Results for 'Frances Layton'
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- A model of human response to workload stress.Moira Lemay,FrancesLayton &David J. Townsend -1990 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 28 (6):547-550.No categories
- Morality, Mortality Volume I: Death and Whom to Save From It.Frances Myrna Kamm -1993 - New York, US: OUP Usa.Morality, Mortality as a whole deals with certain aspects of ethical theory and with moral problems that arise primarily in contexts involving life‐and‐death decisions. The importance of the theoretical issues is not limited to their relevance to these decisions; however, they are, rather, issues at the heart of basic moral and political theory. This first volume comprises three parts. Part I, Death: From Bad to Worse, has with four chapters, and an appendix, discussing death and why it is bad for (...) the person who dies. Part II, Saving Lives: General Issues, has six chapters, and explores a cluster of moral problems that arise in saving lives. The general question raised is whether we should always, in aiding life, act so as to save the greater number of lives or to produce the greatest amount of good. Part III, Scarce Resources: Theoretical Issues, Specific Recommendations, and Organ Transplants, has five chapters, and deals with the problem of the acquisition and distribution of organs for transplantation. It allows us to apply the theoretical discussion of saving lives and relevant/irrelevant utilities presented in the previous parts. However, the discussion can be understood independently of the first two parts, and the conceptual issues and procedures on which it focuses are relevant to dealing with any scarce resource, including money and time, which are needed to use other plentiful resources. Although the book contains much theoretical and methodological argument, it is firmly grounded in practical ethical issues, and is illustrated throughout by examples. (shrink)
- Morality, Mortality Volume Ii: Rights, Duties, and Status.Frances Myrna Kamm -1996 - New York, US: Oup Usa.This volume continues the examination of issues of life and death which F.M. Kamm began in Morality, Mortality, Volume I. Kamm continues her development of a non-consequentialist ethical theory and its application to practical ethical problems. She looks at the distinction between killing and letting die, and between intending and foreseeing, and also at the concepts of rights, prerogatives, and supererogation. She shows that a sophisticated non-consequentialist theory can be modelled which copes convincingly with practical ethical issues, and throws considerable (...) light on some of the key distinctions and concepts of ethical discourse. (shrink)
- Disagreement.BryanFrances -2014 - Malden, MA: Polity.Regardless of who you are or how you live your life, you disagree with millions of people on an enormous number of topics from politics, religion and morality to sport, culture and art. Unless you are delusional, you are aware that a great many of the people who disagree with you are just as smart and thoughtful as you are - in fact, you know that often they are smarter and more informed. But believing someone to be cleverer or more (...) knowledgeable about a particular topic usually won’t change your mind. Should it? This book is devoted to exploring this quandary - what should we do when we encounter disagreement, particularly when we believe someone is more of an authority on a subject than we are? The question is of enormous importance, both in the public arena and in our personal lives. Disagreement over marriages, beliefs, friendships and more causes immense personal strife. People with political power disagree about how to spend enormous amounts of money, about what laws to pass, or about wars to fight. If only we were better able to resolve our disagreements, we would probably save millions of lives and prevent millions of others from living in poverty. The first full-length text-book on this philosophical topic, Disagreement provides students with the tools they need to understand the burgeoning academic literature and its perspectives. Including case studies, sample questions and chapter summaries, this engaging and accessible book is the perfect starting point for students and anyone interested in thinking about the possibilities and problems of this fundamental philosophical debate. (shrink)
- Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let's Not Let the Tail Wag the Dog.Frances Egan -2012 -Journal of Cognitive Science 13:39-49.
- Skill and knowledge.Ernest Sosa &LauraFrances Callahan -2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese,The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 146-156.
- Is there a problem with enhancement?Frances M. Kamm -2005 -American Journal of Bioethics 5 (3):5 – 14.This article examines arguments concerning enhancement of human persons recently presented by Michael Sandel (2004). In the first section, I briefly describe some of his arguments. In section two, I consider whether, as Sandel claims, the desire for mastery motivates enhancement and whether such a desire could be grounds for its impermissibility. Section three considers how Sandel draws the distinction between treatment and enhancement, and the relation to nature that he thinks each expresses. The fourth section examines Sandel's views about (...) parent/child relations and also how enhancement would affect distributive justice and the duty to aid. In conclusion, I briefly offer an alternative suggestion as to why enhancement may be troubling and consider what we could safely enhance. (shrink)
- Representationalism.Frances Egan -2012 - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich,The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of (...) representation. (shrink)
- Harming some to save others.Frances Kamm -1989 -Philosophical Studies 57 (3):227 - 260.
- Killing and Letting Die: Methodological and Substantive Issues†.Frances Myrna Kamm -2017 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (4):297-312.
- The lily's tongue: figure and authority in Kierkegaard's Lily discourses.Frances Maughan-Brown -2019 - Albany: State University of New York Press.The Lily's Tongue offers a nuanced, sustained reading of what Maughan-Brown calls the "Lily Discourses"--four discourses that Kierkegaard wrote about the instruction in the Gospel of Matthew to "consider the lilies." Kierkegaard suggests that the lilies are "authoritative" rather than merely "figural" or "metaphorical." The aim of this book is to explore what exactly Kierkegaard means by asking, How do texts speak with authority? In Maughan-Brown's reading, Kierkegaard argues that the key to a text's authority is in the act of (...) reading itself. No text can have authority unless the reader grants it that authority. That is because, paradoxically, no text can avoid or escape the use of figural language. If the lilies speak authoritatively it is precisely because they are also figural. Texts do not speak directly; their tongue is always the lily's tongue. Drawing on the work of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Benjamin, and Derrida, The Lily's Tongue situates Kierkegaard's reading of Matthew at the intersection of theological, philosophical, political, and literary investigations of figural language. It uniquely contributes to the ongoing discussion of Kierkegaard's theory and practice of "indirect communication" by introducing four pivotal signed discourses into this debate. In so doing, Maughan-Brown reveals a groundbreaking theory of figure--one that ultimately requires a renewed reading of the major pseudonymous works. (shrink)
- Supererogation and obligation.Frances Myrna Kamm -1985 -Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):118-138.
- Harming, not aiding, and positive rights.Frances Myrna Kamm -1986 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1):3-32.
- Nonconsequentialism.Frances Myrna Kamm -2000 - In Hugh LaFollette -,The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Blackwell.No categories
- What Is And Is Not Wrong With Enhancement?Frances Kamm -2009 - In Nick Bostrom & Julian Savulescu,Human Enhancement. Oxford University Press.
- Using time‐series design in the assessment of teaching effectiveness.Huann Shyang Lin &Frances Lawrenz -1999 -Science Education 83 (4):409-422.Export citation
Bookmark - Taking a stand in a postfeminist world: toward an engaged cultural criticism.Frances E. Mascia-Lees -2000 - Albany: State University of New York Press. Edited by Patricia Sharpe.Taking a Stand in a Postfeminist World offers an engaged cultural criticism in a postfeminist context.
- The Frontier of National Sovereignty.S. Milward Alan,Frances M. B. Lynch,Ruggiero Ranieri,Federico Romero &Vibeke Sorensen -forthcoming -History and Theory.Export citation Bookmark
- Active and passive scene recognition across views.RanxiaoFrances Wang &Daniel J. Simons -1999 -Cognition 70 (2):191-210.No categories
- Famine ethics: the problem of distance in morality and Singer's ethical theory.Frances Kamm -1999 - In Dale Jamieson,Singer and His Critics. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 174--203.
- The grotesque in Western art and culture: the image at play.Frances S. Connelly -2012 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.This book establishes a fresh and expansive view of the grotesque in Western art and culture, from 1500 to the present day. Following the non-linear evolution of the grotesque,Frances S. Connelly analyzes key works, situating them within their immediate social and cultural contexts, as well as their place in the historical tradition. By taking a long historical view, the book reveals the grotesque to be a complex and continuous tradition comprised of several distinct strands: the ornamental, the carnivalesque (...) and caricatural, the traumatic, and the profound. The book articulates a model for understanding the grotesque as a rupture of cultural boundaries that compromises and contradicts accepted realities. Connelly demonstrates that the grotesque is more than a style, genre, or subject; it is a cultural phenomenon engaging the central concerns of the humanistic debate today. Hybrid, ambivalent, and changeful, the grotesque is a shaping force in the modern era. (shrink)
- When a Skeptical Hypothesis Is Live.BryanFrances -2005 -Noûs 39 (4):559–595.I’m going to argue for a set of restricted skeptical results: roughly put, we don’t know that fire engines are red, we don’t know that we sometimes have pains in our lower backs, we don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and we don’t even know that we believe any of those truths. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: here’s a skeptical hypothesis; you can’t epistemically neutralize (...) it, you have to be able to neutralize it to know P; so you don’t know P. But the skeptical hypotheses I plug into it are “real, live” scientific-philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, unlike any of the outrageous traditional skeptical hypotheses (e.g., ‘You’re a brain in a vat’). So I call the resulting skepticism Live Skepticism. Notably, the Live Skeptic’s argument goes through even if we adopt the clever anti-skeptical fixes thought up in recent years such as reliabilism, relevant alternatives theory, contextualism, and the rejection of epistemic closure. Furthermore, the scope of Live Skepticism is bizarre: although we don’t know the simple facts noted above, many of us do know that there are black holes and other amazing facts. (shrink)
- The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue. Part 4: general conclusion.AllenFrances,Michael A. Cerullo,John Chardavoyne,Hannah S. Decker,Michael B. First,Nassir Ghaemi,Gary Greenberg,Andrew C. Hinderliter,Warren A. Kinghorn,Steven G. LoBello,Elliott B. Martin,Aaron L. Mishara,Joel Paris,Joseph M. Pierre,Ronald W. Pies,Harold A. Pincus,Douglas Porter,Claire Pouncey,Michael A. Schwartz,Thomas Szasz,Jerome C. Wakefield,G. Scott Waterman,Owen Whooley,Peter Zachar &James Phillips -2012 -Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7:14-.In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by AllenFrances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along withFrances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner (...) all further questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined. (shrink)
- Categorical perception of tactile distance.Frances Le Cornu Knight,Matthew R. Longo &Andrew J. Bremner -2014 -Cognition 131 (2):254-262.No categories
- Institutional Pressures and Ethical Reckoning by Business Corporations.Frances Chua &Asheq Rahman -2011 -Journal of Business Ethics 98 (2):307 - 329.Prior studies have provided explanations for the presence, use and dissemination of codes of corporate ethics or codes of corporate conduct of business corporations. Most such explanations are functional in nature, and are descriptive as they are derived from the codes and their associated documents. We search for more underlying explanations using two complementary theories: first, social contract theories explaining the exogenous and endogenous reasons of organizational behavior, and then institutional theory explaining why organizations take similar measures in response to (...) institutional pressures. Based on our explanations, we contend that the codes and their use and dissemination are arising from underlying social and institutional pressures for firms to continuously validate their existence in the face of increasing changes and recurrent uncertainties. (shrink)
- Live Skeptical Hypotheses.BryanFrances -2008 - In John Greco,The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 225-245.Those of us who take skepticism seriously typically have two relevant beliefs: (a) it’s plausible (even if false) that in order to know that I have hands I have to be able to epistemically neutralize, to some significant degree, some skeptical hypotheses, such as the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) one; and (b) it’s also plausible (even if false) that I can’t so neutralize those hypotheses. There is no reason for us to also think (c) that the BIV hypothesis, for instance, is plausible (...) or probably true. In order to take skepticism seriously it’s sufficient to hold (a) and (b); one need not hold (c). Indeed, philosophers who accept (a) and (b) never endorse (c). Show me a philosopher who suspects that he is a brain in a vat and I’ll show you someone who is deranged! That’s one thing that bothers undergraduates in philosophy. They object: why on earth do some philosophers take the BIV hypothesis to pose any threat at all to our beliefs given that those very same philosophers think that there’s no real chance that the BIV hypothesis is true? Sure, the BIV hypothesis is formally inconsistent with my belief that I have hands, so if the former is true then my belief is false. But so what? Why should that bare inconsistency matter so much? Is this strange attitude amongst philosophers the result of some logic fetish infecting the philosophical community? It is sometimes said that the skeptical hypotheses are not only inconsistent with our beliefs but are explanatory of our experiences, which is supposed to make them more of a threat. But students aren’t fooled: although the skeptical hypotheses may attempt to explain why our experience is as it is, it’s the kind of attempt appropriate for science fiction movies that are all special effects and virtually no plot. No one with any sense of reality will take the evil demon hypothesis to be even tenuously explanatory. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms.Frances Egan -2017 - In David Michael Kaplan,Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-163.A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...) the causal structure of the mechanism underlying the capacity. If they are right, then a cognitive model that resists a transparent mapping to known neural mechanisms fails to be explanatory. I argue that a functiontheoretic characterization of a cognitive capacity can be genuinely explanatory even absent an account of how the capacity is realized in neural hardware. (shrink)
- Feminist theory: a reader.Wendy K. Kolmar &Frances Bartkowski (eds.) -1999 - Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield Pub. Co..This comprehensive reader represents the history, intellectual breadth and diversity of feminist theory.
- Readings in ethics.JamesFrances Leibell -1926 - Chicago, Ill.,: Loyola univesity press.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Man the romantic.ClaraFrances Mcintyre -1930 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 11 (3):194.Export citation Bookmark
- The life of Ernest Renan.Agnes MaryFrances Robinson -1897 - London,: Methuen & Co..No categories
- Political parties and public policy.Christian Salas,Frances McCall Rosenbluth &Ian Shapiro -2020 - In Melissa Schwartzberg & Daniel Viehoff,Democratic failure. New York: New York University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- Reasonable probability of success as a moral criterion in the western just war tradition.Frances V. Harbour -2011 -Journal of Military Ethics 10 (3):230-241.Abstract Finding the western just war criterion of reasonable chance of success to be a contribution to ethical decision making about armed conflict requires dealing with a number of critiques. Specifying ?probability? rather than the alternatives ?hope? or ?chance?, and raising standards of evidence involved, makes the term less vague. Expanding the concept of ?success? to include morally defensible aims that can be achieved without military victory enriches the understanding of the moral relationship between ends and means in armed conflict. (...) Asking decision makers to accept moral responsibility for the costs of possible failure is a unique contribution to the just war criteria. The enriched concept of reasonable probability of success thus offers morally significant insights to prewar jus ad bellum decisions, and can benefit ethical decision-making about whether to continue once fighting has begun. (shrink)
- Equal treatment and equal chances.Frances Myrna Kamm -1984 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (2):177-194.
- (1 other version)Religious Disagreement.BryanFrances -2014 - In Graham Robert Oppy,Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. London: Routledge.In this essay I try to motivate and formulate the main epistemological questions to ask about the phenomenon of religious disagreement. I will not spend much time going over proposed answers to those questions. I address the relevance of the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement. I start with some fiction and then, hopefully, proceed with something that has at least a passing acquaintance with truth.
- Developing Automated Deceptions and the Impact on Trust.Frances S. Grodzinsky,Keith W. Miller &Marty J. Wolf -2015 -Philosophy and Technology 28 (1):91-105.As software developers design artificial agents , they often have to wrestle with complex issues, issues that have philosophical and ethical importance. This paper addresses two key questions at the intersection of philosophy and technology: What is deception? And when is it permissible for the developer of a computer artifact to be deceptive in the artifact’s development? While exploring these questions from the perspective of a software developer, we examine the relationship of deception and trust. Are developers using deception to (...) gain our trust? Is trust generated through technological “enchantment” warranted? Next, we investigate more complex questions of how deception that involves AAs differs from deception that only involves humans. Finally, we analyze the role and responsibility of developers in trust situations that involve both humans and AAs. (shrink)
- Time of Trial.Frances Howard-Snyder -2019 -Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9:96-105.No categories
- The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism.BryanFrances -2006 -Mind 115 (460):1007-1022.For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
- Identification of angry faces in the attentional blink.Frances A. Maratos,Karin Mogg &Brendan P. Bradley -2008 -Cognition and Emotion 22 (7):1340-1352.
- Does Size Matter?Frances E. Bowen -2002 -Business and Society 41 (1):118-124.
- Deciding whom to help, health–adjusted life years and disabilities.Frances Kamm -2004 - In Sudhir Anand,Public Health, Ethics, and Equity. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 225--242.
- Defending Millian Theories.BryanFrances -1998 -Mind 107 (428):703-728.In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent, so it has no additional sense. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke’s puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean’s arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents (...) that are sensitive to our varying personal conceptions of the referents of those elements) are viciously circular. Thus, the Fregean must give new arguments for her central claims. Second, I offer an original, positive argument for the Millian idea that the thoughts that Cicero was bald and that Tully was bald are identical. Incredibly, the argument appeals to nothing but highly intuitive, pre-theoretical principles regarding folk psychological usage—traditionally the source of Fregean intuitions. Third, I examine one of the most important recent papers on Kripke’s puzzle, that by David Sosa (1996). Sosa claims to have found a way to turn the tables on Kripke’s puzzle by using it to argue against Millian theories. I argue that Sosa’s argument on behalf of the Fregean is question-begging. I conclude that Millian theories can be seriously defended without any use of theoretical constructs such as guises or Russellian propositions, and Fregeans need to start over arguing for their theory’s central claims. (shrink)
- DSM-IV Meets Philosophy.A.Frances,A. H. Mack,M. B. First,T. A. Widiger,R. Ross,L. Forman &W. W. Davis -1994 -Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):207-218.The authors discuss some of the conceptual issues that must be considered in using and understanding psychiatric classification. DSM-IV is a practical and common sense nosology of psychiatric disorders that is intended to improve communication in clinical practice and in research studies. DSM-IV has no philosophic pretensions but does raise many philosphical questions. This paper describes the development of DSM-IV and the way in which it addresses a number of philosophic issues: nominalism vs. realism, epistemology in science, the mind/body dichotomy, (...) the definition of mental disorders, and dimensional vs. categorical classification. (shrink)
- with Enhancement?Frances Kamm -2009 - In Nick Bostrom & Julian Savulescu,Human Enhancement. Oxford University Press. pp. 91.
- The genesis of the theory of "art for art's sake" in Germany and in England.RoseFrances Egan -1921 - Philadelphia: R. West.
- A Summary of Research in Science Education‐1990.Fred Finley,Frances Lawrenz &Patricia Heller -1992 -Science Education 76 (3):239-281.No categories
- On the theory of the infinite in modern thought.EleanorFrances Jourdain -1911 - New York [etc.]: Longmans, Green and co..The problem of the finite and the infinite.--Pragmatism and a theory of knowledge.
- How We Count Hunger Matters.Frances Moore Lappé,Jennifer Clapp,Molly Anderson,Robin Broad,Ellen Messer,Thomas Pogge &Timothy Wise -2013 -Ethics and International Affairs 27 (3):251-259.Hunger continues to be one of humanity's greatest challenges despite the existence of a more-than-adequate global food supply equal to 2,800 kilocalories for every person every day. In measuring progress, policy-makers and concerned citizens across the globe rely on information supplied by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), an agency of the United Nations. In 2010 the FAO reported that in the wake of the 2007–2008 food-price spikes and global economic crisis, the number of people experiencing hunger worldwide since 2005–2007 (...) had increased by 150 million, rising above 1 billion in 2009. However, in itsState of Food Insecurity in the World 2012(SOFI 12) the FAO presented new estimates, having revamped its methods and reinterpreted its hunger data back to 1990. The revised numbers for the period 1990–1992 to 2010–2012 reverse the trend to a steadily falling one. Based on the FAO's new calculations, extreme undernourishment peaked in 1990 at a record-breaking one billion, followed by a significant decline through 2006, when progress stalled but did not reverse (see chart below). (shrink)
- Spirituality, Expertise, and Philosophers.BryanFrances -2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan,Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-81.We all can identify many contemporary philosophy professors we know to be theists of some type or other. We also know that often enough their nontheistic beliefs are as epistemically upstanding as the non-theistic beliefs of philosophy professors who aren’t theists. In fact, the epistemic-andnon-theistic lives of philosophers who are theists are just as epistemically upstanding as the epistemic-and-non-theistic lives of philosophers who aren’t theists. Given these and other, similar, facts, there is good reason to think that the pro-theistic beliefs (...) of theistic philosophers are frequently epistemically upstanding. Given their impeccable epistemic credentials on non-theistic matters, the amount of careful thought that lies behind their theism, the large size of the community of philosophical theists, as well as other, similar facts, it would be surprising if all or even most of their pro-theistic beliefs were epistemically blameworthy in some or other signicant sense tied to charges such as ‘He should know better than to believe that’ (so mere false belief need not be blameworthy in this sense; the use of ‘blameworthy’ will be claried below). Of course some of the pro-theistic beliefs of some theistic philosophers are epistemically blameworthy; the mere large numbers of fallible theistic philosophers almost guarantees it. My point here is that it would be unexpected if most of the pro-theistic beliefs of theistic philosophers were epistemically blameworthy. (shrink)
- Online file sharing: resolving the tensions between privacy and property interests.Frances S. Grodzinsky &Herman T. Tavani -2008 -Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 38 (4):28-39.This essay expands upon an earlier work in which we analyzed the implications of the Verizon v RIAA case for P2P Networks vis-à-vis concerns affecting personal privacy and intellectual property. In the present essay we revisit some of the concerns surrounding this case by analyzing the intellectual property and privacy issues that emerged in the MGM Studios v. Grokster case. These two cases illustrate some of the key tensions that exist between privacy and property interests in cyberspace. In our analysis, (...) we contrast Digital Rights Management and Interoperability and we examine some newer distribution models of sharing over P2P networks. We also analyze some privacy implications in the two cases in light of the theory of privacy as contextual integrity. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
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Gwen Bradford
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