes, in its proposal, the critical treatment on assertive trend inherent to language as a source of dogmatism. Thus, the skeptical therapeutic must also operate on the expressions and types of writing pyrrhonics use. Wittgenstein seems close to some of these concerns in the sense that the ways of expressing and writing should reflect the non-theoretical approach in which philosophy is practised -associated to a philosophical reflection on language. Regarding certain aspects of the Pyrrhonian orientation as a reading key, we will study Wittgenstein's reflections on his own writings as are exhibited in his prologues. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

No categories

Export citation   Bookmark  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

This article examines Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflection on philosophy: its method, its scope, and its relationship with other knowledge as central elements of the philosophical proposal the author developed in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Therefore, my proposal is to rehearse a metaphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks about philosophy in TLP focusing, on the one hand, on his reflections on philosophy as an activity and not as a theory; on the other hand, on his categorical differentiation established between philosophical elucidations and scientific explanations. This (...) proposal differs from the readings that interpret it is through the construction of a theory of meaning -or logical doctrine- that one can distinguish philosophical nonsense and see the world correctly. It also differs from Tractatus’s non-theoretical or quietist readings which understand philosophical elucidations as exclusively negative or critical nonsense. My aim is to highlight a positive aspect of philosophical elucidations that I will call performative. From my metaphilosophical reading, not only does the activity of clarification work as a critical sieve that separates what makes sense from what does not –with no theory; but it also makes a modification -a transformation- in the one who establishes it. These performative aspects imply emphasizing that there is a change in the way we see the world but also in the way we ‘see’ language, meaning, logic, science, philosophy, life, etc. Thus, the refusal to elaborate a theory or to offer scientific explanations does not turn the philosophical elucidations in TLP into a mode of self-destructive attack on all kinds of philosophy. On the contrary, these elucidations are part of the defense of a particular way of practicing it. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Recent discussions about the ancient sources of skepticism have provided new elements to evaluate the scope of the Pyrrhonian proposal and to differentiate it from modern skeptical manifestations. This, in turn, has allowed us to explore the affinities between the ideas that Sextus Empiricus exposed in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the ideas that Wittgenstein presented in On Certainty. My purpose is to evaluate the scope of these affnities from the place that both authors give to the problem of disagreement.

No categories

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark