Theory of mind and self-consciousness: What is it like to be autistic?Uta Frith &Francesca Happé -1999 -Mind and Language 14 (1):1-22.detailsAutism provides a model for exploring the nature of self‐consciousness: self‐consciousness requires the ability to reflect on mental states, and autism is a disorder with a specific impairment in the neurocognitive mechanism underlying this ability. Experimental studies of normal and abnormal development suggest that the abilities to attribute mental states to self and to others are closely related. Thus inability to pass standard ‘theory of mind’ tests, which refer to others’ false beliefs, may imply lack of self‐consciousness. Individuals who persistently (...) fail these tests may, in the extreme, be unable to reflect on their intentions or to anticipate their own actions. In contrast, individuals with high‐functioning autism or Asperger syndrome often possess a late‐acquired, explicit theory of mind, which appears to be the result of effortful learning. An experimental study with three people with Asperger syndrome suggested that level of performance on standard theory of mind tasks was strongly related to the ability to engage in introspection. Qualitative differences in the introspections of high‐functioning people with autism are also reflected in autobiographical accounts which may give a glimpse of what it is like to be autistic. (shrink)
‘Theory of Mind’ and Tracking Speakers’ Intentions.Francesca Happé &Eva Loth -2002 -Mind and Language 17 (1-2):24-36.detailsTypical theory of mind tasks assess children’s ability to attribute a false belief in order to predict or explain an action. According to these standard tasks, young children do not represent the independent (mistaken) beliefs of others until the fourth year—yet long before this, children are able to track speakers’ intentions in order to learn new words. Might communication be a privileged domain for theory of mind? In the present study we explored pre‐schoolers’ ability to track a false belief in (...) order to acquire a novel word. A puppet labeled a novel object in a false belief condition (contents of a box had been switched without her knowledge), and a true belief condition (contents switched in her presence). Children were significantly better at tracking the puppet’s false belief in the word‐learning task than in a standard false belief test. Possible reasons for this advantage are discussed, and the suggestion made that representation of mental states may emerge precociously in the service of communication. (shrink)
Autism and Talent.Francesca Happé &Uta Frith (eds.) -2010 - Oup/the Royal Society.detailsWhy do many autistic people develop outstanding abilities in domains like drawing, music, computation, and reading? What aspects of autism predispose some to talent? This book explores the origin and prevalence of exceptional talent, its basis in the brain, the current theories, and the representation of talent and autism in biography and fiction.
Mary has more: Sex differences, autism, coherence, and theory of mind.Uta Frith &Francesca Happé -1996 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):253-254.detailsWe challenge the notion that differences in spatial ability are the best or only explanation for observed sex differences in mathematical word problems. We suggest two ideas from the study of autism: sex differences in theory of mind and in central coherence.
Compensation in autism is not consistent with social motivation theory.Lucy Anne Livingston,Punit Shah &Francesca Happé -2019 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.detailsGrowing evidence, as presented by Jaswal & Akhtar, indicates that social motivation is not universally reduced in autism. Here, we evaluate and extend this argument in light of recent evidence of “compensation” in autism. We thereby argue that autistic “compensators” – exhibiting neurotypical behaviour despite persistent difficulties in social cognition – indicate intact or potentially heightened social motivation in autism.
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Supporting the weight of the elephant in the room: Technical intelligence propped up by social cognition and language.Alex Thornton,Francesca Happé &Christine A. Caldwell -2020 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.detailsWe consider the evolutionary plausibility of Osiurak and Reynaud's arguments. We argue that technical reasoning is not quite the magic bullet that O&R assume, and instead propose a co-evolutionary account of the interplay between technical reasoning and social learning, with language emerging as a vital issue neglected in O&R's account.
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Metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in autism.David M. Williams,Sophie E. Lind &Francesca Happé -2009 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):162-163.detailsThis commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).