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Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 4 Seiten: 1-18.

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Aristotle's assertion inPolitics1.2 that there is a natural impulse to form political communities is immediately contraposed with the claim that the person responsible for their foundation is the cause (αἴτιος) of the greatest of goods (Pol. 1253a33). The attribution of an essential role to the legislator as an efficient cause appears to clash, however, with Aristotle's political naturalism. If thepolisexists by nature and humans are by nature political animals (1253a1–2), then the question arises as to why active intervention by the (...) legislator is necessary for apolis. Conversely, if thepolisis an artefact of practical reason, then Aristotle's distinction between products of the intellect and natural entities seems to preclude the status of thepolisas natural. In light of this apparent tension between different aspects of Aristotle's account of the origins of political communities, the current paper seeks to demonstrate their reconcilability. Section 1 considers the role of the Aristotelian legislator in light of broader Greek assumptions regarding law-making. Section 2 then considers the status of law-making expertise (νομοθετική) as part of political science (πολιτική) and examines the mode of practical reason that is exercised by the legislative founder. Finally, in section 3, and building on recent interpretations which have emphasized that Aristotle operates with an extended teleological conception of nature, I argue that acts of legislative founding and nature can consistently serve as joint causes of thepolis, because the ‘products’ of the practical rationality of the architectonic legislator are themselves an expression of distinctly human nature. (shrink)

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Recent critiques of attempts to ground constitutional legitimacy in the constituent power of a strong popular sovereign have tended to focus upon the tension between strong popular sovereignty and...

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This essay uses citational analyses to argue that most of the philosophers considered "postanalytic" - Wittgenstein, McDowell, Davidson, and Rorty - are not, in fact, genuine figures of rapprochement, since the particular essays cited, and/or the background literature that is cited, are not shared in common between the standard-bearing analytic and continental journals.

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One provocative but frequently overlooked feature of John Finnis’s natural law theory is its appeal to the normative role of the Aristotelian spoudaios (the mature person of practical reasonableness). Finnis’s account of the basic requirements of practical reasonableness and defense of the methodological device of “focal meaning” both have recourse to Aristotle’s claim that, in ethics and politics, things should be judged in terms of how they appear to the mature practically reasonable person. The current paper examines the normative role (...) played by the spoudaios within Finnis’s natural law theory and provides a defense of that role against the objection that it lacks justificatory force because it is dependent upon circular reasoning. Section one contextualizes Finnis’s use of the spoudaios by considering its Aristotelian origins and also sketches some reasons for its demise in subsequent moral theory. This serves as the basis for an assessment in section two of whether Finnis’s employment of the spoudaios as an ethical exemplar conflates explanation and justification, and therefore culminates in decisionism. The conclusion of the paper is that Finnis’s recourse to the spoudaios is not viciously circular, because it is grounded in the reflexive and dialogical mode of justification proper to ethical enquiry. (shrink)

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This paper seeks to elucidate the role played by the common good in John Finnis's arguments for a generic and presumptive moral obligation to obey the law.1 Finnis's appeal to the common good constitutes a direct challenge to liberal and philosophical anarchist denials of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law.2 It is questionable, however, whether Finnis has presented the strongest possible case for his position. In the first section I outline Finnis's account of the relationship between basic (...) goods, the common good, and the authority of law. Section II demonstrates how Finnis's emphasis upon the instrumental nature of the common good leaves his position vulnerable to Joseph Raz's objections3 that not all cases of law make a moral difference and that governmental authority is often unnecessary to resolve coordination problems. I argue that Raz's critique nonetheless fails adequately to address an alternative defense of the existence of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law, suggested by some passages in Finnis's work, according to which the common good is integral, rather than merely instrumental, to the good of individuals. In the final section I consider whether Finnis could strengthen his case for a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law by adopting a more consistently robustaccount of the common good. (shrink)

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One major difficulty confronting attempts to clarify the epistemological and ontological status of abstract objects is determining the sense, if any, in which such entities may be characterised as mind and language independent. Our contention is that the tolerant reductionist position of Michael Dummett can be strengthened by drawing on Husserl's mature account of the constitution of ideal objects and mathematical objectivity. According to the Husserlian position we advocate, abstract singular terms pick out weakly mind-independent sedimented meaning-contents. These meaning-contents serve (...) as the ‘thin’ referents of abstract singular terms, but are ultimately founded in prior acts of meaning-constitution. (shrink)

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Habermas’ theory of popular sovereignty has received comparatively little sustained critical attention in the Anglo-American literature since initial responses to Between Facts and Norms. In light of subsequent work on group agency, this paper argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty—in its denial of the normative force of collective citizen action—is best understood as a renunciation of the doctrine. The paper is structured in three sections. Section 1 examines Habermas’ treatment of popular sovereignty prior to Between Facts and Norms as (...) both (i) a principle of constitutional legitimacy or normative justification for the modern Rechtsstaat and (ii) a concept of legitimation for the rule of the ascendant liberal bourgeoisie. Section 2 then argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty in Between Facts and Norms, by discounting the role of collective citizen agency in the justification of the modern constitutional state, empties the doctrine of its core normative content. The final section briefly elaborates on this claim by reference to Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. (shrink)

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Any attempt to apply Aristotelian political categories to the principles of modern constitutionalism is undoubtedly at risk of anachronism. This paper acknowledges non-trivial differences between the Ancient Greek politeia, as theorised by Aristotle, and the modern constitution. It nonetheless argues that the central principles of the modern liberal constitution can be elucidated within the explanatory frame of the Aristotelian concept of the politeia as a political determination of institutional structures and competences oriented by an interpretation of the public good. The (...) paper is divided in three sections. Section 1 outlines Aristotle’s account of the politeia. Section 2 considers some central principles of modern constitutionalism. Section 3 then examines these principles under an Aristotelian lens. The conclusion sketches a potential objection, implicit in the paper’s arguments, to a recent proposal for a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ normative constitutional theory. (shrink)

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The rehabilitation of the concept of authority is one of the more contentious positions advocated by Gadamer in Truth and Method. Habermas in particular challenged the universality of Gadamer’s hermeneutic project by presenting this rehabilitation as a conservative legitimation of prevailing prejudices which truncates the role of critical reflection. Given that Gadamer’s primary focus is upon the ramifications of the Enlightenment dichotomy between reason and authority for historical hermeneutics, however, and that his examples are drawn primarily from educational domains, the (...) extent to which his account of authority sustains a political interpretation is far from self-evident. In this article I argue that Gadamer’s account can nonetheless make at least two important contributions to contemporary philosophical debates on political authority. Following a brief exposition of Gadamer’s account of authority in Truth and Method, I examine his suggestion that the basis of legitimate political authority is to be found in the normative status of the right to be authoritative, rather than in the factual status of being in a position of authority. This account, I suggest, places in question the abstract dichotomy between theoretical and practical authority which informs much contemporary debate on political authority. I then demonstrate how Gadamer’s emphasis upon the historicity of tradition offers important insights for discussions of the relation between political authority and moral autonomy. (shrink)

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This paper explores the normative implications of Aristotle's concept of politikē and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary debates on legitimate political authority. Section one of the paper provides historical and interpretative background on Aristotle's conception of politikē. The second section examines the central normative role that the common good plays in Aristotle's account of politikē and claims that its capacity to play this role points in the direction of a less exclusionary politics than is suggested by Book 1 of the (...) Politics. Finally, in the third section, with reference to work by Andres Rosler and David Estlund, I consider what Aristotle's account can tell us about contemporary debates on the relationship between political authority, legitimacy and expertise. (shrink)

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In Aristotle and Law, George Duke argues that Aristotle's seemingly dispersed statements on law and legislation are unified by a commitment to law's status as an achievement of practical reason. This book provides a systematic exposition of the significance and coherence of Aristotle's account of law, and also indicates the relevance of this account to contemporary legal theory. It will be of great interest to scholars and students in jurisprudence, philosophy, political science and classics.

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Contemporary debates on the nature and scope of practical reason are often framed in terms of the viewpoints of a few major figures in the history of philosophy. Whereas advocates of skeptical or procedural approaches to practical reason generally seek historical support from Hume, defenders of more substantive conceptions of practical rationality tend to draw inspiration from Aristotle or Kant. This paper argues that it is in fact the work of Aquinas which offers the best material for a defense of (...) a substantive conception of practical rationality. After outlining the distinction between procedural and substantive conceptions, the author turns to Christine M. Korsgaard’s rearticulation of a Kantian viewpoint on practical reason. The advocate of a Kantian framework, he argues, is less well equipped than the defender of the Thomistic conception to meet necessary constraints on a substantive account. The paper closes with a discussion of the way contemporary versions of natural law theory can meet these constraints. (shrink)

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The prevailing approach to the problem of the ontological status of mathematical entities such as numbers and sets is to ask in what sense it is legitimate to ascribe a reference to abstract singular terms; those expressions of our language which, taken at face value, denote abstract objects. On the basis of this approach, neo‐Fregean Abstractionists such as Hale and Wright have argued that abstract singular terms may be taken to effect genuine reference towards objects, whereas nominalists such as Field (...) have asserted that these apparent ontological commitments should not be taken at face value. In this article I argue for an intermediate position which upholds the legitimacy of ascribing a reference to abstract singular terms in an attenuated sense relative to the more robust ascription of reference applicable to names denoting concrete entities. In so doing I seek to clear up some confusions regarding the ramifications of such a thin notion of reference for ontological claims about mathematical objects. (shrink)

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In Principes de Politique (1815), Benjamin Constant offers a blueprint for later liberal attempts to retain a commitment to popular sovereignty, while moderating its absolutist tendencies and associations with arbitrary political power. This paper examines some notable tensions, still relevant today, in Constant’s domesticated liberal concept of popular sovereignty. These tensions, I contend, all point to the conclusion that Constant’s project of limiting popular sovereignty by appeal to a sacrosanct domain of rights rests on a liberal interpretation of the general (...) will, which is in fact constitutive for the enjoyment of individual liberties. Section 2 argues that Constant’s location of popular sovereignty in the legislative general will, as determined by elected representatives, does not overcome the problem of the potential arrogation of the popular will by a partisan minority. Section 3 then examines Constant’s views on rights and the implications of his acknowledgement that the enjoyment of liberties depends upon the institutional guarantee provided by constitutional enactment. Finally, in section 4, I demonstrate that Constant’s valorization of individual self-development is inseparable from an idea of political liberty which reflects the priorities of a liberal elite. (shrink)

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Michael Dummett has argued that the linguistic turn, initiated by Frege, is the decisive moment in the birth of the analytical tradition and what distinguishes that tradition from other movements. The thesis of the paper is that Dummett’s account of the origins of the analytical tradition understates the extent to which Frege’s work, and the linguistic turn more generally, are responses to antinomies in the modern philosophical project. An adequate characterisation of the origins of the analytic tradition presupposes an account (...) of the fundamental conceptual shift that occurred during the time of the scientific revolution and the epistemological problems that arose in conjunction with this shift. This is why it is misleading to assert, with Dummett, that the really interesting developments in terms of understanding the analytical tradition are subsequent to Frege. The most productive contrast in terms of understanding the origins of the analytical tradition is not between pre and post Fregean thought, the paper argues, but between modern and premodern conceptions of philosophy and its relation to the world of everyday experience. (shrink)

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This book offers an historically-informed critical assessment of Dummett's account of abstract objects, examining in detail some of the Fregean presuppositions whilst also engaging with recent work on the problem of abstract entities.

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The role of sovereign authority in Hobbes' political philosophy is to establish peace and stability by serving as a definitive and unambiguous source of law. Although these broad outlines of Hobbes' account of political authority are uncontentious, matters quickly become more complicated once one seeks its normative basis. This much is evident from recent debates on the normative status of the laws of nature and the related issue as to whether Hobbes is better categorised as an incipient legal positivist or (...) as a heterodox natural law thinker. In this paper I argue that although the positivist and natural law commitments in Hobbes' theory of political authority can be partially reconciled, such a reconciliation points to the need for more substantive theories of practical reason and truth than are to be found in Hobbes' official statements on these topics. Section II examines the positivist and natural law dimensions in Hobbes' thought and suggests that the role of sovereign authority in providing the definitive interpretation of the laws of nature allows a partial reconciliation to be effected. In section III, I consider the tension between this reconciliation and Hobbes' instrumentalism about practical reason and equivocal separation of authority and truth. (shrink)

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This paper defends the explanatory priority for the general descriptive theory of law of an investigation into law’s normative point over an investigation of law’s other central features. The paper begins by clarifying the normative priority thesis and implications of the assertion that law has a normative point. It then develops, in Section II, two arguments in favour of the priority thesis. Section III demonstrates the explanatory power of the law’s normative point priority thesis by reference to the related, but (...) derivative, problem of the normativity of legal directives. (shrink)

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The practical, normative dimension of planning is a plausible source of the ‘family resemblances’ noted by a number of legal theorists between Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory and natural law jurisprudence. Foremost among these resemblances is Shapiro’s contention that the law, necessarily, has a moral aim. The moral aim thesis is at first glance surprising given Shapiro’s intention to defend exclusive legal positivism and unequivocal rejection of what he takes to be the core commitments of natural law theory. Shapiro’s claim, however, (...) is that although the law necessarily has a moral aim, this does not entail that it is successful in satisfying that aim. In order to assess this thesis, it is helpful to compare the Planning Theory with contemporary natural law approaches. Bringing Shapiro’s Planning Theory into dialogue with contemporary natural law theories can demonstrate some of the Planning Theory’s weaknesses as an alternative explanation of the ultimate grounds of the authoritativeness of legal norms. Some of these weaknesses, moreover, are instructive beyond the specific contours of the Planning Theory insofar as they generalise to other legal positivist approaches. In section one I consider Shapiro’s treatment of the so-called ‘Possibility Puzzle’ regarding the grounding relation between authoritative norms and legal authority. Shapiro’s denial of the capacity of earlier jurisprudential theories to resolve this puzzle overlooks what is – I suggest – a plausible solution developed by John Finnis on the basis of Joseph Raz’s theory of practical reason and norms. Section two then demonstrates why Shapiro’s attempt to combine a robust construal of the social facts thesis with a commitment to the thesis that law necessarily has a moral aim is ultimately unsuccessful. (shrink)

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The Search for the Nature of Law: A Review of Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa , Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law.

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The syntactic priority thesis (henceforth SP) asserts that the truth of appropriate sentential contexts containing what are, by syntactic criteria, singular terms, is sufficient to justify the attribution of objectual reference to such terms (Wright, 1983, 24). One consequence that the neo-Fregean draws from SP is that it is through an analysis of the syntactic structure of true statements that 'ontological questions are to be understood and settled' (Wright, 1983, 25). Despite the significant literature on SP, little consideration has been (...) given to this bold meta-ontological claim.1 My concern here is accordingly not with specific applications of SP to debates in the philosophy of mathematics, but rather with the .. (shrink)

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The weak natural law thesis asserts that any instance of law is either a rational standard for conduct or defective. At first glance, the thesis seems compatible with the proposition that the validity of a law within a legal system depends upon its sources rather than its merits. Mark C. Murphy has nonetheless argued that the weak natural law thesis can challenge this core commitment of legal positivism via an appeal to law’s function and defectiveness conditions. My contention in the (...) current paper is that in order to make good on the challenge, the defender of the weak natural law thesis should appeal explicitly to the common good, understood as the principal normative reason in the political domain. In section I I outline the main implications of the weak natural law thesis and clarify a common misunderstanding regarding its explanatory role. Section II then argues for the indispensability of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential thesis on the grounds that it has an essential role to play in a natural law account of law’s defectiveness conditions and the presumptive moral obligatoriness of legal norms. Finally, in section III I examine the compatibility of a strengthened version of the weak natural law thesis with legal positivism in light of the centrality of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential position. (shrink)

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