Results for 'Denis Hamelin'
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- An investigation of the effectiveness of concept mapping as an instructional tool.Phillip B. Horton,Andrew A. McConney,Michael Gallo,Amanda L. Woods,Gary J. Senn &DenisHamelin -1993 -Science Education 77 (1):95-111.
- The trials of life: Natural selection and random drift.Denis M. Walsh,Andre Ariew &Tim Lewens -2002 -Philosophy of Science 69 (3):452-473.We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications (...) of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)
- The pomp of superfluous causes: The interpretation of evolutionary theory.Denis M. Walsh -2007 -Philosophy of Science 74 (3):281-303.There are two competing interpretations of the modern synthesis theory of evolution: the dynamical (also know as ‘traditional’) and the statistical. The dynamical interpretation maintains that explanations offered under the auspices of the modern synthesis theory articulate the causes of evolution. It interprets selection and drift as causes of population change. The statistical interpretation holds that modern synthesis explanations merely cite the statistical structure of populations. This paper offers a defense of statisticalism. It argues that a change in trait frequencies (...) in a population can be attributed only to selection or drift against the background of a particular statistical description of the population. The traditionalist supposition that selection and drift are description‐independent causes of population change leads the dynamical interpretation into a dilemma: it must face a contradiction or accept the loss of explanatory power. (shrink)
- Evolutionary essentialism.Denis Walsh -2006 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):425-448.According to Aristotelian essentialism, the nature of an organism is constituted of a particular goal-directed disposition to produce an organism typical of its kind. This paper argues—against the prevailing orthodoxy—that essentialism of this sort is indispensable to evolutionary biology. The most powerful anti-essentialist arguments purport to show that the natures of organisms play no explanatory role in modern synthesis biology. I argue that recent evolutionary developmental biology provides compelling evidence to the contrary. Developmental biology shows that one must appeal to (...) the capacities of organisms to explain what makes adaptive evolution adaptive. Moreover, the specific capacities in question are precisely those that, according to Aristotle, constitute the nature of an organism. Essentialism 1.1 Aristotelian biological kinds Evolutionary anti-essentialism 2.1 Taxonomic anti-essentialism 2.2 Explanatory anti-essentialism Adaptation 3.1 Stability 3.2 Mutability 3.3 Phenotypic plasticity and adaptive evolution The natures of organisms Conclusion. (shrink)
- Matter, motion, and Humean supervenience.Denis Robinson -1989 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4):394 – 409.This paper examines a doctrine which David Lewis has called 'Humean Supervenience' (hereafter 'HS'), and a problem which certain imaginary cases seem to generate for HS. They include rotating perfect spheres or discs, and flowing rivers, imagined as composed of matter which is perfectly homogeneous right down to the individual points. Before considering these examples, I shall introduce the doctrine they seem to challenge.
- Four Pillars of Statisticalism.Denis M. Walsh,André Ariew &Mohan Matthen -2017 -Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 9 (1):1-18.Over the past fifteen years there has been a considerable amount of debate concerning what theoretical population dynamic models tell us about the nature of natural selection and drift. On the causal interpretation, these models describe the causes of population change. On the statistical interpretation, the models of population dynamics models specify statistical parameters that explain, predict, and quantify changes in population structure, without identifying the causes of those changes. Selection and drift are part of a statistical description of population (...) change; they are not discrete, apportionable causes. Our objective here is to provide a definitive statement of the statistical position, so as to allay some confusions in the current literature. We outline four commitments that are central to statisticalism. They are: 1. Natural Selection is a higher order effect; 2. Trait fitness is primitive; 3. Modern Synthesis (MS)-models are substrate neutral; 4. MS-selection and drift are model-relative. (shrink)
- Re-identifying matter.Denis Robinson -1982 -Philosophical Review 91 (3):317-341.
- A Taxonomy of Functions.Denis M. Walsh &André Ariew -1996 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):493 - 514.There are two general approaches to characterising biological functions. One originates with Cummins. According to this approach, the function of a part of a system is just its causal contribution to some specified activity of the system. Call this the ‘C-function’ concept. The other approach ties the function of a trait to some aspect of its evolutionary significance. Call this the ‘E-function’ concept. According to the latter view, a trait's function is determined by the forces of natural selection. The C-function (...) and E-function concepts are clearly quite different, but there is an important relation between them which heretofore has gone unnoticed. The purpose of this paper is to outline that relation.This is not the first paper to discuss the relation of C-function and E-function. Previous attempts all follow either one of two strategies. The first proposes that the two concepts are ‘unified.’ The other proposes that they are radically distinct and apply to wholly different fields within biology. (shrink)
- Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties.Denis Robinson -1993 -Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
- Teleology.Denis Walsh -2008 - In Michael Ruse,The Oxford handbook of philosophy of biology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 113--137.
- Mechanism and purpose: A case for natural teleology.Denis Walsh -2012 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):173-181.
- Working conditions : safety and sweatshops.Denis G. Arnold -2010 - In George G. Brenkert & Tom L. Beauchamp,The Oxford handbook of business ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moral functionalism, ethical quasi-relativism, and the canberra plan.Denis Robinson -2008 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola,Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Bradford.
- Giving and taking: Representational building blocks of active resource-transfer events in human infants.Denis Tatone,Alessandra Geraci &Gergely Csibra -2015 -Cognition 137 (C):47-62.No categories
- Coercion and Moral Responsibility.Denis G. Arnold -2001 -American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):53 - 67.In this dissertation I develop a general theory of coercion that allows one to distinguish cases of interpersonal coercion from cases of persuasion or manipulation, and cases of institutional coercion from cases of oppression. The general theory of coercion that I develop includes as one component a theory of second-order coercion. Second-order coercion takes place whenever one person intentionally impairs the formation of the second-order desires of another person, or constrains them after their formation, in a way that frustrates or (...) eliminates the possibility of the victim fulfilling certain of his or her first-order desires. The concept of second-order coercion is important because it suggests that a person's autonomy may be violated in ways that have not been previously recognized. In this dissertation I argue that the unique feature of all cases of coercion is that the alternatives available to the victim, with regard to the formation of his or her will, are intentionally constrained by another person in a way that violates the victim's autonomy. A general theory of coercion should be able to explain how institutions may be understood as coercive. I argue that if institutions are understood as social practices maintained for the purpose of achieving some end, then they may be properly understood as capable of coercion. ;This theory of coercion allows me to make two arguments concerning moral responsibility. First, I argue that current discussions of moral responsibility are inadequate because they fail to take seriously the claim that a person may be responsible, at least in part, for having the beliefs and desires that make a particular action a case of coercion. Second, I argue that discussions of moral responsibility are inadequate because they fail to recognize that an agent may not be responsible for the state of his or her will because he or she may have been coerced in a way that has not been previously recognized. (shrink)
- Mechanism, Emergence, and Miscibility: The Autonomy of Evo-Devo.Denis M. Walsh -2013 - In Philippe Huneman,Functions: selection and mechanisms. Springer. pp. 43--65.
- On notions of computability-theoretic reduction between Π21 principles.Denis R. Hirschfeldt &Carl G. Jockusch -2016 -Journal of Mathematical Logic 16 (1):1650002.Several notions of computability-theoretic reducibility between [Formula: see text] principles have been studied. This paper contributes to the program of analyzing the behavior of versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and related principles under these notions. Among other results, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an instance of RT[Formula: see text] all of whose solutions have PA degree over [Formula: see text] and use this to show that König’s Lemma lies strictly between RT[Formula: see text] and RT[Formula: see (...) text] under one of these notions. We also answer two questions raised by Dorais, Dzhafarov, Hirst, Mileti, and Shafer on comparing versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and of the Thin Set Theorem with the same exponent but different numbers of colors. Still on the topic of the effect of the number of colors on the computable aspects of Ramsey-theoretic properties, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an [Formula: see text]-coloring [Formula: see text] of [Formula: see text] such that every [Formula: see text]-coloring of [Formula: see text] has an infinite homogeneous set that does not compute any infinite homogeneous set for [Formula: see text], and connect this result with the notion of infinite information reducibility introduced by Dzhafarov and Igusa. Next, we introduce and study a new notion that provides a uniform version of the idea of implication with respect to [Formula: see text]-models of RCA0, and related notions that allow us to count how many applications of a principle [Formula: see text] are needed to reduce another principle to [Formula: see text]. Finally, we fill in a gap in the proof of Theorem 12.2 in Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman. (shrink)
- Function and teleology.Denis Walsh -2014 - In R. Paul Thompson & Denis Walsh,Evolutionary biology: conceptual, ethical, and religious issues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hume on the Moral Difference between Humans and Other Animals.Denis G. Arnold -1995 -History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (3):303 - 316.The primary concern of this paper is Hume's account of the moral difference between humans and other animals. In order to clarify this difference Hume's views regarding reason, sympathy, and human sentiment are examined. The purpose of this investigation is threefold. First, Hume's position on the moral difference between humans and other animals is clarified. It is argued that this difference is properly traced to Hume's account of the sentiment of humanity. Second, Hume is defended against the claim that his (...) position on this matter is inconsistent. Third, it is argued that Hume's theory of morality leaves open the possibility that some earthly species other than our own may be properly understood as moral. (shrink)
- The enchantment of words: Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Denis McManus -2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.The Enchantment of Words is a study of Wittgenstein's early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Recent years have seen a great revival of interest in the Tractatus. McManus's study of the work offers novel readings of all its major themes and sheds light on issues in metaphysics, ethics and the philosophies of mind, language, and logic.
- The Simplicity of Disproving the Theory of Special Relativity.Denis Thomas -2022 -Science and Philosophy 10 (1):111-120.Einstein’s theory of Special relativity is founded on an error made by Hendrick Lorentz. It is not necessary to expose the mathematical inconsistencies of special relativity, since the theory collapses by simply exposing the error made by Lorentz. In doing so, it not only causes special relativity to collapse, but also general relativity, and the many theories built upon these two deceptive theories. There are many claims of tests made which supposedly prove SR or GR, such as the eclipse of (...) 1919, the Hafele-Keating experiment, GPS, the orbit of Mercury, and muons. The error of these will also be shown as well as an area of astronomy which has been negatively impacted by SR. The epistemology approach to special relativity: you can know it is a false theory when the theory requires deceiving the student for acceptance and the tests which support the theory can be proven false. (shrink)
- Identities, Distinctnesses, Truthmakers, and Indiscernibility Principles.Denis Robinson -2000 -Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):145-183.After sketching some aspects of truthmaker doctrines and "truthmaker projects", and canvassing some prima facie objections to the latter, I turn to an issue which might seem to involve confusion about the nature of character of truthmakers if such there be, viz for statements of identity and (specially) distinctness. The real issue here is versions of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I discuss ways of discriminating versions, which are almost certainly true but trivial, which almost certainly substantive but false, and explore (...) an interesting intermediate possibility which might if developed yield a plausibly true yet not-entirely-trivial version of the doctrine: it is equivalent to what I call "the Denial of Bare Distinctness". (shrink)
- Alternative individualism.Denis M. Walsh -1999 -Philosophy of Science 66 (4):628-648.Psychological individualism is motivated by two taxonomic principles: (i) that psychological states are individuated by their causal powers, and (ii) that causal powers supervene upon intrinsic physiological state. I distinguish two interpretations of individualism--the 'orthodox' and the 'alternative'--each of which is consistent with these motivating principles. I argue that the alternative interpretation is legitimately individualistic on the grounds that it accurately reflects the actual taxonomic practices of bona fide individualistic sciences. The classification of homeobox genes in developmental genetics provides an (...) illustration. When applied to the taxonomy of psychological kinds, alternative individualism has some surprising consequences. In particular, externalist taxonomies of thought are consistent with the alternative interpretation, and hence consistent with individualism. I conclude, on this basis, that the individualism/externalism dispute which has long preoccupied philosophy of psychology is an empty one. (shrink)
- Interprétation, signification et «usage» chez Wittgenstein.Denis Sauvé -1996 -Dialogue 35 (4):735-752.Wittgenstein écrit dans les Recherches philosophiques: «Pour une large part des cas d'emploi du mot “signification” — bien que ce ne soit pas pour tous les cas — on peut l'expliquer ainsi: la signification d'un mot est son usage dans le langage». Le slogan «La signification, c'est l'usage» a servi de signe de ralliement à toute une génération de philosophes, mais la question de savoir quel sens lui donne Wittgenstein — mise à part celle de savoir quel sens il avait (...) pour ces philosophes — pose encore un problème aujourd'hui. (shrink)
- Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science.Denis J. M. Bradley -1997 - CUA Press.Annotation. Against the background of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Bradley provides a detailed differentiation between Aristotle's and Aquinas's view on moral principles and the end of man.
- Introduction à la philosophie de la logique.Denis Vernant -1986 - Bruxelles: P. Mardaga.
- Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival.Denis Robinson -2007 - In Dean Zimmerman,Oxford Studies in Metaphysics:Volume 3: Volume 3. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 3-32.I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...) that candidate entities for re-identification by means we take for granted in the case of persons cannot be what I call "mentalistically" individuated. (shrink)
- Clean people, unclean people: the essentialisation of 'slaves' among the southern Betsileo of Madagascar.Denis Regnier -2015 -Social Anthropology 23 (2):152-168.In this article I argue that among the southern Betsileo slave descendants are essentialised by free descendants. After explaining how this striking case of psychological essentialism manifests in the local context, I provide experimental evidence for it and discuss the results of three cognitive tasks that I ran in the field. I then suggest that slaves were not essentialised in the pre-colonial era and contend that the essentialist construal only became entrenched in the aftermath of the 1896 abolition of slavery, (...) which paradoxically triggered the historical process of essentialisation. (shrink)
- Rules, Regression and the ‘Background’: Dreyfus, Heidegger and McDowell.Denis McManus -2008 -European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):432-458.The work of Hubert Dreyfus interweaves productively ideas from, among others, Heidegger and Wittgenstein. A central element in Dreyfus' hugely influential interpretation of the former is the proposal that, if we are to—in some sense—'make sense' of intentionality, then we must recognize what Dreyfus calls the 'background'. Though Dreyfus has, over the years, put the notion of the 'background' to a variety of philosophical uses,1 considerations familiar from the literature inspired by Wittgenstein's reflections on rule-following have played an important role (...) in motivating the case for believing that we need to recognize the 'background' and thus also in identifying precisely what it is about the intentional that supposedly needs to be 'made sense of'. Dreyfus argues that what he calls 'representationalism' will land us with an unstoppable 'regress of rules'. In this paper, I first argue that there are actually two different arguments that Dreyfus invokes; I then go on to evaluate quite how, in the light of the problems that those arguments reveal, our position might be thought to be improved by our recognizing the 'background'. Given that various philosophical positions designed to deal with these problems have emerged within the Wittgensteinian literature, an obvious question to ask is whether the position that Dreyfus would have us adopt is essentially one of those positions. If it isn't, then how does it differ? There is surely a variety of ways in which such a comparison might be carried out and what I offer is only one. I argue that if, through a recognition of the 'background', we are thought to have acquired solutions to those problems, then it's not at all clear that the supposed solutions that emerge work. So I explore instead the possibility that that recognition forms part of an attempt to 'dissolve' those problems. In order to bring some clarity to that possibility I consider a number of different ways in which Dreyfus' proposals might be interpreted by drawing on ideas set out by John McDowell (and I suggest that his view of one of the 'regress' arguments is anticipated by Heidegger himself). I then identify and assess some of the consequences of adopting such McDowellian readings. My sense is that Dreyfus is on the side of the angels, so to speak. But if what is right in his proposals is to become clear, and if he is to be spared some obvious objections that those proposals may elicit, we need to be clear about just what kind of contribution those proposals are meant to make. In pursuing that clarity, I am attempting to follow through on the comparison of Wittgensteinian and Heideggerian ideas that Dreyfus and his supporters have initiated: what has yet to be clarified is how and why recognizing the 'background' will allow us to 'cope better' with the puzzles in the rule-following literature that they have cited in making a case for the need to recognize the 'background'. Ultimately, I will argue that assessing this matter may require a yet broader comparison of Wittgensteinian and Heideggerian themes, one which raises questions about what we take 'doing ontology' and 'doing phenomenology' to be. (shrink)
- The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Denis Mcmanus -2007 -Philosophy 82 (322):657-661.No categories
- Die Sprachphilosophie der Hermeneutik.Denis Thouard -2016 - In Andreas Arndt & Jörg Dierken,Friedrich Schleiermachers Hermeneutik. Interpretationen und Perspektiven. Boston: de Gruyter. pp. 85-100.No categories
- Des mots pour la vivre.Denis Vaginay -2011 -Dialogue: Families & Couples 3 (3):101-114.Les personnes déficientes intellectuelles présentent souvent un langage défaillant ou largement déficitaire, ce qui plonge dans la perplexité lorsqu’il s’agit d’établir leur niveau d’intégration des connaissances ou leurs capacités à être ou à agir, notamment dans un domaine aussi délicat que celui de la sexualité. En s’appuyant sur les repères que donne la psycholinguistique et à partir d’analyses de situations, l’article montre comment certaines de ces personnes déficientes réussissent à élaborer leurs représentations et à étayer leur identité sexuée. Elles le (...) font par le biais d’apprentissages implicites et grâce à leurs compétences pragmatiques. Pour atteindre cet objectif, elles ont à lutter contre les craintes restrictives de leur entourage qui amènent celui-ci à privilégier, quand il choisit d’en donner, les informations complexes et inaccessibles. (shrink)
- Development: three grades of ontogenetic involvement.Denis Walsh -2004 - In Christopher Stephens & Mohan Matthen,Elsevier Handbook in Philosophy of Biology. Elsevier. pp. 179--200.No categories
- On Modal Logics of Model-Theoretic Relations.Denis I. Saveliev &Ilya B. Shapirovsky -2020 -Studia Logica 108 (5):989-1017.Given a class $$\mathcal {C}$$ of models, a binary relation $$\mathcal {R}$$ between models, and a model-theoretic language L, we consider the modal logic and the modal algebra of the theory of $$\mathcal {C}$$ in L where the modal operator is interpreted via $$\mathcal {R}$$. We discuss how modal theories of $$\mathcal {C}$$ and $$\mathcal {R}$$ depend on the model-theoretic language, their Kripke completeness, and expressibility of the modality inside L. We calculate such theories for the submodel and the quotient (...) relations. We prove a downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem for first-order language expanded with the modal operator for the extension relation between models. (shrink)
- Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism about Rules.Denis Robinson -2010 -Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.Part 1 of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement—in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism—and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely cognitivist account of moral (...) judgments. Such a conclusion could be staved off if it could be held that a sufficient condition for commonality of cognitive content in moral judgments could consist, despite the presence of radical moral disagreement, in the parties’acceptance of a common set of fundamental moral principles. Part 1 begins, and Part 2 further develops, a destructive critique of that idea, leading thereby to a skeptical appraisal of the important role sometimes assigned, in metaethical theorizing, to moral rules. Inter alia the paper is intended to suggest the possibility of overlap between relativist and particularist agendas. (shrink)
- Preface: Medieval Logic.Rodrigo Guerizoli &GuyHamelin -2015 -Logica Universalis 9 (2):129-131.
- Cosmopolitics vs Biopolitics: Body, Technoutopia and Access to Space.Denis Y. U. Sivkov -2003 -Sociology of Power 15 (3):95-110.The paper examines the body as a stake in space exploration at the intersection of technology, material practices and utopian imaginaries. Based on an interpretation of the film “Gattaca” in the light of the problem of access to space, the paper opposes two techno-utopian regimes — cosmopolitics and biopolitics. Cosmopolitics assumes an equality of access to space for all beings, while biopolitics links bodily restrictions to the problem of regravitation. Regravitation is the biopolitical practice aimed at preserving the “terrestrial” conditions (...) of the body’s existence. The problem of access to space is exemplified by the debate over the boundary between Earth’s atmosphere and space in the NewSpace movement. A radical step here is taken by space amateurs, defining the stratosphere as “almost space”. In this sense, the amateurs' space techno-utopia turns out to be cosmopolitan — not so much in the sense of space as a political order equal to all beings and entities, but in the sense of a politics of equal access to space beyond Earth. K. E. Tsiolkovsky’s amateur techno-utopia proposes a radical transformation of the body and its liberation from terrestrial gravity. People will become “citizens of the ether” with the help of an extreme environment and gain additional opportunities. (shrink)No categories
- Brentano's chestnuts.Denis M. Walsh -2002 - In André Ariew, Robert Cummins & Mark Perlman,Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 314.
- Questions de logique et de philosophie.Denis Vernant -2018 - [Paris]: Éditions Mimésis.
- (1 other version)Color Geometry - Or Color Grammar?Denis Seron -forthcoming -Meinong Studies.This article discusses some difficulties of the theory of color propounded by Meinong in his Re-marks on the Color Solid and the Mixture Law of 1903. First, I argue that Meinong’s geometrical approach faces at least three sets of difficulties related to the following assumptions: colors pos-sess a “nature” that can be grasped through intuition; they are separated from each other by continua in color space; there are an infinite number of a priori relations between colors. Second, I confront the (...) geometrical approach with Wittgenstein’s grammatical approach, contending that the latter escapes these difficulties. (shrink)No categories
- Ethical Issues in Hospital-based Social Work During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Case from Uganda, with a Commentary.Denis Adia &Sarah Banks -2023 -Ethics and Social Welfare 17 (1):90-97.This paper comprises a case study illustrating ethical and practical challenges for a Ugandan hospital-based social worker early in the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by a commentary. The hospital was under-resourced, with staff and patients experiencing lack of information and panic. The social worker,Denis Adia, recounts his responses to new and ethically challenging situations, including persuading Muslim patients to stop fasting for the good of their health; deciding to keep a baby in hospital with parents although this was against (...) the rules; and supporting a stigmatised former patient in the face of intimidation by colleagues. He reflects on the importance of recognising each person’s unique needs and circumstances, seeing this as a vital role for social workers. The case is followed by a commentary from a UK academic (Sarah Banks), who notes the cognitive and emotional effort (‘ethics work’) undertaken by the social worker to: see the ethical aspects of particular situations; take account of patients’ specific needs; ensure they are treated with respect; promote their well-being; and perform as a good social worker. Banks draws attention to the key role of the virtue of courage in pandemic conditions, which involves working with new risks and facing fears with confidence. (shrink)
- Heidegger, measurement and the 'intelligibility' of science.Denis McManus -2007 -European Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):82–105.
- Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille.Denis Hollier -1992 - MIT Press.Discusses the influential French philosopher, and examines the connections he drew between philosophy and architecture.
- Coarse reducibility and algorithmic randomness.Denis R. Hirschfeldt,Carl G. Jockusch,Rutger Kuyper &Paul E. Schupp -2016 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 81 (3):1028-1046.
- Teoria da justiça de John Jawls: entre o liberalismo e o comunitarismo.Denis Coitinho Silveira -2007 -Trans/Form/Ação 30 (1):169-190.O objetivo do presente artigo é realizar uma análise da teoria da justiça como eqüidade de John Rawls em A Theory of Justice e no Political Liberalism, destacando seu modelo de complementaridade entre o deontológico e o procedimental com o teleológico e substancial, buscando responder algumas das críticas levantadas por autores comunitaristas à teoria rawlsiana de justiça e procurando apontar para suas semelhanças. Parto das críticas dos comunitaristas à teoria da justiça como eqüidade; posteriormente, analiso os aspectos teleológicos contidos em (...) seu modelo deontológico; em seguida, destaco a intrínseca relação entre o procedimental e o substancial; por fim, apresento as respostas às críticas comunitaristas à Rawls, destacando a especificidade de sua concepção de justiça. (shrink)
- Realigning the Neural Paradigm for Death.Denis Larrivee &Michele Farisco -2019 -Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 16 (2):259-277.Whole brain failure constitutes the diagnostic criterion for death determination in most clinical settings across the globe. Yet the conceptual foundation for its adoption was slow to emerge, has evoked extensive scientific debate since inception, underwent policy revision, and remains contentious in praxis even today. Complications result from the need to relate a unitary construal of the death event with an adequate account of organismal integration and that of the human organism in particular. Advances in the neuroscience of higher human (...) faculties, such as the self, personal identity, and consciousness, and dynamical philosophy of science accounts, however, are yielding a portrait of higher order global integration shared between body and brain. Such conceptual models of integration challenge a praxis relying exclusively on a neurological criterion for death. (shrink)
- Education et herméneutique: contribution à une pédagogie de la culture.Denis Simard -2004 - Saint-Nicolas (Québec): Distribution de livres Univers.L'effritement du modèle rationaliste et humaniste de culture, des valeurs de progrès, d'éducation, de raison et d'humanité, constitue depuis une cinquantaine d'années le noyau de l'expérience culturelle occidentale.
- Peirce and the Truth of Moral Propositions.Denis F. Sullivan -1977 -Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 51:183-192.
- The Ethics of Direct to Consumer Advertising.Denis G. Arnold -2009 - In Denis Gordon Arnold,Ethics and the Business of Biomedicine. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131--49.
- Business Ethics Quarterly Report.Denis G. Arnold -2012 -The Society for Business Ethics Newsletter 23 (2):6-6.
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