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Munsat’s objective in collecting eleven selections on the analytic-synthetic distinction is to acquaint the beginning or intermediate student with the major aspects of the issue. The selections are presented in historical sequence and Munsat has effectively edited the works such that one can easily follow the development of the distinction without having to contend with excessive peripheral material. The editor provides a short introduction to the varieties of truth as well as prefatory notes to each selection. Beginning with brief selections (...) from Leibniz and Hobbes, the treatment of necessary and contingent truths is traced through Kant and Mill. The Mill selection, "Of Demonstration, and Necessary Truths," deals with the inductive foundations of the deductive sciences and mathematics. This line of investigation reaches its climax in the Frege passages on the nature of arithmetical propositions andRussell’s "What is an Empirical Science?" Of particular importance are portions of three classic contributions to the analytic-synthetic distinction: Kant’s Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, W. V. Quine’s critical "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and the rebuttal to Quine’s attack by Grice and Strawson, "In Defense of a Dogma." Finally, the segment of J. L. Austin’s "The Meaning of a Word" could just as well have been excluded in the interest of continuity and in deference to some more appropriate selection. Munsat has included a useful nineteen-page bibliography.—B. G. H. (shrink)

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This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege,Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam (...) are critically analyzed. I share completely his conviction that contemporary Anglo-American philosophy follows the spirit of the enlightenment in insisting on intellectual sincerity, clarity, and the willingness to meet scientific doubts or objections openly. --Professor Henri Lauener, Editor of Dialectica. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELL AND G. H. HARDY: A STUDY OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP I. GRATTAN-GUINNESS Faculty of Science, Engineering and Mathematics Middlesex Polytechnic Enfield, Middlesex EN3 45F, England I. INTRODUCTION Prom time to time the name of Hardy turns up inRussell's career: a common interest in set theory and the philosophy of mathematics, similar political and religious sentiments, and certain matters of mutual concern arising at Trinity College Cambridge (...) and in the university in general. However, there is no connected account of their contacts. The purpose of this article is to fill a gap in the literature on both men. After enduring private instruction at home, BertrandRussell gained a minor scholarship in mathematics at Trinity College in 1890; he took Part I of the Mathematical Tripos until 1893 and then Part II of the Moral Sciences Tripos in the following year. In 1895 he gained a Prize Fellowship, which he held until 1901; in 19IO.he was awarded a college lectureship which he lost six years later under circumstances noted in section IV below. Much of the intervening time was spent in Oxford or London; however, he spent part of each year in Cambridge.1 The later years are brieHy recorded in section IV. Born into an intellectual family ofmodest means in 1877 (five years younger thanRussell, therefore), Godfrey Harold Hardy won a scholarship to Winchester College and then went to Trinity College in I Standard biographical information onRussell is easily available; see, for example, R. W. Clark, The Life ofBertrand Russel~ specific phases and events are dealt with in succeeding footnotes. The Autobiography ofBertrandRussell is of lower quality than one might imagine; for example, Hardy is not mentioned at all! rus.ell: the Journal of the BertrandRussell Archives McMasrer Unive~ity Library Press noS. 11 (wimer 1991-92): 165-79 ISSN 0036-01631 166 I. GRATTAN-GUINNESS 1896, just afterRussell had gained his fellowship. He was elected to the Apostles (the "Society") in 1898, the year afterRussell "took wings" after five years' active membership; he seems to have been less active thanRussell as a speaker during his own three years there.2 At some stage he also joined the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club, whichRussell had joined in. 1891; a surprising contribution will be described in section IV.3 Graduating as fourth wrangler in Part I of the Mathematical Tripos in 1898 and gaining a high place in Part II in 1900, Hardy received at once a Prize Fellowship (likeRussell). Upon its termination six years later, he obtained a colleg~ lectureship, which he held until 1919. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of London in 1910 (two years afterRussell),4 and in the following year he began his life-long collaboration with his younger colleague ]. E. Littlewood (1885-1977), also a Trinity College graduate and then Fellow, and also a friend ofRussell.5 The next stages of Hardy's career will be described in section IV: his personality is assessed in a concluding section v. 1 OnRussell'~ and Hardy's roles in the Apostles, see passim in P. Levy, Moore: G. E Moore and the Cambridge Apostles (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979). 3 The chief obituary of Hardy is by E. C. Titchmarsh, published in slightly different forms in Obituary Notices ofthe Royal Society ofLondon, 6 (1949); 447-61, and Journal ofthe London Mathematical Society, 25 (1950): 81-101 (followed by more technical surveys of his mathematics by Titchmarsh and eight other authors on pp. 102-38). The first version is reprinted with a few changes in Hardy's Collected Papers, 7 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1966-79), I: 1-12. No major study has been written on him since. 4 Hardy was n~minated for a Royal Sociery fellowship in 1907 by A. R. Forsyth, seconded by J. W L. Glaisher, and supported "on personal knowledge" by W Burnside, E. W Hobson, P. A. MacMahon, A. N. Whitehead, A. E. H. Love, E. B. Elliott and T.]. d'A. Bromwich; the proposal was "suspended" (put up for voring) in 1908, 1909 and 1910 (Royal Sociery Cettificates, 12: foJ. 311). AlthoughRussell was... (shrink)

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Susan Haack presents a striking and appealing figure in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. In spite of British birth and education, she appears to bridge the gap between analytic philosophy and American pragmatism, with its more diverse influences and sources. Well known for her writings in the philosophy of logic and epistemology, she fuses something of the hard-headed debunking style of a BertrandRussell with a lively interest in Peirce, James and Dewey.

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Bertrand Russells Buch A Cntical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz bildet einen Meilenstein in der Leibniz-Forschung, vor allem in den angelsächsischen Ländern. In diesem Aufsatz untersuche ich zunächst die Entstehungsgeschichte dieses Werkes (Russells intensive Beschäftigung mit Leibniz anläßlich einer Vorlesung, die Quellen, dieRussell benutzt hat, und die Hilfe und Unterstützung, die ihm von Philosophen wie James Ward und G. E. Moore zuteil wurden). Anschließend behandle ich das Echo, das Russells Buch gefunden hat. Am Schluß suche ich Russells (...) Einstellung zu Leibniz' Denken zu verdeutlichen. Dabei berücksichtige ich Russells spätere Werke, soweit sie mit Leibniz in Beziehung stehen. Meine Aufmerksamkeit gilt im besonderen Maß dem Briefwechsel mit Louis Couturat und dem Einfluß, den Couturat aufRussell ausgeübt hat. As an original and critical position regarding Leibniz,Russell's [A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz] is not outdated. It is a work still young, one worked out by the "youngRussell", and of fundamental importance for the historical and philosophical investigation of BertrandRussell's thought. But even more fundamental is what we derive from reading it : the understanding of the history of philosophy in terms of dialogue, where the speculative affinities are properly complemented by that critical perspective which calls into question those divergences which set the limit of philosophical reflections and assess their value circumstantially. (shrink)

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The debate surrounding eliminative materialism, and the role of empiricism more broadly, has been one of the more prominent philosophical debates of the last half-century. But too often what is at stake in this debate has been left implicit. This essay surveys the rhetoric of two participants in this debate, Paul Churchland and Thomas Nagel, on the question of whether or not scientific explanations will do away with the need for nonscientific descriptions. Both philosophers talk about this possibility in language (...) reminiscent of revolutionary politics. These authors do not see eliminative materialism merely as an idea to be evaluated, but a revolution to be welcomed or quashed. After surveying their rhetoric, the paper turns to the work of four philosophers—G.E.M. Anscombe, Peter Winch, Paul Holmer, and G.H. von Wright—to suggest that there is within Wittgensteinian tradition a ‘nonrevolutionary’ approach to the question of eliminative materialism. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviews 105 NEW RUSSIAN WORK ONRUSSELL IRVING H. ANELLIS Modern Logic Publishing I Box 1036, Welch Ave. Station Ames, JA 5°010-1036, USA A. S. Kolesnikov. cI»HJIOCOcPHJl BepTPaHa PacceJIa [Filosofija Bertrana Rassela]. Leningrad: Izdatel'srvo Leningradskogo Universiteta, 1991. Pp. 232. 3 rub. 30 kop.. Anatolii Sergeevich Kolesnikov is a relatively new name inRussell studies,.r1.a1though his book shows a deep knowledge of the material available onRussell (...) in Russian and a wide acquaintance withRussell's publications in English and in Russian translation.1 In this work, which translates as The Philosophy ofBertrand Russel~ Kolesnikov traces the evolution ofRussell's "world-view", while presenting a traditional Soviet interpretation ofRussell's place in "bourgeois" philosophy. This monograph presents for the first time in Russian a thorough analysis of the evolution ofRussell's philosophy as the outstanding representation of contemporary bourgeois philosophy, and is the first major study onRussell's philosophy in Russian since the appearance in'1962 ofSoviet philosopher 1. S. Narskii's The Philosophy ofBertrand Russell2Russell himself is viewed by Kolesnikov as the best representative of the bourgeois humanist, philosopher, and mathematician. The author seeks a critical understanding of the historical and philosophical sources ofRussell's ideas and conceptions and of the influence which these exercised and continue to exercise on contemporary Western philosophy and science. The author's aim is to "uncover" the neo-realist empiricist direction ofRussell's philosophy as it manifested itself as a condition of his scientific and epistemological thinking. As had been usual for Soviet studies of Western "bourgeois" philosophers and their philosophies, Lenin and his empiriocriticism serves as a foil for the elucidation ofRussell's thought and its development. Probably the most famous example of the dialectical attack on anaI Kolesnikov is also the author of The Freethought ofBertrandRussell [Svobodomyslie Bertrana Rassela] (Moscow: Mysl', 1978). 2 The Philosophy ofBertrandRussell: Lectures for Students in the University Philosophy Faculty [Filosofija Bertrana Rassela: lekcija dlja studentovfilosofikih fakul'tov universitetov] (Moscow: 1962). In the first footnote (on p. 60) to his translation of the article on "BertrandRussell in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia: Translation from Russian", Russel~ nos. 23-4 (1976): 60-2, Charles Haynes wrote that "Narskiy... appears to be a leading Soviet writet onRussell's philosophy." In fact Narskii wrote extensively on philosophy of logic, for which work he is bcst known. 106 Reviews lytic philosophy revolved around the rather rough treatment accorded to A. J. Ayer when he lectured at Moscow State University in 1962. This methodology for criticizing "bourgeois idealism" has declined in recent years as a consequence of perestroika; from as early as 1987 Soviet philosophers have managed to refrain from employing this tactic in their writings (as one may readily see, e.g., from Zinaida Sokuler's recent paper on "Wirrgenstein on the Contradictions in Logic and in the Foundations of Mathematics"3). Kolesnikov's discussion of political-ideological, social and moral issues is limited to the Preface, which also presents a brief sketch ofRussell's life, especially his education and the earliest of the philosophical influences at Cambridge, of courseRussell's visit in 1920 to Soviet Russia and the writings that derived from that trip, especially his book The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, and of his travels in China. Here Kolesnikov notesRussell's ties to the Fabian socialists and names in particular the Webbs, H. G. Wells and "other members representative of the bourgeois intelligentsia" (p. 5). Mention is also made here of his activism for nuclear disarmament and against the American war in Indochina, and of the essay "Why I Am Not a Christian". We are told at the very outset (p. 3) that "the name of this philosopher is widely known in our country." The remainder of the book is concerned withRussell's technical philosophy, i.e. with his work in philosophy of mathematics, logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics and epistemology. Kolesnikov dividesRussell's philosophical evolution into three stages (p. 22). The "early" period (1894-1910) is the developmental stage, characterized by the influence ofneo-Hegelianism and neo-Kantianism and by the development of the conception of... (shrink)

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In this essay I try, first of all, to outline the development of Joachim's epistemology from his most significant book, The Nature of Truth (1906), to his posthumous Logical Studies (1948), which gathers together the lectures on Logic delivered by him at the University of Oxford in the years up to his death in 1938. The conception of truth as systematic coherence, upheld by him in his earlier work in a lively polemic against BertrandRussell's empirical-realist 'correspondence theory of (...) truth' as well as against the intuitionist appeal to immediate self-evidence, shows the thorough- going influence of F.H. Bradley's epistemology in its declaredly idealistic orientation and its 'sceptical' outcome. I then criticise the arguments by which, in the final pages of The Nature of Truth, he supports his denial of truth's reality, pointing out that they are plainly self-refuting. Finally, I examine the further development of his conception of thought and truth in his Oxford lectures, where he subjects the above-mentioned arguments to a careful self-critique, which prompted his pupil Errol E. Harris to vindicate, against contemporary anti-metaphysical thought, the perennial theoretical value and moral significance of metaphysics in general, and of Hegel's Absolute Idealism in particular. (shrink)

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"Contemporary" is the controlling word in the title of this book of provocative readings, but foundational ideas of a timeless stamp are also brought to bear after the reader’s attention has been captured. In the section on ethics and society, for example, some selections deal with sex, marriage, abortion, eugenics, and women’s rights, but others are archly included on free will, the good life, duty, and the nature of ethical disagreement. The nineteen philosophers whose works are excerpted for this section (...) range from Kant and Bentham in an earlier era through BertrandRussell and A. H. Maslow of the recent past to today’s Simone de Beauvoir, A. C. Ewing, and Charles L. Stevenson, as well as younger thinkers such as Arthur C. Danto and Nicholas Rescher. The remaining sections of the book cover political problems, language and art, experience and nature, and existential, religious, and other views of the meaning of life. An article by Huston Smith on the religious import of drugs concludes the volume. The editors’ introduction describes in fresh ways what a philosophical approach to an issue is and provides a useful setting for the relevant readings which follow. In the introductions to the five sections of the book, they take a closer look at the particular areas of interest and again try to illuminate the readings, in a different way by setting before the reader the truly challenging questions with which the readings will grapple.—W. G. (shrink)

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This anthology collects readings from important nineteenth and early twentieth century figures who contributed to the philosophy of science before that discipline emerged in the last 40 years as an area of study in its own right. It begins with a seldom-read selection by Kant ) and ends with a selection from Bridgman's The Logic of Modern Physics. Each selection is preceded by a three-page biography of the author together with a bibliography of his major writings and some writings on (...) his work. Many familiar names appear, e.g., Mill, Mach, Pearson, Hertz, Poincare, Peirce, Duhem,Russell, Whitehead, and Campbell. But there are others represented whose actual writings are not so familiar to many students of the philosophy of science, e.g., J. F. W. Herschel, William Whewell, Hermann Von Helmholtz, J. B. Stallo, Emile Boutroux and William Ostwald. With the exception of Stallo, the writings of these figures have been long out of print. In one case, a selection from Ludwig Boltzmann on the nature of mechanics, the editor has translated the selected passage into English expressly for this volume. A wide range of topics are considered in the readings: physical laws, theories, induction, observation, space, time, and others; but, as the nature of the case requires, the focus of attention is on classical science. For this reason most existing courses in the philosophy of science could use this collection only as a supplementary text. But it would function well in such a role. Moreover, specialized courses in the history of philosophical thinking about science will find it very useful.--R. H. K. (shrink)

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For several terms at Cambridge in 1939, Ludwig Wittgenstein lectured on the philosophical foundations of mathematics. A lecture class taught by Wittgenstein, however, hardly resembled a lecture. He sat on a chair in the middle of the room, with some of the class sitting in chairs, some on the floor. He never used notes. He paused frequently, sometimes for several minutes, while he puzzled out a problem. He often asked his listeners questions and reacted to their replies. Many meetings were (...) largely conversation. These lectures were attended by, among others, D. A. T. Gasking, J. N. Findlay, Stephen Toulmin, Alan Turing, G. H. von Wright, R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies. Notes taken by these last four are the basis for the thirty-one lectures in this book. The lectures covered such topics as the nature of mathematics, the distinctions between mathematical and everyday languages, the truth of mathematical propositions, consistency and contradiction in formal systems, the logicism of Frege andRussell, Platonism, identity, negation, and necessary truth. The mathematical examples used are nearly always elementary. (shrink)

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In ordinary life we think that we know many things about the world. I know that I am sitting here. I know that it is not raining. I know that Reagan is President--and many more interesting things. We also think that we know things of a more general sort, e.g., that there are tables, chairs, physical objects, other people. Most of the time, we believe that we have good reasons for our beliefs. Descartes, Hume andRussell, however, as a (...) result of philosophical reflection, discover that we cannot know, nor do we have any good reason for our beliefs. ;Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore reject the sceptic's negative conclusions. They think scepticism is absurd, ridiculous and contrary to common sense. It is contrary to what we believe in ordinary life. These commonsense philosophers do not find the sceptical arguments compelling. They argue that scepticism is not as well supported as the ordinary view that we do know. ;A large part of my dissertation is a defense of scepticism against these commonsense philosophers' objections. I argue that Reid and Moore fail to appreciate the power and significance of scepticism. They fail to understand the relation between philosophical scepticism and ordinary life. A proper understanding of Humean scepticism thwarts any attempt to argue from ordinary life against scepticism. ;Still, I argue that Hume was concerned, indeed distressed, by the conflict between scepticism and ordinary life. But he does not think that conflict casts doubt on the truth of scepticism. I argue that Hume feels "philosophical melancholy" over his discoveries about human nature and the human condition. But his distress is totally at the philosophical level. That is because the recognition of the conflict between ordinary life and philosophical reflection is distressing at the philosophical level. I argue that Hume is right to feel the distress that he does, but I also maintain that he should be dissatisfied with his negative appraisal of our epistemic position, just as we are. ;Reid and Moore are right to be dissatisfied with scepticism, even though their attempts to legitimize that dissatisfaction fail. Their failure to appreciate the nature and importance of scepticism, however, is instructive because it forces us to explain why there is thought to be a problem about knowledge. They force us to express what is indeed difficult to express, namely, what it is that we want to understand when we undertake a philosophical investigation of knowledge. . . . UMI. (shrink)

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The stated aim of this investigation is to clarify and critically examine the philosophical concepts inherent in the cosmological argument: he aspires to investigate the argument rather than to either refute critics or support defenders. He treats both the thirteenth century versions of Aquinas and Duns Scotus and the eighteenth century versions developed by Samuel Clarke and Leibniz, but attaches greater importance and spends more time with the latter, finding them both more sophisticated and more fruitful for investigation. The eighteenth (...) century forms make no use of "what many philosophers would regard as a strange and perhaps nonexistent kind of causal series" and, according to the author, are more relevant because modern objections, e.g. those of Hume andRussell, aim at the eighteenth century forms. (shrink)

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Machine generated contents note: -- Series Editors' PrefaceAcknowledgementsNotes on ContributorsHow Things Are Elsewhere; W. Schwarz Information Change and First-Order Dynamic Logic; B.Kooi Interpreting and Applying Proof Theories for Modal Logic; F.Poggiolesi & G.Restall The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge; D.Cohnitz On Probabilistically Closed Languages; H.Leitgeb Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty; B.Weatherson & D.Jehle Skepticism about Reasoning; S.Roush, K.Allen & I.HerbertLessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligations; C.D.Novaes How to Rule Out Things with Words: Strong Paraconsistency and the Algebra of Exclusion; (...) F.Berto Lessons from the Logic of Demonstratives; G.RussellThe Multitude View on Logic; M.Eklund Index. (shrink)

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Johnstone, H. W., Jr. Rhetoric and communication in philosophy.--Smith, C. R. and Douglas, D. G. Philosophical principles in the traditional and emerging views of rhetoric.--Wallace, K. R. Bacon's conception of rhetoric.--Thonssen, L. W. Thomas Hobbes's philosophy of speech.--Walter, O. M., Jr. Descartes on reasoning.--Douglas, D. G. Spinoza and the methodology of reflective knowledge in persuasion.--Howell, W. S. John Locke and the new rhetoric.--Doering, J. F. David Hume on oratory.--Douglas, D. G. A neo-Kantian approach to the epistomology of judgment in criticism.--Bevilacqua, (...) V. M. Lord Kames's theory of rhetoric.--Brockriede, W. E. Bentham's philosophy of rhetoric.--Anderson, R. E. Kierkegaard's theory of communication.--Macksoud, S. J. Ludwig Wittgenstein, radical operationism and rhetorical stance.--Stewart, J. J. L. Austin's speech act analysis.--Torrence, D. L. A philosophy of rhetoric from BertrandRussell.--Clark, A. Martin Buber, dialogue, and the philosophy of rhetoric.--Bennett, W. Kenneth Burke--a philosophy in defense of un-reason.--Dearin, R. D. The philosophical basis of Chaim Perelman's theory of rhetoric. (shrink)

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Reason and quest for revelation, by P. Tillich.--On the ontological mystery, by G. Marcel.--The problem of non-objectifying thinking and speaking, by M. Heidegger.--The problem of natural theology, by J. Macquarrie.--Metaphysical rebellion, by A. Camus.--Psychoanalysis and religion by E. Fromm.--Why I am not a Christian, by B.Russell.--The quest for being, by S. Hook.--The sacred and the profane; a dialectical understanding of Christianity, by T. J. J. Altizer.--Three strata of meaning in religious discourse by C. Hartshorne.--The theological task, by J. (...) B. Cobb.--Theology and objectivity, by S. A. Ogden.--Can faith validate God-talk? by K. Nielsen.--The logic of God, by J. Wisdom.--Mapping the logic of models in science and theology, by F. Ferré.--On understanding mystery, by I. T. Ramsey.--Teilhard de Chardin; a philosophy of precession, by E. R. Baltazar.--The nature of apologetics, by H. Bouillard.--Metaphysics as horizon, by B. Lonergan.--Deciding whether to believe, by M. Novak. (shrink)

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Leibniz's predicate-in-notion principle and some of its alleged consequences, by C. D. Broad.--On Leibniz's metaphysics, by L. Couturat.--Philosophical reflections of Leibniz on law, politics, and the state, by C. J. Friedrich.--The root of contingency, by E. M. Curley.--Monadology, by M. Furth.--Individual substance, by I. Hacking.--Leibniz on plenitude, relations, and the "reign of the law," by J. Hintikka.--Leibniz's theory of the ideality of relations, by H. Ishiguro.--Leibniz and Spinoza on activity, by M. Kneale.--Leibniz and Newton, by A. Koyré.--Plenitude and sufficient reason (...) in Leibniz and Spinoza, by A. O. Lovejoy.--Leibniz on possible worlds, by B. Mates.--Recent work on the philosophy of Leibniz, by B.Russell.--On Leibniz's explication of "necessary truth," by M. D. Wilson.--Bibliography (p. [421]-425). (shrink)

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Broad, C. D. Leibniz's predicate-in-notion principle and some of its alleged consequences.--Couturat, L. On Leibniz's metaphysics.--Friedrich, C. J. Philosophical reflections of Leibniz on law, politics, and the state.--Curley, E. M. The root of contingency. Furth, M. Monadology.--Hacking, I. Individual substance.--Hintikka, J. Leibniz on plenitude, relations, and the "reign of law."--Ishiguro, H. Leibniz's theory of the ideality of relations.--Kneale, M. Leibniz and Spinoza on activity.--Koyré, A. Leibniz and Newton.--Lovejoy, A. O. Plenitude and sufficient reason in Leibniz and Spinoza.--Mates, B. Leibniz on (...) possible worlds.--Russell, B. Recent work on the philosophy of Leibniz.--Wilson, M. D. On Leibniz's explication of "necessary truth.". (shrink)

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John Danford claims that Hume's philosophy must be understood within the framework of the 'problem of reason'. The problem of reason', according to this account, concerns the general relationship between philosophy and reason, on the one hand, and experience and 'common life' on the other. Danford maintains that the nature and development of Hume's thought, considered as a response to this problem, falls, essentially, into two parts. First, we must consider Hume's Treatise and his first Enquiry (ie., his 'epistemological works' (...) [61-cp.9]). The heart of Hume's Treatise, Danford suggests, lies with the epistemology of Book I and, in particular, with the discussions of causation and the external world. Hume's primary concern in these passages, it is argued, was to refute and discredit the rationalistic, 'scientific philosophies of Descartes and, especially, Hobbes (24-5, 40-5, 59, 74-5, 84-5, 190). These thinkers, Danford maintains, had driven a 'wedge' between philosophy and experienceor 'common life' (24-5). By emphasizing the limits and weakness of h u m a n understanding Hume exposes the vulnerability of Hobbes's and Descartes's scientific ambitions and, in this way, he seeks to return philosophy to the secure and appropriate foundations of 'common life and everyday experience.....Shortly after Hume published the Treatise there was, Danford claims, a 'shift' in his thinking on these matters (28). This shift is represented most clearly in his later works: the Essays, the History, and the Dialogues (10, 33, 7, 88, 108). Danford firmly rejects the suggestion that these works represent a turning away from philosophy. On the contrary, it is these later works, taken together, which constitute Hume's most mature philosophy. Indeed, they are, Danford says, the 'flower ofHume's philosophic career' (10). The mature philosophy of Hume, it is argued, must be interpreted as 'Political philosophy". It is political philosophy in the sense that it attempts to investigate human life in its full diversity and complexity and, on this basis, it seeks to provide us with some general guide as to how we should live (10, 7, 88-9, 183-6). From the 'teachings' of the History and the Essays Danford draws some lessons that are 'valid for all times' (112 and 114). The inspirational message concerns, roughly, the merits of capitalism (see, e.g., p. 131: The increase in personal liberty, then, was and is directly connected to the growth of commerce...' and p.137:'. the central lesson of British history [is] the superiority of liberal commercial society ...). (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 127 seems to imply. Of course, this critique can easily be dismissed as asking for a book that Krieger did not wish to write. His method has produced important results, for Krieger has discerned developmental trends overlooked by others. Otherwise, the only area that I think needs further discussion is Ranke's conception of the nature and function of science. Krieger seems to imply that science automatically means (...) a nomological approach modeled upon the mechanical physical sciences. But Ranke was nourished in an atmosphere where science was often equated with Naturphilosophie. Certainly, Ranke's language is filled with images and terms popularized by Naturphilosophen. Ranke's quest for a science of history may fit very nicely with the ideal dimension of his thought if the science that he is talking about is analogous to Naturphilosophie. It may turn out that the basic polarity in Ranke's idea of history is an analytic construct that has little meaning for Ranke's own intentions. Krieger ends his study with a chapter devoted to the meaning of Ranke's work for modem historiography. It is the dialectical synthesis of the whole study. After recapitulating Ranke's achievements, Krieger then emphasizes the breach that separates Ranke from our conceptual world. We no longer share Ranke's beliefs or values. In fact, for most of us "he must seem simply archaic, and the more he is himself historically restored the more archaic he must seem" (p. 355). For the reader who had to struggle through this difficult book and to contend with Professor Krieger's passion for complex dependent clauses, this announcement appears as a grand denouement. But the shock is only temporary. Krieger's assertion of the differences that separate Ranke from us serves as a warning to those who still take Ranke's approach as an objective model for historical reconstruction. The deeper meaning of Ranke's view of history is the affirmation of history as an autonomous and independent form of knowledge. "History is an inimitable way of rendering comprehensible modes of humanity which must otherwise be incomprehensible" (p. 356). This form of knowledge, which is devoted "to the actual but equipped with a language of common sense organized around the categorical," proceedes by arranging things along a time line (p. 357). Here Krieger launches a spirited counterattack against those modem theorists who have questioned the viability of history as an independent form of knowledge or who have minimized the importance of developmental analysis, preferring instead to concentrate upon relatively static deep structures. Krieger's study affirms Ranke's project in its most general sense; that history is a cumulative logic of the actual, "the meeting ground of philosophy, science, and cataclysmic experience" (p. 356). And it serves, at the same time, as a positive demonstration that a developmental analysis does impart knowledge that other approaches cannot achieve. In this sense, Krieger's masterful study of Ranke reaffirms Ranke's central position as a founding father of modem historical thought. PETER HANNS REILL University of California, Los Angeles Arthur Quinn. The Confidence of British Philosophers:An Essay in Historical Narrative. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977. Pp. xii + 289. Gld. 80. This is a remarkable book. Almost all of it is a study, very well researched and presented, of four major English philosophical movements: Newtonians, the Utilitarians, the Oxford Hegelians, and theRussell, G. E. Moore, and Whitehead group. The study shows the initial enthusiasm, optimism, and confidence of each of the groups. Each believed that it had found a way to solve the intellectual and perhaps moral and social problems of mankind. As each movement developed, the confidence slowly eroded when philosophical problems and difficulties failed to disappear. The picture Quinn presents of these movements is very interesting. He has grouped together 128 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY much detail that makes us see the original intentions of the leaders of each of these movements. He also deftly shows how as stumbling blocks arose each movement lowered its goals and began to fade. Employing a very wide range of printed sources, Quinn presents a series of convincing vignettes, and in so doing be often reveals features of these movements that have been... (shrink)

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