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One basic idea of the causal theory of reference is reference grounding. The name is introduced ostensively at a formal or informal dubbing. The question is: By virtue of what is the grounding term grounded in the object qua-horse and not in the other natural kind whose member it is? In virtue of what does it refer to all horses and only horses? The problem is usually called the qua problem. What the qua problem suggests is that the causal historical (...) theory in the final analysis depends on some kind of unexplained intentionality. This is a great problem since the whole project is an attempt to explain intentionality naturalistically. In this paper, I have two aims: (i) to discuss the most important attempts at solving the qua problem; and (ii) to evaluate the solutions. (i) I focus on the following attempts for the solution of the qua problem: Sterelny (1983), Richard Miller’s (1992), mentioning briefly more recent attempts by Ori Simchen (2012) and Paul Douglas (2018). I also concentrate on the attempts in mind and brain sciences as presented by Penelope Maddy (1983) and more recently by Dan Ryder (2004). (ii) In evaluating the solutions, I argue that when a metaphysical question “what is to name” is replaced/or identified with the question about the mechanism of reference, namely “in virtues of what does a word attach to a particular object”, then the final answer will/should be given by neurosemantics. The most promising attempt is Neander’s (2017), based on the teleological causal explanation of preconceptual content to which the conceptual can be developed, as Devitt and Sterelny suggested in their work (1999). (shrink)

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Content externalism and vehicle externalism (what-externalism and how—externalism) or more commonly known as the thesis of extended mind, are said to be two totally independent views that ”diverge sharply” (Stanford encyclopedia). There are advocates, adversaries but also ag nostics about the extended mind thesis. The approach has been much debated and the controversies about vehicle externalism are importantly manifold. I am not going into any of them. My aim is different and fo cused on why and how content externalism is (...) characterized by vehicle externalists. Content externalism is labelled by extended mind theorists as: merely causal, taxonomic (Wilson), reactionary (Rowlands), passive (Clark), while vehicle externalism is: constitutive, radical and active. Since content externalists (to my knowledge) have not reacted to a rather negative presentation of their ideas, I restrict myself to showing that many of vehicle externalist (VE) presented views about content externalism (CE) are partly unjustified, not definitive and even wrong. I zoom on the following: 1. CE being ‘merely’ causal. 2. Active vs. Passive distinc tion, 3. CE being behaviourally inert. (shrink)

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U knjizi "Ponovno promišljanje urođenosti" , koja izlaže konektivističko stajalište o razvoju, Jeffrey L. Elman et al. iznose nove pristupe i metode u procesu učenja uopće, s posebnim naglaskom na učenje jezika, odnosno materinskog jezika. Slijede najnoviji argumenti protiv Chomskyeve teze o urođenosti jezika koji, između ostalog, propituju sljedeće pretpostavke: 1. modularnost jezika; 2. kritično vrijeme za učenje jezika; 3. siromaštvo podražaja; 4. genetsku osnovu gramatike; 5. lokalizaciju jezika. Zaključak jest da su argumenti uvjerljivi te da postoji novi pogled na (...) urođenost jezika.In the book "Rethinking Innateness, a connectionist perspective on development" Jeffrey L. Elman et al. present new approaches and methods in the learning process in general, with special stress on the acquisition of language or mother tongue. Here are the most recent arguments against Chomskyan thesis about the innateness of language which questions, among other things, the following presuppositions: 1. language modularity; 2. critical period for the acquisition of language; 3. poverty of the stimulus; 4. genetical basis of grammar; 5. language localization. The conclusion is that the arguments are convincing and that there is a new way of looking at the innateness of language. (shrink)

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It is argued that in the exchange that took place between Chomsky and Rey [2003], Chomsky’s answers to Rey might be interpreted more coherently if we interpret Chomsky as an instrumentalist about content. If the instrumentalist position is tenable, then Chomsky is justified in accusing Rey of misreading and applying philosophers’ interpretation on his naturalistic approach to language. Within linguistic theory, for example, syntax does not speak of people as agents who use language: it deals only with the automatically functioning (...) computational systems in people’s heads under the rubric UG, natural language, and I-language.The upshot is that there is no prospect of revealing a conceptual incoherence within linguistic theory by bringing to bear considerations about ordinary or philosophical usage of terms such as ‘knowledge’, ‘tacit’ or ‘innate’, ‘content’ or ‘intentionality’. (shrink)

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In this paper I attempt to look into a possible way in which cognitive pragmatics can help out variational studies in explaining the processes of language change. After broadly setting the scene this article proceeds by giving basic information about variational pragmatics. Then it concentrates on Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and its possible interaction with social sciences, namely its possible application in sociolinguistics. I next present my own research of Split dialect/vernacular change where I concentrate on explanatory side, asking (...) which explanation would be the best one for the changes of some variables in the dialect. The interpretation and discussion of the fi ndings preceed the discussion of salience as the explanatory tool for language change as seen from cognitivists and variationists with the hope that such discussions can bring closer cognitivists, i.e. relevantists, to sociolinguists, i.e. variationists. (shrink)

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In this paper I attempt to look into a possible way in which cognitive pragmatics can help out variational studies in explaining the processes of language change. After broadly setting the scene this article proceeds by giving basic information about variational pragmatics. Then it concentrates on Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and its possible interaction with social sciences, namely its possible application in sociolinguistics. I next present my own research of Split (urban) dialect/vernacular change where I concentrate on explanatory side, (...) asking which explanation would be the best one for the changes of some variables in the dialect. The interpretation and discussion of the fi ndings preceed the discussion of salience as the explanatory tool for language change as seen from cognitivists and variationists with the hope that such discussions can bring closer cognitivists, i.e. relevantists, to sociolinguists, i.e. variationists. (shrink)

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The primary aim of this article is to find out what different linguists say about the role of intentions in the study and explanations of language change. I try to investigate if in the explanation of language change, “having an intention” does any explanatory work. If intentions play a role, how do they do it, at which point it is salutary to invoke them, and what do they contribute to the explanation of language change? My main claim is that speakers’ (...) intentions have a role to play only on higher linguistic levels, e.i., in speakers’ communicative strategies. Since this is a celebration for Kathy Wilkes and her contribution to goal-directed behaviour, in the Concluding remarks I go back to her remarks on language and intentions and see how they fi t my discussion in this paper. (shrink)

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Firstly, I present some of my most important answers to Miščević’s objections to my 2014 paper which I fully disagree with. Secondly and more importantly, I point out that there is a possible confusion or misunderstanding about the distinction between the object-level (sentence produced) and meta-level (sentence judged). I argue that competentionalist actually conflates object and meta levels and show the final consequences of such a conflation. The ordinarist firmly believes that there should be a separation between the object-level and (...) meta-level and provides the explanation for this. Finally, I briefly comment on the so-called ‘Route Question’, the path from the underlying competence to the central processor and argue that competentionalist cannot provide an explanation for it. The hope is that this discussion brings us closer to understanding the difference between the two opposing views. (shrink)

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In this paper I question Devitt and Sterelny’s proposal that reference borrowing is a causal process and that the reference borrower is ignorant about the referent.I argue that borrowers need to have some true beliefs about the referent. If so, reference borrowing involves a causal chain of communication together with some associated description. The conclusion is that what is needed for reference borrowing of other kind terms is also needed for the natural kind terms. There is no need to posit (...) a difference between the two. Thus as you cannot refer to daggers by ‘dagger’ unless you realize that they are edged weapons, so you cannot refer to tigers by ‘tiger’ unless you realize that they are animals of a certain sort. The theory of reference borrowing that we need here in both cases seems to be descriptive-causal and not only causal.If the traditional views of borrowing have demanded too much of individual speakers, the causal picture surely demands too little. Mere causal connection with some antecedent tradition of name use does not suffice for the preservation of reference. (shrink)

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Jim Brown (1991, viii) says that platonism, in mathematics involves the following: 1. mathematical objects exist independently of us; 2. mathematical objects are abstract; 3. we learn about mathematical objects by the faculty of intuition. The same is being claimed by Jerrold Katz (1981, 1998) in his platonistic approach to linguistics. We can take the object of linguistic analysis to be concrete physical sounds as held by nominalists, or we can assume that the object of linguistic study are psychological or (...) mental states which presents the conceptualism or psychologism of Chomsky and that language is an abstract object as held by platonists or realists and urged by Jerrold Katz hinlself.I want to explicate Katz’s proposal which is based on Kant’s conception of pure intuition and give arguments why I find it implausible. I also present doubts that linguists use intuitive evidence only. I conclude with some arguments against the a prioricity of intuitive judgements in general which is also relevant for Jim Brown’s platonistic beliefs. (shrink)

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In this exchange with Michael Devitt on reference borrowing I continue to challenge the idea that reference borrowing is a purely causal process and suggest instead that reference borrowing involves the borrowers having to associate the correct categorial term and have some true beliefs about the referent in the guise of some associate description. I strengthen my defense by suggesting that other kind terms form the core of our language and this is where we associate true categorial descriptions and where (...) error would matter. I also argue that in reference borrowing there is no need to posit a difference between proper names and natural kind terms on one hand and other kind terms on the other. If the traditional views of reference borrowing have demanded too much of individual speakers, the causal picture surely demands too little. Mere causal connection to some antecedent tradition of term use does not suffice for the preservation of reference. (shrink)

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The paper discusses Crane’s analysis of Knowledge argument, and sets forth author’s disagreement with Crane. Surely Mary learns something new when she sees a color for the first time. The time for a physicalist to quarrel comes only when a qualia person says that this experience represents special phenomenal facts, and that such understanding should be identified with propositional knowledge. We should not confuse ‘having information’ with having the same information in the form of knowledge or belief. Mary knows everything (...) there is to know about color vision. The only thing she has not done is practically experience what it is like to see a color. Thus her knowledge gap is practical and not propositional. (shrink)

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There are two clearly opposed camps on the issue of the source of linguistic intuitions that have been labelled competentionalist and ordinarist positions. Competentionalists believe and defend the view that linguistic intuitions have a special status and that linguistic competence is their source, while ordinarists believe and defend the view that linguistic intuitions do not have any special status and that they are not directly derived from linguistic competence. The crucial disagreement is primarily over the source of intuitions. The main (...) question that is addressed in this paper is: Which are the data that competence provides for linguistic intuitions? I try to show that all the criticism mounted against the ordinarist are ill-founded. Competence is not the source of linguistic intuitions. Intuitions do not flow directly from competence. They are the secondary reflections on primary performance. (shrink)

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