Results for 'Elizabeth Lonsdorf'
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- Handedness for Unimanual Grasping in 564 Great Apes: The Effect on Grip Morphology and a Comparison with Hand Use for a Bimanual Coordinated Task.Adrien Meguerditchian,Kimberley A. Phillips,Amandine Chapelain,Lindsay M. Mahovetz,Scott Milne,Tara Stoinski,Amanda Bania,ElizabethLonsdorf,Jennifer Schaeffer,Jamie Russell &William D. Hopkins -2015 -Frontiers in Psychology 6.
- The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely.Elizabeth Grosz -2006 -Journal of Nietzsche Studies 31:69-71.
- (1 other version)The Anatomy of Prejudices.Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich -2001 -Hypatia 16 (1):108-111.
- A dislocation at a free surface.Elizabeth H. Yoffe -1961 -Philosophical Magazine 6 (69):1147-1155.
- The Nature of Sexual Difference: irigaray and darwin.Elizabeth Grosz -2012 -Angelaki 17 (2):69 - 93.Angelaki, Volume 17, Issue 2, Page 69-93, June 2012.
- Jo Richardson (28th August 1923–1st February 1994).Elizabeth Woodcraft -1994 -Feminist Legal Studies 2 (2):219-220.
- The effects of septal lesions or scopolamine injections on retention of habituation to a novel environment.Elizabeth Worsham &Leonard W. Hamilton -1976 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 7 (2):193-195.
- The transfer, storage and procurement of human cells and tissues (Seventh International Workshop, Dublin).Elizabeth Yuko &Bert Gordijn -2011 - In Katharina Beier, Nils Hoppe, Christian Lenk & Silvia Schnorrer,The ethical and legal regulation of human tissue and biobank research in Europe: proceedings of the Tiss.EU project. [G ottingen]: Universit atsverlag G ottingen.Export citation
Bookmark - From Hegel's dialectical trappings to romantic nets : An examination of progress in philosophy.Elizabeth Zaibert -2009 - In Markus Gabriel,The dialectic of the absolute-Hegel's critique of transcendent metaphysics. Continuum.Export citation Bookmark
- Inferential Communication: Bridging the Gap Between Intentional and Ostensive Communication in Non-human Primates.Elizabeth Warren &Josep Call -2022 -Frontiers in Psychology 12:718251.Communication, when defined as an act intended to affect the psychological state of another individual, demands the use of inference. Either the signaler, the recipient, or both must make leaps of understanding which surpass the semantic information available and draw from pragmatic clues to fully imbue and interpret meaning. While research into human communication and the evolution of language has long been comfortable with mentalistic interpretations of communicative exchanges, including rich attributions of mental state, research into animal communication has balked (...) at theoretical models which describe mentalized cognitive mechanisms. We submit a new theoretical perspective on animal communication: the model of inferential communication. For use when existing proximate models of animal communication are not sufficient to fully explain the complex, flexible, and intentional communication documented in certain species, specifically non-human primates, we present our model as a bridge between shallower, less cognitive descriptions of communicative behavior and the perhaps otherwise inaccessible mentalistic interpretations of communication found in theoretical considerations of human language. Inferential communication is a framework that builds on existing evidence of referentiality, intentionality, and social inference in primates. It allows that they might be capable of applying social inferences to a communicative setting, which could explain some of the cognitive processes that enable the complexity and flexibility of primate communication systems. While historical models of animal communication focus on the means-ends process of behavior and apparent cognitive outcomes, inferential communication invites consideration of the mentalistic processes that must underlie those outcomes. We propose a mentalized approach to questions, investigations, and interpretations of non-human primate communication. We include an overview of both ultimate and proximate models of animal communication, which contextualize the role and utility of our inferential communication model, and provide a detailed breakdown of the possible levels of cognitive complexity which could be investigated using this framework. Finally, we present some possible applications of inferential communication in the field of non-human primate communication and highlight the role it could play in advancing progress toward an increasingly precise understanding of the cognitive capabilities of our closest living relatives. (shrink)
- "I'll be glad I did it" reasoning and the significance of future desires.Elizabeth Harman -2004 - In John Hawthorne,Ethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 177-199.We use “I’ll be glad I did it” reasoning all the time. For example, last night I was trying to decide whether to work on this paper or go out to a movie. I realized that if I worked on the paper, then today I would be glad I did it. Whereas, if I went out to the movie, today I would regret it. This enabled me to see that I should work on the paper rather than going out to (...) a movie. This looks like excellent reasoning: Paper argument: 1. If I work on my paper, I’ll be glad I did it. 2. Therefore, I should work on my paper. When we’re having trouble making a big life decision, we often try to picture what will happen each way we might choose, and imagine how we’ll feel in that outcome. When choosing between two jobs, we might use this reasoning. Suppose you are choosing between two jobs and you know quite a lot about what the two jobs will be like. In one, you will make a lot of money but have to work eighty-hour weeks and see little of your family. In the other, you will make considerably less money—though enough to support yourself and your family. You’ll have much more time for your family. The money is attractive. But overall, you realize you’ll be glad to have the time with your family if you take the second job—you’ll be glad you made that choice. It seems this is a good way of realizing that you should take the second job. (shrink)
- Ethics of an Artificial Person: Lost Responsibility in Professions and Organizations.Elizabeth Hankins Wolgast -1992 - Stanford University Press.We can freely cross disciplinary boundaries, as well as the line between theory and practice, and allow practices to cast their light back on the theory and show us its deficiencies. In short, this approach reorients some much-discussed issues of professional, business, and military ethics and reveals them as variations on one deeply rooted theme. The author does not treat current institutions as final and unalterable. If these arrangements frustrate moral evaluation, she finds that an argument for change. To make (...) intelligent changes, however, we need a clear view of the reasoning that makes them seem natural and inevitable. That is what this book attempts to do. In the process, the author also reexamines the concept of "person." Not all cultures put so much stress on the idea as Western - and particularly American - cultures do. If we wish to keep this emphasis, then here is another argument for change. (shrink)
- Eating Meat as a Morally Permissible Mistake.Elizabeth Harman -2016 - In Andrew Chignell, Terence Cuneo & Matthew C. Halteman,Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments on the Ethics of Eating. Routledge. pp. 215-231.Many people who are vegetarians for moral reasons nevertheless accommodate the buying and eating of meat in many ways. They go to certain restaurants in deference to their friends’ meat eating preferences; they split restaurant checks, subsidizing the purchase of meat; and they allow money they share with their spouses to be spent on meat. This behavior is puzzling. If someone is a moral vegetarian—that is, a vegetarian for moral reasons—then it seems that the person must believe that buying and (...) eating meat is morally wrong. But if someone believes that a practice is morally wrong, it seems she should also believe that accommodating and supporting that practice is morally wrong; many moral vegetarians seem not to believe this. In this paper, I will offer a solution to this puzzle; I will offer a possible explanation of why people who are vegetarians for moral reasons nevertheless do accommodate the buying and eating of meat. I will offer an explanation of this accommodation behavior on which it is reasonable and it makes sense. I will argue that moral vegetarians may see the buying and eating of meat as a morally permissible moral mistake. They may see the practice as one that one should not engage in, for moral reasons, but that is not morally wrong. Thus, they may see their accommodation of the practice as accommodation of behavior that is not morally wrong, while it is still the case that they are moral vegetarians who see themselves as required to be vegetarians. (shrink)No categories
- ‘To the victor go the spoils’: Infants expect resources to align with dominance structures.Elizabeth A. Enright,Hyowon Gweon &Jessica A. Sommerville -2017 -Cognition 164 (C):8-21.No categories
- Ethics is Hard! What Follows?Elizabeth Harman -2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom,The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.When someone acts morally wrongly because they are caught in the grip of a false moral view, although they have thought a reasonable amount about morality, are they thereby blameless for so acting? Recently, a number of philosophers have embraced the view that moral ignorance does exculpate in such cases. This paper outlines an attractive line of thought according to which moral ignorance exculpates. This line of thought is mistaken: being caught in the grip of a false moral view is (...) not exculpatory. Ethics is hard, that’s true. But this doesn’t have the implications for blameworthiness that some people think it does. (shrink)No categories
- Freud, Sigmund.Elizabeth Grosz -1992 - In Elizabeth Wright,Feminism and psychoanalysis: a critical dictionary. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 127--134.
- Money, Relativism, and the Post-Truth Political Imaginary.Elizabeth S. Goodstein -2017 -Philosophy and Rhetoric 50 (4):483-508.Astonishment that the things we are experiencing are "still" possible in the twentieth century is not philosophical. It is not the beginning of any insight, unless it is that the idea of history from which it comes is untenable.And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?In 1940 the exiled German critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin warned that fidelity to a vision of history as (...) progress risked normalizing the remy-thologization of politics.1 Recent events have underlined the urgency, both for thought and for action, of rejecting the same unphilosophical astonishment in our own time. In the face of political... (shrink)No categories
- Special issue on Elwyn Richardson.Elizabeth M. Grierson -2016 -Educational Philosophy and Theory 48 (7):655-656.
- Introducing ACCESS Special Issue and Guest Editors.Elizabeth M. Grierson -2015 -Educational Philosophy and Theory 47 (12):1241-1242.
- Political matters : feminism, materialism, and freedom.Elizabeth Grosz -2010 - In Diana Coole & Samantha Frost,New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. Duke University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- Anthropological Institutions in Nineteenth-Century France.Elizabeth Williams -1985 -Isis 76:331-348.
- (1 other version)Interfacing Situations.John Perry &Elizabeth Macken -1996 - In Jerry Seligman & Dag Westerstahl,Logic, Language and Computation. Center for the Study of Language and Inf. pp. 1--443.Export citation Bookmark
- Cretan Deductions.RachelElizabeth Fraser &John Hawthorne -2015 -Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):163-178.No categories
- Letters FromElizabeth Williams to Anne Mowbray; or, Justice to Ourselves and Others, the Consequence of True Piety [Signed M- R-].R. M. &Elizabeth Williams -1829No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Facts and Fetishes: When the Miracles of Medicine Fail Us.Elizabeth Dzeng &Josh Booth -2018 -American Journal of Bioethics 18 (5):63-64.
- Letters, Notes, and Comments.C. Kavin Rowe &Elizabeth Agnew Cochran -2012 -Journal of Religious Ethics 40 (4):705 - 729.This essay argues that retrieving insights from the ancient Stoic philosophers for Christian ethics is much more difficult than is often assumed and, further, that the "ethics of retrieval" is itself something worth prolonged reflection. The central problem is that in their ancient sense both Christianity and Stoicism are practically dense patterns of reasoning and mutually incompatible forms of life. Coming to see this clearly requires the realization that the encounter between Stoicism and Christianity is a conflict of lived traditions. (...) Precisely because we cannot simply extract Stoic insights from the lives in which they belong, the task of determining how Stoicism is useful for Christianity is exceptionally challenging. Indeed, doing justice to the Stoics has more to do with facing an alternative to Christianity than it does with appropriating insights for our own use. These points are developed in conversation withElizabeth Agnew Cochran's recent article on the Stoic influence upon Jonathan Edwards. This essay is a response to C. Kavin Rowe's critique of my 2011 argument that certain dimensions of Roman Stoic ethics are at work in Jonathan Edwards's moral thought. Rowe raises questions about the act of selectively retrieving ideas from a philosophical tradition to support constructive work in another tradition. I argue for the importance of acknowledging how Christian thought has been shaped by what Jeffrey Stout describes as moral bricolage, the selective retrieval of ideas from various traditions, and I contend that this bricolage can continue to be a fruitful means through which Christian ethics engages external traditions. Moreover, the importance of Stoicism's retrieval in early modern philosophy makes the work of eighteenth-century theologians such as Edwards a particularly valuable resource for exploring the plausibility of Christian engagement with the Stoics. (shrink)
- Women and Water in Global Fiction: Feminisms & Gender.Emma Staniland &Elizabeth Jones (eds.) -forthcoming - Routledge.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Plato's epistemology: how hard is it to know?Elizabeth A. Laidlaw-Johnson -1996 - New York: Peter Lang.Plato's thought evolves from the epistemology of the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic to the Combined Doctrine of the Theaetetus. The Combined Doctrine maintains that both Forms and certain objects rooted in perception are objects of knowledge. Dialectic results in apprehension of the Good, and consequently of being, which brings about a permanent change in a person's state of mind enabling one to know what one previously believed. The Combined Doctrine resolves the paradoxes of the refutations of the Theaetetus. It turns (...) out that the difference between true belief and knowledge for Plato amounts to difference in states of mind. (shrink)
- Sciences of appetite in the Enlightenment, 1750–1800.Elizabeth A. Williams -2012 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2):392-404.
- Ethics and Method.Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth -2004 -History and Theory 43 (4):61-83.Historical method rests on the common-denominator values that characterize modernity. Postmodernity challenges those values across the range of practice and with them the very foundations of historical explanation. Responding to this challenge is central to the ethics of history at the present time. An adequate response requires at least three things summarized here: a clear understanding of the cultural function of history as one of the representational methods characterizing modernity; a definition of postmodernity and its challenges that is less trivial (...) than those currently prevailing in North America; and even some experimental effort to explore some of the positive possibilities of the postmodern challenge, including alternative uses for “the past.”. (shrink)
- Of Two Lives One? Jean-Charles-Marguerite-Guillaume Grimaud and the Question of Holism in Vitalist Medicine.Elizabeth A. Williams -2008 -Science in Context 21 (4):593-613.ArgumentMontpellier vitalists upheld a medical perspective akin to modern “holism” in positing the functional unity of creatures imbued with life. While early vitalists focused on the human organism, Jean-Charles-Marguerite-Guillaume Grimaud investigated digestion, growth, and other physiological processes that human beings shared with simpler organisms. Eschewing modern investigative methods, Grimaud promoted a medically-grounded “metaphysics.” His influential doctrine of the “two lives” broke with Montpellier holism, classifying some vital phenomena as “higher” and others as “lower” and attributing the “nobility” of the human (...) species to the predominance of the former. In place of Montpellier teaching that attributed health to the holistic equilibration of vital activities, Grimaud embraced spiritualist dualisms of soul and body, Creator and created. Celebrating the divinely-ordained “wisdom” evident in involuntary physiological processes, he argued that such life functions were incomprehensible to human investigators. While Grimaud's work encouraged inquiry into the division between the central and “vegetative” nervous systems that became paradigmatic in nineteenth-century neuroscience, it also opened Montpellier vitalism to charges of conservatism and obscurantism that are still lodged against it to the present day. (shrink)No categories
- Compunction and Passion.Elizabeth A. Murray -2014 -Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 88:217-225.This paper is a critical examination of Lonergan’s notion of moral conversion. Conversion in general is described as a mode of self-transcendence and distinguished from development. Then moral conversion is contrasted with the two other basic forms of conversion, intellectual and religious. Next, I propose that there are two distinct moments of moral conversion: a negative moment of rational compunction, which is more Kantian in nature, and a positive moment of passionate transcendence, which is consonant with Scheler’s value ethics. I (...) draw on philosophical accounts of the initial awakening of moral consciousness, and argue that it is possible to make this first movement yet fail to make the second movement. (shrink)No categories
- Kant's Theory of Freedom.Elizabeth Pybus -1992 -Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):111-114.No categories
- (1 other version)A Liberating Breath.Elizabeth Dotsenko -forthcoming -Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics.No categories
- Religion, Secularism, and Political Belonging.Leerom Medovoi &Elizabeth Bentley (eds.) -2021 - Duke University Press.Working in four scholarly teams focused on different global regions—North America, the European Union, the Middle East, and China—the contributors to _Religion, Secularism, and Political Belonging_ examine how new political worlds intersect with locally specific articulations of religion and secularism. The chapters address many topics, including the changing relationship between Islam and politics in Tunisia after the 2010 revolution, the influence of religion on the sharp turn to the political right in Western Europe, understandings of Confucianism as a form of (...) secularism, and the alliance between evangelical Christians and neoliberal business elites in the United States since the 1970s. This volume also provides a methodological template for how humanities scholars around the world can collaboratively engage with sweeping issues of global significance. Contributors. Markus Balkenhol,Elizabeth Bentley, Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, David N. Gibbs, Ori Goldberg, Marcia Klotz, Zeynep Kurtulus Korkman, Leerom Medovoi, Eva Midden, Mohanad Mustafa, Mu-chou Poo, Shaul Setter, John Vignaux Smith, Pooyan Tamimi Arab, Ernst van den Hemel, Albert Welter, Francis Ching-Wah Yip, Raef Zreik. (shrink)
- Elisa Romano: La capanna e il tempio: Vitruvio o dell' architettura. (Letteratura Classica.) Pp. 236. Palermo: Palumbo, 1987. Paper, L. 25,000.Elizabeth Rawson -1988 -The Classical Review 38 (2):416-416.
- Translational treatment of aphasia combining neuromodulation and behavioral intervention for lexical retrieval: implications from a single case study.Elizabeth E. Galletta &Amy Vogel-Eyny -2015 -Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
- G. Puccioni: Il problema della monografia storica latina.(Edizioni e Saggi Universitari di Filologia Classica.) Pp. 57. Bologna: Pàtron, 1981. Paper, L. 5,000.Elizabeth Rawson -1982 -The Classical Review 32 (2):283-283.
- Introduction.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe -2004 -Utilitas 16 (2):119-123.
- Introduction, Moral and scientific realism: essays in honor of Richard N. Boyd and Nicholas L. Sturgeon.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe -2015 -Philosophical Studies 172 (4):841-841.No categories
- The Cunning of Recognition: A Reply to John Frow and Meaghan Morris.Elizabeth A. Povinelli -1999 -Critical Inquiry 25 (3):631-637.
- Implicit Prosody and Cue-based Retrieval: L1 and L2 Agreement and Comprehension during Reading.Elizabeth Pratt &Eva M. Fernández -2016 -Frontiers in Psychology 7.
- Sculpture installation : Garden of small nuptials.Elizabeth Presa -2019 - In Paulo de Assis & Paolo Giudici,Aberrant nuptials: Deleuze and artistic research 2. Leuven (Belgium): Leuven University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- The economic philosophy of Jesus Christ vs. the religious philosophy of Karl Marx.Elizabeth Clare Prophet -2019 - Gardiner, Montana: Summit University Press.
- Ethics.Elizabeth Pybus -1987 -Philosophical Books 28 (2):98-99.
- Living Philosophy: An Introduction To Moral Thought.Elizabeth Pybus -1989 -Philosophical Books 30 (2):109-110.
- Kenny’s Aquinas on Dispositions for Human Acts.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe -1984 -New Scholasticism 58 (4):424-446.
- Alienated Labor.Elizabeth Rapaport -1978 -Philosophical Forum 10 (2):295.Export citation Bookmark
- Introduction to Adorno.Elizabeth Rapaport -1974 -Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 19:2.Export citation Bookmark
- Knowledge and politics.Elizabeth Rata -2018 -Educational Philosophy and Theory 50 (14):1318-1319.Postmodernism was, as Jonathan Friedman (1994) remarked, the contemporary version of the age-old tendency of intellectuals to turn against the very means of their own knowledge (Lovejoy & Boas, 193...
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
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