Results for 'E. Reiman'
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- Positron emission tomography in the study of emotion, anxiety and anxiety disorders.E.Reiman,R. Lane,G. Ahern,R. Davidson &G. Schwartz -2000 - In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel & G. L. Ahern,Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Series in Affective Science. Oxford University Press.
- Positron emission tomography, emotion, and consciousness.E. M.Reiman,Richard D. R. Lane,G. L. Ahern &Gary E. Schwartz -1996 - In S. Hamreoff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott,Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.Export citation
Bookmark - Relatos artísticos, construcción de realidades : crítica, historia e historiografía.Karen CorderoReiman -2013 - In Ríos Espinosa, María Cristina, Torres Arroyo & Ana María,Reflexiones en torno al ser del arte. México, D.F.: Universidad Iberoamericana.Export citation Bookmark
- The pro-life argument from substantial identity and the pro-choice argument from asymmetric value: A reply to Patrick Lee.JeffreyReiman -2007 -Bioethics 21 (6):329–341.ABSTRACT Lee claims that foetuses and adult humans are phases of the same identical substance, and thus have the same moral status because: first, foetuses and adults are the same physical organism, and second, the development from foetus to adult is quantitative and thus not a change of substance. Versus the first argument, I contend that the fact that foetuses and adults are the same physical organism implies only that they are the same thing but not the same substance, much (...) as living adults and their corpses are the same thing (same body) but not the same substance. Against Lee's second argument, I contend that Lee confuses the nature of a process with the nature of its result. A process of quantitative change can produce a change in substance. Lee also fails to show that foetuses are rational and thus have all the essential properties of adults, as required for them to be the same substance. Against the pro‐choice argument from asymmetric value (that only the fact that a human has become conscious of its life and begun to count on its continuing can explain human life's asymmetric moral value, i.e. that it is vastly worse to kill a human than not to produce one), Lee claims that foetus's lives are asymmetrically valuable to them before consciousness. This leads to counterintuitive outcomes, and it confuses the goodness of life (a symmetric value that cannot account for why it is worse to kill a human than not produce one) with asymmetric value. (shrink)
- What is exploitation? Reply to JeffreyReiman.John E. Roemer -1989 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1):90-97.
- 22 Anterior Cingulate Cortex Participates in the Conscious Experience of Emotion Richard D. Lane, Eric M.Reiman, Geoffrey L. Ahern, Gary E. Schwartz, Richard J. Davidson. [REVIEW]Beatrice Axelrod &Lang-Sheng Yun -1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & Alwyn Scott,Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press. pp. 2--247.
- Foundations of Paraphysical and Parapsychological Phenomena.E. H. Walker -1975 - In L. Oteri,Quantum Physics and Parapsychology. Parapsychology Foundation.
- The Raft and the Pyramid.'French, PA, Uehling Jr, TE and Wettstein, HK.E. Sosa -1980 - In Peter A. French, Theodore Edward Uehling & Howard K. Wettstein,Studies in epistemology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.No categories
- Political Legitimacy and the Duty to Obey the Law.Patrick Durning -2003 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):373 - 389.A growing number of political and legal theorists deny that there is a widespread duty to obey the law. This has lent a sense of urgency to recent disagreements about whether a state’s legitimacy depends upon its ‘subjects” having a duty to obey the law. On one side of the disagreement, John Simmons, Robert Paul Wolff, David Copp, Hannah Pitkin, Leslie Green, George Klosko, and Joseph Raz hold that a state could only be legitimate if the vast majority of its (...) subjects have a duty to obey the law. On the other side, M.B.E. Smith, JeffreyReiman, Kent Greenawalt. (shrink)
- Anonymity, pseudonymity, or inescapable identity on the net (abstract).Deborah G. Johnson &Keith Miller -1998 -Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 28 (2):37-38.The first topic of concern is anonymity, specifically the anonymity that is available in communications on the Internet. An earlier paper argues that anonymity in electronic communication is problematic because: it makes law enforcement difficult ; it frees individuals to behave in socially undesirable and harmful ways ; it diminishes the integrity of information since one can't be sure who information is coming from, whether it has been altered on the way, etc.; and all three of the above contribute to (...) an environment of diminished trust which is not conducive to certain uses of computer communication. Counterbalancing these problems are some important benefits. Anonymity can facilitate some socially desirable and beneficial behavior. For example, it can eliminate the fear of repercussions for behavior in contexts in which repercussions would diminish the availability or reliability of information, e.g., voting, personal relationships between consenting adults, and the like. Furthermore, anonymity can be used constructively to reduce the effect of prejudices on communications. Negative aspects of anonymity all seem to point to a tension between accountability and anonymity. They suggest that accountability and anonymity are not compatible, and they even seem to suggest that since accountability is a good thing, it would be good to eliminate anonymity. In other words, the problems with anonymity suggest that individuals are more likely to behave in socially desirable ways when they are held accountable for their behavior, and they are more likely to engage in socially undesirable behavior when they are not held accountable. I am not going to take issue with the correlation between accountability and anonymity, but rather with the claim that accountability is good. To examine this problem, let's look at a continuum that stretches from total anonymity at one end, and no anonymity at all at the other end. At the opposite extreme of anonymity is a panopticon society. The panopticon is the prison environment described by Foucault in which prison cells are arranged in a large circle with the side facing the inside of the circle open to view. The guard tower is placed in the middle of the circle so that guards can see everything that goes on in every cell. In a recent article on privacy, JeffreyReiman, reflecting on the new intelligent highway systems, suggests that we are moving closer and closer to a panopticon society. When we contemplate all the electronic data that is now gathered about each one of us as we move through our everyday lives- intelligent highway systems, consumer transactions, traffic patterns on the internet, medical records, financial records, and so on- we see the trend thatReiman identifies. Electronic behavior is recorded and the information is retained. While actions/transactions in separate domains are not necessarily combined, it seems obvious that the potential exists for combining data into a complete portfolio of an individual's day to day life. So it would seem that as more and more activities and domains are moved into a IT-based medium, the closer we will come to a panopticon society. A panopticon society gives us the ultimate in accountability. Everything an individual does is observable and therefore available to those to whom we are accountable. Of course, in doing this, it puts us, in effect, in prison. The prison parallel is appropriate here because what anonymity allows us is freedom; prison is the ultimate in lack of freedom. In this way the arguments for a free society become arguments for anonymity. Only when individuals are free will they experiment, try new ideas, take risks, and learn by doing so. Only in an environment that tolerates making mistakes will individuals develop the active habits that are so essential for democracy. In a world without information technology, individuals have levels or degrees and various kinds of anonymity and consequently different levels and kinds of freedom. Degrees and kinds of anonymity vary with the domain: small town social life versus urban social life, voting, commercial exchanges, banking, automobile travel, airplane travel, telephone communication, education, and so on. Drawing from our experience before IT-based institutions, we might believe that what we need is varying levels or degrees and kinds of anonymity. This seems a good starting place because it suggests an attempt to re-create the mixture that we have in the physical, non-IT-based world. Nevertheless, there is a danger. If we think in terms of levels and degrees of anonymity, we may not see the forest from the trees. We may not acknowledge that in an electronic medium, levels and kinds of anonymity mean, in an important sense, no anonymity. If there are domains in which we can be anonymous but those domains are part of a global communication infrastructure in which there is no anonymity at the entry point, then it will always be possible to trace someone's identity. We delude ourselves when we think we have anonymity on-line or off-line. Rather, what we have both places is situations in which it is more and less difficult to identify individuals. We have a continuum of situations in which it is easy and difficult to link behavior to other behavior and histories of behaviors. In the physical world, we can go places and do things where others don't know us by name and have no history with us, though they see our bodies, clothes, and behavior. If we do nothing unusual, we may be forgotten. On the other hand, if we do something illegal, authorities may attempt to track us down and figure out who we are. For example, law enforcement officials, collection agencies, those who want to sue us may take an active interest in removing our anonymity, ex post facto. Think of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols-the men who apparently bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City. Much of what they did, they did anonymously, but then law enforcement officials set out to find out who had done various things, e.g., rented a car, bought explosives, etc. The shrouds of anonymity under which McVeigh and Nichols had acted were slowly removed. Is this any different than behavior on the internet? Is there a significant difference in the kind or degree of anonymity we have in the physical world versus what we have in an IT-based world? The character of the trail we leave is different; in the one case, its an electronic trail; while in the other it involves human memories, photographs, and paper and ink. What law enforcement officials had to do to track down McVeigh is quite different from tracking down an electronic law breaker. Also, the cost of electronic information gathering, both in time and money, can be dramatically lower than the cost of talking to people, gathering physical evidence, and the other minutia required by traditional detective work. We should acknowledge that we do not and are never likely to have anonymity on the Internet. We would do better to think of different levels or kinds of identity. There are important moral and social issues arising as a result of these varying degrees and kinds of identity. Perhaps the most important matter is assuring that individuals are informed about the conditions in which they are interacting. Perhaps, even more important is that individuals have a choice about the conditions under which they are communicating. In the rest of this paper we explore a few examples of levels and kinds of identity that are practical on the Internet. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages that we see for these "styles" of identity for individuals, and we examine the costs and benefits of these styles for society as a whole. (shrink)No categories
- Stabilizing Dynamics: Constructing Economic Knowledge.E. Roy Weintraub -1991 - Cambridge University Press.Today, economic theory is a mathematical theory, but that was not always the case. Major changes in the ways economists presented their arguments to one another occurred between the late 1930s and the early 1950s; over that period the discipline became mathematized. Professor Weintraub, a noted scholar of the modern history of economic thought, argues that those changes were not merely cosmetic: The mathematical forms of the arguments significantly altered the substance of the arguments. Stabilizing Dynamics is particularly concerned with (...) the ways in which the rich and confusing talk of the 1930s evolved, over a fifteen-year period, into technical analysis of some mathematical structures. The author describes the context for the history of that change, locating it in the broader intellectual currents, and shows how the history of modern economics can be seen as a confluence of several disparate traditions. Historiographically, this book offers one of the first constructivist accounts of modern economic analysis. (shrink)
- A szellem arisztokratája: Böhm Károly értékelmélete.Éva Kissné Novák -2005 - Budapest: Kossuth.
- Respeitar a Mãe Terra.Maya Pataxo Hãhãhãe -2014 - In Maria Pankararu & Edson Kayapó,Memória da Mãe Terra. [Olivença, Bahia, Brazil]: Thydêwá.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research.E. Solomonova &X. W. Sha -2016 -Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):407-416.Context: Phenomenology and the enactive approach pose a unique challenge to dream research: during sleep one seems to be relatively disconnected from both world and body. Movement and perception, prerequisites for sensorimotor subjectivity, are restricted; the dreamer’s experience is turned inwards. In cognitive neurosciences, on the other hand, the generally accepted approach holds that dream formation is a direct result of neural activations in the absence of perception, and dreaming is often equated with “delusions.” Problem: Can enactivism and phenomenology account (...) for the variety of dream experiences? What kinds of experiential and empirical approaches are required in order to probe into dreaming subjectivity? Investigating qualities of perception, sensation, and embodiment in dreams, as well as the relationship between the dream-world and waking-world requires a step away from a delusional or altered-state framework of dream formation and a step toward an enactive integrative approach. Method: In this article, we will focus on the “depth” of dream experiences, i.e., what is possible in the dream state. Our article is divided into two parts: a theoretical framework for approaching dreaming from an enactive cognition standpoint; and discussion of the role and strategies for experimentation on dreaming. Based on phenomenology and theories of enactivism, we will argue for the primacy of subjectivity and imagination in the formation of lived experience. Results: We propose that neurophenomenology of dreaming is a nascent discipline that requires rethinking the relative role of third-, first- and second-person methodologies, and that a paradigm shift is required in order to investigate dreaming as a phenomenon on a continuum of conscious phenomena as opposed to a break from or an alteration of consciousness. Implications: Dream science, as part of the larger enterprise of consciousness and subjectivity studies, can be included in the enactive framework. This implies that dream experiences are neither passively lived nor functionally disconnected from dreamers’ world and body. We propose the basis and some concrete strategies for an empirical enactive neurophenomenology of dreaming. We conclude that investigating dream experiences can illuminate qualities of subjective perception and relation to the world, and thus challenge the traditional subject-object juxtaposition. Constructivist content: This article argues for an interdisciplinary enactive cognitive science approach to dream studies. (shrink)
- E. W. Beth. On machines which prove theorems. Simon Stevin, vol. 32 (1958), pp. 49–60.E. W. Beth -1970 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (4):659-659.
- Ueber die Zeit.E. Wasmuth -1950 -Philosophisches Jahrbuch 60:200-217.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Divide-et-impera, Hegel heidelberg writings on social-classes and constitution.E. Weisserlohmann -1993 -Hegel-Studien 28:193-214.Export citation Bookmark
- 2 essays, against occultism and on picodellamirandola and criticism of astrology.E. Weil -1985 -Archives de Philosophie 48 (4):563-573.Export citation Bookmark
- La ncerca simbolica.E. C. Whitmont -forthcoming -Astrolabio.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Symmetry relations in various physical problems.E. Wigner -1935 -Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 41:306.
- Caroline Herscheus perspective.E. Winterburn -2003 -History of Science 41 (133):351-354.Export citation Bookmark
- Zweienumerative Funktoren.E. Wojciechowski -1992 -Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 26 (68-69):185-190.Export citation Bookmark
- Verehrt-verflucht-verwertet. Die Bedeutung der Tiere fur die menschliche Gesundheit.E. Wolff -2002 -History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 23 (3/4):549-550.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Le complexe d'Œdipe, cristallisateur du débat psychanalyse/anthropologie.Éric Smadja -2009 - Paris: Presses universitaires de France.Avec Totem et tabou, Freud entame la première démarche majeure d’interprétation psychanalytique de données ethnographiques, le conduisant en particulier à situer le complexe d’Œdipe au fondement des premières institutions sociales et à repérer l’action de processus inconscients dans leur élaboration. De plus, en posant l’universalité du complexe d’Œdipe tant psychique que culturelle, il réalise une véritable effraction dans le champ d’investigation des anthropologues, suscitant chez eux des réactions aussi violentes que variées. C’est cette histoire souvent faite de méconnaissance, de défiance (...) et de malentendus entre la psychanalyse et l’anthropologie — ces deux sciences de l’homme toutes deux nées au XIXe siècle — que relate Éric Smadja. Après avoir exposé les conditions épistémologiques et historiques d’instauration de ce débat conflictuel, l’auteur le développe suivant un fil chronologique qui l’amène à explorer ses déterminants et ses enjeux, mais aussi les caractéristiques de ces deux disciplines. Se dévoile alors un moment de l’histoire des idées. (shrink)
- Pour l'atlas byzantin'.E. Honigmann -1936 -Byzantion 11:541-562.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- A theory of consciousness.E. Roy John -2003 -Current Directions in Psychological Science 12 (6):244-250.
- Claire Preston. Thomas Browne and the Writing of Early Modem Science.E. Keller -2006 -Early Science and Medicine 11 (2):240.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- L'humour en musique: et autres légèretés sérieuses depuis 1960.Étienne Kippelen (ed.) -2017 - Aix-en-Provence: Presses universitaires de Provence.L'humour en musique n'a pas bonne presse. Labile, déroutant, anecdotique, il a été vilipendé par certains philosophes et compositeurs de la modernité – Schopenhauer, Adorno, Varèse et Boulez en tête – tandis que d'autres – Bergson, Jankélévitch – y voyaient l'expression d'une légèreté sérieuse, l'essence même de l'art. Après une période de déni, consécutive à la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'humour musical se manifeste depuis les années 1960 chez de multiples compositeurs comme Mauricio Kagel, Gyêrgy Ligeti, Luc Ferrari, Luciano Berio, Bruno (...) Maderna, Arvo Part, Krzysztof Penderecki, Régis Campo, etc. Les quatorze articles réunis dans ce volume tentent tout d'abord d'en éclaircir les principales nuances et de caractériser les cousinages avec le comique, la satire, la parodie, l'ironie. Un deuxième temps est consacré à l'étude du rire musical, ses techniques et sa sémantique. Sans être toujours attaché à l'humour, il engendre des significations secondaires : la peur, la folie, le désespoir. La dernière partie aborde l'esthétique de la satire, qui révèle de riches intertextualités, en particulier à travers le détournement de citations. Y sont également abordés les liens qu'entretiennent l'humour et ses dérivés avec les mutations postmodernes et hypermodernes des sociétés occidentales. (shrink)
- Preamble.Editor Kipton E. Jensen -2022 - In Kipton E. Jensen,Preston King: history, toleration, and friendship. New York: Peter Lang.Export citation Bookmark
- Co-existing traditions: Handmade and wheelmade pottery in Late Bronze Age central Macedonia.E. Kiriatzi,S. Andreou,S. Dimitriadis &K. Kotsakis -1997 -Techne: Craftsmen, Craftswomen and Craftsmanship in the Aegean Bronze Age, Aegaeum 16:361-367.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Nature vs. Nurture Revisited.E. R. Klein -1989 -Between the Species 5 (2):9.
- Canada, the US, and the NICU: cultural differences and ethical consequences.E. H. Kluge -2001 -Journal of Clinical Ethics 12 (3):297.
- Glory days or the lure of scientific misconduct.E. Knoll -1996 -Journal of Information Ethics 5 (1):9-14.
- TG Masaryk and our national identity.E. Kohak -2000 -Filosoficky Casopis 48 (2):181-183.Export citation Bookmark
- Aux hommes de ce monde.Émile Kunz -1968 - [Genève,: rue du Mont-Blanc 4, chez l'auteur.Export citation Bookmark
- Medicaid & Medicare: violations of health care laws found actionable under the FCA.E. T. Kuo -1998 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 26 (3):252.
- Evolución del pensamiento pelagiano. Un movimiento ascético de finales del siglo IV en Roma.E. Lavender &M. A. Eguílaz -1995 -Augustinus 40 (156-159):179-186.No categories
- Siegfried Kracauer, University of Birmingham, 13-14 September 2002.E. Leslie -forthcoming -Radical Philosophy.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- God's Knowledge.E. Stump &N. Kretzmann -1995 - In Thomas David Senor,The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 94--124.
- Kierkegaard und die Phänomenologie der Ehe.E. Tielsch -1957 -Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 11 (2):161 - 187.
- The nature of selection-comment.E. Sober -1986 -Behaviorism 14 (1):89-96.
- Scientists and the State: Domestic Structures and the International Context.E. Solingen &L. Pyenson -1995 -Annals of Science 52 (5):523.
- Leibniz and Dynamics. The Texts of 1692Pierre Costabel R. E. W. Maddison.E. Aiton -1975 -Isis 66 (1):129-130.
- Lukács György: késleltetett életrajz.Éva Fekete -2021 - Budapest: Lukács Archívum Nemzetközi Alapítvány (LANA).
- John V. Pickstone, Ways of Knowing: A New History of Science, Technology and Medicine.E. C. Spary -2003 -International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):200-203.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- A Model Theoretic Semantics for Quantum Logic.E. -W. Stachow -1980 -PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:272 - 280.This contribution is concerned with a particular model theoretic semantics of the object language of quantum physics. The object language considered here comprises logically connected propositions, sequentially connected propositions and modal propositions. The model theoretic semantics arises from the already established dialogic semantics, if the pragmatic concept of the dialog-game is replaced by a "metaphysical" concept of the game. The game is determined by a game tree, the branches of which constitute a set, the set of "possible worlds" of an (...) individual quantum physical system. The semantic concepts like truth, falsity and valuation are defined with respect to this set. (shrink)
- Verbum Cordis According to Saint Thomas Aquinas.E. Ecker Steger -1967 - Dissertation, The Catholic University of AmericaExport citation Bookmark
- History, Theory Change, and Action.E. M. Swiderski -1990 -Epistemologia 13 (1):123-44.Export citation Bookmark
- "Marsh", Frank Burr: Modern Problems in the Ancient World.E. A. Taylor -1945 -Classical Weekly 39:117-118.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- A propos du mot «Essai» chez Montaigne.E. V. Telle -forthcoming -Bibliothèque d'Humanisme Et Renaissance.No categories
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James Chase
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
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Øystein Linnebo
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