Works by Frances Egan
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- How to think about mental content.Frances Egan -2014 -Philosophical Studies 170 (1):115-135.Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so (...) have causal powers; (2) they are intentional, in other words, they have meaning or representational content. This presumes a distinction between a representational vehicle—a physical state or structure that has causal powers and is responsible for producing behavior—and its content. Consider the following characterization of a device that computes the addition functionReaders will recognize the similarity t. (shrink)
- A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation.Frances Egan -2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dołęga & Tobias Schlicht,What Are Mental Representations? New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.Among the cognitive capacities of evolved creatures is the capacity to represent. Theories in cognitive neuroscience typically explain our manifest representational capacities by positing internal representations, but there is little agreement about how these representations function, especially with the relatively recent proliferation of connectionist, dynamical, embodied, and enactive approaches to cognition. In this talk I sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in cognitive neuroscience that couples a realist construal of representational vehicles with a pragmatic account of (...) mental content. I call the resulting package a deflationary account of mental representation and I argue that it avoids the problems that afflict competing accounts. (shrink)
- The Nature and Function of Content in Computational Models.Frances Egan -2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo,The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge.Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational capacities, or as involving representation in some way. Computational theories of vision, for example, typically posit structures that represent edges in the distal scene. Neurons are often said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the ubiquity of representational talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. The point of this chapter is to sketch an account of the nature (...) and function of representation in computational cognitive models. (shrink)
- Computation and content.Frances Egan -1995 -Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.
- Individualism, computation, and perceptual content.Frances Egan -1992 -Mind 101 (403):443-59.
- Computational models: a modest role for content.Frances Egan -2010 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.Keywords: Computation; Representational content; Cognitive capacities; Explanation.
- Must psychology be individualistic?Frances Egan -1991 -Philosophical Review 100 (April):179-203.
- Comments on Favela and Machery's "The Concept of Representation in the Brain Sciences: The Current Status and Ways Forward".Frances Egan -2025 -Mind and Language (2):233-238.Favela and Machery conclude from their studies that neuroscientists' and psychologists' concept of representation is both unclear and confused. Rather than advocating reform or elimination of the concept, they suggest that it can serve various theoretical purposes precisely because it is unclear and confused. I challenge their claim that the concept of representation, as used by neuroscientists and psychologists, is unclear and confused, and I propose an alternative explanation of why it might appear to be so.
- Deflating Mental Representation (The Jean Nicod Lectures).Frances Egan -2025 - MIT Press (open access).Philosophers of mind tend to hold one of two broad views about mental representation: they are either robustly realist about mental representations, taking them to have determinate, objective content independent of attributors’ explanatory interests and goals, or they embrace some form of anti-realism, holding that mental representations are at best useful fictions. It is becoming increasingly clear that neither view is satisfactory. Realists disagree about the basis for objective content, and computational neuroscientists and psychologists, while making widespread use of representational (...) talk in articulating their theories, seem indifferent to the efforts of these philosophers to articulate a secure foundation for such talk, suggesting a disconnect between the preoccupations of philosophers of cognitive science and actual practice in these sciences. Fictionalists, for their part, must deny that representational mental states can be causes of cognition and behavior, and that appeal to mental representation can be genuinely explanatory, views that flatly contradict assumptions central to both science and everyday life. I develop and defend a distinctive ‘third way’ – a view I call a deflationary account of mental representation – that both resolves philosophical worries about content and best fits actual practice in science and everyday life. According to the deflationary account, appeal to mental representation does indeed purport to pick out causes of behavior, but the attribution of content to these causes is best understood as a pragmatically motivated gloss, justified in part by attributors’ explanatory interests and goals. Content plays an explanatory role in the deflationary account, but one quite different than that assumed by robust representational realists. (shrink)No categories
- In defence of narrow mindedness.Frances Egan -1999 -Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology.
- Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let's Not Let the Tail Wag the Dog.Frances Egan -2012 -Journal of Cognitive Science 13:39-49.
- Representationalism.Frances Egan -2012 - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich,The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of (...) representation. (shrink)
- Folk psychology and cognitive architecture.Frances Egan -1995 -Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
- Content is pragmatic: Comments on Nicholas Shea's Representation in cognitive science.Frances Egan -2020 -Mind and Language 35 (3):368-376.Nicholas Shea offers Varitel Semantics as a naturalistic account of mental content. I argue that the account secures determinate content only by appeal to pragmatic considerations, and so it fails to respect naturalism. But that is fine, because representational content is not, strictly speaking, necessary for explanation in cognitive science. Even in Shea’s own account, content serves only a variety of heuristic functions.
- Naturalistic inquiry: Where does mental representation fit in?Frances Egan -2003 - In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein,Chomsky and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 89--104.This chapter contains section titled: Methodological Naturalism Internalism The Limits of Naturalistic Inquiry Computation and Content Intentionality and Naturalistic Inquiry.
- The Elusive Role of Normal-Proper Function in Cognitive Science.Frances Egan -2022 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):468-475.Comments on Karen Neander's A Mark of the Mental.
- The Structure of Perceptual Experience: A New Look at Adverbialism.Frances Egan -2025 - InDeflating Mental Representation (The Jean Nicod Lectures). MIT Press (open access).In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differences among mental states are representational differences, in other words, differences in content. In this paper I defend an alternative view which I call external sortalism, inspired by traditional adverbialism, and according to which experiences are not essentially representational. The central idea is that the external world serves as a model for sorting, conceptualizing, and reasoning surrogatively about perceptual experience. On external sortalism, contents are construed as a kind (...) of gloss on experiences themselves. We can retain what is attractive about representationalism, namely, that perceptual experiences can be evaluated for accuracy, without problematic commitment to the idea that they bear a substantive, representational relation to external objects and properties and that this relation determines the phenomenal character of experience. (shrink)
- Chomsky and His Critics.Frances Egan -2003 - Malden MA: Blackwell.
- Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third way.Frances Egan &Robert J. Matthews -2006 -Synthese 153 (3):377-391.The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and (...) processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms.Frances Egan -2017 - In David Michael Kaplan,Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-163.A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...) the causal structure of the mechanism underlying the capacity. If they are right, then a cognitive model that resists a transparent mapping to known neural mechanisms fails to be explanatory. I argue that a functiontheoretic characterization of a cognitive capacity can be genuinely explanatory even absent an account of how the capacity is realized in neural hardware. (shrink)
- Individualism and vision theory.Frances Egan -1994 -Analysis 54 (4):258-264.
- (1 other version)Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms.Frances Egan -2017 - In David Michael Kaplan,Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-163.A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called function-theoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes the exercise of the cognitive capacity (in the system's normal environment). Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...) the causal structure of the mechanism underlying the capacity. If they are right, then a cognitive model that resists a transparent mapping to known neural mechanisms fails to be explanatory. I argue that a function-theoretic characterization of a cognitive capacity can be genuinely explanatory even absent an account of how the capacity is realized in neural hardware. (shrink)
- Explaining representation: a reply to Matthen.Frances Egan -2014 -Philosophical Studies 170 (1):137-142.Mohan Matthen has failed to understand the position I develop and defend in “How to Think about Mental Content.” No doubt some of the fault lies with my exposition, though Matthen often misconstrues passages that are clear in context. He construes clarifications and elaborations of my argument to be “concessions.” Rather than dwell too much on specific misunderstandings of my explanatory project and its attendant claims, I will focus on the main points of disagreement.RepresentationalismMy project in the paper is to (...) argue for a particular construal of the role of representational content in computational models of cognition. The view is committed to two kinds of representational content—mathematical content, which characterizes the mathematical function computed by a device and subsumes both biological and artifactual computers, and cognitive content. The latter is determined in part by external, so-called ‘naturalistic’ factors (for example, visual mechanisms represent such distal pro. (shrink)
- The moon illusion.Frances Egan -1998 -Philosophy of Science 65 (4):604-23.Ever since Berkeley discussed the problem at length in his Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision, theorists of vision have attempted to explain why the moon appears larger on the horizon than it does at the zenith. Prevailing opinion has it that the contemporary perceptual psychologists Kaufman and Rock have finally explained the illusion. This paper argues that Kaufman and Rock have not refuted a Berkeleyan account of the illusion, and have over-interpreted their own experimental results. The moon illusion (...) remains unexplained, and a Berkeleyan account is still a contender. (shrink)
- The We-Perspective on the Racing Sailboat.Frances Egan -2022 - In Roberto Casati,The Sailing Mind. Springer.Successful sports teams are able to adopt what is known as the 'we-perspective,' forming intentions and making decisions, somewhat as a unified mind does, to achieve their goals. In this paper I consider what is involved in establishing and maintaining the we-perspective on a racing sailboat. I argue that maintaining the we-perspective contributes to the success of the boat in at least two ways: (1) it facilitates the smooth execution of joint action; and (2) it increases the chance that individual (...) crew members will exert their best effort in fulfilling their particular roles on the boat. (shrink)
- Review: Vindicating Intentional Realism. [REVIEW]Frances Egan -1990 -Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59 - 61.
- Wide Content.Frances Egan -2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter,The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
- (1 other version)Intentionality and the theory of vision.Frances Egan -1996 - In Enrique Villanueva,Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co.
- (1 other version)Is there a role for representational content in scientific psychology?Frances Egan -2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael Bishop,Stich and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 14.Steve Stich used to be an eliminativist. As far as I can tell, he renounced eliminativism about the time that he moved from the west to the east pole.1 Stich was right to reject eliminativism, though I am not convinced that he rejected it for the right reasons. Stich 1983 contains a comprehensive attack on representational content, a central feature of both folk psychology and the Representational Theory of Mind, the leading philosophical construal of scientific psychology. Stich’s current position on (...) the role of content in psychological explanation is not entirely clear. One of my aims in this chapter is simply to invite Stich to clarify his views on representational content; the question that forms the title of this chapter is therefore addressed directly to Stich. I begin by sketching his original anti-content argument. I then trace some later developments in his thinking about content. I argue that content does play an important role in scientific psychology, for precisely the reasons that Stich identified in his original argument against content. I conclude with some general remarks on eliminativism. (shrink)
- Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought.Frances Egan -1991 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):379 - 388.In the appendix to Psychosemantics, entitled ‘Why There Still has to be a Language of Thought,’ Jerry Fodor offers several arguments for the language of thought thesis. The LOT, as articulated by Fodor, is a thesis about propositional attitudes. It comprises the following two claims: propositional attitudes are relations to meaning-bearing tokens — for example, to believe that P is to bear a certain relation to a token of a symbol which means that P; and the representational tokens in question (...) are quasi-linguistic — in particular, they have the constituent structure appropriate to a language. (shrink)
- Function-Theoretic Explanation and Neural Mechanisms.Frances Egan -forthcoming - In David M. Kaplan,Integrating Mind and Brain Science: Mechanistic Perspectives and Beyond. Oxford University Press.A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called function-theoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...) the causal structure of the mechanism underlying the capacity. If they are right, then a cognitive model that resists a transparent mapping to known neural mechanisms fails to be explanatory. I argue that a function-theoretic char-acterization of a cognitive capacity can be genuinely explanatory even absent an account of how the capacity is realized in neural hardware. (shrink)
- Aworld withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “naturalism and intentionality”.Frances Egan -1994 -Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):327 - 338.
- Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science 145-163.Frances Egan (ed.) -2017 - Oxford, UK:No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination.Frances Egan -1999 - In Denis Fisette,Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. pp. 217--228.
- 20.1 Arguments for Wide Content.Frances Egan -2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter,The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 351.Export citation Bookmark
- Intentionality and the theory of vision.Frances Egan -1996 - In Enrique Villanueva,Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co.The chapter discusses David Marr's theory of vision, which likens the visual system to an information-processing system with three levels: the topmost “theory of computation,” the algorithmic level, and the implementation level. Marr's work, which is based on computational theory, has been assumed by many acolytes of this field of study to be “intentional.” This chapter aims to refute this assumption utilizing the broad tenets of computational methodology. It argues that, in utilizing the formal, mathematical paradigms of computational theory, Marr's (...) theory is rendered essentially neutral, with no accompanying interpretations. Of course, interpretations based on underlying, external factors can also be valid, but are not essential, even if assigning intentional content can have practical uses for the researcher. The chapter ends the discourse by countering the proposed argument of “narrow content,” which posits that the primitives of Marr's vision theory are intentional, while their content is independent of external, causal factors. (shrink)
- Review of Cummins' Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. [REVIEW]Frances Egan -1998 -Philosophical Review 107 (1):118.“Naturalistic” semantic theories attempt to specify, in nonintentional and nonsemantic terms, a sufficient condition for a mental representation’s having a particular meaning. Such theories have trouble accounting for the possibility of representational error. In his latest book, Robert Cummins traces the problem to the fact that the theories currently on offer identify the meaning of a representation with certain features of its use. Only a theory that takes meaning to be an intrinsic feature of a representation, Cummins argues, can both (...) accommodate representational error and play a genuinely explanatory role in an account of rational capacities. In the second half of the book he develops and defends a proposal that he calls the “picture theory of representation.”. (shrink)
- The content of color experience. [REVIEW]Frances Egan -2008 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):407–414.
- Milkowski, Marcin., Explaining the Computational Mind. [REVIEW]Frances Egan -2013 -Review of Metaphysics 67 (2):436-438.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
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