Works by Gregory Mellema
46 found
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| Gregory Mellema [47] | Gregory F. Mellema [1] | Gregory Frank Mellema [1] |
- Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence.Gregory Mellema -1991 - State University of New York Press.The possibility of supererogation--doing more than one feels morally obliged to do--is denied by many thinkers.
- Complicity and moral accountability.Gregory Mellema -2016 - Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema presents a philosophical approach to the moral issues involved in complicity. Starting with a taxonomy of Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there are nine ways for one to become complicit in the wrongdoing of another, Mellema analyzes each kind of complicity and examines the moral status of someone complicit in each of these ways. Mellema's central argument is that one must perform a contributing action to qualify as an accomplice, and that it is (...) always morally blameworthy to perform such an action. Additionally, he argues that an accomplice frequently bears moral responsibility for the outcome of the other's wrongdoing, but he distinguishes this case from cases in which the accomplice is tainted by the wrongdoing of the principal actor. He further distinguishes between enabling, facilitating, and condoning harm, and introduces the concept of indirect complicity. Mellema tackles issues that are clearly important to any case of collective and shared responsibility, yet rarely discussed in depth, always presenting his arguments clearly, concisely, and engagingly. His account of the nonmoral as well as moral qualities of complicity in wrongdoing--especially of the many and varied ways in which principles and accomplices can interact--is highly illuminating. Liberally sprinkled with helpful and nuanced examples, Complicity and Moral Accountability vividly illustrates the many ways in which one may be complicit in wrongdoing. "In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema has made an immensely important contribution to the discussion of group morality and collective responsibility both within and far beyond professional academic philosophy. His clearly written book will be essential reading." --Fergus Kerr, Honorary Fellow, University of Edinburgh. (shrink)
- Collective responsibility and qualifying actions.Gregory Mellema -2006 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):168–175.The article presents the issues arising from the memberships of moral agents in collectives that have the burden of moral responsibility. Likewise, it examines the qualifying actions that qualify their membership including deliberate contribution, risk taking and others. It differentiates collective responsibility to shared responsibility.
- Quasi-supererogation.Gregory Mellema -1987 -Philosophical Studies 52 (1):141 - 150.
- Supererogation and Protestantism.Gregory Mellema -2023 - In David Heyd,Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 315-327.This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part describes the events leading up to the Protestant Reformation, including Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between the commandments of God and the counsels of God. The second part describes the anti-supererogationist views of the Reformers, Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon. The third part examines the views of a contemporary figure, Joseph Allen, whose Protestant commitment leads him to espouse anti-supererogationist views. The fourth part explains why contemporary Protestants are by and large open to (...) acknowledging the possibility of supererogation. (shrink)
- Supererogation and the fulfillment of duty.Gregory Mellema -1991 -Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (2):167-175.
- Moral Ideals and Virtue Ethics.Gregory F. Mellema -2010 -The Journal of Ethics 14 (2):173-180.There have traditionally been two schools of thought regarding moral ideals and their relationship with moral duty. First, many have held that moral agents at all times have a duty or obligation to realize or attain moral ideals, or at least they have a duty to strive to realize or attain them. A second school of thought has maintained that attaining or pursuing moral ideals is supererogatory or beyond the call of duty. Recently a third school of thought has been (...) articulated by Robert Audi in his essay “Wrongs Within Rights.” In this paper I express agreement with Audi, and it will be my suggestion that the resources of virtue ethics can profitably be employed to illustrate how his view avoids problems which plague the two traditional schools of thought. (shrink)
- Business ethics and doing what one ought to do.Gregory Mellema -1994 -Journal of Business Ethics 13 (2):149 - 153.There are situations in human life where the failure to perform a certain act can be morally blameworthy and at the same time not constitute the failure of moral duty or obligation. While traditional approaches to ethics have not acknowledged the possibility of these acts, recent contributions to the literature have made a strong and convincing case for their existence. Here I explain the nature of these acts, present some examples of these acts as they might arise in one''s business (...) or professional life, and point out the importance of recognizing and performing these acts for those who wish to practice good ethics in their business or professional lives. (shrink)
- Causation, Foresight and Collective Responsibility.Gregory Mellema -1988 -Analysis 48 (1):44 - 50.This essay identifies and examines three theses about collective responsibility which are frequently assumed or presupposed in philosophical discussions of collective responsibility. While the first thesis places constraints upon what counts as collective responsibility in a way which is plausible and defensible, It is argued that the constraints placed by theses two and three are unreasonably limiting.
- Moral expectation.Gregory Mellema -1998 -Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (4):479-488.
- Offence and Virtue Ethics.Gregory Mellema -1991 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):323 - 329.In his 1963 essay ‘Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics,’ Roderick Chisholm describes a category of human acts which he calls ‘offences’:A system of moral concepts which provides a place for what is good but not obligatory, should also provide a place for what is bad but not forbidden. For if there is such a thing as “non-obligatory well-doing” then it is plausible to suppose that there is also such a thing as “permissive ill-doing.” There is no term (...) in moral literature, so far as I know, which has been used to designate just this latter class of actions; I shall refer to them as “offences.”Some recognize the possibility of acts, commonly called acts of supererogation, which are morally good or praiseworthy but not obligatory to perform. In this passage, as well as in a later article co-authored with Ernest Sosa, Chisholm calls attention to the possibility of acts which are morally bad or blameworthy to perform, but whose performance is nevertheless not forbidden. (shrink)
- Praise, blame, and the ought implies can principle.Gregory Mellema -2001 -Philosophia 28 (1-4):425-436.Recently David Widerker argued that from the widely accepted ought implies can principle one can deduce the controversial and much discussed principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Actually, he argues that this result is true only of the part of PAP which deals with moral blame. Because there are acts of supererogation, he maintains that it does not apply to the part which deals with moral praise. What Widerker says about supererogation seems true, and I develop and expand upon this idea (...) in the first half of the paper. Then I argue that Widerker's argument regarding moral blame fails. (shrink)
- Shared responsibility and ethical dilutionism.Gregory Mellema -1985 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):177 – 187.
- Supererogation, blame, and the limits of obligation.Gregory Mellema -1994 -Philosophia 24 (1-2):171-182.
- Moral Luck and Collectives.Gregory Mellema -1997 -Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):144-152.
- Quasi-obligation and the failure to be virtuous.Gregory Mellema -1993 -Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (2):176-185.
- On Being Fully Responsible.Gregory Mellema -1984 -American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):189 - 193.
- Is it Bad to Omit an Act of Supererogation?Gregory Mellema -1996 -Journal of Philosophical Research 21:405-416.There are a great many philosophers and theologians who deny that acts of supererogation are possible on the grounds that no act whose performance is praiseworthy can fail to be obligatory to perform. Here I examine a position which affirms that acts of supererogation are possible but which shares with the opponents of supererogation the sentiment that it is frequently morally blameworthy to omit such acts. This view is endorsed by certain professional philosophers, but it also seems that many non-philosophers (...) are favorably inclined to this attitude. Although it is difficult to offer an outright refutation of this view, I offer some recommendations for those attracted to this position in the hopes that their concerns ahout supererogation can be addressed in ways which do not necessitate endorsing either a strong or moderate version of the anti-supererogationist point of view. (shrink)
- On Bloom’s Taxonomies of Educational Objectives.Gregory Mellema -1987 -Philosophy Research Archives 13:439-462.Without question the Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, by Benjamin Bloom and associates, is currently the most influential work in the theory of curriculum. Here I summarize Bloom’s taxonomies, survey a variety of criticisms raised by others, and conclude that there are serious philosophical problems remainmg to be addressed concerning both the structure and scope of the taxonomies.
- The Little Logic Book.Lee Hardy,Del Ratzsch,Gregory Mellema &Rebecca DeYoung -2013 - Grand Rapids: Calvin Press.Written by four members of the Calvin College philosophy department, The Little Logic Book is a valuable resource for teachers and undergraduate students of philosophy. In addition to providing clear introductions to the modes of reasoning students encounter in their philosophy course readings, it includes a nuanced description of common informal fallacies, a narrative overview of various philosophical accounts of scientific inference, and a concluding chapter on the ethics of argumentation. The book features engaging dialogues on social, philosophical and religious (...) issues based on the styles of argument taken up in the chapters. In additions to core concepts, distinctions, explanations, rules of inference, methods of assessment, and examples, The Little Logic Book provides philosophical commentary that will stimulate discussion of the assumptions and implications of various kinds of human reasoning. (shrink)No categories
- An alternative semantics for knowledge.Gregory Mellema -1979 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (2):265-278.
- Collective responsibility and contributing to an outcome.Gregory Mellema -2006 -Criminal Justice Ethics 25 (2):17-22.
- On measures and distinguishability.Gregory Mellema -1983 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (1):151-158.
- On risk taking and moral responsibility.Gregory Mellema -1987 -Criminal Justice Ethics 6 (2):3-11.
- Scapegoats.Gregory Mellema -2000 -Criminal Justice Ethics 19 (1):3-9.
- Supererogation and Business Ethics.Gregory Mellema -1991 -Journal of Applied Philosophy 8 (2):191-199.ABSTRACT It is occasionally said of individuals or groups of individuals that they have gone beyond the call of duty in certain of their business practices. Not only have they fulfilled or satisfied the requirements of duty, but they have risen above the level of duty in performing various meritorious or praiseworthy actions. Such acts, called acts of supererogation, are never required of moral agents; indeed, it is never morally blameworthy to refrain from them. However, they are morally good to (...) perform and those who perform them are doing that which is morally worthy of praise or approbation. In this essay I begin with some examples of business practices which can plausibly be construed as acts of supererogation. I then discuss some general features of supererogation and draw some conclusions in the form of advice for persons who have a genuine concern to practise good ethics in their business or professional lives. The advice can be summed up as follows: although acts of supererogation are optional, good ethics requires that one should not take a complacent or indifferent attitude toward performing them. (shrink)
- Alternative acts and the demands of morality.Gregory Mellema -2004 -Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (4):451-456.
- An Aristotelian Approach to Thinking about Educational Aims.Gregory Mellema -1983 -New Scholasticism 57 (3):362-374.No categories
- Adam B. seligam, the problem of trust.Gregory Mellema -1999 -Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2):273-275.
- Business: making Christian choices.Gregory Mellema -1990 - Grand Rapids, Mich.: CRC Publications.
- (1 other version)Enabling harm.Gregory Mellema -2005 -Journal of Social Philosophy 37 (2):214–220.
- Expectation in Business and Professional Morality.Gregory Mellema -1999 -Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (2):71-79.
- Groups, responsibility, and risk taking in business organizations.Gregory Mellema -1988 -Journal of Business Ethics 7 (8):593 - 603.Discussions of risk taking in the modern business organization frequently focus upon the behavior of individual moral agents. Here I attempt to identify some of the complexities of risk taking when it is a group phenomenon and to do so in such a way as to shed some light upon the ethics of group risk taking in business organizations.
- Groups, Responsibility, and the Failure to Act.Gregory Mellema -1985 -International Journal of Applied Philosophy 2 (3):57-66.
- Kenneth Konyndyk 1942-1994.Gregory Mellema -1995 -Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5):101 -.No categories
- Knud Logstrup, the ethical demand.Gregory Mellema -1999 -Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2):267-272.
- Mild Dilemmas.Gregory Mellema -2010 -Annales Philosophici 1:51-55.This paper argues that, while the existence of strong moral dilemmas is notoriously controversial, a case can be made for the existence of mild dilemmas. It is common for people to feel that they are caught in some type of moral dilemma. If mild dilemmas are a genuine feature of the moral terrain, perceptions by ordinary people that they are caught in a moral dilemma are to some extent vindicated.Export citation
Bookmark - Moral Dilemmas and Offence.Gregory Mellema -2005 -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):291-298.In 1963 Roderick Chisholm proposed a category of acts called “offences” to capture what he called acts of “permissive ill-doing.” Chisholm’s proposal has proven to be controversial. Here I propose that some progress can be made in validating acts of offence by focusing upon moral dilemmas. Given the problems which have been alleged to beset moral dilemmas, this may initially seem like a puzzling strategy. However, I will call attention to a type of moral dilemma unlike what is standardly discussed (...) in the literature and attempt to show that those who acknowledge that such dilemmas are possible are likewise obliged to acknowledge that acts of offence are possible. My suggestion, then, is that, since the former are plausible to acknowledge, so are the latter. (shrink)
- Multiple quantifiers and Hintikka's logic of perception.Gregory Mellema -1982 -Philosophia 11 (1-2):95-103.
- Must We Do the Best We Can?Gregory Mellema -1992 -Philosophy Today 36 (1):39-43.No categories
- On Quantifiers and Mass Terms.Gregory Mellema -1981 -American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (2):165 - 170.The language of quantification theory does not seem to adequately reflect the logic of mass terms in ordinary english. Mass terms are treated as though they are true of objects which can be counted. In this paper, It is argued that by placing certain restrictions upon formulas which contain the identity sign it is possible to arrive at a formalization of mass term sentences which avoids this difficulty. The proposed restrictions are defended against charges that certain mass term sentences seem (...) to be rendered inexpressible. (shrink)
- Peter Allen De Vos 1940-1993.Gregory Mellema &Kenneth Konyndyk -1994 -Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4):136 - 137.No categories
- Symbolic value, virtue ethics, and the morality of groups.Gregory Mellema -1999 -Philosophy Today 43 (3):302-308.
- The Expectations of Morality.Gregory Mellema (ed.) -2004 - Rodopi.Moral expectation is a concept with which all of us are well acquainted. Already as children we learn that certain courses of action are expected of us. We are expected to perform certain actions, and we are expected to refrain from other actions. Furthermore, we learn that something is morally wrong with the failure to do what we are morally expected to do. A central theme of this book is that moral expectation should not be confused with moral obligation. While (...) we are morally expected to do everything we are obligated to do, a person can be morally expected to do some things that he or she is not morally obligated to do. Although moral expectation is a familiar notion, it has not been the object of investigation in its own right. In the early chapters Mellema attempts to provide a philosophical account of this familiar notion, distinguish it from other types of expectations, and show how it is possible to form false moral expectations. Subsequent chapters explore the role of moral expectation in agreements between people, analyze ways that people avoid moral expectation, illustrate how groups can have moral expectations, and view moral expectation in the context of our relationship with divine beings. The final chapter provides insight into how moral expectation operates in people's professional lives. (shrink)
- The Nature of Aims and Ends in Education.Gregory Mellema -1984 -Philosophy Research Archives 10:321-336.In this paper it is argued that educational aims be approached as states of affairs susceptible of analysis in terms of means and ends. An educator’s various aims, in this way, can be classified according to the means-end relationship they bear to one another. This approach, which stands squarely in the tradition of Aristotle and enjoys little support among contemporary educational theorists, is defended from objections by R.S. Peters, a popular and influential proponent of an alternative approach.
- What is Optional in the Fulfillment of Duty?Gregory Mellema -1987 -Faith and Philosophy 4 (3):282-293.Moral duties are often described in terms of rigid requirements to perform, or refrain from performing, actions of certain specific types. In various theological traditions this point is often expressed in terms of the demands God places upon His creatures. However, there are several important ways, as Kant, Mill, and others have noted, in which the fulfillment of duty admits of options. In this paper an effort is made to offer a precise characterization of these ways. On this basis it (...) is concluded that many duties are not of the form in which duties are commonly characterized. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
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