Works by Greg Currie
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- Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology.Gregory Currie &Ian Ravenscroft -2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Christoph Hoerl.Recreative Minds develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon the latest work in psychology. This theory illuminates the use of imagination in coming to terms with art, its role in enabling us to live as social beings, and the psychological consequences of disordered imagination. The authors offer a lucid exploration of a fascinating subject.
- The Nature of Fiction.Gregory Currie -1990 - Cambridge University Press.This important book provides a theory about the nature of fiction, and about the relation between the author, the reader and the fictional text. The approach is philosophical: that is to say, the author offers an account of key concepts such as fictional truth, fictional characters, and fiction itself. The book argues that the concept of fiction can be explained partly in terms of communicative intentions, partly in terms of a condition which excludes relations of counterfactual dependence between the world (...) and the text. This communicative model is then applied to the following problems: how can something be 'true in the story' without being explicitly stated in the text? In what ways does interpreting a fictional story depend upon grasping its author's intentions? Is there always a unique best interpretation of a fictional text? What is the correct semantics for fictional names? What is the nature of our emotional response to a fictional work? In answering these questions the author explores the complex interaction between author, reader, and text. This interaction requires the reader to construct a 'fictional author' - a character in the story whose personality, beliefs and emotional states must be interpreted if the reader is to grasp the meaning of the work. (shrink)
- Imagining and Knowing: The Shape of Fiction.Gregory Currie -2020 - Oxford University Press.Gregory Currie defends the view that works of fiction guide the imagination, and then considers whether fiction can also guide our beliefs. He makes a case for modesty about learning from fiction, as it is easy to be too optimistic about the psychological insights of authors, and empathy is hard to acquire while not always morally advantageous.No categories
- Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories.Gregory Currie -2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.This text offers a reflection on the nature and significance of narrative in human communication.
- An ontology of art.Gregory Currie -1989 - New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science.Gregory Currie -1995 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.This is a book about the nature of film: about the nature of moving images, about the viewer's relation to film, and about the kinds of narrative that film is capable of presenting. It represents a very decisive break with the semiotic and psychoanalytic theories of film which have dominated discussion. The central thesis is that film is essentially a pictorial medium and that the movement of film images is real rather than illusory. A general theory of pictorial representation is (...) presented, which insists on the realism of pictures and the impossibility of assimilating them to language. It criticizes attempts to explain the psychology of film viewing in terms of the viewer's imaginary occupation of a position within the world of film. On the contrary, film viewing is nearly always impersonal. (shrink)
- Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology.Gregory Currie &Ian Ravenscroft -2004 -Philosophy 79 (308):331-335.No categories
- The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers.Imre Lakatos,John Worrall &Gregory Currie -1979 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):381-402.
- (1 other version)Imagination, delusion and hallucinations.Gregory Currie -1991 - In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies,Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell. pp. 168-183.Chris Frith has argued that a loss of the sense of agency is central to schizophrenia. This suggests a connection between hallucinations and delusions on the one hand, and the misidentification of the subject’s imaginings as perceptions and beliefs on the other. In particular, understanding the mechanisms that underlie imagination may help us to explain the puzzling phenomena of thought insertion and withdrawal. Frith sometimes states his argument in terms of a loss of metarepresentational capacity in schizophrenia. I argue that (...) this formulation is unhelpful. (shrink)
- The moral psychology of fiction.Gregory Currie -1995 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (2):250 – 259.What can we learn from fiction? I argue that we can learn about the consequences of a certain course of action by projecting ourselves, in imagination, into the situation of the fiction's characters.
- Poetry and the Possibility of Paraphrase.Gregory Currie &Jacopo Frascaroli -2021 -The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 79 (4):428-439.Why is there a long-standing debate about paraphrase in poetry? Everyone agrees that paraphrase can be useful; everyone agrees that paraphrase is no substitute for the poem itself. What is there to disagree about? Perhaps this: whether paraphrase can specify everything that counts as a contribution to the meaning of a poem. There are, we say, two ways to take the question; on one way of taking it, the answer is that paraphrase cannot. Does this entail that there is meaning (...) mysteriously locked in a poem, meaning that cannot be represented in any way other than via the poem itself? If that were so it would have profound implications for poetry’s capacity to convey insight. We suggest reasons for thinking that the entailment does not hold. Throughout, we connect the traditional debate over paraphrase, which has largely been conducted within the fields of philosophy and literary theory, with recent empirically oriented thinking about the communicability of meaning, represented by work in pragmatics. We end with a suggestion about what is to count as belonging to meaning, and what as merely among the things that determine meaning. (shrink)
- How to Think about the Modularity of Mind Reading.Gregory Currie &Kim Sterelny -2000 -Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):145-160.
- Delusion, Rationality, Empathy: Commentary on Martin Davies et al.Gregory Currie &Jon Jureidini -2001 -Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):159-162.
- Arts and minds.Gregory Currie -2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.Philosophical questions about the arts go naturally with other kinds of questions about them. Art is sometimes said to be an historical concept. But where in our cultural and biological history did art begin? If art is related to play and imagination, do we find any signs of these things in our nonhuman relatives? Sometimes the other questions look like ones the philosopher of art has to answer. Anyone who thinks that interpretation in the arts is an activity that leaves (...) the intentions of the author behind needs to explain how and why this differs so fundamentally from ordinary conversational interpretation, where the only decent models we have are ones that depend crucially on the recovery of intention. Anyone who thinks that imaginative literature has anything to tell us about time had better have a position on how earlier and later relate to past and future. Anyone who thinks that empathy plays a role in literary engagement had better have a psychologically plausible account of what empathy is. Philosophical questions about the arts also go naturally with other kinds of philosophical questions: we can't think constructively about representation in art without thinking about representation; text, meaning, reference and existence get similarly drawn into the conversation. Some ideas that philosophers of art deal with emerge from other disciplines. In literary theory an enormous amount of attention has been lavished on tracing the sources of unreliability in narrative. Is the result adequate to the details of the particular works we call unreliable? Contemporary film theory is generally hostile to the fiction/documentary distinction. Are there in fact any grounds for this? This book of thirteen connected essays examines questions of all these kinds. It ranges from the semantics of proper names, through the pragmatics of literary and filmic interpretation, to the aesthetic function of stone age implements. Some of the essays have not been published before; some that have are here substantially revised. (shrink)
- Desire in imagination.Gregory Currie -2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne,Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201-221.
- (2 other versions)Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science.Gregory Currie -1995 -Philosophy 71 (278):617-622.No categories
- Visual imagery as the simulation of vision.Gregory Currie -1995 -Mind and Language 10 (1-2):25-44.Simulation Theory says we need not rely exclusively on prepositional knowledge of other minds in order to explain the actions of others. Seeking to know what you will do, I imagine myself in your situation, and see what decision I come up with. I argue that this conception of simulation naturally generalizes: various bits of our mental machine can be run‘off‐line’, fulfilling functions other than those they were made for. In particular, I suggest that visual imagery results when the visual (...) system is run off‐line. I briefly review the empirical evidence and consider the philosophical implications, particularly concerning the mode of mental representation in imagery. (shrink)
- Empathy for Objects1.Gregory Currie -2011 - In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie,Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 82.
- Visible traces: Documentary and the contents of photographs.Gregory Currie -1999 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57 (3):285-297.
- Imagination as simulation: Aesthetics meets cognitive science.Gregory Currie -1995 - In Paul L. Harris,Mental Simulation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Individualism and global supervenience.Gregory Currie -1984 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):345-58.
- Learning from Fiction.Greg Currie,Heather Ferguson,Jacopo Frascaroli,Stacie Friend,Kayleigh Green &Lena Wimmer -2023 - In Alison James, Akihiro Kubo & Françoise Lavocat,The Routledge Handbook of Fiction and Belief. Routledge. pp. 126-138.The idea that fictions may educate us is an old one, as is the view that they distort the truth and mislead us. While there is a long tradition of passionate assertion in this debate, systematic arguments are a recent development, and the idea of empirically testing is particularly novel. Our aim in this chapter is to provide clarity about what is at stake in this debate, what the options are, and how empirical work does or might bear on its (...) resolution. We distinguish between merely influencing people’s opinions and providing genuine learning, where the latter requires that the source of the change in opinion should be reliable. Other important ideas here are the extent to which authors of fiction may be considered to provide testimony, or something like it, and the possibility of recognizing an unstated purpose in the project of the fictional work. We ask whether fictions can furnish us not merely with ideas but with reasons for believing them, perhaps by constituting thought experiments. We consider whether the focus should be on understanding rather than on knowledge, and whether fictions can inform us about the qualities of another’s experiences. We briefly describe some experimental work of recent decades and suggest that the evidence for learning from fiction is currently meagre. (shrink)
- Fictional names.Gregory Currie -1988 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):471 – 488.
- Photography, painting and perception.Gregory Currie -1991 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (1):23-29.
- Why Irony is Pretence.Gregory Currie -2006 - In Shaun Nichols,The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
- Some ways to understand people.Gregory Currie -2008 -Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):211 – 218.Shaun Gallagher and Dan Hutto claim that those once bitter rivals, simulation theory and theory-theory, are now to be treated as partners in crime. It's true that the debate has become more nuanced, with detailed suggestions abroad as to how these two approaches might peaceably divide the field. And there is common ground between them, at least to the extent that they agree on what needs to be explained. But I see no fatal flaw in what they share. In particular, (...) I reject the idea that most interpersonal understanding can be accounted for without the postulation of mechanisms for inferring beliefs and desires. I also query the claim that simulation mechanisms have a very limited explanatory scope, and argue for the existence of such mechanisms at sub-personal levels. I suggest that Gallagher and Hutto's strictures against false belief tests are unwarranted, and their conclusions about the role of narrative in interpersonal understanding are unfounded. (shrink)
- Models As Fictions, Fictions As Models.Gregory Currie -2016 -The Monist 99 (3):296-310.Thinking of models in science as fictions is said to be helpful, not merely because models are known or assumed to be false, but because work on the nature of fiction helps us understand what models are and how they work. I am unpersuaded. For example, instead of trying to assimilate truth-in-a model to truth-in-fiction we do better to see both as special and separate cases of the more general notion truth-according-to-a-corpus. Does enlightenment go the other way? Do we better (...) understand fiction's capacity to generate knowledge by thinking of it as a kind of modelling? If we see, as we should, fictions and models are parts of larger patterns of cognitive activity that include institutional frameworks, the best answer is no. (shrink)No categories
- Supervenience, essentialism and aesthetic properties.Gregory Currie -1990 -Philosophical Studies 58 (3):243 - 257.
- Mental simulation and motor imagery.Gregory Currie &Ian Ravenscroft -1997 -Philosophy of Science 64 (1):161-80.Motor imagery typically involves an experience as of moving a body part. Recent studies reveal close parallels between the constraints on motor imagery and those on actual motor performance. How are these parallels to be explained? We advance a simulative theory of motor imagery, modeled on the idea that we predict and explain the decisions of others by simulating their decision-making processes. By proposing that motor imagery is essentially off-line motor action, we explain the tendency of motor imagery to mimic (...) motor performance. We close by arguing that a simulative theory of motor imagery gives (modest) support to and illumination of the simulative theory of decision-prediction. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Work and text.Gregory Currie -1991 -Mind 100 (3):325-340.
- Unreliability refigured: Narrative in literature and film.Gregory Currie -1995 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 (1):19-29.Aims to improve an understanding of the theoretical issues in response to the influence of fiction. Four things in narrative unreliability; Relation between narration in literary fictions and film; Comprehension of narrative essentially a matter of intentional inference; Fictions misdescribed; Asymmetry between literature and film; Ambiguity and unreliability; Implied author and narrator.
- Interpretation and objectivity.Gregory Currie -1993 -Mind 102 (407):413-428.
- Narrative representation of causes.Gregory Currie -2006 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (3):309–316.
- Pretence, pretending, and metarepresenting.Gregory Currie -1998 -Mind and Language 13 (1):35-55.I assess the claim that metarepresentation is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. I argue that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from belief. I sketch an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing. This depends on a distinction between pretending and pretence, and upon the claim that pretence stands to pretending as truth stands to belief.
- Frege, an introduction to his philosophy.Gregory Currie -1982 - Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble.Studie over het werk van de Duitse wijsgeer Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (1848-1925).
- Standing in the Last Ditch: On the Communicative Intentions of Fiction Makers.Gregory Currie -2014 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (4):351-363.Some of us have suggested that what fiction makers do is offer us things to imagine, that this is what is distinctive of fiction and what distinguishes it from narrative-based but assertive activities such as journalism or history. Some of us hold, further, that it is the maker's intention which confers fictional status. Many, I think, feel the intuitive appeal of this idea at the same time as they sense looming problems for any proposal about fiction's nature based straightforwardly on (...) the identification of fiction with the to-be-imagined. I formulate a very weak version of the proposal which is not vulnerable to some objections recently presented. My formulation is in terms of supervenience. But while this version is weak, it is also quite precise, and its precision brings into view certain other problems which have not so far been attended to. To the extent that these problems are serious, the prospects for an intentional theory of fiction look, I am sorry to say, poor; the version susceptible to the objections is weak, and anything weaker still but not so susceptible could hardly be thought of as a theory of fiction, though it might supplement such a theory. (shrink)
- Realism of Character and the Value of Fiction.Gregory Currie -1998 - In Jerrold Levinson,Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 161--81.
- (1 other version)Philosophical Papers.Imre Lakatos,John Worrall &Gregory Currie -1979 -Philosophy 54 (208):247-249.No categories
- Narrative and coherence.Gregory Currie &Jon Jureidini -2004 -Mind and Language 19 (4):409–427.We outline a theory of one puzzling aspect of human cognition: a tendency to exaggerate the degree to which agency is manifested in the world. We call this over‐coherent thinking. We use Pylyshyn's idea of cognitive penetrability to help characterize this notion. We argue that this kind of thinking is essentially narrative in form rather than theoretical. We develop a theory of the relation between the degree of narrativity in a representation and its aptness to represent, and to express, mind. (...) We review the prospects for several theories about how over‐coherent thinking gains a purchase on motivation. We argue that progress in this difficult area may require the abandonment of a categorical belief/imagination distinction in favour of vaguely specified clusterings in a many‐dimensional cognitive space. We conclude with the idea that an error‐prone system for the retention of ideas that are low in some of the characteristics generally thought desirable in belief might emerge as a result of an arms‐race between deceivers and deceiver‐detectors. (shrink)
- XI-Imagination as Motivation.Gregory Currie -2002 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):201-216.What kinds of psychological states motivate us? Beliefs and desires are the obvious candidates. But some aspects of our behaviour suggest another idea. I have in mind the view that imagination can sometimes constitute motivation.
- The analysis of thoughts.Gregory Currie -1985 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (3):283 – 298.
- What is fiction?Gregory Currie -1985 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 43 (4):385-392.No categories
- Remarks on Frege's conception of inference.Gregory Currie -1987 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (1):55-68.
- Reply to Abell’s and Gilmore’s comments on Currie’s Imagining and Knowing: the Shape of Fiction.Greg Currie -2022 -British Journal of Aesthetics 62 (2):215-222.I am grateful to Catharine Abell and Jonathan Gilmore for their comments and for the opportunity to think again about some important questions. Before I respond.
- Aesthetic sense and social cognition: a story from the Early Stone Age.Gregory Currie &Xuanqi Zhu -forthcoming -Synthese.Human aesthetic practices show a sensitivity to the ways that the appearance of an artefact manifests skills and other qualities of the maker. We investigate a possible origin for this kind of sensibility, locating it in the need for co-ordination of skill-transmission in the Acheulean stone tool culture. We argue that our narrative supports the idea that Acheulian agents were aesthetic agents. In line with this we offer what may seem an absurd comparison: between the Acheulian and the Quattrocento. In (...) making it we display some hidden richness in what counts as an aesthetic response to an artefact. We conclude with a brief review of rival explanations—biological and/or cultural—of how this skills-based sensibility became a regular feature of human aesthetic practices. (shrink)No categories
- Authenticity and Implicature.Gregory Currie &Jon Robson -2023 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 81 (3):387-391.In her book Things, Carolyn Korsmeyer argues that authenticity or what she often calls “genuineness” is “an aesthetically salient property” (2019, 34), a proper.
- Popper's evolutionary epistemology: A critique.Gregory Currie -1978 -Synthese 37 (3):413 - 431.
- Simulation-theory, theory-theory, and the evidence from autism.Gregory Currie -1996 - In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith,Theories of Theories of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 242.
- Fictional truth.Gregory Currie -1986 -Philosophical Studies 50 (2):195 - 212.
- Internal and external pictures.Catherine Abell &Gregory Currie -1999 -Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):429-445.What do pictures and mental images have in common? The contemporary tendency to reject mental picture theories of imagery suggests that the answer is: not much. We show that pictures and visual imagery have something important in common. They both contribute to mental simulations: pictures as inputs and mental images as outputs. But we reject the idea that mental images involve mental pictures, and we use simulation theory to strengthen the anti-pictorialist's case. Along the way we try to account for (...) caricature and for some basic features of pictorial representations. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
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Jussi Suikkanen
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