At T-time, the Inchoative Nick of Time, and “Statements about the Past”: Time and History in the Analytic Philosophy of Language.Géza Kállay -2011 -Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3):322-351.detailsThe paper, drawing on articles by J. M. E. McTaggart, G. E. Moore, D. Davidson, J. L. Austin, B. Russell, A. J. Ayer and G. E. M. Anscombe, argues that the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition has developed an “inchoative“ view of time, and history is a problem as regards the existence of events in the past and how these events can be known. An alternative view is hinted at through the work of L. Wittgenstein and S. Cavell.
Nonsense and the Ineffable: Re-reading the Ethical Standpoint in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.Géza Kállay -2012 -Nordic Wittgenstein Review 1 (1):103-130.detailsThe paper examines the ethical standpoint of the Tractatus as it has been reconstructed by Cora Diamond (“the austere view”) and gives an account of some of the criticism this reconstruction has received in the work of P. M. S. Hacker and Meredith Williams (“the standard view”). The second half of the paper tries to argue that the austere and the standard views rather complement each other if we recognize “two I ’-s” in the Tractatus and if it is supposed (...) that there is a “3rd person” and “1st person” perspective which are both voiced on its pages. (shrink)