Works by Fiora Salis
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- Capturing the scientific imagination.Fiora Salis &Roman Frigg -2019 - In Arnon Levy & Peter Godfrey-Smith,The Scientific Imagination. New York, US: Oup Usa.
- The New Fiction View of Models.Fiora Salis -2021 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):717-742.How do models represent reality? There are two conditions that scientific models must satisfy to be representations of real systems, the aboutness condition and the epistemic condition. In this article, I critically assess the two main fictionalist theories of models as representations, the indirect fiction view and the direct fiction view, with respect to these conditions. And I develop a novel proposal, what I call ‘the new fiction view of models’. On this view, models are akin to fictional stories; they (...) represent real-world phenomena if they stand in a denotation relation with reality; and they enable knowledge of reality via the generation of theoretical hypotheses, model–world comparisons and direct attributions. (shrink)
- The Nature of Model-World Comparisons.Fiora Salis -2016 -The Monist 99 (3):243-259.Upholders of fictionalism about scientific models have not yet successfully explained how scientists can learn about the real world by making comparisons between models and the real phenomena they stand for. In this paper I develop an account of model-world comparisons in terms of what I take to be the best antirealist analyses of comparative claims that emerge from the current debate on fiction.
- Learning through the Scientific Imagination.Fiora Salis -2020 -Argumenta 6 (1):65-80.Theoretical models are widely held as sources of knowledge of reality. Imagination is vital to their development and to the generation of plausible hypotheses about reality. But how can imagination, which is typically held to be completely free, effectively instruct us about reality? In this paper I argue that the key to answering this question is in constrained uses of imagination. More specifically, I identify make-believe as the right notion of imagination at work in modelling. I propose the first overarching (...) taxonomy of types of constraints on scientific imagination that enables knowledge of reality. And I identify two main kinds of knowledge enabled by models, knowledge of the imaginary scenario specified by models and knowledge of reality. (shrink)
- Fictional Names and the Problem of Intersubjective Identification.Fiora Salis -2013 -Dialectica 67 (3):283-301.The problem of intersubjective identification arises from the difficulties of explaining how our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters can be directed towards the same (or different) characters given the assumption that there are no fictional entities. In this paper I aim to offer a solution in terms of participation in a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, which is inspired by Sainsbury's name-using practices. I will critically discuss a similar idea that was put forward by Friend (...) in terms of participation in what Perry calls a notion-network. I will then argue in favor of Sainsbury's baptism-based approach against Perry's information-based approach and I will answer some recent objections that Friend put forward against the former. (shrink)
- Fictional Entities.Fiora Salis -2013 -Online Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy.In this entry I present one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary analytic philosophy regarding the nature of fictional entities and the motivations that might be adduced for and against positing them into our ontology. The entry is divided in two parts. In the first part I offer an overview of the main accounts of the metaphysics of fictional entities according to three standard realist views, fictional Meinongianism, fictional possibilism and fictional creationism. In the second part I describe (...) two main kinds of arguments for or against positing fictional entities into our ontology. The first kind is traditionally inspired by the linguistic data coming from our talk about fictional characters. The second kind is more recent and it builds on genuine ontological considerations. (shrink)
- Scientific Discovery Through Fictionally Modelling Reality.Fiora Salis -2018 -Topoi 39 (4):927-937.How do scientific models represent in a way that enables us to discover new truths about reality and draw inferences about it? Contemporary accounts of scientific discovery answer this question by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms involved in the generation of new ideas and concepts in terms of a special sort of reasoning—or model-based reasoning—involving imagery. Alternatively, I argue that answering this question requires that we recognise the crucial role of the propositional imagination in the construction and development of models (...) for the purpose of generating hypotheses that are plausible candidates for truth. I propose simple fictionalism as a new account of models as Waltonian games of make-believe and suggest that models can lead to genuine scientific discovery when they are used as representations that denote real world phenomena and generate two main kinds of theoretical hypotheses, model-world comparisons and direct attributions. (shrink)
- Bridging the Gap: The Artifactual View Meets the Fiction View of Models.Fiora Salis -2021 - In Alejandro Cassini & Juan Redmond,Models and Idealizations in Science: Artifactual and Fictional Approaches. Springer Verlag. pp. 159-177.Fiora Salis compares the fictional and the artifactual views of models. She argues that both accounts contain several deep insights concerning the nature of scientific models but they also face some difficult challenges. She then puts forward an account of the ontology of models intended to incorporate the benefits of both views avoiding their main difficulties. Her key idea is that models are human-made artifacts that are akin to literary works of fiction. In this view, models are complex objects that (...) are constituted by a model description and the model content generated within a game of make-believe. As per the fiction view, model descriptions are construed as props in a game of make-believe, where props are concrete objects that prescribe certain imaginings. As per the artifactual view, model descriptions are construed as concrete representational tools that enable and constrain a scientist’s cognitive processes and provide intersubjective epistemic access to their imaginings. (shrink)
- Inseparable Bedfellows: Imagination and Mathematics in Economic Modeling.Fiora Salis &Mary Leng -2023 -Philosophy of the Social Sciences 53 (4):255-280.In this paper we explore the hypothesis that constrained uses of imagination are crucial to economic modeling. We propose a theoretical framework to develop this thesis through a number of specific hypotheses that we test and refine through six new, representative case studies. Our ultimate goal is to develop a philosophical account that is practice oriented and informed by empirical evidence. To do this, we deploy an abductive reasoning strategy. We start from a robust set of hypotheses and leave space (...) for the generation of further hypotheses and theoretical claims based on the qualitative analysis of new empirical data. (shrink)
- The Problem of Satisfaction Conditions and the Dispensability of I-Desire.Fiora Salis -2016 -Erkenntnis 81 (1):105-118.The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires - what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie's argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine (...) desires. To this aim I will show that the same sort of puzzling phenomenon involved in our responses to tragic fictions arises also in a non-fictional case, and I will offer a solution to the problem of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. The key to the explanation is in the notion of condition-dependent desires triggered by fictions. (shrink)
- The Meanings of Fictional Names.Fiora Salis -2021 -Organon 28 (1):9-43.According to Millianism, the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. According to anti-realism about fictional entities, there are no such entities. If there are no fictional entities, how can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names? Our best theory of fiction, Walton’s theory of make-believe, makes the same assumptions but lacks the theoretical resources to answer the question. In this paper, I propose a pragmatic solution in terms of two main dimensions of meaning, a subjective, psychological (...) dimension and an intersubjective, public dimension. The psychological dimension builds on the notion of mental files; the public dimension builds on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. The account is coherent with two main theoretical principles, parsimony and uniformity. Furthermore, it satisfies three explanatory conditions posed by the intentionality of our thought and discourse about fiction, object-directedness, counterfictional imagining and intersubjective identification. (shrink)
- Of Predators and Prey: Imagination in Scientific Modeling.Fiora Salis -2020 - In Keith A. Moser & Ananta Charana Sukla,Imagination and Art: Explorations in Contemporary Theory. Brill | Rodopi. pp. 451–474.What are theoretical models and how do they contribute to a scientific understanding of reality? In this chapter, I will argue that models are akin to fictional stories in that they are human-made artifacts created through the imaginative activities of scientists. And I will suggest that the sort of imagination involved in modeling is make-believe and that this is constrained in three main ways which, together, enable knowledge of reality. I will conclude by addressing recent criticisms against the fiction view (...) of models and the relevance of scientific imagination in modeling put forward by Weisberg and Knuuttila. (shrink)
- Imaginação.Fiora Salis -2014 -Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.Nesta entrada irei apresentar uma nova taxonomia sistemática das nossas capacidades imaginativas, coerente com os tratamentos convencionais em ciência cognitiva, filosofia da mente e estética. Em particular, irei distinguir entre a imaginação não-proposicional e a imaginação proposicional, o que inclui ainda outras subvariedades, como a imaginação objectual, a imagética, a imaginação experiencial, a suposição, o faz-de-conta e outras.
- Fictionalism.Fiora Salis -2015 -Online Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy.In this entry I will offer a survey of the contemporary debate on fic- tionalism, which is a distinctive anti-realist view about certain regions of discourse that are valued for their usefulness rather than their truth.
- Imagination.Fiora Salis -2014 -Online Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy.In this entry I will offer a systematic novel taxonomy of our imaginative abilities coherent with standard treatments in cognitive science, philosophy of mind and aesthetics. In particular, I will distinguish between the non-propositional imagination and the propositional imagination, which include several further sub-varieties such as the objectual imagination, imagery, experiential imagination, supposition, make-believe and more.
- Entidades Ficcionais.Fiora Salis -2014 -Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
- (1 other version)Capturing the Scientific Imagination.Fiora Salis &Roman Frigg -2019 - In Arnon Levy & Peter Godfrey-Smith,The Scientific Imagination. New York, US: Oup Usa.No categories
- Fictional Reports A Study on the Semantics of Fictional Names.Fiora Salis -2010 -Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 25 (2):175-185.Against standard descriptivist and referentialist semantics for fictional reports, I will defend a view according to which fictional names do not refer yet they can be distinguished from one another in virtue of their different name-using practices. The logical structures of sentences containing fictional names inherit these distinctions. Different interpretations follow.
- The Reference Book.Fiora Salis -2014 -Disputatio 6 (38):123-130.No categories
- Essay review: Models and exploratory models.Fiora Salis -2017 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 63:58-61.Review essay of How to do science with models. A philosophical primer. Springer briefs in philosophy, Axel Gelfert., 129, Price € 49,99 softcover, ISBN: 978-3-319-27954-1.
- Of rabbits and men: fiction and scientific modelling.Roman Frigg &Fiora Salis -2019 - In Bradley Armour-Garb & Frederick Kroon,Fictionalism in Philosophy. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.No categories
- Book Symposium on François Recanati's Mental Files.Fiora Salis (ed.) -2013 - Disputatio V (36).Export citation
Bookmark - Introduction.Fiora Salis -2013 -Disputatio 5 (36):i-vi.
- Ezbozo de la Filosofía de Kripke. [REVIEW]Fiora Salis -2009 -Disputatio 3 (27):239-244.
- The Reference Book, by John Hawthorne and David Manley. [REVIEW]Fiora Salis -2014 -Disputatio (38):123-130.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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