Movatterモバイル変換

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity-prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider (...) what hearers are obligated to do in response to these injustices. I argue that because epistemic harms to marginalized knowers also arise from prejudicially inflated assessments of their credibility, the virtue of testimonial justice must be revised to remedy them. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   89 citations  

In this article, I offer an account of an unjust epistemic practice―namely, epistemic appropriation―that harms marginalized knowers through the course of conceptual dissemination and intercommunal uptake. The harm of epistemic appropriation is twofold. First, while epistemic resources developed within the margins gain uptake with dominant audiences, those resources are overtly detached from the marginalized knowers responsible for their production. Second, epistemic resources developed within, but detached from, the margins are utilized in dominant discourses in ways that disproportionately benefit the powerful.

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   56 citations  

This chapter has two aims. First, I distinguish between two forms of testimonial injustice: identity-based testimonial injustice and content-based testimonial injustice. Second, I utilize this distinction to develop a partial explanation for the persistent lack of diverse practitioners in academic philosophy. Specifically, I argue that both identity-based and content-based testimonial injustice are prevalent in philosophical discourse and that this prevalence introduces barriers to participation for those targeted. As I show, the dual and compounding effects of identity-based and content-based testimonial injustice (...) in philosophy plausibly contribute to a lack of diversity in the social identities of practitioners and the discourses in which practitioners are engaged. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   8 citations  

This paper reconsiders Tommie Shelby's (2016) analysis of procreation in poor black communities. I identify three conceptual frames within which Shelby situates his analysis—feminization, choice-as-control, and moralization. I argue that these frames should be rejected on conceptual, empirical, and moral grounds. As I show, this framing engenders a flawed understanding of poor black women's procreative lives. I propose an alternative framework for reconceiving the relationship between poverty and procreative justice, one oriented around reproductive flourishing instead of reproductive responsibility. More generally, (...) the paper develops a methodological challenge for nonideal moral and political philosophy, especially concerning the obligations of the oppressed. Specifically, I argue that in the absence of descriptive and conceptual accountability, the moral gaze of the philosopher risks preserving, rather than destabilizing, oppressive ideologies. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Novelty—the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this, however, novelty functions as a metric of success. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one. As I show, the pursuit of novelty is neither as desirable nor as feasible as it might initially seem.

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Academic philosophy has a novelty problem. Novelty has become a litmus test for a contribution’s value. This results in a common undertaking for academic researchers. Read a bunch. Look for holes and gaps. Figure out what hasn’t been said. Try to insert yourself in a conversation by saying something new. On first glance, this approach might appear to make sense. If it’s not new, why do we need it? Yet a fixation on novelty sculpts a landscape of philosophical inquiry that (...) is inhospitable and self-undermining. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

There are three stages at which procreative outcomes can be prevented or altered: (1) prior to conception (2) during pregnancy and (3) after birth. Daniel Engster (Soc Theory Pract 36(2):233–262, 2010) has ably argued that plans to prevent or alter procreative outcomes at stages (2) and (3)—through abortion and adoption—introduce financial, physical, and emotional hardships to which women are disproportionately vulnerable. In this paper, I argue that plans to prevent or alter undesirable procreative outcomes at stage (1)—through contraception use—similarly disadvantage (...) women. I suggest that accounts proposing moral responsibilities to delay or permanently avoid procreation are insufficiently attentive to the methods through which undesirable procreative outcomes might be prevented and how such methods unfairly burden women. In conclusion, I propose several ways that men and women might more equitably share contraceptive responsibility. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

This paper considers two conceptual expansions of Du Boisian double consciousness—white double consciousness (Alcoff 2015) and kaleidoscopic consciousness (Medina 2013)—both of which aim to articulate the moral-epistemic potential of cultivating double consciousness from racially dominant or other socially privileged positions. We analyze these concepts and challenge them on the grounds that they lack continuity with their Du Boisian predecessor and face problems of practical feasibility. As we show, these expansions obscure structural barriers that make white double consciousness and kaleidoscopic consciousness (...) unlikely antidotes to the kind of racial domination that double consciousness was introduced to illuminate. We conclude that while more intersectional and pluralistic accounts of double consciousness may be desirable, the project of expansion has moral limits. Identifying these limitations, we outline ways in which double consciousness—as a tool for conceptualizing the genealogy of structural anti-Blackness—remains valuable in the absence of ever-expanding revision. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

This chapter revisits the metaphilosophical critique offered in The Racial Contract (Mills 1997). My analysis explicates Mills’s characterization of the “Racial Contract”—and non-ideal theory more broadly—as a conceptual bridge. I consider three questions: (a) what is the nature of the domains it connects, (b) what is the function and orientation of the bridge, (c) what is the relationship between once isolated domains after a bridge has been constructed? In answering these questions, I outline several features of the bridge’s construction, which, (...) though seemingly necessary for its functionality as a bridge, nonetheless compromise its structural integrity. Taking the discipline of philosophy as the primary subject of analysis, I advance an alternative conception of The Racial Contract. I argue that in constructing a bridge, Mills offers a critical cartography of the discipline itself. I contextualize these observations in light of Mills’s metaphilosophical views as they shifted over time and conclude with an invitation to explore new possibilities for non-ideal theory as a methodology of continued necessity. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

En este artículo doy cuenta de una práctica epistémica injusta —la apropiación epistémica—, que daña a agentes de conocimiento marginalizados en el transcurso de la diseminación conceptual y la asimilación intercomunal. El daño de la apropiación epistémica es doble. En primer lugar, mientras que los recursos epistémicos desarrollados en los márgenes son asimilados por audiencias dominantes, son explícitamente desprendidos de los agentes de conocimiento marginalizados responsables de su producción. En segundo lugar, los recursos epistémicos desarrollados en los márgenes, desprendidos de (...) ellos, se utilizan en discursos dominantes, en formas que benefician desproporcionadamente a los poderosos. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark