Works by Dean Zimmerman
85 found
Order:
1 filter applied
DisambiguationsDisambiguations:
| Dean W. Zimmerman [53] | Dean Zimmerman [38] | Dean Wallace Zimmerman [1] |
- Contemporary debates in metaphysics.Theodore Sider,John P. Hawthorne &Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) -2008 - Malden, MA: Blackwell.This anthology introduces advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students to today's debates in metaphysics. The book consists of essays by contemporary metaphysicians, and all but one appear here for the first time. For each of nine topics, there are two essays, one "pro-" and one "con-".
- Theories of masses and problems of constitution.Dean W. Zimmerman -1995 -Philosophical Review 104 (1):53-110.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact[email protected].
- The privileged present : Defending an "a-theory" of time.Dean Zimmerman -2008 - In Theodore Sider, John P. Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman,Contemporary debates in metaphysics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 211--225.Uncorrected Proof; please cite published version.
- Presentism and the space-time manifold.Dean Zimmerman -2011 - In Craig Callender,The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 163-246.
- The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’.Dean W. Zimmerman -2005 -Dialectica 59 (4):401-457.The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name ‘taking tense seriously’; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A-theories (or what are sometimes called ‘tensed theories of time’). Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A-theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: (...) growing-block theorists eschew ontological commitment to future entities; presentists, to future and past entities. Others think of themselves as A-theorists but exclude no past or future things from their ontology. The metaphysical skeptic suspects that their attempt to articulate an ‘eternalist’ version of the A-theory collapses into merely ‘taking tense seriously’– a thesis that does not imply the A-theory. The second half of the paper is the search for a stable eternalist A-theory. It includes discussion of temporary intrinsics, temporal parts, and truth. (shrink)
- Could extended objects be made out of simple parts? An argument for "atomless gunk".Dean W. Zimmerman -1996 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):1-29.Let us say that an extended object is “composed wholly of simples” just in case it is an aggregate of absolutely unextended parts spread throughout an extended region—that is, just in case there is a set S such that: every member is a point-sized part of the object, and for every x, x is part of the object if and only if it has a part in common with some member of S. Could a truly extended substance be composed entirely (...) of unextended parts? Reflection upon the fact that it must be at least possible for extended objects to touch one another suggests that the answer to this question is: No. (shrink)
- Persistence and presentism.Dean W. Zimmerman -1996 -Philosophical Papers 25 (2):115-126.The ‘friends of temporal parts’ and their opponents disagree about how things persist through time. The former, who hold what is sometimes called a ‘4D’ theory of persistence, typically claim that all objects that last for any period of time are spread out through time in the same way that spatially extended objects are spread out through space — a different part for each region that the object fills. David Lewis calls this manner of persisting ‘perdurance’. The opposing, ‘3D’ theory (...) has it that at least some objects do not persist in this manner; they ‘endure’ through time by ‘being wholly present at more than one time’.1 A related dispute pits ‘presentists’ against ‘non-presentists’. Presentists hold that the only things that really exist are those that exist now, at the present moment; and nonpresentists believe in something like a ‘block-universe’ in which non-simultaneous objects and events nevertheless co-exist (in a tenseless or non-temporal sense). Of late, the relations between these four positions have come under considerable scrutiny.2 As Ned Markosian has pointed out, it would be surprising if commitment to a perdurance or endurance theory of persistence automatically foreclosed one’s options in the presentism—non-presentism debate. But, says Markosian, that is just what the standard formulations of the perdurance and endurance theories imply.3 David Lewis has set the terms of the debate; in his usage, someone who thinks that all persisting objects endure would be said to hold the following. (shrink)
- The Oxford handbook of metaphysics.Michael J. Loux &Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) -2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics offers the most authoritative and compelling guide to this diverse and fertile field of philosophy. Twenty-four of the world's most distinguished specialists provide brand-new essays about 'what there is': what kinds of things there are, and what relations hold among entities falling under various categories. They give the latest word on such topics as identity, modality, time, causation, persons and minds, freedom, and vagueness. The Handbook's unrivaled breadth and depth make it the definitive reference work (...) for students and academics across the philosophical spectrum. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Metaphysics: The Big Questions.Peter van Inwagen &Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) -1991 - Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.This volume provides a vital student resource: a collection of the essential classic and contemporary readings in metaphysics.
- Indivisible Parts and Extended Objects.Dean W. Zimmerman -1996 -The Monist 79 (1):148-180.Physical boundaries and the earliest topologists. Topology has a relatively short history; but its 19th century roots are embedded in philosophical problems about the nature of extended substances and their boundaries which go back to Zeno and Aristotle. Although it seems that there have always been philosophers interested in these matters, questions about the boundaries of three-dimensional objects were closest to center stage during the later medieval and modern periods. Are the boundaries of an object actually existing, less-than-three-dimensional parts of (...) the object—that is, are solids bounded by two-dimensional surfaces, surfaces by one-dimensional “edges” or “physical lines”, edges by dimensionless “simples”? If not, how does a perfectly spherical object manage to touch a perfectly flat object—what part of the sphere is in immediate contact with the plane, if the sphere has no unextended parts? But if such parts be admitted, are we not then saddled with “actual infinities” of simples, lines, and surfaces spread throughout each continuous object—the boundaries of all the object’s internal parts? Does it help to say that these internal boundaries exist only “potentially”? (shrink)
- I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman -2010 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119-150.Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an adverbial construal (if they (...) are modifications of the thing that is conscious because of them, not properties of something else to which the subject of consciousness is related), then the property dualist can be driven to speculative forms of materialism none of which, at this point, looks more likely to be true than the more modest versions of emergent dualism defended by contemporary substance dualists. (shrink)
- Distinct indiscernibles and the bundle theory.Dean W. Zimmerman -1997 -Mind 106 (422):305-309.
- The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival.Dean W. Zimmerman -1999 -Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):194-212.It is not easy to be a materialist and yet believe that there is a way for human beings to survive death. Peter van Inwagen identifies the central obstacle the materialist faces: Namely, the need to posit appropriate “immanent-causal” connections between my body as it is at death and some living body elsewhere or elsewhen. I offer a proposal, consistent with van Inwagen’s own materialist metaphysics, for making materialism compatible with the possibility of survival.
- Temporal parts and supervenient causation: The incompatibility of two Humean doctrines.Dean W. Zimmerman -1998 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):265 – 288.
- The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics.Michael J. Loux &Dean W. Zimmerman -2004 -Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):375-376.No categories
- The Constitution of Persons by Bodies.Dean W. Zimmerman -2002 -Philosophical Topics 30 (1):295-338.
- (1 other version)Material people.Dean W. Zimmerman -2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman,The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 491-526.
- (1 other version)Immanent causation.Dean W. Zimmerman -1997 -Philosophical Perspectives 11:433-471.
- Persons: Human and Divine.Peter van Inwagen &Dean Zimmerman -2009 -International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (1):59-64.
- Yet another anti-molinist argument.Dean Zimmerman -2009 - In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen,Metaphysics and the good: themes from the philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. New York: Oxford University Press.‘Molinism’, in contemporary usage, is the name for a theory about the workings of divine providence. Its defenders include some of the most prominent contemporary Protestant and Catholic philosophical theologians.¹ Molinism is often said to be the only way to steer a middle..
- Substance: Its Nature and Existence.Dean W. Zimmerman,Joshua Hoffman &Gary S. Rosenkrantz -1999 -Philosophical Review 108 (1):118.This book addresses two basic questions: What is the proper philosophical analysis of the concept of substance? and What kinds of compound substances are there? The second question is mainly addressed by asking what relations among objects are necessary and sufficient for their coming to compose a larger whole. The first 72 pages of the book contain a short history of attempts to answer the first question, and a brief presentation of the analysis the authors defend at length in their (...) earlier book, Substance Among Other Categories. In the remaining 119 pages, the authors take up the second question. This order of presentation makes sense; but it may help to create a false impression in those who only glance at the first few pages—that this book is just a simplified version of the earlier one, with a little bit of history thrown in. It would be quite unfortunate, however, if very many potential readers get this impression; for it might discourage them from looking closely at the bulk of the book, which is new. The issues discussed in the later chapters are at the center of one of the most lively debates in contemporary metaphysics; and the position Hoffman and Rosenkrantz stake out is appealing and carefully articulated. Their views deserve careful attention from philosophers working on the metaphysics of persistence through time, personal identity, artifact identity, and mereology. (shrink)
- Chisholm and the Essences of Events.Dean Zimmerman -1997 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn,The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court. pp. 73--100.
- From Experience to Experiencer.Dean Zimmerman -2010 - In Mark C. Baker & Stewart Goetz,The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations Into the Existence of the Soul. Continuum Press. pp. 168.
- Criteria of Identity and the 'Identity Mystics'.Dean Zimmerman -1998 -Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):281 - 301.
- Coincident Objects: Could a Stuff Ontology Help.Dean W. Zimmerman -1997 -Analysis 57 (1):19-27.
- Personal identity and the survival of death.Dean Zimmerman -2013 - In Fred Feldman Ben Bradley,The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oxford University Press. pp. 97.
- A Recent Defense of Monism Based Upon the Internal Relatedness of All Things.Dean Zimmerman -2016 - In Anna Marmodoro & David Yates,The Metaphysics of Relations. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
- The A-Theory of Time, Presentism, and Open Theism.Dean Zimmerman -2009 - In Melville Y. Stewart,Science and Religion in Dialogue. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 789--809.This chapter contains sections titled: * I Introduction * II A-Theories and B-Theories * III Competing Versions of the A-Theory * IV Presentism a Trivial Truth? * V Open Theism and the A-Theory of Time * VI The âTruthmakerâ Argument * VII Conclusion * Notes.
- Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1.Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.) -2004 - Oxford University Press.Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this new series will be a much-needed focus for it. OSM will offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy (...) of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here. (shrink)
- Problems for Animalism.Dean Zimmerman -2008 -Abstracta 4 (S1):23-31.My comments have two parts. I begin by laying out the argument that seems to me to be at the core of Olson’s thinking about human persons; and I suggest a problem with his reasons for accepting one of its premises. The premise is warranted by its platitudinous or commonsensical status; but Olson’s arguments lead him to conclusions that undermine the family of platitudes to which it belongs. Then I’ll raise a question about how Olson should construe the vagueness that (...) would seem to infect the boundaries of human animals. (shrink)
- Persons: Human and Divine.Peter Van Inwagen &Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) -2007 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press UK.The nature of persons is a perennial topic of debate in philosophy, currently enjoying something of a revival. In this volume for the first time metaphysical debates about the nature of human persons are brought together with related debates in philosophy of religion and theology. Fifteen specially written essays explore idealist, dualist, and materialist views of persons, discuss specifically Christian conceptions of the value of embodiment, and address four central topics in philosophical theology: incarnation, resurrection, original sin, and the trinity.
- One really big liquid sphere: Reply to Lewis.Dean W. Zimmerman -1999 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):213 – 215.
- Two cartesian arguments for the simplicity of the soul.Dean Zimmerman -1991 -American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (3):127-37.The most well-known arguments for the simplicity of the soul - i.e., for the thesis that the subject of psychological states must be an unextended substance -are based upon the logical possibility of disembodiment. Descartes introduced this sort of argument into modern philosophy, and a version of it has been defended recently by Richard Swinburne. Some of the underlying assumptions of both arguments are examined and defended, but a closer look reveals that each depends upon unjustified inferences from the conceivability (...) of a certain state of affairs to the logical possibility of that state of affairs. (shrink)
- Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind.Dean W. Zimmerman -2006 - In John Corcoran,Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edition. macmillan.
- Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5.Dean Zimmerman (ed.) -2009 - Oxford University Press UK.Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this series is a much-needed focus for it. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides (...) independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. This fifth volume is largely focused on the metaphysics of time, with sections on time travel; persistence through time; and time, space, and location. The final section of the volume is devoted to a neglected topic that is starting to attract philosophical attention: the metaphysics of sounds. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here. (shrink)
- Theology and tense.Roderick M. Chisholm &Dean W. Zimmerman -1997 -Noûs 31 (2):262-265.
- (2 other versions)Oxford Studies in Metaphysics I.Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.) -2004 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is a major new series dedicated to the timely publication of new work in this highly fertile field of philosophy.
- Prologue: metaphysics after the twentieth century.Dean W. Zimmerman -2004 -Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:9-22.No categories
- God Inside Time and Before Creation.Dean Zimmerman -2001 - In Gregory E. Ganssle & David M. Woodruff,God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--94.Many theists reject the notion that God’s eternity consists in his timelessness — i.e., in his lacking temporal extension and failing to possess properties at any times. Some of these “divine temporalists” hold that, for philosophical reasons, it is impossible to accept both the timelessness of God and the view that God knows what happens at different times and brings about events in time. 1 Many reject divine timelessness as a dubious import from Platonism with no biblical or theological warrant.2 (...) And some question the very intelligibility of the doctrine. (shrink)
- Resisting Rowe's No-Best-World Argument for Atheism.Dean Zimmerman -2019 - In Mirosław Szatkowski,Quo Vadis, Metaphysics?: Essays in Honor of Peter van Inwagen. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 443-468.
- Christians should affirm mind-body dualism.Dean W. Zimmerman -2003 - In Michael L. Peterson,Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Hoboken: Blackwell. pp. 315--326.
- Scala and the Spinning Spheres.Dean W. Zimmerman -2002 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):398-405.I have argued that contemporary humeans face a trilemma: either (i) give up temporal parts. (ii) deny the humean supervenience of causal relations, or (iii) deny the possibility of there being a difference between rotating and nonrotating homogeneous spheres. Mark Scala (“Homogeneous Simples”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64, 2002) describes an interesting class of seemingly possible objects, spinning and stationary simples; and argues their possibility undermines my argument. I argue that it does not. And 1 conclude with a more (...) general assessment of the status of objections to humeanism from the possibility of homogeneous objects in motion. (shrink)
- On Perceiving God: Prospects for a Cognitive Science of Religious Experience.Mark C. Baker &Dean Zimmerman -2019 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Brian P. McLaughlin,Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 125-154.
- Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 6.Karen Bennett &Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) -2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this series is a much-needed focus for it.
- Ever Better Situations and the Failure of Expression Principles.Dean Zimmerman -2018 -Faith and Philosophy 35 (4):408-416.William Rowe argues that if an omnipotent, omniscient being were faced with an infinite hierarchy of better and better worlds to create, that being could not also be unsurpassably morally excellent. His argument assumes that, at least in ideal circumstances, degree of moral goodness must be perfectly expressed in the degree of goodness of the outcomes chosen. Reflection upon the application of analogous expression principles for certainty and desire shows that such principles can be expected to fail for anyone capable (...) of facing an infinite range of options. (shrink)No categories
- Mind-Body Dualism.Dean Zimmerman &Penelope Mackie -2011 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):181 - 199.I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind. I take issue with Zimmerman's contention that the vagueness of 'garden variety' material objects such as brains or bodies makes them unsuitable candidates for the possession of phenomenal properties. I also argue that the 'speculative materialism' that is (...) available to a substance materialist property dualist who abandons the identification of persons with such garden variety objects is significantly more attractive than Zimmerman allows. Although I do not attempt to refute its substance dualist rival, I conclude that the combination of property dualism with substance materialism can withstand Zimmerman's objections. (shrink)
- I. The 'bruteness' of CFs.Dean Zimmerman -2011 - In Ken Perszyk,Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 163.No categories
- Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 10.Karen Bennett &Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) -2017 - Oxford University Press UK.Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philsophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical (...) essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here. (shrink)
- Oxford Studies in Metaphysics:Volume 3: Volume 3.Dean Zimmerman (ed.) -2007 - Oxford University Press UK.Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this new series is a much-needed focus for it. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. (...) Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here. (shrink)
- Robinson's Regress Argument from Vagueness to Dualism.Dean Zimmerman -2022 -Dialectica 999 (1).Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite different arguments from the vagueness of composite objects to the conclusion that I am not a physical object at all. One of them, developed over the course of several chapters, takes the following form: All composite physical objects (and only composite physical objects are candidates to be a human being) are non-fundamental; non-fundamental things are inevitably vague in various ways; this vagueness shows that we must "make a conceptual (...) interpretation of them", treating them as "artefacts of conceptualisation"; and this in turn precludes our identifying ourselves with any such things. Some interesting morals fall out of close consideration of Robinson's argument; but, in the end, materialists can reasonably resist it. (shrink)No categories
| 1 — 50 / 85 |
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server or OpenAthens.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
 Email |  RSS feed |
Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Home |New books and articles |Bibliographies |Philosophy journals |About PhilPapers |API |Contact us |Code of conduct
PhilPapers logo byAndrea Andrews andMeghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see ourterms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).Use of this site is subject toterms & conditions.
All rights reserved byThe PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-54b44b69b7-g6h22 uwo