Works by Eric Katz
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- Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community.Eric Katz -1996 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Written by one of the instrumental figures in environmental ethics, Nature as Subject traces the development of an ethical policy that is centered not on human beings, but on itself. Katz applies this idea to contemporary environmental problems, introducing themes of justice, domination, imperialism, and the Holocaust. This volume will stand as a foundational work for environmental scholars, government and industry policy makers, activists, and students in advanced philosophy and environmental studies courses.
- Environmental Pragmatism.Eric Katz &Andrew Light (eds.) -1996 - Routledge.Environmental pragmatism is a new strategy in environmental thought. It argues that theoretical debates are hindering the ability of the environmental movement to forge agreement on basic policy imperatives. This new direction in environmental thought moves beyond theory, advocating a serious inquiry into the merits of moral pluralism. Environmental pragmatism, as a coherent philosophical position, connects the methodology of classical American pragmatic thought to the explanation, solution and discussion of real issues. This concise, well-focused collection is the first comprehensive presentation (...) of environmental pragmatism as a new philosophical approach to environmental thought and policy. (shrink)
- Environmental Pragmatism.Andrew Light &Eric Katz -1996 -Ethics and the Environment 2 (2):199-202.
- Considering De-Extinction: Zombie Arguments and the Walking (And Flying and Swimming) Dead.Eric Katz -2022 -Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (2):81-103.De-extinction raises anew ontological and epistemological problems that have engaged environmental philosophers for decades. This essay re-examines these issues to provide a fuller understanding—and a critique—of de-extinction. One of my claims is that de-extinction as a philosophical problem merely recycles old issues and debates in the field (hence, “zombie” arguments). De-extinction is a project that arises out of the assertion of human domination of the natural world. Thus the acceptance of de-extinction as an environmental policy is an expression of a (...) human-nature relationship that disvalues the natural world and subjugates nature completely to the interests of humanity. (shrink)
- Further Adventures in the Case against Restoration.Eric Katz -2012 -Environmental Ethics 34 (1):67-97.Ecological restoration has been a topic for philosophical criticism for three decades. In this essay, I present a discussion of the arguments against ecological restoration and the objections raised against my position. I have two purposes in mind: to defend my views against my critics, and to demonstrate that the debate over restoration reveals fundamental ideas about the meaning of nature, ideas that are necessary for the existence of any substantive environmentalism. I discuss the possibility of positive restorations, the idea (...) that nature can restore itself, the meaning of artifacts, and the significance of the distinction between humanity and nature. (shrink)
- Replacement and Irreversibility: The Problem with Ecological Restoration as Moral Repair.Eric Katz -2018 -Ethics and the Environment 23 (1):17.Should the process of ecological restoration be considered a type of moral reparation? In a recent issue of this journal, Ben Almassi (2017) has argued that ecological restoration should be understood as a moral repair, i.e., as "a model for rebuilding the moral conditions of relationships" (20). Ideas of restorative justice and moral repair are appropriate to address human injustice and wrongdoing. But these concepts are vacuous and lose their meaning when addressing the ethics of human activities regarding the natural (...) world because of the essential character of the restoration process: the replacement or substitution of new entities for pre-existing entities in an attempt to reverse the irreversible. At best, the idea of moral reparations to nature is a weak metaphor with no practical efficacy; at worst, it totally misconceives the relationship between human activity and the natural environment in the process of ecological restoration and provides yet another dangerous and disingenuous justification of human arrogance and domination of the natural world. In the guise of the act of moral reparations, humans are instead attempting to assume the powers of God, to control the natural and human world. My previous criticisms of the ethics and meaning of ecological restorations—especially regarding the substitution of new individuals and the artifactual nature of restorations—can be used to undermine Almassi's thesis of moral repair as a goal of ecological restoration practice. In addition an analysis of the Book of Job in the Old Testament demonstrates that not even God—much less humans—can restore and replace what has been destroyed. (shrink)
- The call of the wild: The struggle against domination and the technological fix of nature.Eric Katz -1992 -Environmental Ethics 14 (3):265-273.In this essay, I use encounters with the white-tailed deer of Fire Island to explore the “call of the wild”—the attraction to value that exists in a natural world outside of human control. Value exists in nature to the extent that it avoids modification by human technology. Technology “fixes” the natural world by improving it for human use or by restoring degraded ecosystems. Technology creates a “new world,” an artifactual reality that is far removed from the “wildness” of nature. The (...) technological “fix” of nature thus raises a moral issue: how is an artifact morally different from a natural and wild entity? Artifacts are human instruments; their value lies in their ability to meet human needs. Natural entities have no intrinsic functions; they were not created for any instrumental purpose. To attempt to manage natural entities is to deny their inherent autonomy: a form of domination. The moral claim of the wilderness is thus a claim against human technological domination. We have an obligation to struggle against this domination by preserving as much of the natural world as possible. (shrink)
- The Nazi Comparison in the Debate over Restoration: Nativism and Domination.Eric Katz -2014 -Environmental Values 23 (4):377-398.In this essay, I discuss the comparison between the restoration of natural environments and the Nazi project to develop a pure homeland for native species and authentic Aryan humans. There exists a metaphorical comparison between Nazi eliminationist policies regarding specific human populations and the eradication of invasive and non-native species in ecological restorations. Moreover, there are substantive environmental policies of the Nazi regime that appear to be similar to the goals and methodology of contemporary restoration practice. But there is also (...) a more fundamental connection: the idea of the domination of the natural world. The idea of domination is the key to understanding both the process of ecological restoration and its real connection to Nazism. (shrink)
- The Problem of Ecological Restoration.Eric Katz -1996 -Environmental Ethics 18 (2):222-224.
- Geoengineering, Restoration, and the Construction of Nature.Eric Katz -2015 -Environmental Ethics 37 (4):485-498.An old book by children’s author Dr. Seuss can be an inspiration to examine the ethical and ontological meaning of geoengineering. My argument is based on my critique of the process of ecological restoration as the creation of an artifactual reality. When humanity intentionally interferes with the processes and entities of nature, we change the ontological reality of the natural world. The world becomes a garden, or a zoo, an environment that must be continually managed to meet the goals of (...) human purposes. Geoengineering is a more radical and comprehensive example of this process of planetary management. Thus, as with ecological restoration, geoengineering reinforces the paradigm of human mastery and domination of nature. To counteract this dream of domination, we must, as Dr. Seuss instructed us when we were children, learn to live in the natural world with humility. (shrink)
- Searching for Intrinsic Value.Eric Katz -1987 -Environmental Ethics 9 (3):231-241.Anthony Weston has criticized the place of “inttinsic value” in the development of an environmental ethic, and he has urged a “pragmatic shift” toward a plurality of values based on human desires and experiences. I argue that Weston is mistaken for two reasons: (1) his view of the methodology of environmental ethics is distorted: the intrinsic value of natural entities is not the ground of all moral obligations regarding the environment; and (2) his pragmatic theory of value is too anthropocentric (...) and subjective for the development of a secure and reliable environmental ethic. The obligation to protect the natural environment should not be based on certain “correct” experiences of humans as they interact with wild nature. (shrink)
- A pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism.Eric Katz -1999 -Environmental Ethics 21 (4):377-390.For much of its brief history, the field of environmental ethics has been critical of anthropocentrism. I here undertake a pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism. In the first part of this essay, I explain what a pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism means. I differentiate two distinct pragmatic strategies, one substantive and one methodological, and I adopt methodological pragmatism as my guiding principle. In the second part of this essay, I examine a case study of environmental policy—the problem of beach replenishment on Fire (...) Island, New York—as a pragmatic test of anthropocentrism. I conclude that the debate between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism needs to be expressed in non-absolutist terms, i.e., in a language that permits compromise, flexibility, and a pluralism of values. Thechoice between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism as the basis of both environmental policy and environmental ethics is highly contextual and thus requires a subtle examination of the concrete policy situation. (shrink)
- Six Trees.Eric Katz -2023 -Environmental Ethics 45 (2):175-197.Consider the existence of six identical trees of the same species across a variety of environments. The first tree is in a wild and isolated landscape. The second is in a wilderness park. The third is in a heavily forested “tree plantation” owned by International Paper. The fourth is in the Ramble in Central Park. The fifth is in a suburban yard. The sixth is inside the six-story atrium of a Manhattan skyscraper. This paper begins with the intuition that the (...) identical trees have different values because they exist in different environments and biological-social contexts. To understand the different evaluations of the trees we must think along a spectrum that incorporates both axiology and ontology. This thought experiment is useful in exploring arguments about both the management and the preservation of the natural world. The conclusion is that we must think along a spectrum of natural being and value to understand the dualism between humanity and nature and thereby avoid the domination of the natural environment. (shrink)
- Understanding Moral Limits in the Duality of Artifacts and Nature:A Reply to Critics.Eric Katz -2002 -Ethics and the Environment 7 (1):138-146.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 138-146 [Access article in PDF] Understanding Moral Limits in the Duality of Artifacts and NatureA Reply to Critics Eric Katz Ned Hettinger and Wayne Ouderkirk present some cogent criticisms of my ideas in environmental ethics, especially those ideas closely associated with my attacks on the process of ecological restoration. Both trace the source of my alleged problems to a pernicious dualism of nature (...) and humanity that they perceive in my environmental philosophy. In this reply I accept their basic analysis of my work but deny that my overall position leads to the problems they suggest. I explicitly endorse the dualism of human artifacts and natural entities, and I argue that this dualism exists along a spectrum of "more-or-less" natural or artifactual. I claim that this dualism is not pernicious, but on the contrary, it is the first necessary step to understanding the moral limits of human action in the natural world.I begin with a consideration of the formal structure of these critical papers—there is a remarkable formal similarity between these two essays. Each author begins with a brief review of the positive aspects of my position or "theory" in environmental ethics; then there is an analysis of the problems within the position, and the problematic consequences or implications [End Page 138] of my position for environmental policy and environmentalism generally; then there is an attempt to begin a solution to the problems encountered "on my own terms" so to speak—each author points out that within my position there are ideas that could be used to solve the problems uncovered. Thus I am urged to develop specific strands of my own thought—a recommendation that I (logically) cannot avoid.Now on one level this formal structure is commonplace in polite scholarly discourse. Before offering criticisms of an author—especially when he is in the same room—we cite a few positive things about his work, and we end by noting that the position of the author is not completely hopeless. So perhaps the structural similarity between these two papers is not particularly noteworthy. But in this case I think it is. For the structure of the papers points out a distinguishing feature of my work that I recognize: My work is essentially negative and critical. I believe that I am raising problems and provocative questions. My criticisms apply to both traditional ethics (especially as it relates to environmental issues) and to the standard (policy-driven) versions of environmental ethics (especially the anthropocentric and individualistic variations). My criticisms also create questions for mainstream environmental policies—or I so hope, for this is my chief purpose in doing environmental philosophy. Since it is essentially critical, the most one can derive from my work in a positive vein are suggestions or hints for directions in which solutions may be found. I readily admit that I have not followed these paths to work out solutions—at least not yet. Thus in a formal or structural sense I am in substantial agreement with my critics: my essays raise a lot of problems; I do not offer fully worked out solutions; but the seeds of possible solutions may be present in the body of my work.But I have to make one distinction concerning the nature of "problems." Ouderkirk and Hettinger raise two distinct kinds of problems when they interpret my work. First, there are (possibly) internal contradictions in my ideas that make the theory itself incoherent in some mostly formal way. (For example, my argument for the importance of nonanthropocentric value might hide a latent anthropocentrism—Ouderkirk says at one point that I may be letting anthropocentrism in through the back door.) And second, there are (supposedly) problems in my position because my view has serious negative consequences for standard environmental policies. (For example, both Hettinger and Ouderkirk claim that my view of the distinction between artifacts and natural entities makes impossible all restoration [End Page 139] efforts in the natural world.) Does my position lead to unacceptable consequences for standard environmental... (shrink)
- Preserving the distinction between nature and artifact.Eric Katz -2011 - In Gregory E. Kaebnick,The ideal of nature: debates about biotechnology and the environment. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 71.
- Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology.Eric Katz,Andrew Light &David Rothenberg -2000 - MIT Press.The philosophy of deep ecology originated in the 1970s with the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess and has since spread around the world. Its basic premises are a belief in the intrinsic value of nonhuman nature, a belief that ecological principles should dictate human actions and moral evaluations, an emphasis on noninterference into natural processes, and a critique of materialism and technological progress.This book approaches deep ecology as a philosophy, not as a political, social, or environmental movement. In part I, the (...) authors compare deep ecology's philosophical ideas with other positions and debates in environmental philosophy and to other schools of thought such as social ecology, ecofeminism, and moral pluralism. In part II, they investigate the connections between deep ecology and other contemporary world views, such as continental philosophy, postmodernism, and non-Western philosophical traditions. The first anthology on deep ecology that is not primarily the work of the movement's followers, Beneath the Surface offers a rigorous assessment of deep ecology's strengths and weaknesses as a philosophical position.Contributors : John Clark, Deane Curtin, Arran Gare, William Grey, Mathew Humphrey, Knut Jacobsen, Eric Katz, Andrew Light, Jonathan Maskit, Val Plumwood, David Rothenberg, Ariel Salleh, Bron Taylor, Michael Zimmerman. (shrink)
- Imperialism and Environmentalism.Eric Katz -1995 -Social Theory and Practice 21 (2):271-285.
- Organism, community, and the "substitution problem".Eric Katz -1985 -Environmental Ethics 7 (3):241-256.Holistic accounts of the natural environment in environmental ethics fail to stress the distinction between the concepts of comnlunity and organism. Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic” adds to this confusion, for it can be interpreted as promoting either a community or an organic model of nature. The difference between the two concepts lies in the degree of autonomy possessed by constituent entities within the holistic system. Members within a community are autonomous, while the parts of an organism are not. Different moral (...) conclusions and environmental policies may result from this theoretical distinction. Treating natural entities as parts of an organism downgrades their intrinsic value as individual natural beings, since the only relevant moral criterion in an organic environmental ethic is the instrumental value that each natural entity has for the system. This ethic allows instances of the “substitution problem”-the replacement of one entity in an ecosystem by another provided that the overall functioning of the system is notharmed. However, since substitution violates environmentalist principles, for example, calling for respect for the integrity of the entities in a natural system, an organic environmental ethic must be rejected. A community model focuses on both the functional value and the autonomous intrinsie value of natural entities in a system. A community environmental ethic thus avoids the substitution problem. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Is There a Place for Animals in the Moral Consideration of Nature.Eric Katz -forthcoming -Environmental Ethics. An Anthology.
- Utilitarianism and Preservation.Eric Katz -1979 -Environmental Ethics 1 (4):357-364.In “The Concept of the Irreplaceable,” John N. Martin claims that utilitarian arguments can explain the environmentalist position concerning the preservation of natural objects as long as human attitudes toward preservation are considered along with the direct benefits of environmental preservation. But this type of utilitarian justification is biased in favor of the satisfaction of human preferences. No ethical theory which calculates goodness in terms of the amount of human satisfaction can present an adequate justification of environmental preservation. Since human (...) interests must be considered primary, natural objects will only be preserved when their preservation is in accord with human preferences. (shrink)
- Convergence and ecological restoration: a counterexample.Eric Katz -2009 - In Ben Minteer,Nature in Common?: Environmental Ethics and the Contested Foundations of Environmental Policy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Defending the use of animals by business: Animal liberation and environmental ethics.Eric Katz -forthcoming -Business, Ethics and the Environment: The Public Policy Debate.
- What the Heck Cattle Have to Do with Environmentalism: Rewilding and the Continuous Project of the Human Management of Nature.Eric Katz -2024 -Ethics, Policy and Environment 27 (2):227-249.In the 1920s and 1930s, an attempt was made to resurrect the aurochs (Bos primigenius primigenius), the extinct wild ancestor of contemporary domestic cattle. The back-bred species that was produced are called ‘Heck cattle’. I argue that the attempt to create the Heck cattle as a form of resurrected aurochs, and their subsequent use in rewilding projects (as in the Oostvaardersplassen in the Netherlands) is a prime example of the continuous human project of the domination of nature. The consideration of (...) domination as an extreme form of management serves as a critical lens on the policy of rewilding, similar to long-standing critiques of the policy of ecological restoration by this author. Rewilding projects do not re-create a ‘wild’ nature free from human intervention and activity. Rewilding is another form of the human management of natural processes to achieve anthropocentric goals. My examination of the Heck cattle in the rewilding process is intentionally provocative because there is a connection to Nazism. I will argue that policies of rewilding have historical antecedents (and parallels in philosophical meaning) to the Nazi plans for re-creating an authentic Aryan landscape in the lands of Eastern Europe. The case history of the Heck cattle projects illustrates the danger of pursuing radical forms of management of the natural world. (shrink)
- Philosophy and Geography I: Space, Place, and Environmental Ethics.Andrew Light,Jonathan M. Smith,Annie L. Booth,Robert Burch,John Clark,Anthony M. Clayton,Matthew Gandy,Eric Katz,Roger King,Roger Paden,Clive L. Spash,Eliza Steelwater,Zev Trachtenberg &James L. Wescoat (eds.) -1996 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.The inaugural collection in an exciting new exchange between philosophers and geographers, this volume provides interdisciplinary approaches to the environment as space, place, and idea. Never before have philosophers and geographers approached each other's subjects in such a strong spirit of mutual understanding. The result is a concrete exploration of the human-nature relationship that embraces strong normative approaches to environmental problems.
- The Liberation of Humanity and Nature.Eric Katz -2002 -Environmental Values 11 (4):397-405.What does the ' liberation ' of nature mean? In this essay, I use a pragmatic methodology to reject the idea that we need a metaphysical understanding of the nature of nature before we can speak of nature's liberation, and explain the sense of liberation as being the continuation of human non-interference in natural processes. Two real life policy cases are cited as examples: beach restoration on Fire Island and rock climbing in designated wilderness areas.
- Introduction: Environmental pragmatism and environmental ethics as contested terrain.Andrew Light &Eric Katz -1996 - In Eric Katz & Andrew Light,Environmental Pragmatism. Routledge. pp. 1--18.
- Envisioning a De-Anthropocentrised World: Critical Comments on Anthony Weston's 'The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher'.Eric Katz -2011 -Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (1):97-101.Weston and I will be forever linked in the field of environmental philosophy because of an exchange of essays that were published in the journal Environmental Ethics in 1985 and 1987 on the subject...
- Anne Frank's Tree: Thoughts on Domination and the Paradox of Progress.Eric Katz -2010 -Ethics, Place and Environment 13 (3):283-293.Consider the significance of Anne Frank's horse chestnut tree. During her years of hiding in the secret annex, Anne thought of the tree as a symbol of freedom, happiness, and peace. As a stand-in for all of Nature, Anne saw the tree as that part of the universe that could not be destroyed by human evil. In this essay, I use Anne's tree as a starting point for a discussion of the domination of both nature and humanity. I connect the (...) concept of domination to the policy of ecological restoration, to national and historical narratives of the connection to forest landscapes, and to the environmental policies of the Third Reich, the specific evil entity that confronted Anne Frank. Domination is also intertwined with the idea of the “paradox of progress,” viz., that human progress cannot be separated from acts and policies of domination. (shrink)
- Artefacts and Functions: A Note on the Value of Nature.Eric Katz -1993 -Environmental Values 2 (3):223-232.This paper examines and compares the ontological and axiological character of artefacts – human creations – with nonhuman natural entities. The essential difference between artefacts and natural entities is that the former are always the result of human intention and design, while the latter are independent of human purpose. Artefacts have functions ; natural entities do not. The connection to human intentional purpose implies a different kind of value for artefacts. Artefacts are evaluated solely by their instrumental use, while natural (...) entities can be appreciated for their independent and autonomous existence. This distinction has normative implications, especially for environmental policy and the development of an environmental ethic. Intervention in natural processes, even to 'improve' nature, must be limited, for human action changes natural entities and systems into artefacts. A moral imperative requires respect for the autonomy of nature and resistance to the human domination of nature. (shrink)
- The Nazi Engineers: Reflections on Technological Ethics in Hell.Eric Katz -2011 -Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (3):571-582.Engineers, architects, and other technological professionals designed the genocidal death machines of the Third Reich. The death camp operations were highly efficient, so these technological professionals knew what they were doing: they were, so to speak, good engineers. As an educator at a technological university, I need to explain to my students—future engineers and architects—the motivations and ethical reasoning of the technological professionals of the Third Reich. I need to educate my students in the ethical practices of this hellish regime (...) so that they can avoid the kind of ethical justifications used by the Nazi engineers. In their own professional lives, my former students should not only be good engineers in a technical sense, but good engineers in a moral sense. In this essay, I examine several arguments about the ethical judgments of professionals in Nazi Germany, and attempt a synthesis that can provide a lesson for contemporary engineers and other technological professionals. How does an engineer avoid the error of the Nazi engineers in their embrace of an evil ideology underlying their technological creations? How does an engineer know that the values he embodies through his technological products are good values that will lead to a better world? This last question, I believe, is the fundamental issue for the understanding of engineering ethics. (shrink)
- Judaism.Eric Katz -1991 - In Dale Jamieson,A Companion to Environmental Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 81–95.This chapter contains sections titled: The unnatural Jew: alienation and transcendence Subdue the earth: domination, dominion, and stewardship Environmental regulations: rituals and commandments The treatment of non‐human animals Bal tashchit: Do Not Destroy Conclusion.No categories
- Anthropocentric Indirect Arguments: Return of the Plastic-tree Zombies.Eric Katz -2014 -Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (3):264-266.Forget Aldo Leopold. Or Holmes Rolston, III, or Baird Callicott. Forget Arne Naess. I vote for Martin H. Krieger as the most influential environmental philosopher of all time. It has been over 40 y...
- The Challenger Tragedy: A Case Study in Organizational Communication and Professional Ethics.Norbert Elliot,Eric Katz &Robert Lynch -1993 -Business and Professional Ethics Journal 12 (2):91-108.
- Authenticity and Place The authenticity of place in culture and nature: thoughts on the Holocaust in the Spanish synagogue of Venice.Eric Katz -2002 -Philosophy and Geography 5 (2).Export citation
Bookmark - Autonomous Nature: Problems of Prediction and Control from Ancient Times to the Scientific Revolution.Eric Katz -2018 -Environmental Ethics 40 (1):93-94.
- Buffalo-Killing and the Valuation of Species.Eric Katz -1986 -Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 8:114-123.
- Dale Jamieson: Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle against Climate Change Failed—And What It Means for Our Future.Eric Katz -2015 -Environmental Ethics 37 (2):255-256.
- Die musikalischen Stilbegriffe des 17. Jahrhunderts.Erich Katz -1926 - [Charlottenburg: Druck: W. Flagel].
- Methodology in Applied Environmental Ethics: Comments on Dombrowski and Finsen.Eric Katz -1988 -Between the Species 4 (1):6.
- Nature by design: People, natural process, and ecological restoration.Eric Katz -2007 -Environmental Ethics 29 (2):213-216.
- Naturalness: Is the “Natural” Preferable to the “Artificial”?Eric Katz -2016 -Environmental Ethics 38 (2):241-244.
- Nature's Presence and the Technology of Death: Reflections On Healing and Domination.Eric Katz -1997 -Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 17 (1):3-7.No categories
- Nature, Value, Duty: Life on Earth with Holmes Rolston, III.Eric Katz -2008 -Environmental Ethics 30 (1):89-92.
- Pollution Prevention Across the Technological Curriculum: an Interdisciplinary Case Approach.Eric Katz,Burt Kimmelman &Nancy Walters Coppola -1994 -Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 14 (3):150-154.No categories
- Reconsidering the Turn to Policy Analysis.Eric Katz -2014 -Environmental Ethics 36 (2):131-132.No categories
- Svein Anders Noer Lie,Philosophy of Nature: Rethinking Naturalness.Eric Katz -2017 -Environmental Values 26 (1):111-113.
- The abstract wild.Eric Katz -2000 -Environmental Ethics 22 (1):105-108.
- Unfair to Foundations? A Reply to Weston.Eric Katz -1988 -Environmental Ethics 10 (3):288-288.
- A Theory of General Ethics. [REVIEW]Eric Katz -2009 -Environmental Ethics 31 (2):215-216.
- Dark Green Religion. [REVIEW]Eric Katz -2011 -Environmental Ethics 33 (3):325-328.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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