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In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...) be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

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Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is (...) paraconsistent if it invalidates either the inferential or the meta-inferential notion of Explosion. We show the non-triviality of this criterion by discussing a number of logics. On the one hand, logics which validate and invalidate both versions of Explosion, such as classical logic and Asenjo–Priest’s 3-valued logic LP. On the other hand, logics which validate one version of Explosion but not the other, such as the substructural logics TS and ST, introduced by Malinowski and Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij, which are obtained via Malinowski’s and Frankowski’s q- and p-matrices, respectively. (shrink)

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Infectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated as a way to treat different pathological sentences differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and as a way to treat the semantic pathology suffered by at least (...) some of these sentences as infectious. This leads us to consider four distinct four-valued logics: one where truth-value gaps are infectious, but gluts are not; one where truth-value gluts are infectious, but gaps are not; and two logics where both gluts and gaps are infectious, in some sense. Additionally, we focus on the proof theory of these systems, by offering a discussion of two related topics. On the one hand, we prove some limitations regarding the possibility of providing standard Gentzen sequent calculi for these systems, by dualizing and extending some recent results for infectious logics. On the other hand, we provide sound and complete four-sided sequent calculi, arguing that the most important technical and philosophical features taken into account to usually prefer standard calculi are, indeed, enjoyed by the four-sided systems. (shrink)

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The aim of this article is to discuss the extent to which certain substructural logics are related through the phenomenon of duality. Roughly speaking, metainferences are inferences between collect...

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We will present a three-valued consequence relation for metainferences, called CM, defined through ST and TS, two well known substructural consequence relations for inferences. While ST recovers every classically valid inference, it invalidates some classically valid metainferences. While CM works as ST at the inferential level, it also recovers every classically valid metainference. Moreover, CM can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. Nevertheless, CM cannot recapture every classically valid meta-metainference. We will afterwards develop a hierarchy of consequence relations (...) CMn for metainferences of level n. Each CMn recovers every metainference of level n or less, and can be nontrivially expanded with a transparent truth predicate, but cannot recapture every classically valid metainferences of higher levels. Finally, we will present a logic CMω, based on the hierarchy of logics CMn, that is fully classical, in the sense that every classically valid metainference of any level is valid in it. Moreover, CMω can be nontrivially expanded with a transparent truth predicate. (shrink)

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Recently, it has been proposed to understand a logic as containing not only a validity canon for inferences but also a validity canon for metainferences of any finite level. Then, it has been shown that it is possible to construct infinite hierarchies of ‘increasingly classical’ logics—that is, logics that are classical at the level of inferences and of increasingly higher metainferences—all of which admit a transparent truth predicate. In this paper, we extend this line of investigation by taking a somehow (...) different route. We explore logics that are different from classical logic at the level of inferences, but recover some important aspects of classical logic at every metainferential level. We dub such systems meta-classical non-classical logics. We argue that the systems presented deserve to be regarded as logics in their own right and, moreover, are potentially useful for the non-classical logician. (shrink)

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In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

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In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)

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In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and (...) complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory. (shrink)

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When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

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This book is the first to present a comprehensive investigation of the technical features of the metainferential logics developed in the last years, with their most relevant results and applications. It provides some new paths to define and investigate metainferential logics and offers a thorough study of the semantics and the proof-theories of this new and exciting variety of families of logics. This volume examines the hierarchies of metainferential logics and gives a general and systematic theory of them, and of (...) the truth theories based on these logics. This book puts forward the prospects for truth-theories based on the metainferential logics of the TS/ST hierarchy and argues for its promise noting that each of these logics can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. It also goes onto to explore new developments in three fields related to logics – namely metainferential logics built by means of the Weak Kleene schema and combining them with logics defined through the Strong Kleene schema, proof-theoretic presentations, and those with a with a global or an absolutely global validity standard, instead of a local one. This book is of interest to scholars in formal logic. (shrink)

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Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-based hierarchy, of which LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document} and ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document}, ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} and the logics of the ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-metainferential logics in general—and STTω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {STT}}_{\omega }$$\end{document} in particular—are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth. (shrink)

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ABSTRACTWe will present 12 different mixed metainferential consequence relations. Each one of them is specified using two different inferential Tarskian or non-Tarskian consequence relations: or. We will show that it is possible to obtain a Tarskian logic with non-Tarskian inferential logics, but also a non-Tarskian logic with Tarskian inferential logics. Moreover, we will show how some of these metainferential logics work better than the corresponding inferential rivals. Finally, we will show how these logics prove that it is not enough to (...) work with inferences as pairs of sets of formulas to obtain a contractive logic. (shrink)

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In recent years, some theorists have argued that the clogics are not only defined by their inferences, but also by their metainferences. In this sense, logics that coincide in their inferences, but not in their metainferences were considered to be different. In this vein, some metainferential logics have been developed, as logics with metainferences of any level, built as hierarchies over known logics, such as \, and \. What is distinctive of these metainferential logics is that they are mixed, i.e. (...) the standard for the premises and the conclusion is not necessarily the same. However, so far, all of these systems have been presented following a semantical standpoint, in terms of valuations based on the Strong Kleene truth-tables. In this article, we provide sound and complete sequent-calculi for the valid inferences and the invalid inferences of the logics \ and \, and introduce an algorithm that allows obtaining sound and complete sequent-calculi for the global validities and the global invalidities of any metainferential logic of any level. (shrink)

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In this paper, we present a way to translate the metainferences of a mixed metainferential system into formulae of an extended-language system, called its associated σ-system. To do this, the σ-system will contain new operators (one for each standard), called the σ operators, which represent the notions of "belonging to a (given) standard". We first prove, in a model-theoretic way, that these translations preserve (in)validity. That is, that a metainference is valid in the base system if and only if its (...) translation is a tautology of its corresponding σ-system. We then use these results to obtain other key advantages. Most interestingly, we provide a recipe for building unlabeled sequent calculi for σ-systems. We then exemplify this with a σ-system useful for logics of the ST family, and prove soundness and completeness for it, which indirectly gives us a calculus for the metainferences of all those mixed systems. Finally, we respond to some possible objections and show how our σ-framework can shed light on the “obeying” discussion within mixed metainferential contexts. (shrink)

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It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. and Pailos recovers classical logic, either in the sense that every classical inferential validity is valid at some point in the hierarchy ), or because a logic of a transfinite level defined in terms of the hierarchy shares its validities (...) with classical logic. Each of these logics is consistent with transparent truth—as is shown in Pailos —, and this suggests that, contrary to standard opinions, transparent truth is after all consistent with classical logic. However, Scambler presents a major challenge to this approach. He argues that this hierarchy cannot be identified with classical logic in any way, because it recovers no classical antivalidities. We embrace Scambler’s challenge and develop a new logic based on these hierarchies. This logic recovers both every classical validity and every classical antivalidity. Moreover, we will follow the same strategy and show that contingencies need also be taken into account, and that none of the logics so far presented is enough to capture classical contingencies. Then, we will develop a multi-standard approach to elaborate a new logic that captures not only every classical validity, but also every classical antivalidity and contingency. As a€truth-predicate can be added to this logic, this result can be interpreted as showing that, despite the claims that are extremely widely accepted, classical logic does not trivialize in the context of transparent truth. (shrink)

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_T__S_ is a logic that has no valid inferences. But, could there be a logic without valid metainferences? We will introduce _T__S_ _ω_, a logic without metainferential validities. Notwithstanding, _T__S_ _ω_ is not as empty—i.e., uninformative—as it gets, because it has many antivalidities. We will later introduce the two-standard logic [_T__S_ _ω_, _S__T_ _ω_ ], a logic without validities and antivalidities. Nevertheless, [_T__S_ _ω_, _S__T_ _ω_ ] is still informative, because it has many contingencies. The three-standard logic [ \(\mathbf {TS}_{\omega (...) }, \mathbf {ST}_{\omega }, [{\overline {\emptyset }}{\emptyset }, {\emptyset } {\overline {\emptyset }}]\) ] that we will further introduce, has no validities, no antivalidities and also no contingencies whatsoever. We will also present two more validity-empty logics. The first one has no supersatisfiabilities, unsatisfabilities and antivalidities ∗. The second one has no invalidities nor non-valid-nor-invalid (meta)inferences. All these considerations justify thinking of logics as, at least, three-standard entities, corresponding, respectively, to what someone who takes that logic as correct, accepts, rejects and suspends judgement about, just because those things are, respectively, validities, antivalidities and contingencies of that logic. Finally, we will present some consequences of this setting for the monism/pluralism/nihilism debate, and show how nihilism and monism, on one hand, and nihilism and pluralism, on the other hand, may reconcile—at least according to how Gillian Russell understands nihilism, and provide some general reasons for adopting a multi-standard approach to logics. (shrink)

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The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities, but not be the same logic.

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It has been argued recently that dialetheist theories are unable to express the concept of naive validity. In this paper, we will show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {LP}$$\end{document} can be non-trivially expanded with a naive validity predicate. The resulting theory, LPVal\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {LP}^{\mathbf {Val}}$$\end{document} reaches this goal by adopting a weak self-referential procedure. We show that LPVal\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf (...) {LP}^{\mathbf {Val}}$$\end{document} is sound and complete with respect to the three-sided sequent calculus SLPVal\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {SLP}^{\mathbf {Val}}$$\end{document}. Moreover, LPVal\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {LP}^{\mathbf {Val}}$$\end{document} can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. We will also present an alternative theory LPVal∗\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {LP}^{\mathbf {Val}^{*}}$$\end{document}, which includes a non-deterministic validity predicate. (shrink)

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We will present all the mixed and impure disjoint three-valued logics based on the Strong Kleene schema. Some, but not all of them, are (inferentially) empty logics. We will also provide a recipe to build philosophical interpretations for each of these logics, and show why the kind of permeability that characterized them is not such a bad feature.

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In order to define some interesting consequence relations, certain generalizations have been proposed in a many-valued semantic setting that have been useful for defining what have been called pure, mixed and ordertheoretic consequence relations. But these generalizations are insufficient to capture some other interesting relations, like other intersective mixed relations (a relation that cannot be defined as a mixed relation, but only as the intersection of two mixed relations) or relations with a conjunctive (or, better, “universal”) interpretation for multiple conclusions. (...) We propose a broader framework to define these cases, and many others, and to set a common background that allows for a direct compared analysis. At the end of the work, we illustrate some of these comparisons. (shrink)

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1. As Graham Priest claims in Priest (forthcoming), blocking semantic paradoxes is not hard. It just requires giving up (at least) one of the principles involved in the derivation of the undesirabl...

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A metainference is usually understood as a pair consisting of a collection of inferences, called premises, and a single inference, called conclusion. In the last few years, much attention has been paid to the study of metainferences—and, in particular, to the question of what are the valid metainferences of a given logic. So far, however, this study has been done in quite a poor language. Our usual sequent calculi have no way to represent, e.g. negations, disjunctions or conjunctions of inferences. (...) In this paper we tackle this expressive issue. We assume some background sentential language as given and define what we call an inferential language, that is, a language whose atomic formulas are inferences. We provide a model-theoretic characterization of validity for this language—relative to some given characterization of validity for the background sentential language—and provide a proof-theoretic analysis of validity. We argue that our novel language has fruitful philosophical applications. Lastly, we generalize some of our definitions and results to arbitrary metainferential levels. (shrink)

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Theories where truth is a naive concept fall under the following dilemma: either the theory is subject to Curry’s Paradox, which engenders triviality, or the theory is not trivial but the resulting conditional is too weak. In this paper we explore a number of theories which arguably do not fall under this dilemma. In these theories the conditional is characterized in terms of non-deterministic matrices. These non-deterministic theories are similar to infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic in that they are consistent and their (...) conditionals are quite strong. The difference is the following: while Łukasiewicz logic is \-inconsistent, the non-deterministic theories might turn out to be \-consistent. (shrink)

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Recently, it has been observed that the usual type-theoretic restrictions are not enough to block certain paradoxes involving two or more predicates. In particular, when we have a self-referential language containing modal predicates, new paradoxes might appear even if there are type restrictions for the principles governing those predicates. In this article we consider two type-theoretic solutions to multimodal paradoxes. The first one adds types for each of the modal predicates. We argue that there are a number of problems with (...) most versions of this approach. The second one, which we favour, represents modal notions by using the truth predicate together with the corresponding modal operator. This way of doing things is not only useful because it avoids multimodal paradoxes, but also because it preserves the expressive capacity of the language. As an example of the sort of theory we have in mind, we provide a type-theoretic axiomatization that combines truth with necessity and knowledge. (shrink)

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In this paper, we present two ways of modelling every epistemic formal conditional commitment that involves (at most) three key epistemic attitudes: acceptance, rejection and neither acceptance nor rejection. The first one consists of adopting the plurality of every mixed Strong Kleene logic (along with an epistemic reading of the truth-values), and the second one involves the use of a unified system of six-sided inferences, named 6SK, that recovers the validities of each mixed Strong Kleene logic. We also introduce a (...) sequent calculus that is sound and complete with respect to both approaches. We compare both accounts, and finally, we suggest that the plurality of Strong Kleene logic as well as the general framework 6SK are linked to formal epistemic norms via bridge principles. (shrink)

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The main thesis of this work is as follows: there are versions of Yablo’s paradox that, if Cook is right about the non-circular character of his version of it, are truly paradoxical and genuinely non-circular, and Cook’s version of Yablo’s paradox is one of them. Here I will not evaluate the"circular" or"non-circular" side to Cook’s proposal. In fact, I think that he is right about it, and that his version of Yablo’s list is non-circular. But is it paradoxical? In order (...) to be so, the principles that lead to (i) the derivation of a contradiction, or (ii) the impossibility to give a stable assignment of truth values to the relevant set of sentences, must be acceptable. I will explore two ways to argue that they are not. I will conclude that these attempts lead to a very narrow conception of a theory of truth, or to deny that a paradigmatic case of paradox, such as the"Old-Fashioned Liar," is truly paradoxical. La tesis principal de este trabajo es la siguiente: hay versiones de la paradoja de Yablo tales que, si Cook está en lo cierto acerca del carácter no-circular de su propia versión de ella, son genuinamente paradójicas y auténticamente no-circulares, y la versión de Cook en cuestión es una de ellas. Aquí no voy a evaluar su carácter circular o no-circular. Creo, de hecho, que Cook está en lo correcto sobre el punto. Pero, ¿es su versión auténticamente paradójica? Para que lo fuera, los principios que llevan a (i) derivar una contradicción, o (ii) la imposibilidad de dar una asignación de valores de verdad estables al conjunto relevante de oraciones, deben ser aceptables. Voy a explorar dos modos de argumentar que no lo son. voy a concluir que estos intentos llevan a una concepción de la teoría de la verdad muy estrecha, o a negar que un caso paradigmático de paradoja, como el"mentiroso Tradicional", sea auténticamente paradójica. (shrink)

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Foreword : Consistency, Contradiction, and Consequence.

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El relativismo acerca de las atribuciones de conocimiento de John MarFarlane pretende ser una teoría que explica la corrección de las intuiciones centrales que tenemos acerca de ellas. Sin embargo, el relativismo es incompatible con la corrección de algunas intuiciones que tenemos con respecto a casos de Stanley, a conjunciones de estos casos y a casos en los que la situación práctica del evaluador es menos apremiante que la del sujeto o la del emisor de la atribución. Esto, no obstante, (...) no señala un límite a las posibilidades del relativismo, sino que insta a dar versiones más sofisticadas del mismo. MarFarlane's relativism about knowledge attributions aspires to be a theory that explains why the central intuitions about them are correct. Nevertheless, relativism is incompatible with the accuracy of some intuitions about Stanley's cases, with conjunctions of them and with intuitions about cases in which there is less at stake from the assessor than what is at stake from the subject or the attributor. Nevertheless, this doesn't establish a limit to the possibilities of relativism, but calls for an improvement of it. (shrink)

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Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions (...) have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it. (shrink)

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Crispin Wright afirma que tanto la norma que insta a afirmar lo verdadero como la que exhorta a afirmar lo justificado son distintivas de la práctica asertórica. A pesar de que ellas no son diferentes en la práctica, son distintas. Pero Richard Rorty argumenta que las razones ofrecidas obligarían a Wright a aceptar demasiadas reglas como propias de dicha práctica. Wright admitiría que las normas pueden ser ilimitadas, pero no que son ilimitadas las normas correctas. Para defender esta posición, basta (...) con distinguir, como hace, las normas descriptivas de las prescriptivas. A pesar de ello, la posición de Rorty es admisible, pues no parece haber ventajas visibles en distinguir ambas normas. Si no se exponen estas ventajas, la teoría resultante será más débil que una que no lo pretenda. (shrink)

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En conjunción con la tesis de que sólo se debe actuar sobre la base de lo que se sabe, el Invariantismo Relativo al Interés que propone Stanley permite explicar la mayoría de nuestras intuiciones en torno a ciertos ejemplos relevantes. Pero si se relativiza el valor de verdad de las atribuciones de conocimiento a la situación práctica de todo individuo relevante, se pueden rescatar todas estas intuiciones, y no sólo la mayoría de ellas. Esta posición también explica la extrañeza generada (...) por la paradoja de Moore, y el papel de las atribuciones de conocimiento en la justificación de las acciones. /// Together with the thesis that one should only act based on what one knows, Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism explains most of our intuitions by means of certain relevant examples. But if one posits that the truth-value of knowledge attributions is relative to the practical situation of all of the relevant agents, it is possible to explain why all our intuitions on these cases are correct. This position helps us to explain the oddity in Moore's paradox and the role of knowledge attributions in the justification of actions. (shrink)

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Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue (a) that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and (b) that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.

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Las teorías relativistas acerca de las atribuciones de conocimiento sostienen que el valor de verdad de una atribución de conocimiento está determinado por el contexto de evaluación de la atribución. Me ocuparé de dos de las principales críticas que se le han formulado al relativismo. Por un lado, Jason Stanley niega que el relativismo pueda dar cuenta de la factividad del conocimiento. Por otra parte, Manuel García Carpintero sostiene que el relativismo se compromete con una inaceptable imagen sobre las normas (...) que rigen la práctica asertiva. Responderé ambas objeciones. Presentaré primero un modo de dar cuenta de la factividad no evaluado por Stanley. La respuesta a García Carpintero, por su parte, supondrá distinguir en qué sentido la verdad es, y en que otro no es, una norma de la aserción.Relativist’s theories about knowledge attributions maintain that the truth value of such assertions is partially fixed by the assessment context. I will answer two of the main objections that it has received. On the one side, Jason Stanley denies that relativism can explain the factivity of knowledge. On the other side, Manuel García Carpintero believes that relativism is commited to an unacceptable picture of assertion. The answer to Stanley’s objection involves a way of explaining factivity that he has not evaluated. The answer to García Carpintero involves distinguishing in what way truth is, and in what way it isn’t, a norm of assertion. (shrink)

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En A Letter Concerning Toleration John Locke argumenta en favor de la tolerancia religiosa afirmando que el Estado no puede mejorar la vida de las personas forzándolas a vivir de acuerdo con creencias que ellas no suscriben. Más recientemente, Ronald Dworkin y Will Kymlicka han desarrollado argumentos similares. En el caso del primero, contra ciertas políticas paternalistas; en el del segundo, en apoyo de la tesis liberal de la neutralidad estatal. Mi propósito en el presente artículo es analizar la plausibilidad (...) de dichos argumentos concebidos como una defensa de la tesis de la neutralidad estatal. Intentaré demostrar que ambas versiones del argumento fracasan. En la sección II, cuestionaré la capacidad de los argumentos para respaldar las conclusiones que aspiran establecer, sin objetar la plausibilidad de las premisas involucradas. En la sección III, desarrollaré tres objeciones contra la concepción del bienestar crítico que constituye el corazón de ambas versiones del argumento. In A Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke argues in favor of religious toleration positing that the state cannot make a person's life better by forcing that person to live according to beliefs he refuses. More recently, Ronald Dworkin and Will Kymlicka have developed similar arguments. In the first case, against some paternalistic policies; in the second, in support of the liberal ideal of state neutrality. My aim in the present paper is to analyze the plausibility of these arguments conceived as a defense of liberal neutrality. I will prove that both versions of the argument fail. In section II, I will object the argument's capability to support the conclusions it attempts to establish, without raising doubts about the reliability of its premises. In section III, I will submit three objections against the conception of critical well-being that constitutes the core of both versions of the argument. (shrink)

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Los desafíos escépticos cuestionan la justificación de las proposiciones que aceptamos. Pero es posible justificar en términos probabilísticos cada una de las proposiciones empíricas aceptadas. Para eso, su probabilidad condicional al resto de las proposiciones aceptadas, deberá ser mayor que su probabilidad absoluta. Esta justificación es circular, pero virtuosa. Sin embargo, carece de eficacia dialéctica frente al escéptico.

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