Big Profits, Big Harm? Exploring the Link Between Firm Financial Performance and Human Rights Misbehavior.Elisa Giuliani,FedericaNieri &Andrea Vezzulli -2023 -Business and Society 62 (6):1248-1299.detailsWe examine whether, relative to their global peers, the financial performance of firms from developing countries leads to increases in human rights abuses. We also study the institutional conditions that qualify this relationship. Based on a combination of behavioral and neo-institutional theories, we suggest there is a positive relationship between financial performance and human rights misbehavior as home country liabilities motivate firms to misbehave to achieve their primary goal of economic leadership. We also suggest that strong regulatory and normative pressures (...) attenuate the abovementioned positive relationship, as failure to comply with norms endangers such firms’ secondary goal of achieving international legitimacy. Our analysis, based on a sample of 245 large companies from eight developing countries studied over a 20-year period, supports our hypotheses. Our empirical results suggest that such companies misbehave when they endeavor to strike a balance between maintaining their global economic leadership and sustaining their social legitimacy. (shrink)
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Business and Human Rights: A Configurational View of the Antecedents of Human Rights Infringements by Emerging Market Firms.Luciano Ciravegna &FedericaNieri -2021 -Journal of Business Ethics 179 (2):431-450.detailsThis study investigates the antecedents of human rights infringements by emerging market firms. We used fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to examine HRIs in 245 firms based in eight emerging markets, between 2003 and 2012. Our findings disclose three equifinal configurations of high levels of HRIs, all involving EFs that have expanded to a high number of foreign markets: large, old, low performing state-owned enterprises operating in high quality institutions’ home and host markets, small, young, over-performing EFs operating in low (...) quality institutions’ home and host markets, and finally large, old, high performing SOEs, operating in low quality institutions’ home and host markets. We contribute to the literature by examining a novel dataset on HRIs by EFs, and by building a configurational explanation of HRIs that bridges the arguments of the institutional theory and strain theory literatures on corporate wrongdoing. (shrink)
What Mutual Assistance Is, and What It Could Be in the Contemporary World.Federica Nalli -2021 -Journal of Business Ethics 182 (4):1041-1053.detailsThis paper explores the implications of a Civil Economy approach to consumer ethics, by addressing the idea that Antonio Genovesi’s (1713–1769) notion of _mutual assistance_ can be understood in terms of _collective intentionality_ or _team reasoning_. I try to give reasons for this idea by a careful examination of Genovesi’s conception of social life and human agency and by reading it through the lens of team reasoning. I argue that this understanding of mutual assistance may imply broad constraints over agents’ (...) choices whenever they conflict with the good of society. Then I explore the implications of a mutual assistance approach to market ethics in a global society, where conflicting views of good and different group affiliations are possible. (shrink)
Embodiment, Disembodiment and Re-embodiment in the Construction of the Digital Self.Federica Buongiorno -2019 -Humana Mente 12 (36).detailsIn this article I will show that the problem of embodiment goes back to the question of the mind-body split, as this has been established and discussed by the philosophical tradition. With the digital turn and the advent of ubiquitous computing the problem of embodiment has taken new forms that have led scholars to introduce the notion of a “new digital Cartesianism.” Subjectivation processes within digital culture have mostly been explained by resorting to what I will call the “E-D-R scheme,” (...) which assumes that a real detachment between the body and the mind really occurs in digital processes. Since—as I will show—this is not actually the case, I will suggest replacing this epistemological scheme with a new one, which I will call the “double-embodiment scheme,” in order to acquire a more fitting epistemological account of the underlying digital ontology. Finally, I will discuss the distinction between bodily extension and the incorporation of non-bodily objects introduced by Helena De Preester in order to show that, in the digital realm, this distinction is much more blurred and complex than she acknowledges: digital interaction requires both bodily extension and the incorporation of objects as complementary processes. (shrink)
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Causality: Philosophical theory meets scientific practice.Phyllis McKay Illari &Federica Russo -2014 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Edited by Federica Russo.detailsScientific and philosophical literature on causality has become highly specialised. It is hard to find suitable access points for students, young researchers, or professionals outside this domain. This book provides a guide to the complex literature, explains the scientific problems of causality and the philosophical tools needed to address them.
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Software Theory: A Cultural and Philosophical Study.Federica Frabetti -2014 - Rowman & Littlefield International.detailsThis book engages directly in close readings of technical texts and computer code in order to show how software works. It offers an analysis of the cultural, political, and philosophical implications of software technologies that demonstrates the significance of software for the relationship between technology, philosophy, culture, and society.
Decisioni pubbliche e disaccordo.Federica Liveriero -2017 - Roma RM, Italia: LUISS University Press.detailsIn this book I address the widely debated topic of the legitimacy of democratic decisions showing that the traditional concept of the legitimacy of political authority developed by liberal theories involves dilemmatic outcomes. In order to solve this intrinsic tension of the liberal model of legitimacy, I argue that the legitimacy of political decisions must be granted with a two steps strategy that involves both ideal and non-ideal analysis. Starting from the models developed by John Rawls and Gerald Gaus, I (...) build up my own paradigm, claiming that, pace Rawls, it is not possible to do away with an epistemic analysis of the actual circumstances of justification. I look at the epistemology of disagreement literature in order to build up an epistemic and procedural framework in which it could be shown that disagreement is not a practical obstacle that prevents participants from agreeing on virtually correct solutions; rather, it is exactly in virtue of the fact of disagreement that democracy is the best method for collective decisions. The heart of this proposal is that given certain epistemic circumstances (i.e. pervasive disagreement due to an opaque appraisal of evidence), it is possible to argue that participants within a collective decision-making setting should refer to each other as epistemic peers. This normative request inherits its value from a shared understanding of persons as being on an equal footing and capable of reasoning powers. This reading of political equality implies two related features of peerhood. One is the proceduralist tenet that equality is a non-instrumental value that should be expressed by the fact that any voice, in the political arena, should be given equal weight. The second is the idea that, assumed the fact of pluralism, citizens should be ready to share both practical and epistemic authority while publicly debating over evaluative matters. In the second part of the book I argue that democratic procedures of decision-making, in order to actually respect members of society as equal peers, and in the attempt to solve the dilemmatic outcomes of public reason models of legitimacy, should look at political agreements achieved through compromise rather than consensus. In fact, an overly idealized approach to collective-choice procedures may lose track of actual decision-making processes (lack of guidance). Moreover, seeking consensus, through the establishment of deliberative standards that some individuals or groups have less opportunities than others to fulfil may engender exclusion and inequality (lack of inclusion). Accordingly, I suggest that deliberative constraints should be loosened to include partisan and interested claims and to pursue principled compromises rather than consensual agreement. According to the model of legitimacy I defend, a normative account of democracy cannot rely on standards that could be only applied in an ideal context, otherwise this attempt will be doomed to fail in two ways: 1) delegitimizing actual democratic decision-making processes and 2) undermining the actual possibility to implement decisions reached through deliberation in real contexts. (shrink)
Thinking Together Time Capsule.Federica Menin,Katrina Bruch &Valentina Desideri -forthcoming -Rhuthmos.detailsGirls Laughters Solar Eclipse Output Solar Eclipse The programmatic ontology of our contemporary technical-information age is marked by a complicity with algorithmic architectures : new models of information processing evolving with the entropically-hiden complexities and open-ended contingencies of material evolution. Algorithms are abstractly-coordinated entities of “soft thought” sui generis. In fusing generative concreteness with abstract modelling – i. e. matter with information – - Galerie sonore – Nouvel article.
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A Moral Political Economy: Present, Past, and Future.Federica Carugati &Margaret Levi -2021 - Cambridge University Press.detailsEconomies - and the government institutions that support them - reflect a moral and political choice, a choice we can make and remake. Since the dawn of industrialization and democratization in the late eighteenth century, there has been a succession of political economic frameworks, reflecting changes in technology, knowledge, trade, global connections, political power, and the expansion of citizenship. The challenges of today reveal the need for a new moral political economy that recognizes the politics in political economy. It also (...) requires the redesign of our social, economic, and governing institutions based on assumptions about humans as social beings rather than narrow self-serving individualists. This Element makes some progress toward building a new moral political economy by offering both a theory of change and some principles for institutional design. (shrink)
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On Empirical Generalisations.Federica Russo -2012 - In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stöltzner & Marcel Weber,Probabilities, Laws, and Structures. Berlin: Springer. pp. 123-139.detailsManipulationism holds that information about the results of interventions is of utmost importance for scientific practices such as causal assessment or explanation. Specifically, manipulation provides information about the stability, or invariance, of the relationship between X and Y: were we to wiggle the cause X, the effect Y would accordingly wiggle and, additionally, the relation between the two will not be disrupted. This sort of relationship between variables are called 'invariant empirical generalisations'. The paper focuses on questions about causal assessment (...) and analyses the status of manipulation. It is argued that manipulationism is trapped in a dilemma. If manipulationism is read as providing a conceptual analysis of causation, then it fails to provide a story about the methods for causal assessment. If, instead, manipulationism is read as providing a method for causal assessment, then it is at an impasse concerning causal assessment in areas where manipulations are not performed. Empirical generalisations are then reassessed, in such a way that manipulation is not taken as methodologically fundamental. The paper concludes that manipulation is the appropriate tool for some scientific contexts, but not for all. (shrink)
Scientific Realism as the Most Reasonable choice?Federica Isabella Malfatti -2018 -Isonomia: Online Philosophical Journal of the University of Urbino 1:1-17.detailsScientific realism, roughly, is the view that successful scientific theories are (at least partially or approximately) true. Is this the most reasonable stance to assume towards science? The no-miracle argument says it is: the stunning empirical success of our scientific theories is in need of an explanation, and (partial or approximate) truth seems to be the best explanation that we have at hand. The aim of this paper is to briefly reconstruct the trajectory of the success–to–truth inference, to critically analyse (...) it in its latest formulation, and to sketch a possible way to go in order to make it a safer inference. (shrink)
ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding.Federica Isabella Malfatti -forthcoming -Social Epistemology.detailsIs ChatGPT a good teacher? Or could it be? As understanding is widely acknowledged as one of the fundamental aims of education, the answer to these questions depends on whether ChatGPT fosters or could foster the acquisition of understanding in its users. In this paper, I tackle this issue in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I explore and analyze the set of skills and social-epistemic virtues that a teacher must exemplify to perform her job well – (...) in those contexts in which epistemic aims are at play and in which understanding plays a pivotal role. In the second part of the paper, I put my conception of good teacher to test and deal with the question whether, and to which extent, the software ChatGPT is (or could serve as, if suitably modified or fine-tuned) a good teacher for its users. I close with some final reflections that point to further directions of research. -/- . (shrink)
Are We in a Sixth Mass Extinction? The Challenges of Answering and Value of Asking.Federica Bocchi,Alisa Bokulich,Leticia Castillo Brache,Gloria Grand-Pierre &Aja Watkins -forthcoming -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.detailsIn both scientific and popular circles it is often said that we are in the midst of a sixth mass extinction. Although the urgency of our present environmental crises is not in doubt, such claims of a present mass extinction are highly controversial scientifically. Our aims are, first, to get to the bottom of this scientific debate by shedding philosophical light on the many conceptual and methodological challenges involved in answering this scientific question, and, second, to offer new philosophical perspectives (...) on what the value of asking this question has been — and whether that value persists today. We show that the conceptual challenges in defining ‘mass extinction’, uncertainties in past and present diversity assessments, and data incommensurabilities undermine a straightforward answer to the question of whether we are in, or entering, a sixth mass extinction today. More broadly we argue that an excessive focus on the mass extinction framing can be misleading for present conservation efforts and may lead us to miss out on the many other valuable insights that Earth’s deep time can offer in guiding our future. (shrink)
On Understanding and Testimony.Federica Isabella Malfatti -2019 -Erkenntnis 86 (6):1345-1365.detailsTestimony spreads information. It is also commonly agreed that it can transfer knowledge. Whether it can work as an epistemic source of understanding is a matter of dispute. However, testimony certainly plays a pivotal role in the proliferation of understanding in the epistemic community. But how exactly do we learn, and how do we make advancements in understanding on the basis of one another’s words? And what can we do to maximize the probability that the process of acquiring understanding from (...) one another succeeds? These are very important questions in our current epistemological landscape, especially in light of the attention that has been paid to understanding as an epistemic achievement of purely epistemic value. Somewhat surprisingly, the recent literature in social epistemology does not offer much on the topic. The overarching aim of this paper is to provide a tentative model of understanding that goes in-depth enough to safely address the question of how understanding and testimony are related to one another. The hope is to contribute, in some measure, to the effort to understand understanding, and to explain two facts about our epistemic practices: the fact that knowledge and understanding relate differently to testimony, and the fact that some pieces of testimonial information are better than others for the sake of providing one with understanding and of yielding advancements in one’s epistemic standing. (shrink)
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Further to the Left: Stress-Induced Increase of Spatial Pseudoneglect During the COVID-19 Lockdown.Federica Somma,Paolo Bartolomeo,Federica Vallone,Antonietta Argiuolo,Antonio Cerrato,Orazio Miglino,Laura Mandolesi,Maria Clelia Zurlo &Onofrio Gigliotta -2021 -Frontiers in Psychology 12.detailsBackgroundThe measures taken to contain the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, such as the lockdown in Italy, do impact psychological health; yet, less is known about their effect on cognitive functioning. The transactional theory of stress predicts reciprocal influences between perceived stress and cognitive performance. However, the effects of a period of stress due to social isolation on spatial cognition and exploration have been little examined. The aim of the present study was to investigate the possible effects and impact of the (...) COVID-19 pandemic on spatial cognition tasks, particularly those concerning spatial exploration, and the physiological leftward bias known as pseudoneglect. A right-hemisphere asymmetry for spatial attention processes crucially contributes to pseudoneglect. Other evidence indicates a predominantly right-hemisphere activity in stressful situations. We also analyzed the effects of lockdown on coping strategies, which typically show an opposite pattern of hemispheric asymmetry, favoring the left hemisphere. If so, then pseudoneglect should increase during the lockdown and be negatively correlated with the efficacy of coping strategies.MethodsOne week before the start of the lockdown due to COVID-19 in Italy, we had collected data from a battery of behavioral tests including tasks of peri-personal spatial cognition. During the quarantine period, from late April to early May 2020, we repeated the testing sessions with a subgroup of the same participants. At both testing sessions, participants performed digitized neuropsychological tests, including a Cancellation task, Radial Arm Maze task, and Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices. Participants also completed a newly developed COVID-19 Student Stress Scale, based on transactional models of stress, and the Coping Orientation to Problems Experienced—New Italian Version to assess coping orientation.ResultsThe tendency to start cancelation from a left-sided item, to explore first a left-sided arm of the maze, and to choose erroneous response items on the left side of the page on Raven’s matrices increased from T1 to T2. The degree of pseudoneglect increment positively correlated with perceived stress and negatively correlated with Positive Attitude and Problem-Solving COPE-NIV subscales.ConclusionLockdown-related stress may have contributed to increase leftward bias during quarantine through a greater activation of the right hemisphere. On the other hand, pseudoneglect was decreased for better coping participants, perhaps as a consequence of a more balanced hemispheric activity in these individuals. (shrink)
Causality in the Sciences.Phyllis McKay Illari,Federica Russo &Jon Williamson (eds.) -2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.detailsWhy do ideas of how mechanisms relate to causality and probability differ so much across the sciences? Can progress in understanding the tools of causal inference in some sciences lead to progress in others? This book tackles these questions and others concerning the use of causality in the sciences.
Can Testimony Transmit Understanding?Federica I. Malfatti -2020 -Theoria 86 (1):54-72.detailsCan we transmit understanding via testimony in more or less the same way in which we transmit knowledge? The standard view in social epistemology has a straightforward answer: no, we cannot. Three arguments supporting the standard view have been formulated so far. The first appeals to the claim that gaining understanding requires a greater cognitive effort than acquiring testimonial knowledge does. The second appeals to a certain type of epistemic trust that is supposedly characteristic of knowledge transmission (and maybe of (...) the transmission of epistemic goods in general) and that is allegedly incompatible with understanding. The third aims to show that there is a certain aspect of understanding (what epistemologists these days like to call “grasping”) that cannot be passed on to another person via testimony alone. In this article, I show that all of these arguments can be resisted. Thus, there seem to be no compelling reasons to embrace the standard view. (shrink)
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Understanding and Transmission.Federica Isabella Malfatti -forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup,The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.detailsTestimony spreads information. It is also widely acknowledged that it can transfer, maybe even generate, propositional knowledge. But what about other epistemic goods? Knowledge of individual propositions is certainly very important to us. In many domains, however, we want more than just collecting knowledge about isolated items of fact. We also want to see how things hang together. We want to grasp the reason(s) why things are the way they are and not otherwise. We want to understand the subject matter (...) of what we believe. What is the role of testimony in the process of disseminating understanding in an epistemic community? Can understanding be testimonially transmitted from one epistemic agent to another? Pessimists about understanding transmission believe that everything testimony can do is to lay the groundwork for understanding. When a speaker tells or explains something to a hearer, she plants, so to say, the seed of understanding. Whether the seed then grows and flourishes or dries up and perishes in the soil, however, is not in the speaker’s hands; it is only up to the hearer. Optimists, on the other hand, believe that testimony can do more than lay the groundwork for understanding. Under certain conditions, it can work as an epistemic source of understanding. In this entry, I sketch a model of understanding that could be embraced by pessimists and optimists alike (section 2). After having analyzed what it means for an epistemic good to be transmitted via testimony (section 3), I will argue that there is more room for optimism than for pessimism. Understanding, conceived along the lines I suggest, can be very probably transmitted via testimony (section 4). I conclude by showing how pessimists might resist this conclusion (section 5). (shrink)
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Minimal credential disclosure in trust negotiations.Federica Paci,David Bauer,Elisa Bertino,Douglas M. Blough,Anna Squicciarini &Aditi Gupta -2009 -Identity in the Information Society 2 (3):221-239.detailsThe secure release of identity attributes is a key enabler for electronic business interactions. Users should have the maximum control possible over the release of their identity attributes and should state under which conditions these attributes can be disclosed. Moreover, users should disclose only the identity attributes that are actually required for the transactions at hand. In this paper we present an approach for the controlled release of identity attributes that addresses such requirements. The approach is based on the integration (...) of trust negotiation and minimal credential disclosure techniques. Trust negotiation supports selective and incremental disclosure of identity attributes, while minimal credential disclosure guarantees that only the attributes necessary to complete the on-line interactions are disclosed. (shrink)
Causal Arrows in econometric Models.Federica Russo -2009 -Humana Mente 3 (10).detailsEconometrics applies statistical methods to study economic phenomena. Roughly, by means of equations, econometricians typically account for the response variable in terms of a number of explanatory variables. The question arises under what conditions econometric models can be given a causal interpretation. By drawing the distinction between associational models and causal models, the paper argues that a proper use of background knowledge, three distinct types of assumptions (statistical, extra-statistical, and causal), and the hypothetico-deductive methodology provide sufficient conditions for a causal (...) interpretation of econometric models. (shrink)
Ethical Assessments of Emerging Technologies: Appraising the moral plausibility of technological visions.Federica Lucivero -2016 - Cham: Imprint: Springer.detailsThis book systematically addresses the issue of assessing the normative nature of visions of emerging technologies in an epistemologically robust way. In the context of democratic governance of emerging technologies, not only it is important to reflect on technologies' moral significance, but also to address their emerging and future oriented character. The book proposes an original approach to deal with the issue of "plausible" ethical evaluation of new technologies. Taking its start from current debates about Technology Assessment, the proposed solution (...) emerges as a combination of theoretical and methodological insights from the fields of Philosophy of Technology, Science and Technology Studies and a normative justification based on pragmatist ethics. The book's main contribution is to engage a diverse and interdisciplinary audience (ethicists, philosophers, social scientists, technology assessment researchers and practitioners) in a reflection concerning the epistemological challenges that are associated to the endeavour of appraising the moral significance of emerging technologies in the attempt of democratically governing them. It brings together concepts and methodologies from different disciplines and shows their synergy in applying them to two specific case studies of emerging biomedical technologies. (shrink)
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Can Testimony Generate Understanding?Federica Isabella Malfatti -2019 -Social Epistemology 33 (6):477-490.detailsCan we gain understanding from testifiers who themselves fail to understand? At first glance, this looks counterintuitive. How could a hearer who has no understanding or very poor understanding of a certain subject matter non-accidentally extract items of information relevant to understanding from a speaker’s testimony if the speaker does not understand what she is talking about? This paper shows that, when there are theories or representational devices working as mediators, speakers can intentionally generate understanding in their hearers by engaging (...) in relevant speech acts without understanding the topic of these speech acts themselves. More specifically, I argue that testifiers can intentionally elicit understanding of empirical phenomena in their hearers even if they themselves lack such understanding – granted that they properly understood the epistemic mediators involved. (shrink)
Metrics in biodiversity conservation and the value-free ideal.Federica Bocchi -2024 -Synthese 203 (5):1-27.detailsThis paper examines one aspect of the legacy of the Value-Free Ideal in conservation science: the view that measurements and metrics are value-free epistemic tools detached from ideological, ethical, social, and, generally, non-epistemic considerations. Contrary to this view, I will argue that traditional measurement practices entrenched in conservation are in fact permeated with non-epistemic values. I challenge the received view by revealing three non-epistemic assumptions underlying traditional metrics: (1) a human-environment demarcation, (2) the desirability of a people-free landscape, and (3) (...) the exclusion of cultural diversity from biodiversity. I also draw a connection between arguments for retaining traditional metrics to “scientific colonialism,” exemplified by a fortress conservation model. I conclude by advocating for abandoning the myth of the intrinsic value-freedom of measurement practices and embracing metrics aligned with societal and scientific goals. (shrink)
On the Epistemological Potential of Worrall's Structural Realism.Federica Isabella Malfatti -2018 -Philosophical Inquiries 2 (VI):9-24.detailsStructural realism à-la-Worrall is the view that inasmuch as our scientific theories provide us with (partially) adequate descriptions of an objective and independent reality, they do so by shedding light on the way this reality is in itself structured, and not on the so-called nature of existing objects. This position seems to imply that there is something about reality that lies beyond our grasp. I will reconstruct and shed new light onto Worrall’s position and show that, contrary to how it (...) might appear at first sight, its allegedly negative, or pessimist stance has a positive side: by placing a constraint on our (theoretically mediated) knowledge, structural realism might tell us something relevant about the nature and functioning of our scientific understanding of the world. The paper is divided in three parts. The first part is devoted to a brief reconstruction of Worrall’s position. In the second part, I propose a new reading of the position in question by uncovering, highlighting and developing its epistemological consequences. In the last part, I investigate and scrutinize the connection between understanding and structures. The overall aim is to show how Worrall’s structural realism, especially in the reading I am proposing here, may provide us with a plausible explanation of the epistemic value of past and actual scientific theories. (shrink)
Interpreting causality in the health sciences.Federica Russo &Jon Williamson -2007 -International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):157 – 170.detailsWe argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences - pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory (...) of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the epistemic theory of causality provides the required unification. (shrink)
Conversation with Lawrence Blum.Federica Berdini -2015 -Aphex 12.detailsLawrence Blum is Distinguished Professor of Liberal Arts and Education and Professor of Philosophy at University of Massachusetts Boston. His scholarly interests are in race theory, moral philosophy and psychology, moral education, multiculturalism, social and political philosophy, and philosophy of education. Over the last decades Blum has brought his skill as a moral philosopher in the racially and ethically diverse context of the Cambridge Rindge and Latin High School by teaching on four occasions a course on race and racism to (...) a class of seniors. The interview looks back on the development of his philosophical identity by illuminating its relationships to the social and academic environments in a time span of over forty years. (shrink)
The Potential of Passivity Beyond the Intentional Model.Federica Buongiorno &Susan Kozel -unknowndetailsThis article reconfigures Merleau-Ponty’s “Problem of Passivity” into the potential of passivity. It contributes to Claude Lefort’s strong claims that Merleau-Ponty’s Passivity course from 1954-1955 published in the volume of course notes Institution and Passivity provides an «attack against the root of modern ontology», and that the phenomenon of passivity has largely been «neglected by most philosophers». Reflected in these assertions is a 21st century perspective on Merleau-Ponty’s work, with relevance to current performative, corporeal and political reworkings of phenomenology. The (...) article's aim is to chart how Merleau-Ponty’s work on passivity, sleep and the unconscious represents a powerful critique of the Husserlian intentional model and the phenomenological concept of constitution, at the same time as opening potential for viewing consciousness as plural, culturally situated and diffracted. (shrink)