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ABSTRACT In “What isterrorism?” Igor Primoratz defines ‘terrorism’ as “the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.” I argue that thisdefinition needs to be modified (1) by requiring that the harm or threat be to persons other than those intimidated, (2) by including aims which do not concern action, and (3) by (...) distinguishing terrorists who know they are terrorists from those who do not. (shrink)

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: This essay analyzes the U.S. political situation before the 2003 invasion of Iraq and ties this conflict to the events of 9/11. The guiding thread of the discussion is thedefinition of “terrorism” that has led to George W. Bush's declared “war onterrorism.” By means of Hegel's dialectic logic, the essay exposes the problem offered by the category of causality involved in thedefinition ofterrorism: Isterrorism the original “cause” of the (...) war declared on it by the United States or isterrorism rather the very “consequence” of that war? (shrink)

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What isterrorism? What ought we to do about it? And why is it wrong? We think we have clear answers to these questions. But acts of violence, like U.S. drone strikes that indiscriminately kill civilians, and mass shootings that become terrorist attacks when suspects are identified as Muslim, suggest that definitions ofterrorism are always contested. In Genealogies ofTerrorism, Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson rejects attempts to define whatterrorism is in favor of a historico-philosophical investigation into (...) the conditions under which uses of this contested term become meaningful. The result is a powerful critique of the power relations that shape how we understand and theorize political violence. -/- Tracing discourses and practices ofterrorism from the French Revolution to late imperial Russia, colonized Algeria, and the post-9/11 United States, Erlenbusch-Anderson examines what we do when we name somethingterrorism. She offers an important corrective to attempts to develop universal definitions that assure semantic consistency and provide normative certainty, showing thatterrorism means many different things and serves a wide range of political purposes. In the tradition of Michel Foucault’s genealogies, Erlenbusch-Anderson excavates the history of conceptual and practical uses ofterrorism and maps the historically contingent political and material conditions that shape their emergence. She analyzes the power relations that make different modes of understandingterrorism possible and reveals their complicity in justifying the exercise of sovereign power in the name of defending the nation, class, or humanity against the terrorist enemy. Offering an engaged critique ofterrorism and the mechanisms of social and political exclusion that it enables, Genealogies ofTerrorism is an empirically grounded and philosophically rigorous critical history with important political implications. (shrink)

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Shortly after the bus and subway bombings in London on July 7, 2005, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon world leaders to reach consensus on adefinition ofterrorism, one that would facilitate 'moral clarity' and underwrite the United Nations convention againstterrorism. The Secretary General's plea to world leaders help to highlight the practical significance and urgency of having a workabledefinition ofterrorism. For the task of definingterrorism is not (...) only theoretically or academically important; it is important for far-reaching practical, moral, and political purposes as well. For without at least some semblance of a workabledefinition ofterrorism, it is impossible to identify and collect data on acts ofterrorism throughout the world; to understand and address the root causes ofterrorism; and to reach international agreement and undertake collective action in addressingterrorism. And yet in spite of practical and moral urgency of the task at hand, consensus on an acceptabledefinition ofterrorism has been notoriously elusive. (shrink)

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Twenty years after September 11, thedefinition ofterrorism remains a contentious issue. How to understand or not to understand ‘terrorism’ is by no means a purely academic exercise. The term has a history of being used to denounce certain types of political violence and their perpetrators as being wrongful per se. Like Tony Coady, I believe that it is not just possible but, in fact, crucial to separate the descriptive from the evaluative component if the concept (...) is to be informative at all and if we aspire to an open-ended inquiry into its distinctive wrongness. In The Meaning ofTerrorism, Coady revisits and refines the themes of his writing on the topic over the past decades while providing in-depth discussions of many of the key figures in the debate on the ethics of war andterrorism. (shrink)

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This articles exposes the methodological errors involved in attempting to operationalize or value-neutralize the concept of 'terrorism.' It defends, instead, an effects-based approach to the taxonomy of 'terrorism' that builds out from a central conceptual connection between the term's negative connotation and a widely shared moral presumption against the killing of innocent non-combatants. Although this approach to the core meaning of 'terrorism' is far from value-neutral, it has a number of virtues to recommend it. First, it has (...) the political virtue of even-handedness in the way it enables competing appraisals of asymmetric conflicts. Second, it is has the ethical virtue of being flexible enough to accommodate nuanced appraisals of various modes and degrees of terrorist violence. And third, it has the empirical virtue of being useful for purposes of rigorous social scientific research. (shrink)

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This paper explores whether terrorist violence could be morally justified or excused. It defends the absolute immunity of innocent people against those who might want to sacrifice them for other goals. The defense is based on recognizing people’s stringent natural duty of nonmaleficence, which entails an obligation on moral agents to refrain from intentionally bringing about harm or significant risk of it to the innocent. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part distinguishes between unconditional and conditional critics’ (...) arguments regarding the use of terrorist violence, and between a narrow and a broaddefinition ofterrorism. While unconditional critics accept the narrowdefinition or one akin to it because they equateterrorism with murder, conditional critics accept the broaddefinition or one akin to it because they attempt to justify or excuse the use ofterrorism based, e.g., on an analogy with a just war approach, consequentialism, moral relativism, supreme emergency or last resort. Exception is taken with the latter arguments since they attempt to justify or excuse morally unjustifiable and inexcusable actions such as the deliberate use of violence against the innocent. The second part explores plausible conditional critics’ reasons for justifying or excusing the 9/11/01 attacks and find them wanting. If the argument works, then, with minor modifications, it could also apply to the 3/11/04 attacks in Madrid, the 7/7/05 attacks in London, and similar attacks elsewhere. (shrink)

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Many contemporary conceptualizations ofterrorism inadvertently reify political conceptions ofterrorism. Mainly because they in the end rely on the intentions of terrorists in defining ‘terrorism’, the process ofterrorism, which involves an unfolding dialectic of actions and reactions, is omitted from researchers’ focus. Thus,terrorism becomes simplified to intentional actions by terrorists, and this short-cutting of the causal chain of the process ofterrorism facilitates both a political ‘negation of history’ and a ‘rhetoric (...) of response’. In this paper, I put forward a conceptualization ofterrorism that transcends existing definitions and conceptualizations by first of all discerning between ‘terrorism’ and ‘terror’, and by subsequently conceptualizingterrorism as a paradox: whatterrorism is, is inextricably bound to the reaction toterrorism. It is, in fact, the reaction of some states toterrorism that, in a sense ex post facto, constitutes an act as ‘terrorism’ by ‘refolding’ actions that unfolded subsequent to an event into that event as the root cause of the entire chain of events. (shrink)

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The international community has not been able to agree on adefinition of “terrorism,” which has been a controversial term for decades. In order to understand the controversy, here the meaning of “terrorism” is analysed by means of the inferentialist framework developed by Robert Brandom. It will be shown that there is wide agreement about (at least some of) the consequences of application of the term, whereas the conditions of application are precisely what is at issue. Three (...) consequences of application will be distinguished: epistemic, evaluative, and programmatic. Evaluative and programmatic consequences of application of the term “terrorism” are widespread and very serious, even in the absence of a precisedefinition, and that explains why the conditions of application are a controversial matter. In the end, the controversy is best understood as a clash of interests regarding when the consequences of the term should apply. (shrink)

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In this paper, a two-fold strategy is carried out for gaining conceptual clarity in response to the question: What isterrorism? The first stage is to defend a broad workingdefinition ofterrorism that emphasizes the instrumental employment of terror or fear to obtain any number of possible ends. As proposed in this paper,Terrorism is an act or threat of violence to persons or property that elicits terror, fear, or anxiety regarding the security of human (...) life or fundamental rights and that functions as an instrument to obtain further ends. This instrumentality relies upon either an explicit or implicit threat of separate acts of future violence. It is argued that such a functionalist approach to definingterrorism captures the core qualities that unite the broad family of both political and nonpolitical terrorist actions. At the same time, the proposeddefinition avoids the problems associated with other approaches that either focus upon the terrorist’s ‘unconventional’ tactics, or the ‘innocence’ of their targets, or their coercive intentions. The breadth of the proposeddefinition allows for the more nuanced typological analysis in the second stage. The typology is primarily an analysis of the modes ofterrorism’s instrumentality. Thus, the broad phenomenon ofterrorism is divided according to factors of targets, the degree of force employed, agency, and the geographic context of the action. It is only by drawing out the diverse types ofterrorism that the projects of morally evaluatingterrorism and formulating a just response toterrorism can take place in a concrete and meaningful way. (shrink)

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There is a strong tendency in the scholarly and sub-scholarly literature onterrorism to treat it as something like an ideology. There is an equally strong tendency to treat it as always immoral. Both tendencies go hand in hand with a considerable degree of unclarity about the meaning of the term ‘terrorism’. I shall try to dispel this unclarity and I shall argue that the first tendency is the product of confusion and that once this is understood, we (...) can see, in the light of a more definite analysis ofterrorism, that the second tendency raises issues of inconsistency, and even hypocrisy. Finally, I shall make some tentative suggestions about what categories of target may be morally legitimate objects of revolutionary violence, and I shall discuss some lines of objection to my overall approach. (shrink)

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Examining the reasons for the conventional application of the term 'massacre' to some sorts of killings but not others, I arrive at thisdefinition of the term. A massacre is the mass murder and mutilation of innocent victims by an assailant or assailants immediately present at the scene. This is a conventional and not a stipulativedefinition. Many standard definitions are imprecise for several reasons. They might say the killing is unnecessary or indiscriminate or at a distance or (...) they might confuse it withterrorism. lmprecise definitions do not grasp the etymological connection to the slaughterhouse, the limited space at the scene, or the cruelty required of the assailants. The difference between weak and strong, descriptive and evaluative uses of the term 'massacre' allows for dishonesty and propagandistic uses of the term. (shrink)

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C. A. J. Coady offers to clear up confusion about whatterrorism is. His "tacticaldefinition" focuses on terrorist acts as violent attacks upon non-combatants. He discusses what it means to be a non-combatant, considers various philosophical attempts to defendterrorism, and examines the idea of a connection between religion andterrorism.

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For the sake of developing and evaluating public policy decisions aimed at combatingterrorism, we need a precise publicdefinition ofterrorism that distinguishesterrorism from other forms of violence. Ordinary usage does not provide a basis for such adefinition, and so it must be stipulative. I propose essentially pragmatic criteria for developing such a stipulative publicdefinition. After noting that definitions previously proposed in the philosophical literature are inadequate based on these criteria, (...) I propose an alternative, which I call the 'group-target'definition and which distinguishesterrorism from other forms of violence by the distinctive principle of discrimination used by terrorists to identify legitimate targets. I argue that thisdefinition meets the criteria for a satisfactory publicdefinition, and suggest that based on it there is good reason to suspect the adequacy of anti-terrorism policies that rely predominantly on forceful interdiction of terrorists. (shrink)

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n the essays in HowTerrorism Is Wrong, I aim to provide moral assessments of various forms of political violence, focusing especially onterrorism. Also considered are war, military intervention to protect human rights, and violence to bring about or to prevent political change. Among cases considered are the liberation movement that brought about the ending of apartheid in South Africa, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the genocide in Rwanda, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and its antecedents in the breakup (...) of the former Yugoslavia, the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and the U.S. response, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. I argue thatterrorism is best understood as on a continuum of violence, rather than as uniquely atrocious. I question such frequently made judgments as that war can be justified butterrorism is necessarily wrong. I explore definitions ofterrorism and conclude that even though it often targets civilians, it should not be thought to be wrong bydefinition. Yet, although it may be less unjustifiable than war,terrorism is very difficult to justify. Ways ought to be found to reduce all forms of violence, including political violence. The book examines also the question of who has legitimate authority to use political violence, for instance in a liberation movement. Just War Theory has been developed for violence between the armed forces of states. It is questionable how and whether it should be applied to the increasingly common sorts of violence used by nonstate groups. I also discuss whether and how nonstate groups can be morally responsible for violence, including ethnic violence, and how the media should coverterrorism. (shrink)

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“Terrorism”' is sometimes defined as a “form ofcoercion.” But there are important differences between ordinary coercion and terrorist intimidation. This paper explores some of those differences, particularly the relation between coercion, on the one hand, and terror and terrorization, on the other hand. The paper argues that whileterrorism is not necessarily associated with terror in the literal sense, it does often seek to instill a mental state like terror in the populations that it targets. However, the point (...) of instilling this mental state is not necessarily coercive or intimidatory: one can try to instill terror as an act of punishment, or as an expressive or therapeutic act, or because one values the political consequences that might follow, or because one thinks terror is preferable, from an ethical point of view, to the inauthentic complacency that characterizes the targeted population at present. Though this paper asks questions about thedefinition of “terrorism,” these questions are not asked for their own sake. The quest for a canonicaldefinition of “terrorism” is probably a waste of time. But asking questions which sound like questions ofdefinition is sometimes a fruitful way of focusing our reflections onterrorism and organizing our response. (shrink)

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First, I argue that the contestability of the term “terrorism” is insufficient to justify the targeting of those who are innocent noncombatants beyond reasonable doubt; second, that states could be as vicious, if not even more so, than nonstate actors could be in perpetrating acts that might be described asterrorism, and, third, that an adequatedefinition of internationalterrorism must focus on the actual victims of such despicable acts.

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The primary thesis ofTerrorism and the Ethics of War is that terrorist acts are always wrong. I begin this paper by describing two views that I criticize in the book The first condemns allterrorism but applies the term in a biased way; the second defends some terrorist acts. I then respond to issues raised by the commentators. I discuss Joan McGregor’s concerns about thedefinition ofterrorism and about howterrorism differs from other (...) forms of violence againstinnocent people. I respond to Sally Scholz’s challenges to my interpretation of innocence. She argues that soldiers can be innocent victims ofterrorism and that both relationships and vulnerability are important to understanding innocence. Matthew Silliman questions my defense of utilitarianism and challenges two views that I defend: that all terrorist acts are wrong and that war can sometimes be right. I sketch brief responses to these important points. (shrink)

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Without attempting a full-scaledefinition of “terrorism,” I assume that terrorist acts are politically motivated, that the political goals of terrorists are both diverse and a “mixed bag,” that terrorist acts inflict deliberate harm on innocent civilians, and that they are therefore to be condemned even when the goals they ostensibly serve are defensible goals. The various versions of the “root causes” argument seek to explain the phenomenon ofterrorism, not to justify it. Nevertheless, anti-terrorism strategists (...) must take these explanations seriously and be prepared to adopta suitably broad view of the causal factors that may be involved. Exclusive concentration on the motives of terrorists is a mistake. Also important, for example, are the attitudes of members of populations in which there is sympathy for the goals of terrorists without any endorsement of their methods. (shrink)

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Without doubt,terrorism is one of the most vehemently debated subjects in current political affairs as well as in academic discourse. Yet, although it constitutes an issue of general socio-political interest, neither in everyday language nor in professional (political, legal, or academic) contexts does there exist a generally accepteddefinition ofterrorism. The question of how it should be defined has been answered countless times, with as much variety as quantity in the answers. In academic discourse, it (...) is difficult to find two scholars who use the term ‘terrorism’ in the same way. -/- While it is impossible to formulate adefinition which satisfies everyone, discussing thedefinition question is indispensable. The necessity to review existing definitions with a view to improving them is especially obvious in legal and political contexts. Howterrorism is defined in these contexts has serious consequences, and if we lack clear definitions we run into problems. How can we have laws or take political measures against something we have not clearly defined? Without doubt, there exists a practical necessity for adefinition in these fields. It is important to have clear standards for definingterrorism. -/- In my view, thedefinition should meet three basic criteria: first, it should cover those cases that we concurrently consider to be instances ofterrorism (such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in September 2001 or those on commuting trains in Madrid Atocha in March 2004). That is, ideally, ourdefinition ofterrorism remains close to uncontroversial usages of the term. Second, thedefinition should abstain from morally judging the act in question. Later I will say more about so called “moral” definitions ofterrorism. For now, it suffices to say that defining an action and evaluating it are distinct tasks and should remain so. Third, thedefinition must identify characteristics that are specific toterrorism alone, characteristics which clearly distinguish it from other phenomena. (shrink)

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This chapter contains sections titled: TheDefinition ofTerrorism in Terms of Innocents TheDefinition ofTerrorism in Terms of Non‐CombatantsTerrorism, Combatants and Authoritarian States TheDefinition ofTerrorism: An Indirect Strategy Conclusion.

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On September 11, 2001, Americans were painfully reminded of a truth that for years had been easy to overlook, namely, thatterrorism can affect every person in the world – regardless of location, nationality, political conviction, or occupation – and that, in principle, nobody is beyondterrorism’s reach. However, our renewed awareness of the ubiquity of the terrorist threat has been accompanied by wide disagreement and confusion about the moral status ofterrorism and howterrorism ought (...) to be confronted. Much of the disagreement and confusion, I contend, is rooted in an inadequate understanding of just what it is that constitutesterrorism. In this paper, I offer the beginnings of a response to the challenge ofterrorism by providing an account of whatterrorism is and of some of the philosophical issues involved. My account is divided into two sections. In the first section I examine some of the difficulties involved in definingterrorism, and show that some of the most common “ordinary” understandings ofterrorism are inadequate. In the second section I offer a workingdefinition ofterrorism that overcomes many of the difficulties outlined in the first section. I argue thatterrorism consists in the use of “systematically unsystematic” violence (whether directed at combatants or noncombatants), and that the random or indiscriminate character of terroristic violence points us in the direction of seeing what is distinctively wrong with it. The fundamental problem is thatterrorism is not committed to any rules of armed conflict or any principles that would facilitate the eventual containment or termination of the conflict. (shrink)

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This book engages with the most urgent philosophical questions pertaining to the problem ofterrorism. What isterrorism? Could it ever be justified? Assuming thatterrorism is just one of many kinds of political violence, the book denies that it is necessarily wrong and worse than war. In fact, it may be justifiable under certain circumstances.

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The debate on the ethics ofterrorism focuses for the most part on the argument that employing violence against innocents or non-combatants is morally wrong. This point is usually made in combination with a so called narrowdefinition ofterrorism , i.e. one that definesterrorism as exclusively targeting innocents . Yet, some scholars prefer a so called widedefinition ofterrorism, i.e. they hold that it may well be directed against non-innocents. Leaving from (...) the assumption thatterrorism can be directed against non-innocents, in this paper I explore the ethical implications of such a widedefinition regarding the possible justifiability ofterrorism. Asterrorism in this wide sense does not infringe the prohibition against killing innocents it seems, at the first glance, that suchterrorism is somewhat less reprehensible or even justifiable. I use the termterrorism as describing an indirect strategy of using fear or terror induced by violent attacks or force (or the threat of its use) against one group of people (direct target) or their property as a means to intimidate and coerce another group of people (indirect target) and influence their actions in order to reach further political objectives. Terrorist acts are the violent acts that form part of such a strategy. I will furthermore distinguish between strong and weakterrorism: When the direct targets are so-called innocents it is strongterrorism; in any other case it is weakterrorism. I focus on the question of whether killing in the course of acts of weakterrorism may be justified, and if so, under what conditions. According to mydefinition, weakterrorism is characterised by violent acts that are not intentionally directed against so called innocents, i.e. people who cannot be held responsible for the problem the terrorists are fighting and are thus immune from attack. (shrink)

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This is the first comprehensive discussion of all the main philosophical issues raised byterrorism against the background of its past and recent developments. Prominent philosophers discuss definitions ofterrorism, approaches to its moral evaluation, and the contentious subject of stateterrorism. Also included are four case studies, showing how the concepts and arguments philosophers deploy in discussing violence, war andterrorism apply to particular instances of both insurgent and stateterrorism, ranging from World War (...) II to September 11, 2001. (shrink)

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This article disputes the premise dominant in moral philosophy and the social sciences that a strictdefinition ofterrorism is needed in order to evaluate and confront contemporary political violence. It argues that adefinition ofterrorism is not only unhelpful, but also impossible if the historicity and flexibility of the concept are to be taken seriously. Failure to account forterrorism as a historical phenomenon produces serious analytical and epistemological problems that result in an (...) anachronistic, ahistorical, and reductive understanding. Because there are no historically or contextually stable answers to the question whatterrorism is, this article argues for a novel account ofterrorism that replaces the attempt to defineterrorism with an analysis of its meaning and function within a specific context. (shrink)

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In this timely collection of thoughtful and provocative essays, a diverse group of prominent philosophers and political scientists discuss critical issues such as the nature anddefinition ofterrorism.

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This paper begins with a discussion of different definitions of “terrorism” and endorses one version of a tacticaldefinition, so-called because it treatsterrorism as involving the use of a quite specific tactic in the pursuit of political ends, namely, violent attacks upon the innocent. This contrasts with a political statusdefinition in which “terrorism” is defined as any form of sub-state political violence against the state. Some consequences of the tacticaldefinition are explored, (...) notably the fact that it allows for the possibility of stateterrorism against individuals, sub-state groups and other states. But a major problem for the tacticaldefinition is the account to be given of “the innocent.” In line with justwar thinking, the idea of “the innocent” is unpacked in terms of the concept of non-combatants and this in turn is treated as the category of those who are not prosecuting the harm that allows for a legitimate violent response. Problems with this approach are explored, with particular reference to criticisms made by Gregory Kavka. The recent drive to expand the class of those who may be legitimately attacked is subjected to scrutiny. Particular attention is paid to the role of “collective responsibility” and “deserving your government” in these arguments. (shrink)

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Over the last few years, virtually all forms of non-state violence have been labeled as “terrorism”. As a result, differences between various forms of war and violence are lost in the analysis. This article proposes a conceptual distinction betweenterrorism and guerrilla warfare by analyzing their differences and similarities. Definitions ofterrorism and guerrilla warfare are presented. Starting with these definitions, the question of the legitimacy ofterrorism and guerrilla violence is answered with reference to just (...) war theory. Particular attention is paid to the issue of the so called “innocent victims” ofterrorism. (shrink)

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Radical environmental groups engaged in ecotage—or economic sabotage of inanimate objects thought to be complicit in environmental destruction—have been identified as the leading domestic terrorist threat in the post-9/11 “war on terror.” This article examines the case for extending the conventionaldefinition ofterrorism to include attacks not only against noncombatants, but also against inanimate objects, and surveys proposed moral limits suggested by proponents of ecotage. Rejecting the mistaken association between genuine acts ofterrorism and ecotage, it (...) considers the proper moral constraints upon ecotage through an examination of just war theory and nonviolent civil disobedience. (shrink)

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This paper argues that philosophers require a strict canonicaldefinition ofterrorism if they are to be of any use in morally evaluating the changing character war. Thisdefinition ought to be a narrow, critical one, articulating precisely what is wrong withterrorism and strictly specifying which incidents fall into this derogatory category and which do not. I argue against those who avoid definitions or adopt wide and apologetic ones. The latter claim neutrality for themselves and (...) accuse those who defineterrorism strictly of political bias. The apologetics ofterrorism often allege that stringent, critical, definitions ofterrorism beg important questions of justification, renderingterrorism unjustifiable bydefinition. The apologetics ofterrorism however, have an obvious political agenda. Those who deliberately blur the distinctions betweenterrorism and other forms of violence cannot claim academic ?neutrality? or ?objectivity? for their wide, defensive definitions, which are in fact deliberately designed to advance particular political views. (shrink)

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In today’s postmodern world with the latest and top notch internet technologies in the market, if it has become easy and accessible for everyone to communicate with others sitting at the other corner of the world, it has also given rise to the cybercrimes including cyber terro rism which has not only provided grave threats to the whole world but also posed a question of whether with the manipulation of cyber space, cyber terrorists can damage or destroy the physical infrastructure (...) of its target. Owing to easy access to everyone and strong damage done as compared to traditionalterrorism, today terrorists are relying on cyberterrorism as well. The Islamic State has emerged as one of the brutal and violent terrorist organization s which hired cyber experts and manipulated cyber space to the extent that today they are most active and professional cyber users’ terrorist organization of the world. The main focus of the paper is to highlight the basicdefinition of cyberterrorism, how often it is different from traditionalterrorism, use of cyberterrorism, how cyberterrorism can be manipulated through various latest tools and techniques and how Islamic State is using cyber space to spread its message. (shrink)

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Political theory between moralism and realism -- Telling stories : on art's role in dispelling genocide blindness -- How to do things with hypotheticals : assessing thought experiments about torture -- Genealogy as critique : problematizing definitions ofterrorism -- The conceptual tapestry of political violence.

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The article concerns thedefinition of the problem field of a new type of modern terrorist activity in the information space under the conditions of globalization - informationterrorism.The findings systematized, which are presented in the domestic social and political discourse and can serve as the basis for its further comprehensive research in the direction of building its corresponding model / concept. The research strategy of the well-known American methodologist L. Coser used for the analysis of elements of (...) social reality - the search for a set of interrelated indicators (variables) that can clarify the content, conditions for the emergence and development of this research subject.It substantiated that when constructing the problem field of the analysis of informationterrorism as an element of social reality, such indicators can be: first, the interpretation of the very concept of «informationterrorism»;secondly, the analysis of the causes and conditions of the spread of terrorist activity in the information space; thirdly, the classification of the main forms of manifestation of informationterrorism; fourth, the analysis of the main technologies and methods of carrying out terrorist activities of an informational nature; fifth, substantiation of conditions and development of mechanisms against the wide spread of informationterrorism in the modern world.The analysis of the essence of informationterrorism from the standpoint of constructing an analytical (five-link) scheme for researching the problematic field of this type of terrorist activity provides a basis for generalizing and interpreting this new form ofterrorism as the use of information and information infrastructure by certain (states, organizations, structures), on the one hand, for violence against people’s consciousness, manipulation of their behavior using certain methods and methods of influence, and on the other hand – to influence the information and technical structure of the state, with the aim of exerting pressure on the adoption of favorable decisions by states, groups of people or individuals by creating conditions for chaos, panic, etc. (shrink)

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In this paper I consider the general view ofterrorism put forward by Jan Narveson in his “Pacificism andTerrorism: Why We Should Condemn Both” and by Alan Rosenbaum in his “OnTerrorism and the Just War: Some Philosophical Reflections.” This is the view thatterrorism is morally indefensible. Contra Narveson and Rosenbaum, I argue that some forms ofterrorism are morally defensible in some circumstances.In the first section of the paper I will discuss the (...)definition ofterrorism, including the definitions put forward by Narveson and Rosenbaum. In the second section, I will outline an account of collective moral responsibility as a necessary precursor to identifying potentially morally defensible forms ofterrorism. In the third section I outline a morally defensible form ofterrorism, namelyterrorism in which certain categories of morally culpable non-attackers are targeted. (shrink)

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The purpose of this paper is to argue against a certain view of whatterrorism is. In particular, I wish to dispute thedefinition ofterrorism used by philosophers Andrew Vails and Angelo Corlett who separately put forward arguments defending the possibility of morally legitimate acts ofterrorism. In support of this conclusion, they each employ a broaddefinition ofterrorism that makes room for highly discriminate, i.e., precisely targeted, acts of political violence to (...) count asterrorism. Defending a broaddefinition ofterrorism requires the inclusion of such cases. I argue in defense of a more narrowdefinition ofterrorism, one that associatesterrorism with more indiscriminate acts of violence. I believe that thisdefinition better accords with common usage and commonsense. (shrink)

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The terrorist threat remains a disturbing issue for the early 1990s. This book explores whetherterrorism can ever be morally justifiable and if so under what circumstances. Professor Burleigh Taylor Wilkins suggests that the popular characterisation of terrorists as criminals fails to acknowledge the reasons why terrorists resort to violence. It is argued thatterrorism cannot be adequately understood unless the collective responsibility of organised groups, such as political states, for wrongs allegedly done against the groups which the (...) terrorists represent is taken into account.Terrorism and Collective Responsibility provides an analysis of various models of collective responsibility, and it takes into account recent discussions of military responsibility and business ethics. The book also explores the problems thatterrorism poses for the just war tradition. The arguments of prominent philosophers againstterrorism are critically examined and the claim thatterrorism necessarily violates the rights of innocent persons is considered. Wilkins sets forth an originaldefinition ofterrorism that is sure to provoke controversy. (shrink)

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It is facile and factually incorrect to represent suicide terrorists as simply seeking mass destruction, as demented or believing that they will be rewarded by "seventy-two virgins in paradise". In my book The Myth of the Closed Mind: Understanding How and Why People are Rational I felt it was important to deal with the issue ofterrorism by consulting explanatory theories of human behaviour and the substantial research on the strategic pattern of terrorist incidents over the decades, led principally (...) by Professor Robert Pape of Chicago University. -/- To defeat your enemy, you must first understand him. Strangely, we must first grant that, though morally depraved, terrorists are rational: they concoct and execute detailed plans with definite strategic goals in mind. Only once we have granted the terrorist a rational mind can we, in the end, create peace. My argument is that while religion may have a small role interrorism, it is principally politics, or the logic of territorial control, that is the key to understanding the threat we face. -/- This extract from my book is principally about Al Qaeda, but a similar analysis applies to ISIS, the current greatest threat to our peace in the west. -/- The strategic goal of Al Qaeda was simply to repulse what they saw as foreign intervention. ISIS has the same goal, but in order to continue its growth as a state in the sense of a monopoly of coercion over a given geographical area. -/- ISIS, a rogue state that arose in ungoverned space created unintentionally by foreign intervention in Iraq, is now lashing out at foreign governments that have severely shrunk the territory ISIS occupies. Before October 2015, ISIS confined itsterrorism to the goal of extending its territory in Iraq and Syria, and there were no significant ISIS-led or inspired suicide terrorist attacks outside Iraq and Syria. But now, as their territory collapses, they are attacking the countries that have strangled their control of territory in Iraq and Syria: the coalition of western governments – Britain, Belgium, Canada, France, Morocco, Turkey, Russia, the U.S.A. and others – exactly the countries that have recently seen an explosion of suicideterrorism. (shrink)

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I. The New World Order The issue at the center of Giorgio Agamben's book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995), that of the relation of bare life to politics and the law, has, in the ten years since the book's appearance, been propelled so forcefully into the foreground by events on the world political stage that Agamben's central figure has taken on an uncanny actuality.1The images broadcast around the world of Guantánamo Bay appear like visualizations of the homo (...) sacer, thedefinition of which is he who “may be killed and yet not sacrificed.”2 Even more so…. (shrink)

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This essay investigates the possibilities and limits of interdisciplinary research intoterrorism. It is shown that approaches that combine philosophy and international law are necessary, and when such an approach needs to be adopted. However, it is also important not to underestimate how much of a challenge is posed by the absence of agreement concerning thedefinition ofterrorism, and also by the structural differences in the way the two disciplines address the problem and formulate the issues. (...) Not least, the discussion enables us to reach conclusions as to howterrorism research that combines philosophy and international law in particular, and interdisciplinary research intoterrorism in general, can be meaningfully implemented. The individual aspects are clarified on the basis of the discussion surrounding justified measures for combatingterrorism and the justification of the targeted killing of terrorists. (shrink)

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A number of philosophers and feminist authors have recently equated domestic abuse with the ubiquitous and ill-defined concept of “terrorism.” Claudia Card, for instance, argues that domestic abuse is a frequently ignored form ofterrorism that creates and maintains “heterosexual male dominance and female dependence and service”. Alison Jaggar, in a recent article, also concludes that an acceptabledefinition ofterrorism will find rape and domestic violence to be terrorist acts. Yet there seem to be several (...) obstacles to any simple appropriation of the term “terrorism” for cases of domestic abuse. In this paper I will address what I take to be three significant problems that might be raised with regard to any attempt to identify domestic abuse as an act ofterrorism. These problems include the fact that a) definitions ofterrorism usually require clear political motivations, b) definitions ofterrorism normally require that the terrorist intend to create a climate of terror, and c) adopting the termterrorism for cases of domestic abuse might appear simply inappropriate or unhelpful. I will argue, however, that each of these possible objections can be answered effectively and that domestic abuse rightly falls under the rubric ofterrorism. (shrink)

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DebatingTerrorism is an innovative new textbook, addressing a number of key issues in contemporaryterrorism studies from both 'traditional' and 'critical' perspectives. In recent years, theterrorism studies field has grown in quantity and quality, with a growing number of scholars rooted in various professional disciplines beginning to debate the complex dynamics underlying this category of violence. Within the broader field, there are a number of identifiable controversies and questions which divide scholarly opinion and generate opposing (...) arguments. These relate to theoretical issues, such as thedefinition ofterrorism and stateterrorism, substantive issues like the threat posed by al Qaeda and the utility of different responses toterrorism, different pathways leading people to engage in terrorist tactics, and ethical issues such as the torture of terrorist suspects and targeted assassination. This volume aims to bring together in one place many of the field's leading scholars to debate the key issues relating a set of 12 important controversies and questions. The format of the volume involves a leading scholar taking a particular position on the controversy, followed by an opposing or alternative viewpoint written by another scholar. In addition to the pedagogic value of allowing students to read opposing arguments in one place, the volume will also be important for providing an overview of the state of the field and its key lines of debate. This textbook will be essential reading for all students ofterrorism and political violence, criticalterrorism studies, critical security studies, security studies and IR in general. (shrink)

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This paper criticizes three assumptions regardingterrorism and the agents who carry it out: 1) terrorists are always indiscriminate in their targeting, 2)terrorism is never effective in combating oppression, and 3) terrorists never participate in fair negotiations as they merely wish to switch places with their oppressors. By criticizing these three prejudices againstterrorism, the paper does not attempt to justify or excuseterrorism generally nor in the specific case of Sri Lanka which is examined. (...) Instead, it creates the necessary room for such justifications or excuses to be critically appraised by dismantling the popular myths surroundingterrorism. (shrink)

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The ongoing duel between realist and anti-realist tendencies in film theory usually positions the ideas of André Bazin unambiguously on the realist side. Whatever else we expect to find in his writing – and the current resurgence is finding more and more – we should find this: realism, cinematic realism. But what type of realism? Is it ontological, and, if so, is it based on a claim for the primacy of photography's “analogical” relation to the world, even to the point (...) of a “direct contact” with the physical existence of nature? Is it aesthetic, celebrating depth of field? Unaffected mise-en-scène? The documentary impulse in preference to fantasy or artifice? In this article, however, I want to argue that we must expand thedefinition of Bazinian realism through its sensitivity to the non-human. The terrain of the cinematic “Real” is inhabited by a singular complex, one that includes physical space, animality, and material objects, as well as persons and events. To shift our attention to these elements and their effects – intimate as well as alienating, familiar as well as jarring and unexpected – offers another way to glimpse the Real. Which is not to say that the socially constituted world drops out. Of course, language, gender and culture are inescapable mediations. Yet they are, in a certain sense, all wrought by a transcendent human hand. Bazin's conception of realism provides access to a space that is less anthropocentric and testifies to an immanence of the Real, such that non-human, objective realism is not about capturing reality in toto but registering the fact that the human is only a part of reality. There are realities beyond human subjectivity – in space, in objects, in animality – realities that we are put in contact with by cinema. Ideally, what cinema makes possible is an equality, a democratic freedom, not merely for the human spectator – to view and explore film worlds – but for the viewed “object” too: a democracy of the viewer-viewed that installs intersubjectivity in the Real. (shrink)

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The immediate perception after 9/11 was that we were entering a world of “newterrorism”: new actors, new tactics, new responses. And yet more than a decade later, it seems that not much has really changed, or that the changes have been contextual rather than structural. Authors have used the modifier “new” in many different ways, creating a contested and confused understanding of whatterrorism is and how it appears in the world. The same applies to how one (...) definesterrorism, examines its domains and forms, delineates its actors and strategies, or compares it to state violence and fear in international relations. This raises the question of why scholars, rather than agreeing on adefinition ofterrorism, have focused on its many contexts, applications, and psychologies, concluding that there is a substantial and significant difference between the old and the newterrorism. However, when one tests this notion of the “newterrorism” against the case of Al-Qaeda, one finds that the tactical changes, primarily technological, as well as those in motivation and organization, are hardly new, and that the structural, ideological, and political features ofterrorism have remained fundamentally the same. (shrink)

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: The evolution of the U.S. war onterrorism is on a path that poses a substantial probability of losing to it, although not necessarily of a victory by its declared targets. That conclusion follows from thedefinition presented ofterrorism and thus central questions about the merits of responses justified by an objective of reducing it. Likely American responses to 9/11 are suggested by a review of well‐known policy‐making tendencies from past scholarship and experience, tendencies well‐established (...) prior to 9/11 and by no means unique to the Bush II presidency. The expectations those tendencies suggest have been born out by what the United States has done and not done. Well‐established criteria and their implied rules of practice for security enhancing great‐power statecraft are presented, and the chosen U.S. program of action is found to be counter‐productive in their light. (shrink)

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ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word ‘terrorism’has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for adefinition that captures the trait, or traits, ofterrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of (...) class='Hi'>terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology ofterrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify asterrorism, so that we can speak of non‐violentterrorism? Ifterrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense canterrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of ‘stateterrorism’, or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who defineterrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the followingdefinition:terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take. (shrink)

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Modern slavery is a major topic of concern in international law and global governance, in civil society, and in academic debates. Yet, what does modern slavery mean, and can its highly different forms be covered in a single concept? This paper discusses these questions in three steps: First, it develops common definitions of modern slavery. Second, it discusses critical rejections of these definitions. The two camps that adhere to the definitions of modern slavery, and that reject them, respectively, face certain (...) limits. In a third step, the paper takes up with the limits and the strengths of both. It suggests that the limits of definitions of modern slavery can be overcome by critical approaches; and that the limits of critical approaches can be overcome by definitions of modern slavery. The key is their integration into a human rights frame. Ultimately, the paper proposes an approach to modern slavery that neither relies on a binary distinction between slavery and non-slavery, nor does it strive for the abolishment of the concept of modern slavery. Rather, the paper calls for a normatively and contextually embedded approach within the human rights frame. (shrink)

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