Linear models in decision making.Robyn M.Dawes &Bernard Corrigan -1974 -Psychological Bulletin 81 (2):95-106.detailsA review of the literature indicates that linear models are frequently used in situations in which decisions are made on the basis of multiple codable inputs. These models are sometimes used normatively to aid the decision maker, as a contrast with the decision maker in the clinical vs statistical controversy, to represent the decision maker "paramorphically" and to "bootstrap" the decision maker by replacing him with his representation. Examination of the contexts in which linear models have been successfully employed indicates (...) that the contexts have the following structural characteristics in common: each input variable has a conditionally monotone relationship with the output; there is error of measurement; and deviations from optimal weighting do not make much practical difference. These characteristics ensure the success of linear models, which are so appropriate in such contexts that random linear models may perform quite well. 4 examples involving the prediction of such codable output variables as GPA and psychiatric diagnosis are analyzed in detail. In all 4 examples, random linear models yield predictions that are superior to those of human judges. (shrink)
The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making.Robyn M.Dawes -1979 -American Psychologist 34 (7):571-582.detailsProper linear models are those in which predictor variables are given weights such that the resulting linear composite optimally predicts some criterion of interest; examples of proper linear models are standard regression analysis, discriminant function analysis, and ridge regression analysis. Research summarized in P. Meehl's book on clinical vs statistical prediction and research stimulated in part by that book indicate that when a numerical criterion variable is to be predicted from numerical predictor variables, proper linear models outperform clinical intuition. Improper (...) linear models are those in which the weights of the predictor variables are obtained by some nonoptimal method. The present article presents evidence that even such improper linear models are superior to clinical intuition when predicting a numerical criterion from numerical predictors. In fact, unit weighting is quite robust for making such predictions. The application of unit weights to decide what bullet the Denver Police Department should use is described; some technical, psychological, and ethical resistances to using linear models in making social decisions are considered; and arguments that could weaken these resistances are presented. (shrink)
Fake news and epistemic flooding.Glenn Https://Orcidorg Anderau -2023 -Synthese 202 (4):1-19.detailsThe advance of the internet and social media has had a drastic impact on our epistemic environment. This paper will focus on two different risks epistemic agents face online: being exposed to fake news and epistemic flooding. While the first risk is widely known and has been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature, the notion of ‘epistemic flooding’ is a novel concept introduced in this paper. Epistemic flooding occurs when epistemic agents find themselves in epistemic environments in which they are (...) routinely confronted with more information and evidence than they can diligently process. Epistemic flooding is one of the most significant risks epistemic agents run while using social media and one of the reasons why the first risk (being exposed to fake news) is especially pernicious. It is particularly harmful if one ascribes to the Spinozan model of belief acquisition in which belief comes easy. Mitigating the combined threat of fake news and epistemic flooding requires us to think normatively about our epistemic environments and how to better them. This paper turns to the normative framework of epistemic environmentalism in order to accomplish this. (shrink)
Belief is not the issue: A defence of inference to the best explanation.Gregory W.Dawes -2012 -Ratio 26 (1):62-78.detailsDefences of inference to the best explanation (IBE) frequently associate IBE with scientific realism, the idea that it is reasonable to believe our best scientific theories. I argue that this linkage is unfortunate. IBE does not warrant belief, since the fact that a theory is the best available explanation does not show it to be (even probably) true. What IBE does warrant is acceptance: taking a proposition as a premise in theoretical and/or practical reasoning. We ought to accept our best (...) scientific theories since they are the theories that are most likely to lead to the goal of science, which is that of knowledge. In support of this claim I invoke Bill Lycan's Panglossian reflections regarding Mother Nature.1. (shrink)
Identifying Pseudoscience: A Social Process Criterion.Gregory W.Dawes -2018 -Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):283-298.detailsMany philosophers have come to believe there is no single criterion by which one can distinguish between a science and a pseudoscience. But it need not follow that no distinction can be made: a multifactorial account of what constitutes a pseudoscience remains possible. On this view, knowledge-seeking activities fall on a spectrum, with the clearly scientific at one end and the clearly non-scientific at the other. When proponents claim a clearly non-scientific activity to be scientific, it can be described as (...) a pseudoscience. One feature of a scientific theory is that it forms part of a research tradition being actively pursued by a scientific community. If a theory lacks this form of epistemic warrant, this is a pro tanto reason to regard it as pseudoscientific. (shrink)
In defense of naturalism.Gregory W.Dawes -2011 -International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):3-25.detailsHistory and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a methodological naturalism that disregards talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical (...) commitment is naturalistic, but is both a posteriori and provisional, arising from the fact that for more than 400 years no proposed theistic explanation has been shown capable of meeting the procedural requirement. I argue that there is nothing to prevent religious thinkers from seeking to overturn this metaphysically naturalistic stance. But in order to do so they would need to show that their proposed theistic explanations are the best available explanations of a range of phenomena. Until this has been done, the metaphysical naturalism of history and the sciences remains defensible. (shrink)
A new science of religion.Gregory W.Dawes &James Maclaurin (eds.) -2013 - New York: Routledge.detailsThis volume examines the diversity of new scientific theories of religion, by outlining the logical and causal relationships between these enterprises.
Defining Fake News.Glenn Https://Orcidorg Anderau -2021 -Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):197-215.detailsFake news is a worrying phenomenon which is growing increasingly widespread, partly because of the ease with which it is disseminated online. Combating the spread of fake news requires a clear understanding of the nature of fake news. However, the use of the term in everyday language is heterogenous and has no fixed meaning. Despite increasing philosophical attention to the topic, there is no consensus on the correct definition of “fake news” within philosophy either. This paper aims to bring clarity (...) to the philosophical debate of fake news in two ways: Firstly, by providing an overview of existing philosophical definitions and secondly, by developing a new account of fake news. This paper will identify where there is agreement within the philosophical debate of definitions of “fake news” and isolate four key questions on which there is genuine disagreement. These concern the intentionality underlying fake news, its truth value, the question of whether fake news needs to reach a minimum audience, and the question of whether an account of fake news needs to be dynamic. By answering these four questions, I provide a novel account of defining “fake news”. This new definition hinges upon the fact that fake news has the function of being deliberately misleading about its own status as news. (shrink)
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What is wrong with intelligent design?Gregory W.Dawes -2007 -International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61 (2):69 - 81.detailsWhile a great deal of abuse has been directed at intelligent design theory (ID), its starting point is a fact about biological organisms that cries out for explanation, namely "specified complexity" (SC). Advocates of ID deploy three kind of argument from specified complexity to the existence of a designer: an eliminative argument, an inductive argument, and an inference to the best explanation. Only the first of these merits the abuse directed at it; the other two arguments are worthy of respect. (...) If they fail, it is only because we have a better explanation of SC, namely Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. (shrink)
The naturalism of the sciences.Gregory W.Dawes &Tiddy Smith -2018 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 67:22-31.detailsThe sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a “methodological naturalism,” which disregards talk of divine agency. In response to those who argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism, a number of philosophers have offered a pragmatic defense. The naturalism of the sciences, they argue, is provisional and defeasible: it is justified by the fact that unsuccessful theistic explanations have been superseded by successful natural ones. But this defense is inconsistent with the history of the sciences. The sciences have (...) always exhibited what we call a domain naturalism. They have never invoked divine agency, but have always focused on the causal structure of the natural world. It is not the case, therefore, that the sciences once employed theistic explanations and then abandoned them. The naturalism of the sciences is as old as science itself. (shrink)
The Role of the Intellectual in Liquid Modernity: An Interview with Zygmunt Bauman.SimonDawes -2011 -Theory, Culture and Society 28 (3):130-148.detailsThe 85th birthday of Zygmunt Bauman in November 2010 presented the occasion for TCS to publish a special section of commissioned commentary pieces on a number of central themes in his work. The section, edited and introduced by editorial board member Roy Boyne, featured articles by Martin Jay, John Milbank and Julia Hell, and concentrated respectively upon the themes of modernity, the role of the intellectual, and the gaze of/at the other, highlighting the dependence on metaphor and the significance of (...) ‘looking’ in his writing. This interview takes that special section as its starting point, and asks Bauman to respond to some of the claims and suggestions made in those articles. In doing so, he argues for the continuing salience of the ‘liquid modernity’ concept for understanding the ‘purpose behind the effort’, and explains in detail his view of the intellectual (and, specifically, the sociologist) and the role such an intellectual should play in the context of liquid modernity. (shrink)
The concept of dignity in the universal declaration of human rights.Glenn Hughes -2011 -Journal of Religious Ethics 39 (1):1-24.detailsThis essay examines the function of the concept of human dignity (both as an inherent feature of human existence and as an ideal achievement) in the United Nations's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It explains why the key framers of the document affirmed an inherent human dignity in order to provide an explanatory basis for the validity of universal human rights while eschewing any religious or metaphysical justification for this affirmation. It argues that the key framers, while aware of (...) the Christian anthropology informing the modern Western concept of the dignity of the person, grasped (1) that the Declaration, to be ratifiable, would need to be free of religious reference, and also (2) that the notion of inherency suffices to suggest heuristically not only a universal human nature but also, crucially, a transcendent reality in which all persons participate. (shrink)
Can a Darwinian Be a Christian?Gregory W.Dawes -2007 -Religion Compass 1 (6):711-24.detailsA number of recent historians claim to have defeated what they call the ‘conflict thesis’, the idea that there exists some inevitable conflict between Darwinism and Christianity. This is often thought to be part of a broader ‘warfare thesis’, which posits an inevitable conflict between science and religion. But, all they have defeated is one, relatively uninteresting form of this thesis. There remain other forms of the conflict theses that remain entirely plausible, even in light of the historical record.
(2 other versions)Religion, Science, and Explanation.Gregory W.Dawes -2012 -Ars Disputandi: The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12.detailsA recent legal ruling in the United States regarding ‘intelligent design’ argued that ID is not science because it invokes a supernatural agent. It therefore cannot be taught in public schools. But the important philosophical question is not whether ID invokes a supernatural agent; it is whether it meets the standards we expect of any explanation in the sciences. More generally, could any proposed theistic explanation – one that invokes the deity of classical theism – meet those standards? Could it (...) be both scientific and religious? The present paper sets out the factors to be taken into account when answering this question. (shrink)
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Evolution and the Bible: The Hermeneutical Question.Gregory W.Dawes -2012 -Relegere 2:37-63.detailsTheistic evolutionists often suggest that one can reconcile evolutionary theory with biblical teaching. But in fact Christians have accepted Darwinian theory only after reinterpreting the opening chapters of Genesis. Is such a reinterpretation justified? Within Western Christian thought, there exists a hermeneutical tradition that dates back to St Augustine and which offers guidelines regarding apparent conflicts between biblical teaching and natural philosophy (or “science”). These state that the literal meaning of the text may be abandoned only if the natural-philosophical conclusions (...) are established beyond doubt. But no large-scale scientific theory, such as Darwin’s, can claim this degree of certainty. It follows that to justify their reinterpretation of Genesis 1–3, Christians must either argue that the literal sense of the biblical text can be maintained or accept that the Augustinian view of biblical authority is untenable. Three alternative views are discussed: a first that attempts to limit the scope of biblical authority, a second that distinguishes between the Bible and the Word of God, and a third that abandons the idea that religious faith offers certain knowledge. While the third view seems the most defensible, it comes at a cost: the recognition that, as John Locke put it, “reason must be our last judge and guide in everything.”. (shrink)
Could There be Another Galileo Case?Gregory W.Dawes -2002 -Journal of Religion and Society 4.detailsIn his 1615 letter to the Grand Duchess Christina of Lorraine, Galileo argues for a “principle of limitation”: the authority of Scripture should not be invoked in scientific matters. In doing so, he claims to be following the example of St Augustine. But Augustine’s position would be better described as a “principle of differing purpose”: although the Scriptures were not written in order to reveal scientific truths, such matters may still be covered by biblical authority. The Roman Catholic Church has (...) rejected Galileo’s principle, opting rather for Augustine’s, leaving open the possibility of future conflicts between scientists and Church authority. (shrink)
Justified Believing:Avoiding the Paradox.Gregory W.Dawes -2012 - In James Maclaurin,Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.detailsColin Cheyne has argued that under certain circumstances an internalist or deontological theory of epistemic justification will give rise to a paradox. The paradox, he argues, arises when a principle of epistemic justification is both justifiably believed (in terms of the theory) and false. To avoid this paradox, Cheyne recommends abandoning the principle of justification-transference, which states that acts of believing made on the basis of a justifiably-believed principle are themselves justified. Since such a principle seems essential to any internalist (...) theory of justified believing, internalist theories may also need to be abandoned. I argue that while some theories of epistemic justification may indeed give rise to this paradox, an internalist or deontological theory of subjective justification will avoid it. The reason for this is that a false principle of justified believing does not render acts of believing subjectively unjustified, provided that the agent does not realize that the principle is false. (shrink)
Paradigmatic Explanations: Strauss's Dangerous Idea.Gregory W.Dawes -2007 -Louvain Studies 32 (1-2):67-80.detailsDavid Friedrich Strauss is best known for his mythical interpretation of the Gospel narratives. He opposed both the supernaturalists (who regarded the Gospel stories as reliable) and the rationalists (who offered natural explanations of purportedly supernatural events). His mythical interpretation suggests that many of the stories about Jesus were woven out of pre-existing messianic beliefs and expectations. Picking up this suggestion, I argue that the Gospel writers thought paradigmatically rather than historically. A paradigmatic explanation assimilates the event-to-be- explained to what (...) is thought to be a prototypical instance of divine action. It differs from a historical or scientific explanation insofar as it does not specify the conditions under which it should be applied. It is, therefore, a wonderfully flexible way to understand the present in the light of the past. (shrink)
Neoliberalism Studies and Media Studies.SimonDawes -2024 -Diogenes 65 (2):264-275.detailsThis short article provides an overview of the various theoretical and methodological approaches to analysing neoliberalism, paying particular attention to political-economic and governmental approaches (and the extent to which they can be contrasted or combined), and argues for a more theoretically- and methodologically-informed, interdisciplinary critique of neoliberalism in media studies. In emphasising the heterogeneity of approaches to studying an object such as neoliberalism, as well as the differences in how those approaches are deployed in different ‘studies’, it will thus also (...) argue for the applicability of such concerns to research in multiple disciplines in other countries (such as France) as well. (shrink)
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The Function of Memes in Political Discourse.Glenn Https://Orcidorg Anderau &Daniel Https://Orcidorg Barbarrusa -2024 -Topoi 43 (5):1529-1546.detailsThe use of memes has become increasingly widespread in political discourse. However, there is a dearth of philosophical discussion on memes and their impact on political discourse. This paper addresses this gap in the literature and bridges the divide between the empirical and philosophical work on memes by offering a functionalist account which allows for a more in-depth analysis of the role memes play in political discourse. We offer a taxonomy of the eight key characteristics of memes: 1. humor; 2. (...) fostering in-group identity; 3. caricatures; 4. replicability; 5. context collapse; 6. hermeneutical resources; 7. low reputational cost; 8. signaling. On the positive side, the propensity memes have to foster in-group identity and to function as a hermeneutical tool for people to make sense of their own experiences are a boon especially to marginalized communities. On the flipside, the creation of an in-group/out-group dynamic can also be exploited by sinister political actors, especially since the low reputational cost of circulating memes allows for plausible deniability. We use the analysis in this paper to jumpstart a discussion of how we should understand memes and debate which norms should govern the novel speech act of posting a meme given its impact on political discourse. Based on our findings, we end with a call to adopt stricter norms for the act of posting a meme. (shrink)
Experiment, Speculation, and Galileo’s Scientific Reasoning.GregoryDawes -2016 -Perspectives on Science 24 (3):343-360.detailsPeter Anstey has suggested that in our analyses of early modern natural philosophy we should abandon a frequently used distinction: that between rationalism and empiricism. He argues that we should replace it with another distinction, that between experimental and speculative natural philosophy. The second distinction, he argues, was not only widely used at the time, but has a greater explanatory range. It follows, he suggests, that it is a better way of “carving up” the writings of that period.It is clear (...) that a distinction between experimental and speculative natural philosophy did become common in the late seventeenth-century. But I am less convinced that it is a useful one. This.. (shrink)
Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de Vignmont's model.Glenn Carruthers -2009 -Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.detailsDe Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont (...) uses to argue that the body image does not underlie the sense of embodiment does not rule out the possibility that part of the body image I call 'offline representations' underlies the sense of embodiment. An alternative model of the sense of embodiment in terms of offline representations of the body is presented. (shrink)
A theory of irrationality as a `reasonable' response to an incomplete specification.Robyn M.Dawes -2000 -Synthese 122 (1-2):133 - 163.detailsSuppose the principles explaining how the human mind (brain) reaches logical conclusions and judgments were different from – and independent of – thoseinvolved innormatively valid reasoning. Then such principles should affect both conclusion generation and recognition that particular conclusions are or are not justified. People, however, demonstrate a discrepancy between impaired performance in generating logical conclusions as opposed to rather impressive competence in recognizing rational (versus irrational) ones. This discrepancy is hypothesized to arise from often generating an incomplete specification of (...) a logical or judgmental problem when attempting to solve it – versus a recognition of such incompleteness when it is pointed out. The basic argument is developed, with common examples, in the context of specifying or failing to specify all possible combinations in simple logical arguments and is then extended to probabilistic reasoning, where complete versus incomplete specification corresponds to attending to all or to only some components of Bayes theorem-based reasoning. (shrink)
The Philosophy of a Business Man.G.Dawes Hicks -1928 -Philosophy 3 (9):49-64.detailsEnglish Philosophy owes much that is most characteristic of it to the assiduous toil of men whose vocation has not been that of academic teaching and research. Many of them have been engulfed in the routine of business life, and such hours as they could devote to philosophic reflexion have been snatched from intervals of leisure which the majority of business men relinquish to recreation and rest. The friend to whose memory I wish to pay my humble tribute would not (...) have claimed for himself, nor have permitted his associates to claim for him, the distinction of having initiated a new line of speculative reflexion. But, if he did not propound any original metaphysical theory, he possessed, in quite unusual measure, the. (shrink)
Religious Studies and Theology in the University: 'Some Ambiguities' Revisited.Gregory W.Dawes -1996 -Religion 26:49-68.detailsWhat is the relationship between religious studies and theology? Do both have a place within the university? This paper will argue that no clear distinction can be drawn between religious studies and theology on the level of the methods they employ. Each is multidisciplinary and each is able to address questions of religious truth. They can be distinguished only by asking `What is the question which each is attempting to answer?'. Religious studies addresses the question of the meaning and truth (...) of any religion. Theology is interested in the question of the meaning and truth of one particular faith. By adopting the language of one particular faith, the theologian is able to explore particular religious questions in some depth. (shrink)
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God Beyond Theism? Bishop Spong, Paul Tillich, and the Unicorn.Gregory W.Dawes -2011 -Pacifica 15 (1):65-71.detailsJohn Shelby Spong has recently advocated belief in a ‘God beyond theism’. While rejecting traditional theism, he also distinguishes his position from atheism. He suggests that there is a divine reality, which may be described as ‘being itself’ and which reveals itself in our commitment to unconditional ideals. The paper argues that this notion of God is vacuous, the product of a confused belief that ‘being’ is a characteristic of individual beings which may be universalized. Belief in such a God (...) is also unmotivated, since there exist naturalistic explanations of the phenomena to which the Bishop appeals. (shrink)
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Neoliberalism Studies et Media Studies.SimonDawes &Nicole G. Albert -2019 -Diogène n° 258-259-258 (2-4):125-138.detailsCe bref article propose un panorama des différentes approches théoriques et méthodologiques pour analyser le néolibéralisme. Il s’attache tout spécialement à définir les approches politico-économiques et gouvernementales (et dans quelle mesure elles s’opposent ou se combinent) et plaide en faveur d’une critique du néolibéralisme mieux construite sur le plan théorique et méthodologique dans le champ des Media Studies. En soulignant l’hétérogénéité des modes d’analyse d’un objet tel que le néolibéralisme, ainsi que les différences dans la manière dont ces approches se (...) déploient dans d’autres domaines des Studies, il préconisera donc d’appliquer ces regards critiques à la recherche menée également au sein de multiples disciplines dans d’autres pays (comme la France). (shrink)
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(1 other version)The ethics of using or not using statistical prediction rules in psychological practice and related consulting activities.Robyn M.Dawes -2002 -Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S178-S184.detailsProfessionals often believe that they must “exercise judgment” in making decisions critical to other people’s lives. The relative superiority of statistical prediction rules to intuitive judgment for combining incomparable sources of information to predict important human outcomes leads us to question this personal input belief. Some professionals hence use SPR’s to “educate” intuitive judgment, rather than replace it. In psychology in particular, such amalgamation is not justified. If a well‐validated SPR that is superior to professional judgment exists in a relevant (...) decision making context, professionals should use it, totally absenting themselves from the prediction. (shrink)
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Why Historicity Still Matters: Raymond Brown and the Infancy Narratives.Gregory W.Dawes -2011 -Pacifica 19:156-176.detailsThe infancy narratives of Matthew and Luke pose in an acute form the question of the historical value of the Gospels. Raymond Brown suggests that redaction criticism can bypass this question by spelling out the theological message intended by the evangelists. But his own exegesis suggests this is to misunderstand the genre of this literature. Brown’s indifference to historicity would be justified only if the evangelists were writing something resembling allegory, a form of narrative in which the literal sense of (...) the story is the clothing of a spiritual message. But Brown’s exegesis suggests that the evangelists do not regard the literal sense of these stories as dispensable; they regard their theological message as resting on a foundation of historical fact. It follows that if interpreters focus on the intention of the evangelists, they cannot avoid addressing the question of historicity. (shrink)
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