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The paper argues that, although the role of responsibilist epistemic virtues is unclear in the framework of traditional knowledge-centred individualist and idealised epistemology, it can be properly understood if one considers other epistemic goods and activities, adopts insights from social epistemology, and acknowledges the non-ideality of our epistemic world. It proposes to explain the value of epistemic virtues in terms of their contribution to a healthy epistemic social environment. Specifically, it is argued that responsibilist virtues are essential (1) for respecting (...) listeners who commit to testimonial justice; (2) for distinguished epistemic agents in their roles of teachers, guides, and exemplars; and (3) both to create and properly recognise these roles and epistemic positions within social networks. In that way, responsibilist virtue epistemology finds its place among the newly emerging topics of social epistemology. (shrink)

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This paper examines the epistemic value of other-regarding epistemic virtues, challenging the common view that these virtues are primarily moral in nature. To this end, it proposes a new framework to explain the role of epistemic virtues: the Epistemic Social Environment (ESE). It is argued that the value of an epistemic virtue stems from its contribution to a healthy ESE. This approach enables a broader and unified theory of epistemic virtues, emphasising their role in the communal production of knowledge. Ultimately, (...) the paper aims to reconcile virtue epistemology with insights from social epistemology, offering a comprehensive account of the epistemic value of sharing knowledge. (shrink)

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In recent years, virtue epistemology has been criticized for its individualism. Correspondingly, some attempts have been made to make it more social. However, there is some confusion about what it means for virtue epistemology to be individualistic, and how it should be socialized in the face of this. The current paper proposes a systematic answer to these questions. We distinguish elements of theories of virtue that might give rise to different forms of individualism: “subject individualism,” “faculty/trait individualism,” and “value individualism.” (...) Then we show what specific challenges these elements might pose for virtue reliabilism and responsibilism. We focus on two challenges: the epistemic value of other-regarding intellectual virtues, and the problem of “epistemic outsourcing.” In both cases, we identify and evaluate possible strategies for socializing these elements of virtue epistemology. (shrink)

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In face of unethical incidents that threaten the world of science, a question of the necessity and a possible shape of intellectual ethics has been raised. The article argues that advantages of virtue epistemology make it more attractive than other models of intellectual ethics. To that purpose, it reviews alternative models for intellectual ethics, analyses and criticises deontological approach and demonstrates the virtues of the virtue approach. As problems with implementation of virtue ethics have been put against that approach, the (...) article addresses the question of how to promote virtue intellectual ethics. It discusses four possible methods of formation in virtues: theoretical, success-oriented, social and based on emulating exemplars. It argues for the role of excellent exemplars whose emulation forms virtues in agent. The conclusions of the article should transform the way we think about intellectual ethics and promote it. (shrink)

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In recent years, virtue epistemology has been criticized for its individualism. Correspondingly, some attempts have been made to make it more social. However, there is some confusion about what it means for virtue epistemology to be individualistic, and how it should be socialized in the face of this. The current paper proposes a systematic answer to these questions. We distinguish elements of theories of virtue that might give rise to different forms of individualism: “subject individualism,” “faculty/trait individualism,” and “value individualism.” (...) Then we show what specific challenges these elements might pose for virtue reliabilism and responsibilism. We focus on two challenges: the epistemic value of other-regarding intellectual virtues, and the problem of “epistemic outsourcing.” In both cases, we identify and evaluate possible strategies for socializing these elements of virtue epistemology. (shrink)

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The paper aims to make sense of the reproach to adherents of conspiracy theories (and other bad beliefs) that they should not exempt themselves too easily from knowing better. I propose that a significant factor contributing to this exemption might be their epistemic laziness. To define this vice, I consider its normative context. I argue that epistemic laziness can be addressed without adopting a normative contextualist if it is integrated into the Aristotelian triad of virtue and two opposing vices: epistemic: (...) diligence, laziness, and overzealousness. I emphasize the need for a comprehensive analysis that includes both motivational and phronetic dimensions. For that reason, epistemic laziness cannot be reduced to akrasia alone. On the other hand, epistemic diligence demands an intrinsic motivation of love for knowledge, coupled with proper engagement and refraining from further inquiry. This expanded account offers some novel approaches to addressing epistemic laziness and combating conspiracy theories. (shrink)

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The article examines the relation between correspondence and convergence in Charles S. Peirce’s theory of truth. An analysis of the context in which the pragmatic concept of truth was introduced, as well as the logical structure of Peirce’s definition, support the claim that Peirce’s position should be understood as a reform of the classical concept of truth rather than its rejection. In particular, the question of the nominalist and realist interpretation of classical and non-classical accounts of truth is addressed, as (...) well as a critique of the proposal to reconcile the actualist and counterfactual interpretation of the convergence condition for truth. (shrink)

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