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In this article, I argue for cooperation as a three-dimensional phenomenon lying on the continua of a cognitive, a behavioural, and an affective axis. Traditional accounts of joint action argue for cooperation as involving a shared intention. Developmental research has shown that such cooperation requires rather sophisticated social cognitive skills such as having a robust theory of mind - that is acquired not until age 4 to 5 in human ontogeny. However, also younger children are able to cooperate in various (...) ways. Moreover, the coordinated behaviours of the agents can be more or less complex. Finally, phenomenological considerations and findings from social psychology illustrate that affective states and agent-specificities may play a central role in cooperative activities. I end with discussing the implications of my analysis that speak in favour of a pluralist account of social cognition. (shrink)

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This paper discusses the possibility of the phenomenon ofempathy between humans and robots, starting from what happens during their eye contact. First, it is shown, through the most relevant results of HRI studies on this matter, what are the most important effects of the robot gaze on human emotions and behaviour. Secondly, these effects are compared to what happens during the phenomenon ofempathy between humans, taking inspiration from the studies of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. Finally, (...) similarities and differences between human-human and human-robotempathy are conceptualized through Merleau-Ponty’s idea of flesh, which is the extended bodily element of the world. If there is a common concept of body, including both machine-bodies and living bodies, then a transcorporeal analogy takes place, thus explaining why the phenomenon ofempathy occurs both in human-human and human-robot interactions. (shrink)

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We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemicempathy”.

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In this article, I examine stigmatizing and especially patronizing attitudes towards others’ depression that people who are well-intentioned produce. The strategy of the article is to consider the social experience of depression through two separate subfields of philosophy: epistemic injustice and phenomenology. The solution that I propose is a phenomenological account ofempathy. The empathetic attitude that I argue for involves actively listening to the depressed individual and taking their depression testimony as direct evidence. The article has been written (...) both for those who seek to better support neurodiverse people in their lives and for depressives (and other neurodivergents) themselves in order to provide them with a better account for advocating for themselves against social stigma. (shrink)

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In fifteen essays-one new, two newly revised and expanded, three with new postscripts-Kendall L. Walton wrestles with philosophical issues concerning music, metaphor,empathy, existence, fiction, and expressiveness in the arts. These subjects are intertwined in striking and surprising ways. By exploring connections among them, appealing sometimes to notions of imagining oneself in shoes different from one's own, Walton creates a wide-ranging mosaic of innovative insights.

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This chapter is about issues in ethics and moral psychology that have been little explored by contemporary philosophers, ones that concern the advantages and disadvantages of two different kinds ofempathy. Roughly, first type is what is sometimes called “other-focused”empathy, in which one reconstructs the thoughts and feelings that someone else has or would have. The second type, “self-focused”empathy, is the sort of emotional attitude someone adopts when she imagines how she would think or feel (...) were she in the other person’s place. Both are variants ofempathy, for both have to do with having thoughts and feelings that are more apt, in the relevant senses, for someone else’s circumstances than one’s own. But they differ with respect to how much one makes substantial reference to oneself in order to elicit those thoughts and feelings. Some influential philosophers and psychologists have taken note of the distinction, but none have engaged the issues as thoroughly as did Zhu Xi and his students in twelfth century, largely in a series of commentaries and conversations that have yet to be translated into Western languages. The aim of this chapter is to explicate Zhu’s view about self- and other-focusedempathy as he characterized them, reconstruct his arguments for his view, and then discuss some of the implications for ethics and moral psychology more generally. Zhu’s position in brief is that self-focusedempathy is—for flawed moral agents like ourselves—a necessary and useful means by which we can better understand and care for others, but that ultimately it is the ladder we must kick away in favor of purely other-focusedempathy. (shrink)

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Empathy is thought to play a key role in motivating prosocial behavior, guiding our preferences and behavioral responses, and providing the affective and motivational base for moral development. While these abilities have traditionally been examined using behavioral methods, recent work in evolutionary biology, developmental and cognitive neuroscience has begun to shed light on the neural circuitry that instantiate them. The purpose of this article is to critically examine the current knowledge in the field of affective neuroscience and provide an (...) integrative and comprehensive view of the computational mechanisms that underlieempathy. This framework is of general interest and relevance for theory as well as for assisting future research in the domains of affective developmental neuroscience and psychopathology. (shrink)

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Illuminated by the writings of Edith Stein, this paper presents a model ofempathy as a very particular intersubjective understanding. This is commonly a view absent from psychology literature. For Stein,empathy is the experience of experientially and directly knowing another person’s experience, as it unfolds in the present, together with the awareness of the ‘otherness’ of that experience. It can be conceptually distinguished, in terms of process and experience, from current models that propose that empathic understandings are (...) ‘intellectual’ experiences or sympathetic experiences. As such, she provides an additional or alternative aspect to understanding other people’s experiences. Our paper provides a summary of Stein’s key analytic claims about three key facets ofempathy. Her views are discussed in the light of debates relevant for contemporary psychology and social cognition. (shrink)

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When participants observed a rubber hand being touched, their sense of touch was activated . While this illusion might be caused by multi-modal integration, it may also be related to empathic function, which enables us to simulate the observed information. We examined individual differences in the RHI, including empathic and schizotypal personality traits, as previous research had suggested that schizophrenic patients would be more subject to the RHI. The results indicated that people who experience a stronger RHI might have stronger (...) empathic and schizotypal personalites simultaneously. We discussed these relationships in terms of self-other representations. (shrink)

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The purpose of this article is to critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz againstempathy, and to argue instead thatempathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, andempathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the (...) view thatempathy is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotionalempathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly. (shrink)

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Empathy is an integral aspect of human existence. Without at least a basic ability to access others’ affective life, social interactions would be well-nigh impossible. Yet, recent studies seem to show that the means we have acquired to access others’ emotional life no longer function well in what has become our everyday business – technologically mediated interactions in digital spaces. If this is correct, there are two important questions: (1) What makesempathy for frequent internet users so difficult? (...) and (2) What can we do to alleviate the negative consequences? Correspondingly, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, we identify structural differences between offline and technologically mediated interactions that can explain why digitalempathy is harder to achieve. Second, drawing on the literature on ‘situated affectivity,’ we consider the idea of modifying digital spaces in ways specifically designed to ‘scaffold’empathy where our evolved mechanisms fail. Section 2 argues thatempathy is requires _interpreting_ the behavior of _embodied subjects_. Section 3 identifies three factors that are crucial for this interpretative endeavor: the empathizer’s _affective repertoire_, their _perceptual input_, and their _background knowledge_. Section 4 argues that technologically mediated interactions differ from face-to-face interactions with regard to these factors in ways which render our evolvedempathy mechanisms less effective in the digital world. Section 5 introduces the idea that situational factors can serve as ‘empathic scaffolds,’ i.e., as ‘tools’ that can ‘shape’ people’s empathic reactions. Section 6 wraps up the main line of reasoning, responds to objections and invites further scholarship. (shrink)

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The discovery of mirror neurons in both primates and humans has led to an enormous amount of research and speculation as to how conscious beings are able to interact so effortlessly among one another. Mirror neurons might provide an embodied basis for passive synthesis and the eventual process of further communalization throughempathy, as envisioned by Edmund Husserl. I consider the possibility of a phenomenological and scientific investigation of laughter as a point of connection that might in the future (...) bridge the gap Husserl feared had grown too expansive between the worlds of science and philosophy. Part I will describe some implications of the discovery of mirror neurons. Part II will address Husserl’s concept of embodiment as it relates to neuroscience andempathy. Part III will be a primer to investigating laughter phenomenologically. Part IV will be a continuation of the study of laughter andempathy as possible elements helpful in broadening the scope of what Husserl calls the Life-World. (shrink)

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I argue that deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a bad approach for incarcerated psychopaths for two reasons. First, given what we know about psychopathy,empathy, and DBS, it is unlikely to function as an effective treatment for the moral problems that characterize psychopathy. Second, considerations of neurodiversity speak against seeing psychopathy as a mental illness in the first place.

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This paper discuss the phenomenon ofempathy in social robotics and is divided into three main parts. Initially, I analyse whether it is correct to use this concept to study and describe people’s reactions to robots. I present arguments in favour of the position that people actually do empathise with robots. I also consider what circumstances shape humanempathy with these entities. I propose that two basic classes of such factors be distinguished: biological and socio-cognitive. In my opinion, (...) one of the most important among them is a sense of group membership with robots, as it modulates the empathic responses to representatives of our- and other- groups. The sense of group membership with robots may be co-shaped by socio-cognitive factors such as one’s experience, familiarity with the robot and its history, motivation, accepted ontology, stereotypes or language. Finally, I argue in favour of the formulation of a pragmatic and normative framework for manipulations in the level ofempathy in human–robot interactions. (shrink)

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The extent to which individuals with a variety of cultural backgrounds differ in empathic responsiveness is unknown. This article describes the differences in traitempathy in one independent and one interdependent society (i.e., the US and Iran, respectively). The analysis of data collected from self-reported questionnaires answered by 326 adults indicated a significant difference in the cognitive component ofempathy concerning participants’ affiliation to either egocentric or socio-centric society: Iranian participants with interdependent cultural norms, reported higher cognitive (...) class='Hi'>empathy compared to American participants who share independent cultural norms. In line with previous studies, gender differences were observed in all subscales of questionnaires, except theEmpathy Quotient (EQ). Female participants demonstrated moreempathy than males in both samples. Implications for understanding the cross-cultural differences of various components ofempathy are discussed. (shrink)

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The problem I wish to address here is how Edith Stein‘s theory of sharedempathy and psychotherapeutic group therapy are required condition for any successful work with patients in medical and clients in philosophical praxis. Moreover, a theory of sharedempathy must also account for the arguably more intricate issue of how group members might properly share an own mental domain with its distinctive phenomenology, and its distinctive attitudes toward one another, so that the necessarily self-testimonies of clients (...) does not rest on a previous pathological state. In the following, I aim to offer some steps towards solving this problem. I will do so by outlining what methodology lies behind the theory of sharedempathy, and showing how, on the results of a case study, it can be applied in a way whereby it still accommodates all requirements for what counts as valid coherence of self-testimony and successful client’s healing. (shrink)

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Janette Dinishak’s work has helped shed critical light on the scientifically questionable and ethically troubling tendency in psychology and philosophy of mind to theorize autistic people as deficient empathizers. In a recently published reply on the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, Dinishak (2024) brings her important perspective on this topic to bear on our paper “AAC Technology, Autism, and the Empathic Turn” (2022). Dinishak is largely sympathetic to our view while also raising a number of rich and thoughtful philosophical (...) questions. Since each of these questions is capable of jumpstarting a lengthy exchange, we focus our response on those questions that, we hope, are particularly fruitful for advancing further conversation. With this aim in mind, we also engage with some of Dinishak’s own insights from her 2016 chapter “Empathy, Like-mindedness, and Autism.” … [please read below the rest of the article]. (shrink)

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This study examined how the level of meat consumption was related to two psychological factors, selfishness and animal-orientedempathy, and three motivations related to animal, health, and environmental issues. A sample of Australian adults between 18 and 80 (N = 497) was surveyed online via the Zoho Survey platform. Structural equation modelling was applied to the data, and the resulting models revealed that higher selfishness and lowerempathy were associated with higher meat consumption for males but there was (...) no association between psychological factors and meat consumption for females. All three motivations were associated with both higherempathy and selfishness for males. For females, higherempathy was associated with higher health and animal motivations, while higher selfishness was associated with higher environmental motivation. Lastly, none of the three motivations were related to meat consumption for either gender. Thus, the results only partially supported the hypotheses that selfishness andempathy would influence meat consumption and motivations. Nevertheless, this study contributes to research on personality factors in relation to meat consumption and the link between masculinity and meat consumption. (shrink)

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Consistency is the hallmark of a coherent ethical philosophy. When considering the morality of particular behaviour, one should look to identify comparable situations and test one’s approach to the former against one’s approach to the latter. The obvious comparator for animal experiments is non-consensual experiments on people. In both cases, suffering and perhaps death is knowingly caused to the victim, the intended beneficiary is someone else, and the victim does not consent. Animals suffer just as people do. As we condemn (...) non-consensual experiments on people, we should, if we are to be consistent, condemn non-consensual experiments on animals. The alleged differences between the two practices often put forward do not stand up to scrutiny. The best guide to ethical behaviour isempathy—putting oneself in the potential victim’s shoes. Again to be consistent, we should empathise with all who may be adversely affected by our behaviour. By this yardstick, too, animal experiments fail the ethical test. (shrink)

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Erick J. Ramirez, Miles Elliott and Per‑Erik Milam (2021) have recently claimed that using Virtual Reality (VR) as an educational nudge to promoteempathy is unethical. These authors argue that the influence exerted on the participant through virtual simulation is based on the deception of making them believe that they are someone else when this is impossible. This makes the use of VR forempathy enhancement a manipulative strategy in itself. In this article, we show that Ramirez et (...) al.’s ethical rejection ofempathy enhancement through VR is based on confusion. First, we show that this misunderstanding stems from the conception ofempathy-enhancing simulations solely as failed attempts at “being someone else,” along with ignoring the crucial difference between the psychological perspective-taking processes of imagine-other and imagine-self. Then, having overcome that misconception, we argue that the ethical misgivings about the use of VR to promoteempathy should disappear and that these projects have greater potential for behavioural change than purely sympathy-focused interventions. (shrink)

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This paper argues for a comprehensive conception ofempathy as comprising epistemic, affective, and motivational elements and introduces the ancient Stoic theory of attachment (Greek,oikeiōsis) as a model for describing the embodied, emotional response to others that we take to be distinctive ofempathy. Our argument entails that in order to provide a suitable conceptual framework for the interdisciplinary study ofempathy one must extend the scope of recent “simulationalist” and “enactivist” accounts ofempathy in two (...) important respects. First, against the enactivist assumption that human mindreading capacities primarily rely on an immediate, quasi-perceptual understanding of other’s intentional states, we draw on Alfred Schutz’ analysis of social understanding to argue that reflective types of understanding play a distinct, but equally fundamental role in empathic engagements. Second, we insist thatempathy also involves an affective response toward the other and their situation (as the empathizer perceives this). We suggest analyzing this response in terms of the Stoic concepts of attachment, concern, and a fundamental type of prosocial motivation, that can best be described as an “extended partiality.” By way of conclusion, we integrate the above concepts into a comprehensive conceptual framework for the study ofempathy and briefly relate them to current debates about empathic perception and prosocial motivation. The result, we argue, is an account that stays neutral with regard to the exact nature of the processes involved in producingempathy and can therefore accommodate discussion across theoretical divides—e.g., those between enactivist, simulationalist, and so-called theory-theorist approaches. (shrink)

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Intelligent humanoid robots (IHRs) are becoming likely to be integrated into nursing practice. However, a proper integration of IHRs requires a detailed description and explanation of their essential capabilities, particularly regarding their competencies in replicating and portraying emotive functions such asempathy. Existing humanoid robots can exhibit rudimentary forms ofempathy; as these machines slowly become commonplace in healthcare settings, they will be expected to expressempathy as a natural function, rather than merely to portray artificial (...) class='Hi'>empathy as a replication of humanempathy. This article works with a twofold purpose: firstly, to consider the impact of artificialempathy in nursing and, secondly, to describe the influence of Affective Developmental Robotics (ADR) in anticipation of the empathic behaviour presented by artificial humanoid robots. The ADR has demonstrated that it can be one means by which humanoid nurse robots can achieve expressions of more relatable artificialempathy. This will be one of the vital models for intelligent humanoid robots currently in nurse robot development for the healthcare industry. A discussion of IHRs demonstrating artificialempathy is critical to nursing practice today, particularly in healthcare settings dense with technology. (shrink)

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. The human brain combinesempathy and imagination via the old brain which sets our destiny in the evolutionary scheme of things. This new understanding of cognition is an emergent phenomenon—basically an expressive ordering of reality as part of “a single natural system.” The holographic and subsymbolic paradigms suggest that we live in a contextual universe, one which we create and yet one in which we are required to adapt. The inadequacy of the new brain—specially the left hemisphere's rational (...) view of destiny—is replaced by a view of a new relatedness in reality in which human destiny comes from and depends upon the mutual interchange between the new brain and the old brain for the survival of what is significant to the whole systemic context in which we live. (shrink)

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This research aims to monitor the current situation of confinement in Spanish society motivated by COVID-19 crisis. For this, a study of its socio-family, psychological and educational impact is conducted. The sample (N= 165 families, 89.1% nuclear families with children living in the same household and 20.5% with a relative in a risk group) comes from the Aragonese region (Spain). The instruments used are: Beck-II Depression Inventory (BDI-II); Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright’sEmpathy Quotient (EQ) with its cognitiveempathy subscale, (...) as well as an ad-hoc questionnaire, reviewed by a panel of experts, to learn about socio-personal, family and housing conditions, use of technology, involvement in school tasks and household, and working condition. The multiple regression analysis results show that the anxiety derived from the current situation is explained in 23.1% (p< 0.001) by the variables: gender (t = -2.31,p= 0.022), level of Internet consumption (t = 2.139,p= 0.034), increase of family conflicts (t = 2.980,p= 0.003) and help with school tasks (t = 2.980,p= 0.040). On the other hand, cognitiveempathy is explained in 24.6% (p< 0.001) by the variables: gender (t = -4.690,p< 0.001) and mother’s hours of teleworking (t = 2.101,p= 0.037). All this leads us to conclusions related to preventive systems of social, psychological, and educational aspects to better serve families. These conclusions can be also be transferred to the future with an inclusive care to family settings from those three parameters. (shrink)

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This article expands Michel Foucault’s schema of the human ‘technologies’—those of production, signification, power and technologies of the self —to posit the existence of a fifth technological modality described here as technologies of the other. This refers to techniques and practices that facilitate the autonomy, not of the self, but of another person or persons. The specificity of these techniques of care, I argue, is obscured in Foucault’s work in so far as they are subsumed as a ‘position’ within the (...) technologies of the self, rather than afforded the status of a separate mode of technological practice in their own right. This not only misrecognizes their qualitative difference—the special kind of human ‘making’ they entail—but also allows for the dubious claim of an ‘ontological primacy’ of self-care when this is actually preceded by, and dependent upon, prior other-care. As one potential candidate or fragment of this alternative technological lineage, the paper revisits the writings on the psychoanalytic technique ofempathy elaborated in the British Independent tradition of Donald Winnicott. It explores how these empathetic techniques engage in an ethics of ‘other-fashioning’—a necessary prelude to the emergence of capacities of autonomous ‘self-fashioning’—and suggests that suchempathy can neither be encapsulated fully under the rubric of technologies of the self, nor read as isomorphic with the technologies of power. (shrink)

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We explored the relationship between mother, father, and peer attachment security,empathy, and moral authority in order to clarify certain problems of previous empirical research on such relationships. A sample of 202 Persian-speaking undergraduate students completed questionnaires pertaining to these constructs. The results revealed that mother and father attachment were significantly correlated with family, society welfare, and equality sources of moral authority, whereas peer attachment security was related only to society welfare and equality sources of moral authority. Out of (...) theempathy subscales, only empathic concern was associated with moral authority sources. Empathic concern was also related to mother, father, and peer attachment, whereas perspective taking was correlated with mother and peer attachment. The combination of empathic concern and mother, father, and peer attachment predicted significant amount of variance of ?principle source of moral authority? (including society welfare and equality sources). Findings support existence of a strong relationship between attachment security and the content of moral thought of adolescents, and findings redress an empirical imbalance in research literature on the relation of attachment and morality. (shrink)

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The recognition of the other as subject has achieved a prominent place in contemporary psychoanalysis on both sides of the analytic relationship, but this development has tended to focus on the recognition of who the other is and has been. It is the purpose of this article to add the future, the transcendent experience of the other, to the recognition of the other in the analytic dyad. Heidegger's concept of the “ek-static” will be used to elucidate the human subject as (...) moving beyond him or herself in a continual process of becoming. The result of the peeling back of defenses is not a homunculus waiting to be unearthed, but affective dispositions and desires that have yet to become organized modes of being. It is the purpose of the analytic process to bring this potential to fruition. For this process to take place, the therapist must have a concept of not only who the patient is, but also who she or he is not but may be. It will be suggested that dispositional affects, desires, and passions that emerge when defenses give way provide clues to unformed possibilities that can become ways of being if perceived as such by the therapist. A clinical strategy is proposed in which the analytic space becomes a negative capability for the formation of new ways of being and relating. This idea is illustrated with a clinical example in which the patient's compliant pattern was transcended. (shrink)

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Abstract:Multidisciplinary healthcare workers describe interactions with "difficult" patients that have shaped their lives and their clinical practice. The narrators recall navigating the push-pull ofempathy and frustration to forge therapeutic patient relationships in inhospitable, under-resourced environments. Their stories offer glimpses into the traumatized people hiding behind "difficult" patient facades. This commentary explores how the narrators engaged inempathy and obligation to build trusting relationships with patients. To protect themselves and their patients, healthcare workers must engage beyond individual clinical (...) duties to help remodel American healthcare. They should be encouraged to advocate for implementation of trauma informed care and to engage in public discourse about transforming healthcare for the good of healthcare workers, patients, and families. (shrink)

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A network of gene regulation organized in a hierarchical and combinatorial manner is crucially involved in the development of the neural network, and has to be considered one of the main substrates of genetic change in its evolution. Though qualitative features may emerge by way of the accumulation of rather unspecific quantitative changes, it is reasonable to assume that at least in some cases specific combinations of regulatory parts of the genome initiated new directions of evolution, leading to novel capabilities (...) of the brain. These notions are applied, in this paper, to the evolution of the capability of cognition-based human empa­thy. It is suggested that it has evolved as a secondary effect of the evolution of strategic thought. Development of strategies depends on abstract representations of one’s own pos­sible future states in one’s own brain to allow assessment of their emotional desirability, but also on the representation and emotional evaluation of possible states of others, allowing anticipation of their behaviour. This is best achieved if representations of others are con­nected to one’s own emotional centres in a manner similar to self-representations. For this reason, the evolution of the human brain is assumed to have established representations with such linkages. No group selection is involved, because the quality of strategic thought affects the fitness of the individual. A secondary effect of this linkage is that both the actual states and the future perspectives of others elicit vicarious emotions, which may contribute to the motivations of altruistic behaviour. (shrink)

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Zahavi’s book has added greatly to our understanding of some of the difficult issues surrounding the notion ofempathy. In this note, however, I argue that by overlooking some essential features ofempathy, Zahavi’s account unnecessarily limits its scope. In particular, I argue that Zahavi’s account, by characterizingempathy as an immediate, direct perceptual access to the other’s experiences, overlooks its normative dimension.

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The epistemic and moral worth ofempathy is deeply contested. Some doubt the possibility and sufficiency of empathic knowledge. Others question whether knowing how another feels is causally linked to moral actions. Though some have defendedempathy as a form of knowing or an important epistemic endeavor, there is a gap in these responses that weakens their force againstempathy’s skeptics. On the one hand, the epistemologists tend to focus on individuals. On the other hand, the moral (...) theorists and moral-epistemologists tend to focus on the social. Here, I contend that the first group could learn from the second and, together, form a stronger defense ofempathy’s epistemic import. Namely, if, as epistemologists, we can begin from a conceptualization ofempathy as a social epistemic practice within which knowledge is formed and confirmed with others, then we can better allow for possibility in understanding how another feels, reliability in empathic processes, and appropriate sensitivity to variance and degrees of empathic knowing. (shrink)

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After the great enthusiasm about the moral potentialities ofempathy of the last thirty years, this phenomenon has been recently called into question, if not openly criticized, by both philosophers and psychologists among whom we find Jesse Prinz or Paul Bloom. This paper aims to show whyempathy should not too easily be regarded as useless or even deleterious for morality and to propose a special role for it. In order to reach this goal, I will briefly sketch (...) what I mean with the termempathy and how is this psychological mechanism different from other akin phenomena like compassion. I will then turn my attention to some criticisms that can be made about the role ofempathy for morality which show thatempathy seems not a necessary element of the three main dimensions of morality, that is moral judgment, moral development and moral conduct. After that, I will try to defendempathy thanks to the identification of some important roles it can play both at a moral and at an epistemological level, in the attempt to demonstrate thatempathy is in fact part of the fundamental features of a moral person. (shrink)

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This book has two main objectives. The first is to identify and adequately describe the phenomenon ofempathy. This essentially means offering a strong, reasoned and accurate description of the phenomenon ofempathy in order to capture the essence of the empathic phenomenon and clearly distinguish it from other similar emotional phenomena such as sympathy or compassion The second part focuses on the role that this phenomenon can play on the ethical-moral level. The question is whetherempathy (...) is necessary or at least important for morality, and if so, to what extent, in what way and for what reasons. This is an open access book. (shrink)

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This report discusses the findings of the first ever study dedicated to the qualitative exploration of mirror-touch synaesthesia from a first-person perspective. As part of a project investigating the cross-disciplinary resonances of mirror-touch in the context of the broader social trait ofempathy, this study aimed to document the lived experiences of people with this form of synaesthesia in order to offer insights into existing and new theoretical models for mirror-touch. Through examination of quotes drawn from first-hand accounts given (...) by participating mirror-touch synaesthetes concerning their unique perceptual, interpersonal, and social experiences, this report demonstrates the value of experimental research, in particular first-person reporting, to enhancing the understanding of the way mirror-touch relates toempathy and social functioning beyond its quantitiavely measurable characteristics. The descriptions point to mirror-touch synaesthetes' automatic feeling into the emotional lives of others and their deliberate attempts to regulate this. (shrink)

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Objectives The use ofempathy during clinical practice is paramount to delivering quality patient care and is important for understanding patient concerns at both the cognitive and affective levels. This study sought to determine how and when physicians self-report the use ofempathy when interacting with their patients. Methods A cross-sectional survey of 76 physicians working in a large urban hospital was conducted in August of 2017. Physicians were asked a series of questions with Likert scale responses as (...) well as asked to respond to open-ended questions. Results All physicians self-report that they always (69%) or usually (29.3%) use empathic statements when engaging with patients. 93.1% of physicians believe that their colleagues always (20.7%) or usually (69%) use empathic statements when communicating with patients. Nearly one-third of physicians (33%) indicated that using the words “I understand” denotes an empathic statement. Although 36% of physicians reported that they would like to receive more training or assistance about how and when to useempathy during clinical practice. Significance of Results Despite the self-reported prevalent use of empathic statements, one-third of physicians indicate a desire for more training in whatempathy means and when it should be used in a clinical setting. Additionally, nearly one-third of physicians in this study reported using responses that patients may not perceive as being empathic, even when intended to be empathic. This suggests that many physicians feel uncertain about a clinical skill they believe should be used in most, if not all, encounters. (shrink)

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Empathy is a topic of continuous debate in the nursing literature. Many argue thatempathy is indispensable to effective nursing practice. Yet others argue that nurses should rather rely on sympathy, compassion, or consolation. However, a more troubling disagreement underlies these debates: There’s no consensus on how to defineempathy. This lack of consensus is the primary obstacle to a constructive debate over the role and import ofempathy in nursing practice. The solution to this problem (...) seems obvious: Nurses need to reach a consensus on the meaning and definition ofempathy. But this is easier said than done. Concept analyses, for instance, reveal a profound ambiguity and heterogeneity of the concept ofempathy across the nursing literature. Since the term “empathy” is used to refer to a range of perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena, the presence of a conceptual ambiguity and heterogeneity is hardly surprising. Our proposal is simple. To move forward, we need to return to the basics. We should develop the concept from the ground up. That is, we should begin by identifying and describing the most fundamental form of empathic experience. Once we identify the most fundamental form ofempathy, we will be able to distinguish among the more derivative experiences and behaviors that are addressed by the same name and, ideally, determine the place of these phenomena in the field of nursing. The aim of this article is, consequently, to lay the groundwork for a more coherent concept ofempathy and thereby for a more fruitful debate over the role ofempathy in nursing. In Part 1, we outline the history of the concept ofempathy within nursing, explain why nurses are sometimes warry of adapting concepts from other disciplines, and argue that nurses should distinguish between adapting concepts from applied disciplines and from more theoretical disciplines. In Part 2, we show that the distinction between emotional and cognitiveempathy—borrowed from theoretical psychology—has been a major factor in nurses’ negative attitudes toward emotionalempathy. We argue, however, that both concepts fail to capture the most fundamental form ofempathy. In Part 3, we draw on and present some of the seminal studies ofempathy that can be found in the work of phenomenological philosophers including Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein. In Part 4, we outline how their understanding ofempathy may facilitate current debates aboutempathy’s role in nursing. (shrink)

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_In Perception,Empathy, and Judgment_ Arne Johan Vetlesen focuses on the indispensable role of emotion, especially the faculty ofempathy, in morality. He contends that moral conduct is severely threatened onceempathy is prevented from taking part in an interplay with cognitive faculties in acts of moral perception and judgment. Drawing on developmental psychology, especially British "object relations" theory, to illuminate the nature and functioning ofempathy, Vetlesen shows how moral performance is constituted by a sequence (...) involving perception, judgment, and action, with an interplay between the agent's emotional and cognitive faculties occurring at each stage. In the powerful tradition from Kant to present-day theorists such as Kohlberg, Rawls, and Habermas, reason is privileged over feeling and judgment over perception, in such a way that basic philosophical questions remain unasked. Vetlesen focuses our attention on these questions and challenges the long-standing assertion that emotions are damaging to moral response. In the final chapter he relates his argument to recent feminist critiques that have also castigated moral theorists in the Kantian tradition for their refusal to recognize a role for emotion in morality. While the book's argument is philosophical, its method and scope are interdisciplinary. In addition to critiques of such philosophers as Arendt, MacIntyre, and Habermas, it contains discussions of specific historical, ideological, and sociological factors that may cause "numbing"—selective or broad-ranging, pathological insensitivity—in humans. The Nazis' mass killing of Jews is studied to illuminate these and other relevant empirical aspects of large-scale immoral action. (shrink)

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Empathy is a form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective‐taking. It is also the unique source of a particular form of understanding, which I will call humane understanding. Humane understanding consists in the direct apprehension of the intelligibility of others’ emotions. This apprehension is an epistemic good whose ethical significance is multifarious. In this paper, I focus on elaborating the sense in which humane understanding of others is non‐instrumentally valuable to its recipients. People have a complex but profound need to (...) be humanely understood. Because we respond to others’ very real need when we pursue this sort of understanding of their emotions,empathy is best understood as itself a way of caring, rather than just a means to promote other caring behavior. (shrink)

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: Today’s debate onempathy is characterized by an interplay between neuroscience, philosophy of mind and phenomenology that has led to several distinct definitions ofempathy. Much of the difficulty in definingempathy is due to the emphasis on its prosocial value, a feature that has made it a “keyword” of our time. Does the roleempathy has been assigned in social interactions imply its involvement in matters of identity, similarity and affective resonance? What happens when (...) the flow of sensations and emotions between humans produces more complex interactions and gives rise to feelings of estrangement, facing the unknown, or a fear of others? We need a paradigm shift in which we considerempathy in practice, rather than theory. We need to consider how various empathies arise in different contexts and manifest in diverse ways. In this way, we can shed light on the limits and failures of mutual comprehension, and arrive at a more radical and realistic vision of the great challenge involved in relating to others. Keywords:Empathy; Phenomenological Approach; Intersubjectivity; Neuroscience; Otherness Dall’empatia alle empatie. Verso un mutamento di paradigma Riassunto: Il dibattito attuale sull’empatia è caratterizzato da uno scambio particolarmente vivo tra neuroscienze, filosofia della mente e fenomenologia. Da un esame dei numerosi contributi che hanno tentato di rispondere alla domanda “che cos’è l’empatia?” proponendo varie definizioni risulta chiaro che la difficoltà di fondo dell’intero dibattito consiste nel fare i conti con il valore prosociale dell’empatia, l’aspetto che ne ha fatto una parola chiave del nostro tempo. Per esplicare il ruolo che le viene assegnato nelle interazioni sociali l’empatia deve implicare somiglianza e corrispondenza affettiva? Che cosa accade quando il flusso di sensazioni e di emozioni tra esseri umani genera movimenti più complessi, in cui emergono l’estraneità, l’ignoto, la paura dell’altro? È necessario cambiare paradigma e considerare l’empatia non in teoria, ma in pratica. E guardare alle empatie, i cui contesti e differenti manifestazioni mettono in luce limiti e fallimenti, che forniscono una visione più radicale e realistica della grande scommessa delle relazioni con gli altri. Parole chiave: Empatia; Approccio fenomenologico; Intersoggettività; Neuroscienza; Alterità. (shrink)

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In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues thatempathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents--that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the (...) class='Hi'>empathy thesis.Empathy, regarded at the beginning of the twentieth century as the fundamental method of gaining knowledge of other minds, has suffered a century of philosophical neglect. Stueber addresses the plausible philosophical misgivings aboutempathy that have been responsible for its failure to gain widespread philosophical acceptance.Crucial in this context is his defense of the assumption, very much contested in contemporary philosophy of mind, that the notion of rational agency is at the core of folk psychology. Stueber then discusses the contemporary debate between simulation theorists--who defend various forms of theempathy thesis--and theory theorists. In distinguishing between basic and reenactiveempathy, he provides a new interpretive framework for the investigation into our mindreading capacities. Finally, he considers epistemic objections toempathy raised by the philosophy of social science that have been insufficiently discussed in contemporary debates.Empathy theorists, Stueber writes, should be prepared to admit that, althoughempathy can be regarded as the central default mode for understanding other agents, there are certain limitations in its ability to make sense of other agents; and there are supplemental theoretical strategies available to overcome these limitations. (shrink)

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There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon ofempathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action (...) Model, together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature. It can also predict a variety ofempathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels ofempathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding ofempathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels ofempathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. Key Words: altruism; cognitiveempathy ; comparative; emotion; emotional contagion;empathy ; evolution; human; perception-action; perspective taking. (shrink)

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In these brief comments, I explore some ambiguities concerning John Deigh's notion ofempathy in relation to morality and justice. First, does Deigh conceive ofempathy as a morally neutral capacity that can be used for good or bad purposes or, rather, as a capacity that presupposes a moral orientation? I look to his previous work and find evidence supporting both readings. I suggest that the right way to understandempathy is as a moral notion.Empathy (...) is the product of an activity—the activity of empathizing. This activity in turn presupposes a certain moral orientation: one that involves placing a certain kind of value on others. I then ask whether Deigh equatesempathy with the sense of justice. I do not believe he does, but still he does not say much about the relation between them. I suggest that while the two are not the same, and while there can be tension between them, they ultimately stem from the same basic moral orientation, one that at least vaguely resembles the morality of cooperation. (shrink)

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This paper argues that the graphic adaptation of Dennis Lehane’s Shutter Island utilizes the medium to evoke an affective participation and investment from the reader. It explores the ways the graphic novel overcomes problematic representations of mental illness in the popular film version. Drawing on graphic fiction theory, I contend that readers’ engagement in and construction of the story between panels, in the “gutters,” allows them to participate in the protagonist’s persecutory delusion. Additionally, I draw on Foucault’s conceptualizations of the (...) medical gaze and historical figurations of madness connected to water in order to demonstrate the mechanism by which the reader is placed in a dual subject position, becoming both observer and observed. In this capacity, I suggest that graphic fiction provides a unique experience to engenderempathy for psychiatric illness. (shrink)

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Empathy has for a long time, at least since the eighteenth century, been seen as centrally important in relation to our capacity to gain a grasp of the content of other people's minds, and predict and explain what they will think, feel, and do; and in relation to our capacity to respond to others ethically. In addition,empathy is seen as having a central role in aesthetics, in the understanding of our engagement with works of art and with (...) fictional characters. A fuller understanding ofempathy is now offered by the interaction of research in science and the humanities. This volume draws together nineteen original chapters by leading researchers across several disciplines, together with an extensive Introduction by the editors. The individual chapters reveal how important it is, in a wide range of fields of enquiry, to bring to bear an understanding of the role ofempathy in its various guises. It offers the ideal starting-point for the exploration of this intriguing aspect of human life. (shrink)

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