Works by Erik C. W. Krabbe
50 found
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| Erik C. W. Krabbe [53] | Erik C. W. Krabbe [1] |
- Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning.Douglas Neil Walton &Erik C. W. Krabbe -1995 - Albany, NY, USA: State University of New York Press.Develops a logical analysis of dialogue in which two or more parties attempt to advance their own interests. It includes a classification of the major types of dialogues and a discussion of several important informal fallacies.
- Handbook of Argumentation Theory.Frans H. van Eemeren,Bart Garssen,Erik C. W. Krabbe,A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans,Bart Verheij &Jean H. M. Wagemans -2014 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.No categories
- Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to Negotiation.Jan Albert van Laar &Erik C. W. Krabbe -2018 -Argumentation 32 (3):329-350.Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into (...) negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way. (shrink)
- The Ways of Criticism.Erik C. W. Krabbe &Jan Albert van Laar -2011 -Argumentation 25 (2):199-227.This paper attempts to systematically characterize critical reactions in argumentative discourse, such as objections, critical questions, rebuttals, refutations, counterarguments, and fallacy charges, in order to contribute to the dialogical approach to argumentation. We shall make use of four parameters to characterize distinct types of critical reaction. First, a critical reaction has a focus, for example on the standpoint, or on another part of an argument. Second, critical reactions appeal to some kind of norm, argumentative or other. Third, they each have (...) a particular illocutionary force, which may include that of giving strategic advice to the other. Fourth, a critical reaction occurs at a particular level of dialogue (the ground level or some meta-level). The concepts here developed shall be applied to discussions of critical reactions by Aristotle and by some contemporary authors. (shrink)
- Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments.Frans H. van Eemeren,Rob Grootendorst,Francisca Snoeck Henkemans,J. Anthony Blair,Ralph H. Johnson &Erik C. W. Krabbe -1998 -Philosophy and Rhetoric 31 (1):71-74.No categories
- The Problem Of Retraction In Critical Discussion.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2001 -Synthese 127 (1-2):141-159.In many contexts a retraction of commitment isfrowned upon. For instance, it is not appreciated,generally, if one withdraws a promise or denies anearlier statement. Critical discussion, too, caneasily be disrupted by retractions, if these occur toofrequently and at critical points. But on the otherhand, the very goal of critical discussion –resolution of a dispute – involves a retraction,either of doubt, or of some expressed point of view.A person who never retracts, not even under pressureof cogent arguments, would hardly qualify as (...) areasonable discussant. Also, inconsistencies in one'sposition, once they have been pointed out, must bedealt with by some kind of retraction. The problem ofretraction is to find a suitable model of dialoguethat allows retractions where they seem reasonable, oreven required, and rules them out (or puts sanctionsupon them) whenever they would become disruptive of awell-organized process of dialogue.The present paper tries to point to a solution basedon the following principles: (1) Retraction rulesdetermine what retractions are permissible, and (2) ifpermissible what the consequences of retraction are.(3) Retraction rules vary according to the type ofdialogue and (4) according to the type of commitmentretracted. For instance, assertions and mereconcessions need to be distinguished, as well aslight-side and dark-side commitments. (5) To accountfor our contradictory intuitions on the issue ofretractions, one may best resort to a complex type ofdialogue in which different retraction rules hold fordifferent parts.The paper explains, summarizes, and expands upon thediscussion of retraction in Commitment inDialogue by Douglas Walton and the present author(cf. Walton and Krabbe 1995). (shrink)No categories
- The Role of Argument in Negotiation.Jan Albert van Laar &Erik C. W. Krabbe -2018 -Argumentation 32 (4):549-567.The purpose of this paper is to show the pervasive, though often implicit, role of arguments in negotiation dialogue. This holds even for negotiations that start from a difference of interest such as mere bargaining through offers and counteroffers. But it certainly holds for negotiations that try to settle a difference of opinion on policy issues. It will be demonstrated how a series of offers and counteroffers in a negotiation dialogue contains a reconstructible series of implicit persuasion dialogues. The paper (...) is a sequel to van Laar and Krabbe, in which we showed that for some differences of opinion it may be reasonable to shift from persuasion dialogue, aimed at a resolution of the difference on the merits, to negotiation dialogue, aimed at compromise, whereas in the present paper we show that such a shift need not amount to the abandonment of argumentation. Our main aim in this paper as well as in the previous one is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation. (shrink)
- The Burden of Criticism: Consequences of Taking a Critical Stance.Jan Albert Laar &Erik C. W. Krabbe -2013 -Argumentation 27 (2):201-224.Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convincingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of “directiveness” that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether (...) there are normative requirements that enhance the directiveness of criticism. Does the opponent have in circumstances a dialectical obligation to provide clarifications, explanations, or even arguments? In this paper, it is hypothesized that the competitiveness inherent in critical discussion must be mitigated by making the opponent responsible for providing her counterconsiderations, if available, thus assisting the proponent in developing an argumentative strategy that defuses them. (shrink)
- The burden of criticism.Jan van Laar &Erik C. W. Krabbe -2013 -Argumentation 27 (2):201-224.Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convinc-ingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of ‘directiveness’ that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether (...) and to what extent there is a normative requirement to strive after criticism that is more than minimally directive. In this paper, it is hypothesized that the com-petitiveness inherent in critical discussion must be mitigated by making the opponent responsible for providing her counterconsiderations, if available, thus assisting the proponent in developing an argumenta-tive strategy that defuses them. (shrink)
- Strategies in Dialectic and Rhetoric.Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknown
- So what? Profiles for relevance criticism in persuation dialogues.Erik C. W. Krabbe -1992 -Argumentation 6 (2):271-283.This paper discusses several types of relevance criticism within dialogue. Relevance criticism is a way one could or should criticize one's partner's contribution in a conversation as being deficient in respect of conversational coherence. The first section tries to narrow down the scope of the subject to manageable proportions. Attention is given to the distinction between criticism of alleged fallacies within dialogue and such criticism as pertains to argumentative texts. Within dialogue one may distigguish tenability criticism, connection criticism, and narrow-type (...) relevance criticism. Only the last of these three types of criticism constitutes a charge of fallacy and carries with it a burden of proof. In the second it is observed that a full study of narrow-type relevance criticism would require the construction of complicated, many-layered, dialogue systems. Such a study can, however, be profitably preceded by setting up profiles of dialogue that help us discuss the ins and outs of certain types of move. This is illustrated with an example. (shrink)
- On How to Get Beyond the Opening Stage.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2007 -Argumentation 21 (3):233-242.Any well-structured argumentative exchange must be preceded by some preparatory stages. In the pragma-dialectical four-stage model of critical discussion, the clarification of issues and positions is relegated to the confrontation stage and the other preparatory matters are dealt within the opening stage. In the opening stage, the parties involved come to agree to discuss their differences and to do so by an argumentative exchange rather than by, say, a sequence of bids and offers. They should also come to agree on (...) the rules of dialogue, on roles, on logical principles, on types of argument, and on the propositions that can be used as basic premises. All in all, a lot of work needs to be done before the first topical argument can be put forward. Especially the opening stage seems prone to further disagreements and protracted discussions, e.g., about the admissibility of particular kinds of argument or particular basic premises. There is also the problem that a successful opening stage threatens to settle matters beforehand and thus put the argumentation stage out of business. The paper suggests some measures that could alleviate the workload of the opening stage, without making the argumentation stage otiose. (shrink)
- About Old and New Dialectic: Dialogues, Fallacies, and Strategies.Erik C. W. Krabbe &Jan Albert van Laar -2007 -Informal Logic 27 (1):27-58.We shall investigate the similarities and dissimilarities between old and new dialectic. For the ‘old dialectic’, we base our survey mainly on Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistical Refutations, whereas for the ‘new dialectic’, we turn to contemporary views on dialogical interaction, such as can, for the greater part, be found in Walton’s The New Dialectic. Three issues are taken up: types of dialogue, fallacies, and strategies. Though one should not belittle the differences in scope and outlook that obtain between the old (...) and the new dialectic, the paper will show that in many respects the old dialectic foreshadows the new dialectic. (shrink)
- Topical Roots of Formal Dialectic.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2013 -Argumentation 27 (1):71-87.Formal dialectic has its roots in ancient dialectic. We can trace this influence in Charles Hamblin’s book on fallacies, in which he introduced his first formal dialectical systems. Earlier, Paul Lorenzen proposed systems of dialogical logic, which were in fact formal dialectical systems avant la lettre, with roles similar to those of the Greek Questioner and Answerer. In order to make a comparison between ancient dialectic and contemporary formal dialectic, I shall formalize part of the Aristotelian procedure for Academic debates. (...) The resulting system will be compared (1) with Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s system of rules of Critical Discussion (the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure), which must, however, first itself be reconstructed as a formal dialectical system, and (2) with a Hamblin-type system, and (3) a Lorenzen-type system. When drawing comparisons, it will become clear that there is a line to be drawn from Aristotle to formal dialectic and pragma-dialectics, extending to contemporary computational models of argument. (shrink)
- In the quagmire of quibbles: a dialectical exploration.Erik C. W. Krabbe &Jan Albert van Laar -2019 -Synthese 198 (4):3459-3476.Criticism may degenerate into quibbling or nitpicking. How can discussants keep quibblers under control? In the paper we investigate cases in which a battle about words replaces a discussion of the matters that are actually at issue as well as cases in which a battle about minor objections replaces a discussion of the major issues. We survey some lines of discussion dealing with these situations in profiles of dialogue.
- Fair and unfair strategies in public controversies.Jan Albert van Laar &Erik C. W. Krabbe -2016 -Journal of Argumentation in Context 5 (3):315-347.Contemporary theory of argumentation offers many insights about the ways in which, in the context of a public controversy, arguers should ideally present their arguments and criticize those of their opponents. We also know that in practice not all works out according to the ideal patterns: numerous kinds of derailments are an object of study for argumentation theorists. But how about the use of unfairstrategiesvis-à-vis one’s opponents? What if it is not a matter of occasional derailments but of one party’s (...) systematic refusal to take other parties seriously? What if one party continually forgoes any form of critical testing and instead resorts to threats or blackmail? Can this be countered by the tools of reason? Or should one pay one’s opponent back in the same coin? To gain some grasp of these issues, we describe a number of strategies used in the public controversy about induced earthquakes in Groningen. We check whether these strategies arefair,i.e.balanced, transparent,andtolerant.We also investigate the effects of the choice for a particular kind of strategy. It appears that, in circumstances, choosing a fair strategy may be detrimental for resolving the controversy and choosing an unfair one beneficial. Following up ideas from social psychology and political science, we formulate some guidelines for the choice of strategies. At the end, we stress the importance — especially for those whose opinions carry little weight — of having a society in which the knowledge and skills needed for assessing the fairness of strategies are widespread. (shrink)
- Pressure and Argumentation in Public Controversies.Jan Albert van Laar &Erik C. W. Krabbe -2019 -Informal Logic 39 (3):205-227.When can exerting pressure in a public controversy promote reasonable outcomes, and when is it rather a hindrance? We show how negotiation and persuasion dialogue can be intertwined. Then, we examine in what ways one can in a public controversy exert pressure on others through sanctions or rewards. Finally, we discuss from the viewpoints of persuasion and negotiation whether and, if so, how pressure hinders the achievement of a reasonable outcome.
- Strategic Maneuvering in Mathematical Proofs.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2008 -Argumentation 22 (3):453-468.This paper explores applications of concepts from argumentation theory to mathematical proofs. Note is taken of the various contexts in which proofs occur and of the various objectives they may serve. Examples of strategic maneuvering are discussed when surveying, in proofs, the four stages of argumentation distinguished by pragma-dialectics. Derailments of strategies (fallacies) are seen to encompass more than logical fallacies and to occur both in alleged proofs that are completely out of bounds and in alleged proofs that are at (...) least mathematical arguments. These considerations lead to a dialectical and rhetorical view of proofs. (shrink)
- Noncumulative dialectical models and formal dialectics.Erik C. W. Krabbe -1985 -Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (2):129 - 168.
- That’s no argument! The dialectic of non-argumentation.Erik C. W. Krabbe &Jan Albert van Laar -2015 -Synthese 192 (4):1173-1197.What if in discussion the critic refuses to recognize an emotionally expressed argument of her interlocutor as an argument, accusing him of having presented no argument at all. In this paper, we shall deal with this reproach, which taken literally amounts to a charge of having committed a fallacy of non-argumentation. As such it is a very strong, if not the ultimate, criticism, which even carries the risk of abandonment of the discussion and can, therefore, not be made without burdening (...) oneself with correspondingly strong obligations. We want to specify the fallacies of non-argumentation and their dialectic, i.e., the proper way to criticize them, the appropriate ways for the arguer to react to such criticism, and the appropriate ways for the critic to follow up on these reactions. Among the types of fallacy of non-argumentation, the emphasis will be on the appeal to popular sentiments. Our aim is to reach, for cases of non-argumentation, a survey of dialectical possibilities. By making the disputants themselves responsible for the place of emotion in their dialogues, we hope to contribute to a further development of the theory of dialectical obligations. (shrink)
- Predicaments of the Concluding Stage.Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknownArgumentative discussion is successful only if, at the concluding stage, both parties can agree about the result of their enterprise. If they can not, the whole discussion threatens to start all over again. Dialectical ruling should prevent this from happening. The paper investigates whether dialectical rules may enforce a decision one way or the other; either by recognizing some arguments as conclusive or some criticisms as devastating. At the end the pragma-dialectical model appears more successful than even its protagonists have (...) claimed. (shrink)
- The Formalization of Critical Discussion.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2017 -Argumentation 31 (1):101-119.This paper makes an independent start with formalizing the rules for the argumentation stage of critical discussions. It does not deal with the well-known code of conduct consisting of ten rules but with the system consisting of fifteen rules on which the code of conduct is based. The rules of this system are scrutinized and problems they raise are discussed. Then a formal dialectical system is defined that reflects most of the contents of these rules. The aim is to elucidate (...) the way the rules work and to show how a formal approach can be useful to achieve this. It is also shown how the present method can be used to study the nature of circular argumentation. While, generally, the formalization follows closely the original rules for the argumentation stage of critical discussions, there will also be proposed some modifications of the original protocol. (shrink)
- A theory of modal dialectics.Erik C. W. Krabbe -1986 -Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (2):191 - 217.
- It's All Very Well for You to Talk! Situationally Disqualifying Ad Hominem Attacks.Erik C. W. Krabbe &Douglas Walton -1993 -Informal Logic 15 (2).The situationally disqualifying ad hominem attack is an argumentative move in critical dialogue whereby one participant points out certain features in his adversary's personal situation that are claimed to make it inappropriate for this adversary to take a particular point of view, to argue in a particular way, or to launch certain criticisms. In this paper, we discuss some examples of this way of arguing. Other types of ad hominem argumentation are discussed as well and compared with the situationally disqualifying (...) type. The socalled Houtlosser Dilemma highlights the danger of unconditionally condoning ad hominem arguments. We propose a classification of ad hominem, and a more restrictive use of the term 'circumstantial'. Finally, we discuss whether ad hominem arguments are (always?) to be rejected as fallacious. (shrink)
- Aristotle’s On Sophistical Refutations.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2012 -Topoi 31 (2):243-248.
- Dialogue foundations: Dialogue logic revisited: Erik C. W. Krabbe.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2001 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):33–49.No categories
- Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?Erik C. W. Krabbe -1997 -Argumentation 12 (2):281-294.Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of (...) the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy. (shrink)
- Inconsistent Commitments and Commitment to Inconsistencies.Erik C. W. Krabbe -1990 -Informal Logic 12 (1).Inconsistent Commitments and Commitment to Inconsistencies.
- Note on a completeness theorem in the theory of counterfactuals.Erik C. W. Krabbe -1978 -Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):91 - 93.
- The Pragmatics of Deductive Arguments.Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknown
- Strategies for strengthening presumptions and generating ethos by manifestly ensuring accountability.Fred Kauffeld &Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknownIn argumentation, as elsewhere, speakers strategically engage favourable presumptions by manifestly making themselves accountable for their communicative efforts. Such strategies provide the addressee with reasons to regard the speaker as accountable in specific ways and, via that regard for the speaker, with situation-specific rationales for responding positively to what the speaker says. This paper identifies some resources available to arguers for strengthening, elaborating, and focusing such special presumptions. The paper offers an analysis of Barbara Jordan’s “Statement on the Articles of (...) Impeachment” as illustrative of these resources for strengthening a speaker’s ethos. (shrink)
- Arne Næss (1912–2009).Erik C. W. Krabbe -2010 -Argumentation 24 (4):527-530.No categories
- Creative reasoning in formal discussion.Erik C. W. Krabbe -1988 -Argumentation 2 (4):483-498.Systems of formal dialectics articulate methods of conflict resolution. To this end they provide norms to regulate verbal exchanges between the Proponent of a thesis and an Opponent. These regulated exchanges constitute what are known as formal discussions.One may ask what moves, if any, in formal discusions correspond to arguing for or against the thesis. It is claimed that certain moves of the Proponent's are properly designated as arguing for the thesis, and that certain moves of the Opponent purport to (...) criticize the tenability or the relevance of the reasons advanced. Thus the usefulness of formal dialectic systems as models for reasonable argument is vindicated.It is then proposed to make these systems more realistic by incorporating in them a norm of Creative Reasoning that removes the severe restrictions to which the Proponent's arguing was hitherto subject. As a consequence, a certain type of irrelevant reason is no longer automatically excluded. Therefore, it is proposed to extend the Opponent's rights to exert relevance criticism. The new dialectic systems are shown to be strategically equivalent to the original ones. Finally, it is stressed that the Opponent's criticism should not be designated as arguing against the thesis. The Opponent criticizes, but does not argue. (shrink)
- The adequacy of material dialogue-games.Erik C. W. Krabbe -1978 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (3):321-330.
- Christopher W. Tindale, Fallacies and Argument Appraisal: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, xvii + 218 pp. Series: Critical Reasoning and Argumentation.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2009 -Argumentation 23 (1):127-131.
- Winning and Losing for Arguers.Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknownWhat roles do “winning” and “losing” have to play in argumentative discussions? We say that someone has “won” a discussion or debate, but also an emphasis on “winning” is often rejected. The question is: can these concepts be so interpreted that justice is done to these antagonistic views? Starting from Aristotelian ideas, the paper purports to establish that the views mentioned above can indeed be reconciled.No categories
- Else Barth.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2016 -Argumentation 30 (3):341-343.No categories
- Empirical Logic and Public Debate: Essays in Honour of Else M. Barth.Erik C. W. Krabbe,Renée José Dalitz &Pier A. Smit (eds.) -1993 - Rodopi.Empirical Logic and Public Debate supplies a large number of previously unpublished papers that together make up a survey of recent developments in the field of empirical logic. It contains theoretical contributions, some of a more formal and some of an informal nature, as well as numerous contemporary and historical case studies. The book will therefore be attractive both to those who wish to focus upon the theory and practice of discussion, debate, arguing, and argument, as well as to those (...) readers who are primarily interested in applications to a particular field, such as ethics, political philosophy, feminist philosophy, or the history of philosophy. (shrink)
- Fundamental Circularities in the Theory of Argumentation.Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknownSometimes pernicious circularities appear in definitions of fundamental concepts of argumentation theory. For instance, in pragma-dialectical theory, the concept of a fallacy and that of a critical discussion aiming at resolving a difference of opinion mutually presuppose one another. A similar relationship obtains, in argumentation theory at large, between the concept of argumentation and that of rationality. Again, the concept of an argumentative dialogue presupposes a concept of statement. Yet, statementhood is sometimes claimed to be determined by a locution’s function (...) in dialogue. Similarly, for the concepts of proof and argument. Are these circularities really objectionable? Are they resolvable? If they are not, how can we live with them? It will be argued that some of these problems can be neglected some of the time, but not all of them all of the time. Though there may be no royal road towards resolution, several strategies can be applied. But sometimes patience is what is needed. (shrink)
- Opportunities and Challenges in an Ageing Society.E. M. Barth &Erik C. W. Krabbe -1992 - North Holland.Paperback. What has happened to the science of Logic, as an academic discipline and pursuit? The diagnoses do not coincide, but the recognition is growing that since the days of Mill, Russell or Beth, something has gone wrong. A logical vacuum - theoretical as well as practical - in large parts of contemporary culture is easily perceived and is particularly visible in politicis, precisely where logic as a science ought to make its greatest impact.The present volume offers analyses and reflections (...) of various types, written by logicians and other analytical philosophers. Some analyse the logic of political activists and thinkers, or the political thought of a logician. Other chapters offer concrete logico-analytical studies of burning political issues of our time, emphasizing the possibilities for an advancement of logic in, and through parliamentary debate, and of the problems connected with this goal. The final part of the book looks at possib. (shrink)
- Being right, admitting that someone is right, being judged right. Krabbe, Erik C. W. -unknownNo categories
- Commentary on Blair.Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknownNo categories
- Commentary on Godden.Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknownNo categories
- Commentary on Michel Dufour's "On the difference between fallacy and sophism".Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknown
- Douglas Neil Walton.Erik C. W. Krabbe &Bart Verheij -2020 -Argumentation 35 (3):513-518.No categories
- Frans H. van Eemeren (ed.) (2001), Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2003 -Argumentation 17 (3):355-359.
- Jacobus C. Visser, A Dialogue Game for Critical Discussion: Groundwork in the Formalisation and Computerisation of the Pragma-Dialectical Model of Argumentation. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam: Amsterdam Center for Language and Communication, Amsterdam, xiv + 153 pp.Erik C. W. Krabbe -2018 -Argumentation 32 (3):457-460.No categories
- Reply to my Commentator - Krabbe.Erik C. W. Krabbe -unknownNo categories
- Meeting in the House of Callias: Rhetoric and Dialectic. [REVIEW]Erik C. W. Krabbe -2000 -Argumentation 14 (3):205-217.The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe and compare the original goals and perspectives of both rhetoric and dialectic in theory and in practice. Dialectic is the practice and theory of conversations; rhetoric that of speeches. For theory of dialectic, this paper will turn to Aristotle's Topics and Sophistical Refutations; for theory of rhetoric, to his Rhetoric. Thus it will appear that rhetoric and dialectic are pretty close. Yet, on the other hand, there is a long tradition of (...) mutual antagonism. The paper tries to summarize the common features of, as well as the differences between, the two. To get a taste of both dialectic and rhetoric in practice the reader is invited to enter the House of Callias, as we know it from Plato's Protagoras. After this visit there remains no doubt that rhetoric and dialectic are intertwined on the level of practice. Moreover, we may look forward to their integration on the level of theory. (shrink)
- Book Review: John Woods, Paradox and Paraconsistency: Conflict Resolution in the Abstract Sciences (2003). Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. pp. xviii+362, ISBN 0-521-81094-9 (cloth), 0-521-00934-0 (paper). [REVIEW]Erik C. W. Krabbe -2004 -Argumentation 18 (4):495-499.No categories
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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