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After a short sketch of Lowe’s account of his four basic categories, I discuss his theory of formal ontological relations and how Lowe wants to account for dispositional predications. I argue that on the ontic level Lowe is a pan-categoricalist, while he is a language dualist and an exemplification dualist with regard to the dispositional/categorical distinction. I argue that Lowe does not present an adequate account of disposition. From an Aristotelian point of view, Lowe conflates dispositional predication with hôs epi (...) to poly statements about what is normally or mostly the case. (shrink)

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We argue that the inference from dispositional essentialism about a property (in the broadest sense) to the metaphysical necessity oflaws involving it is invalid. Let strict dispositional essentialism be any view according to which any given property’s dispositional character is precisely the same across all possible worlds. Clearly, any version of strict dispositional essentialism rules out worlds with differentlaws involving that property. Permissive dispositional essentialism is committed to a property’s identity being tied to its dispositional profile (...) or causal role, yet is compatible with moderate interworld variation in a property’s dispositional profile. We provide such a model of dispositional essentialism about a property and metaphysical contingency of thelaws involving it. (shrink)

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A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in some appropriate context. The mainstream view in the twentieth century was that such properties are to be explained in terms of more fundamental non-dispositional properties, together with thelaws of nature. In the last few decades, however, a rival view has become popular, according to which some properties are essentially dispositional in nature, and thelaws of nature are to be explained in terms of (...) these fundamentaldispositions. The supposed ability of fundamentaldispositions to ground naturallaws is one of the most attractive features of the dispositional essentialist position. In this paper, however, I cast doubt on the ability of dispositional essences to ground thelaws of nature. In particular I argue that the dispositional essentialist position is not able to coherently respond—sympathetically or otherwise—to Cartwright's challenge that there are no true generallaws of nature. (shrink)

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Metaphysics should follow science in postulatinglaws alongside properties. I defend this claim against the claim that natural properties conceived as powers makelaws of nature redundant. Natural properties can be construed in a “thin” or a “thick” way. If one attributes a property in the thin sense to an object, this attribution does not conceptually determine which other properties the object possesses. The thin construal is underlying the scientific strategy for understanding nature piecemeal. Science explains phenomena by (...) cutting reality conceptually in properties attributed to space-time points, where these properties are conceived of independently of each other, to explore then, in a separate step, how the properties are related to each other; those determination relations between properties arelaws. This is compatible with the thesis thatlaws are metaphysically necessary. According to the thick conception, a property contains all its dependency relations to other properties. The dependency relationships between properties (which appear aslaws in the thin conception) are parts of the properties they relate. There are several reasons to resist the thick conception of properties. It makes simple properties “holistic”, in the sense that each property contains many other properties as parts. It cannot account for the fact that properties constrain each other’s identity; it can neither explain why natural properties are linked to a unique set ofdispositions, nor why and how this set is structured nor why the truth-maker of many disposition attributions is relational although the disposition is grounded on a monadic property. (shrink)

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Canlaws of nature be universal regularities and nevertheless have exceptions? Several answers to this question, in particular the thesis that there are nolaws outside of fundamental physics, are examined and rejected. It is suggested that one can account for exceptions by conceiving oflaws as strictly universal determination relations between (instances of) properties. When a natural property is instantiated,laws of nature give rise to other, typically dispositional properties. In exceptional situations, such properties manifest (...) themselves either in an unusual way or not at all. (shrink)

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Laws are supposed to tell us how physical systems actually behave. The analysis of an important part of physical practice--abstraction--shows, however, thatlaws describe the behavior of physical systems under very special circumstances, namely when they are isolated. Nevertheless,laws are applied in cases of non-isolation as well. This practice requires an explanation. It is argued that one has to assume that physical systems havedispositions. I take these to be innocuous from an empiricist's standpoint because (...) they can--at least in principle--be measured.Laws can be applied whenever such a disposition is present, they describe how the physical system would behave if the disposition were manifest. (shrink)

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It is common to appeal to governinglaws of nature in order to explain the existence of natural regularities. Classical theism, however, maintains the sovereignty thesis: everything distinct from God is created by him and is under his guidance and control. It follows from this that God must somehow be responsible for naturallaws and regularities. Therefore, theists need an account of the relation between regularities,laws, and God. I examine competing accounts oflaws of nature (...) and conclude that dispositional essentialism provides the most satisfactory explanation of the relation between, and. (shrink)

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Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the vast topic oflaws of nature. Thus, it first outlines the alleged characteristics of thelaws of nature, namely truth, objectivity, contingency, necessity, universality, grounding counterfactuals and their role in science. Among these aspects, the peculiar modal status oflaws of nature will be identified as the ‘holy grail’ of the debate. The second part of this chapter is concerned with the three main families of theories oflaws (...) of nature – neo-humean, ADT and dispositional theories – which are introduced and evaluated in regard to the aforementioned characteristics. It will then be argued that among those theories, the dispositional ones show the greatest promise of being able to account for the natural necessity of thelaws of nature. -/- Before a dispositional account oflaws of nature can be given,dispositions themselves need to be understood. Consequently, Chapter 2 introduces various analyses ofdispositions. Asdispositions are pre-theoretically close to conditionals, a lot of analyses try to reducedispositions to conditionals. This chapter critically assesses some chosen accounts: the simple conditional analysis, Carnap’s reduction sentences, the simple counterfactual conditional analysis, Lewis’ reformed conditional analysis, Malzkorn’s sophisticated con- ditional analysis, Choi and Gundersen’s context-dependent analysis, Manley and Wasserman’s gradable dispostion ascriptions, and Fara’s habituals. The prevention problem, which poses a threat to any account ofdispositions, is depicted. It is argued that, ultimately, none of the conditionalising attempts is able to convince since they all exclude the problem cases which leads to explanation gaps and outlaw areas. -/- Chapter 3 contains the synchronic part of my preferred solution to the prevention problem. The notion of ‘component causes’ is introduced, and the ontological status of components discussed. Millikan’s oil drop experiment is depicted en detail. In a first step, making a distinction betweendispositions and the resulting behaviour is advocated. Via the symmetry argument, mani- festations and masks are shown to be ontologically on a par. In a second step, a triadic account consisting ofdispositions, wirkungen and resultant behaviour, is established. Finally, the ontological interpretation of the trias is given. It is in the nature of thedispositions to bring about the wirkungen. These interact via combinations rules like the functions f and fa or vector addition, which are built-in into todispositions. -/- The diachronic part of my favourite interpretation, the triadic process picture ofdispositions (TPD), is presented in chapter 4. The dynamics of dispo- sition manifestation are discussed and it is argued that fiddling with the trigger works only up to a certain point. Diachronic masking cases turn out to be no- torious. An excursus to action theory shows that the ontology needs to include processes, as understanding disposition manifestations as processes solves the diachronic prevention problem. The (TPD) can account for all counterexamples by taking the stimulus as the beginning of the manifestation process. -/- Chapter 5 applies the (TPD) to the debate aboutlaws of nature. In order to judge its adequacy, the characteristics oflaws of nature given in chapter 1 are consulted. As a first step, the criteria truth, objectivity, universality, grounding counterfactuals and their role in science are covered. It is sketched how the (TPD) can account for these. The second part of the chapter deals with the modal status of thelaws of nature. The dispositional essentialist’s view thatlaws of nature are metaphysical necessary is depicted and then criticised. It is argued that metaphysical necessity is not the appropriate modal status of thelaws of nature. Finally, the (TPD) account of the necessity of thelaws of nature is presented:laws of nature are naturally necessary and metaphysically contingent. (shrink)

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One view of the nature of properties has been crystallized in recent debate by an identity thesis proposed by Shoemaker. The general idea is that there is for behaviour. Well-known criticisms of this approach, however, remain unanswered, and the details of its connections tolaws nothing more to being a particular causal property than conferring certaindispositions of nature and the precise ontology of causal properties stand in need of development. This paper examines and defends a dispositional essentialist (...) account of causal properties, combining a Shoemaker-type identity thesis with a Dretske, Tooley, and Armstrong-type view thatlaws are relations between properties, and a realism aboutdispositions. The property identity thesis is defended against standard epistemological and metaphysical objections. The metaphysics of causal properties is then clarified by a consideration of thelaws relating them, vacuouslaws, and ceteris paribus law statements. (shrink)

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The more science progresses, the more it is evident that the physical world presents regularities. This raises a metaphysical problem: why is the world so ordered? In the first part of the article, I attempt to clarify this problem and justify its relevance. In the following three parts, I analyze three hypotheses already formulated in philosophy in response to this problem: the hypothesis that the order of the world is explained 1) bylaws of nature, 2) bydispositions (...) of the fundamental physical entities, 3) or by a memory immanent to matter (a hypothesis developed by Peirce, Bergson and James). The third hypothesis may seem surprising. However, it can be shown that the three hypotheses have a psychomorphic dimension in the sense that they give to nature properties analogous to those of mind. In addition, this third hypothesis presents several interesting arguments. (shrink)

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Bird argues that Armstrong’s necessitarian conception of physical modality andlaws of nature generates a vicious regress with respect to necessitation. We show that precisely the same regress afflicts Bird’s dispositional-monist theory, and indeed, related views, such as that of Mumford & Anjum. We argue that dispositional monism is basically Armstrongian necessitarianism modified to allow for a thesis about property identity.

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It appears that light may be thrown on the nature of moral principles if they are construed as morallaws analogous to ceteris-paribuslaws of nature. Luke Robinson objects that the analogy either cannot explain how moral principles are necessary or cannot explain how obligations can be pro-tanto; and that a dispositional account of moral obligation has explanatory superiority over one in terms of morallaws. I explain the analogy, construinglaws of nature as necessary relationships (...) after the fashion of William Kneale and Karl Popper. I then show that Robinson’s objections are mistaken and that if the difference between a dispositional account and a law account is not merely verbal, then it is the law account that is superior. I also dispel the common confusion between the necessity oflaws and the existence of forces. (shrink)

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When prospective parents use in vitro fertilization, many of them hope to generate more embryos than they intend to implant immediately. The technology often requires multiple attempts to reach a successful pregnancy, and couples can cryopreserve any excess embryos so that they have them on hand for later attempts. As part of obtaining informed consent for IVF or cryopreservation, clinics typically ask patients to specify their preferences for the embryos in the event of divorce or death, offering options such as (...) use of the embryos by a specified partner, donation to research, or discarding the remaining embryos. Still, many courts face a recurring problem: the partners dissolve their relationship, and one party wants to use the frozen embryos over the objections of the other. Courts and legislatures have struggled with how to handle these cases, which seem to pit one partner's right to procreate against the other's right not to procreate. In this essay, we use one of the most recent decisions in this line of cases—the Appellate Court of Illinois's decision in Szafranski v. Dunston—to explain the current state of the law and make recommendations for changes. The issue is ripe for revisiting because in the last year, embryo disputes have become a battlefront for larger conflagrations over the moral status of embryos. (shrink)

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This paper discusses the relationship betweendispositions andlaws and the prospects for any analysis of talk oflaws in terms of talk ofdispositions. Recent attempts at such a reduction have often been motivated by the desire to give an account of ceteris paribuslaws and in this they have had some success. However, such accounts differ as to whether they viewdispositions as properties fundamentally of individuals or of kinds. I argue that (...) ifdispositions are properties of individuals, we cannot give a complete account of ceteris paribuslaws. Alternatively, ifdispositions are properties of kinds, any reductive analysis oflaws would require an extension of the notion of the dispositional beyond its usual meaning so that in effect there can be no reduction oflaws todispositions as traditionally understood. An attempt to reduce the nomological to the dispositional is therefore not the way to provide a unified account of traditional and ceteris paribuslaws. (shrink)

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In this paper, it is argued that, contrary to some suggestions in the philosophical literature,dispositions cannot replacelaws in the description of the physical world. If for a certain type of physical situation a well-working law-based account is available, then it is not possible to describe that situation equally well in terms ofdispositions. Using an example consisting of fourlaws (Coulomb’s law, Newton’s law of gravitation, the rule for the composition of forces and Newton’s (...) second law), it is shown that when one attempts to replace a law-based account with a disposition-based account, the latter turns out to be either less informative or inferior with respect to theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, unification, non-triviality of predictions and explanatory power.Laws are also better suited to deal with interactions and their screening off. Using inference to the best explanation, one can conclude from this comparison that it islaws rather thandispositions that should be included in our ontological picture of nature. (shrink)

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Bird reveals an important problem at the heart of Armstrong’s theory oflaws of nature: to explain how a law necessitates its corresponding regularity, Armstrong is committed to a vicious regress. In his very brief response, Armstrong gestures towards an argument that, as he admits, is more of a “speculation.” Later, Barker and Smart argue that a very similar problem threatens Bird’s dispositional monist theory oflaws of nature and he is committed to a similar vicious regress. In (...) this paper, first, I construct Armstrong’s would-be argument in response to Bird. Second, I argue that his response makes his account oflaws and natural properties incompatible with science. Finally, I argue that Armstrong’s strategy to address Bird’s criticism can be used, quite ironically, to defuse Barker and Smart’s argument against Bird. (shrink)

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Two related claims have lately garnered currency: dispositional essentialism—the view that some or all properties, or some or all fundamental properties, are essentially dispositional; and the claim thatlaws of nature (or again, many or the fundamental ones) are metaphysically necessary. I have argued elsewhere (On the metaphysical contingency oflaws of nature, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) that thelaws of nature do not have a mind-independent metaphysical necessity, but recent developments ondispositions have given (...) these ideas a new vibrancy and made them the topic of more focused discussion. So I would like to revisit this, arguing that the new work, as interesting and important as it is to our understanding of fundamental properties, powers anddispositions, should not change our minds about metaphysical necessity. One should still think necessity is conceptually or conventionally grounded. I do not argue thatlaws of nature are not necessary, nor that properties do not have dispositional essences, but only that if these are the case, then, like other de re or empirical necessities, they have no metaphysical weight and are based in our rules or decisions about how to talk about the world. We may have excellent reasons to talk and think in this way—but these reasons do not include, require or provide evidence of mind-independent metaphysical necessity or essences. (shrink)

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In this paper I take a look at what I take to be the best argument fordispositions. According to this argument we needdispositions in order to understand certain features of scientific practice. I point out that thesedispositions have to be continuously manifestable. Furthermore I will argue thatdispositions are not the causes of their manifestations. However,dispositions and causation are closely connected. What it is to be a cause can best be understood (...) in terms of counterfactuals that are based ondispositions. (shrink)

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As we understand them,dispositions are relatively uncontroversial 'predicatory' properties had by objects disposed in certain ways. By contrast, powers are hypothetical 'ontic' properties posited in order to explain dispositional behaviour. Chapter 1 outlines this distinction in more detail. Chapter 2 offers a summary of the issues surrounding analysis ofdispositions and various strategies in contemporary literature to address them, including one of our own. Chapter 3 describes some of the important questions facing the metaphysics of powers including (...) why they're worth positing, and how they might metaphysically explainlaws of nature and modality. (shrink)

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Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world.Dispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated withdispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature ofdispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence,laws of nature and causation.

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Stephen Mumford puts forward a new theory ofdispositions, showing how central their role is in metaphysics and philosophy of science. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is expressed in terms of dispositional properties--from the solubility of sugar to the belief that zebras have stripes. Mumford discusses what it means to say that something has a property of this kind, and howdispositions can possibly be real things in the world. His clear, straightforward, realist (...) account reveals them to be less mysterious than they seem, and shows that an understanding ofdispositions is essential to an understanding of properties, causation, and scientificlaws. (shrink)

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Moral obligations rest on circumstances. But what are these obligating reasons and in virtue of what are they such reasons? Nomological conceptions define such reasons in terms of morallaws. I argue that one such conception cannot be correct and that others do not support the familiar and plausible view that obligating reasons are pro tanto reasons, either because they entail that this view is false or else because they cannot explain—or even help to explain—how it could be true. (...) I also argue that a particular dispositional conception of obligating reasons does support this view of obligating reasons by enabling an explanation of how it could be true. Moreover, my arguments show that the dispositional moral metaphysic on which this conception is predicated can do something that nomological alternatives cannot: explain why obligating reasons and moral obligations are pro tanto reasons and obligations. (shrink)

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Cognitive science has come down with a nasty cold, so Jerry Fodor has recently lamented, and the afflicting strain is something called concept pragmatism.1 Its chief symptom is the urge to identify the content of a concept with the inferences habitually drawn upon in its use (a ‘definition-in-use’), these serving also as its condition of possession, in knowing how to draw those inferences definitive of the concept.2 The affliction is quite fatal if Fodor is right, but the welfare of the (...) patient is of only indirect concern. What I want instead to ask here is whether the diagnosis has anything to do with the pragmatism that he says, breathlessly, has “bred monsters” down the last century—in particular, with the.. (shrink)

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Dispositional essentialism is a non-Humean view about the essences of certain fundamental or natural properties that looms large in recent metaphysics , not least because it promises to explain neatly the natural modalities such aslaws of nature, counterfactuals, causation and chance. In the current paper, however, several considerations are presented that indicate a serious tension between its essentialist core thesis and natural “metaphysical” interpretations of its central explanatory claims.

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Dispositional Essentialism is a unified anti-Humean account of the metaphysics of low-level physical properties andlaws of nature. In this paper, I articulate the view that I label Canonical Dispositional Essentialism, which comprises a structuralist metaphysics of properties and an account oflaws as relations in the property structure. I then present an alternative anti-Humean account of properties andlaws. This account rejects CDE’s structuralist metaphysics of properties in favour of a view of properties as qualitative grounds (...) ofdispositions and it rejects CDE’s view oflaws as relations in favour of a view oflaws as features of an efficient description of possible property distributions. I then defend this view over CDE on the grounds that it can overcome an explanatory shortcoming of CDE and that it achieves a level of continuity with science that CDE fails to achieve. The upshot of this paper is a significant narrowing of the range of possibilities in which the absolutely best unified account oflaws and properties resides. (shrink)

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Within the community of philosophers who advocate a broadly realist picture oflaws of nature, there remains a vexed question about truthmakers: What is it that makes statements of natural law true? One view has it that thelaws of a world are true in virtue of the fact that there exist ultimatedispositions or powers at that world. Following Brian Ellis and Caroline Lierse, I call this view 'Dispositional Essentialism,' and I defend it against a recent (...) attack from Stephen Mumford who prefers the view according to which naturallaws are a kind of 'brute fact'. (shrink)

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'Why did the window break when it was hit by the stone? Because the window is brittle and the stone is hard; hardness and brittleness are powers, dispositional properties ordispositions.'Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. This book is a record of the debate on the nature ofdispositions between three distinguished philosophers - D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place - who have been thinking aboutdispositions all their (...) working lives. Their distinctive accounts cover many of the issues surroundingdispositions such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence,laws of nature and causation.Dispositions illuminates this central topic in analytic philosophy and at the same time highlights deeper concerns of metaphysics. (shrink)

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Dispositional essentialists ultimately appeal to dispositional essences in order to provide (a) an explanation of the conservation of physical quantities and (b) identity conditions for fundamental physical properties. This paper aims to offer alternative suggestions based on symmetry considerations and exhibits their consequences for the thesis of dispositional essentialism.

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This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that somedispositions—those which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks (...) and antidotes are a major obstacle to a conditional analysis ofdispositions, thesedispositions that are unfinkable may be successfully analysed by the conditional analysis ofdispositions. This result is of importance for those who think that the fundamental properties might bedispositions which lack any distinct causal basis, because it suggests that these properties, if they exist, can be analysed by simple conditionals and that they will not be subject to ceteris paribuslaws. (shrink)

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Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of ‘finkish’dispositions:dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s, it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r, x would give response z; so finkishdispositions afford a counter‐example to the simplest conditional analysis ofdispositions. Martin went on to suggest (...) that finkishdispositions required a theory of primitive causal powers; there, I think, he was mistaken. All that they require is an improved conditional analysis, and this improved analysis can be built upon whatever treatments of properties and oflaws we may favour on other grounds. (shrink)

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An important task for metaphysicians and philosophers of science is to account forlaws of nature – in particular, how they distinguish themselves from ‘mere’ regularities, and the modal force they are endowed with, ‘natural necessity’. Dispositional essentialism aboutlaws is roughly the view thatlaws distinguish themselves by being grounded in the essences of natural entities. This paper does not primarily concern how essentialism compares to its main rivals – Humeanism and Armstrongeanism. Rather, it distinguishes and (...) comparatively assesses various brands of essentialism – which mainly differ as to where exactly they takelaws to find their essentialist sources, and what they take to be the targets oflaws, namely what they apply to. Yet, this internal comparison is not unrelated to the more general debate aboutlaws: the main criteria with which I compare these essentialist views concern how they can deal with some of the main objections faced by essentialism in general, and how they can keep what is arguably the main intuitive advantage of essentialism over its rivals. Thus, the paper also concerns the relative position of essentialism in the larger debate aboutlaws – ultimately bringing support to it. (shrink)

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Most metaphysicians deny thatdispositions are among the fundamental constituents of the world. The solubility of salt, for example, is regarded as derivative from more basic features of reality, such as the molecular structure of salt and thelaws of nature. This is an initially plausible view: a disposition seems to be essentially a characterization of what its bearer can do, which seems to be wholly dependent on what that bearer is like. ;Nonetheless, I think that the most (...) attractive view ofdispositions is that they are fundamental constituents of reality---in fact, almost all real properties are irreducibly dispositional. Following D. M. Armstrong, I call this view dispositionalism. In my dissertation, I address several major difficulties for dispositionalism. For instance, it is often argued that dispositionalism makes causal relations necessary, and is thus committed to an unacceptable theory of causation. In response to this worry, I defend the thesis that causal relations are necessary. A second objection is based on C. B. Martin's "finkish" cases. It is widely accepted that some accounts ofdispositions are able to escape this objection by adopting David Lewis's response to it. Contra Lewis, I argue that dispositionalism can follow in their footsteps. Finally, I consider the objection that dispositionalism, by implying that it isdispositions all the way down, leads to a vicious regress. I think that this is the most serious problem for dispositionalism, and although I do not fully lay it to rest, I make some headway. ;I also survey a wide range of competing theories ofdispositions. I argue that the difficulties they face are both far greater than has been recognized, and more serious than the difficulties that beset dispositionalism. The result is not a conclusive proof of dispositionalism, but a demonstration that this underdog theory is preferable to its more popular competitors. (shrink)

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Even though theistic philosophers and scientists agree that God created, sustains, and providentially governs the physical universe and even though much has been published in general regarding divine action, what is needed is a fine-grained, conceptually coherent account of divine action, causation,dispositions, andlaws of nature consistent with divine aseity, satisfying the widely recognized adequacy conditions for any account ofdispositions.1 Such an account would be a basic part of a more comprehensive theory of divine action (...) in relation to the fundamental concepts of science and of mathematics. Our aim in this article is simply to present such a theory. (shrink)

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Dispositional essentialists argue that physical properties have their causal roles essentially. This is typically taken to mean that physical properties are identical todispositions. I argue that this is untenable, and that we must instead say that properties bestowdispositions. I explore what it is for a property to have such a role essentially. Dispositional essentialists argue for their view by citing certain epistemological and metaphysical implications, and I appeal to these implications to place desiderata on the concept (...) of essence involved. I argue that the traditional modal theory of essence meets these desiderata, but that the resulting theory wrongly implies that certaindispositions essential to mass are essential to charge, thereby offering a new argument against modal theories of essence. I argue that dispositional essentialism requires a primitive notion of essence, and develop a primitivist theory based on Kit Fine's views. I show that the primitivist theory has all the virtues of the modal alternative, and none of the vices. I develop a novel way of thinking about the relationship between properties,laws anddispositions, and argue that it has distinct advantages over standard dispositional essentialist formulations. (shrink)

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The paper presents the main lines of arguments recently offered by Brian Ellis and Steven Mumford in favor of some versions of dispositional essentialism and tries to evaluate them, especially as far as a dispositionalist account oflaws is concerned. Favoring herself some form of dispositional realism (rather than essentialism), the author makes some suggestions about the major difficulties which any kind of dispositionalism should be ready to face.

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Some time ago, Joel Katzav and Brian Ellis debated the compatibility of dispositional essentialism with the principle of least action. Surprisingly, very little has been said on the matter since, even by the most naturalistically inclined metaphysicians. Here, we revisit the Katzav–Ellis arguments of 2004–05. We outline the two problems for the dispositionalist identified Katzav in his 2004 , and claim they are not as problematic for the dispositional essentialist at it first seems – but not for the reasons espoused (...) by Ellis. (shrink)

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According to the theory ofdispositions here defended, to have a disposition is to have some (non-dispositional) property that enters into a law of a certain form. The theory does not have the crucial difficulty of the singular material implication account ofdispositions, but at the same time avoids the unfortunate notion of 'reduction sentences'. It is further argued that no dispositional explanation is one of the covering-law type; but the theory shows how, for any dispositional explanation! To (...) construct a potential explanation of the covering-law type. The theory can also be applied fruitfully to human behavior, especially with respect to the issues of reasons and causes and of' rational' explanation. The success of the applicability of this theory ofdispositions is further evidence of its adequacy. (shrink)

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Those who favour an ontology based ondispositions are thereby able to provide a dispositional essentialist account of thelaws of nature. In part 1 of this paper I sketch the dispositional essentialist conception of properties and the concomitant account oflaws. In part 2, I characterise various claims about the modal character of properties that fall under the heading ‘quidditism’ and which are consequences of the categoricalist view of properties, which is the alternative to the dispositional (...) essentialist view. I argue that quidditism should be rejected. In part 3, I address a criticism of a strong dispositional essentialist view, viz. that ‘structural’ (i.e. geometrical, numerical, spatial and temporal) properties must be regarded as categorical. (shrink)

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