What is a Law of Nature?David Malet Armstrong -1983 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Sydney Shoemaker.detailsFirst published in 1985, D. M. Armstrong's original work on what laws of nature are has continued to be influential in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Presenting a definitive attack on the sceptical Humean view, that laws are no more than a regularity of coincidence between stances of properties, Armstrong establishes his own theory and defends it concisely and systematically against objections. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Marc (...) Lange, illuminating its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this influential work is available for a new generation of readers. (shrink)
Universals and scientific realism.David Malet Armstrong -1978 - New York: Cambridge University Press.detailsv. 1. Nominalism and realism.--v. 2. A theory of universals.
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.David Malet Armstrong -1989 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.detailsDavid Armstrong's book is a contribution to the philosophical discussion about possible worlds. Taking Wittgenstein's Tractatus as his point of departure, Professor Armstrong argues that nonactual possibilities and possible worlds are recombinations of actually existing elements, and as such are useful fictions. There is an extended criticism of the alternative-possible-worlds approach championed by the American philosopher David Lewis. This major work will be read with interest by a wide range of philosophers.
Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind.David Malet Armstrong &Norman Malcolm -1984 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell. Edited by Norman Malcolm.detailsTwo distinguished philosophers present opposing views on the questions of howthe objects of consciousness are perceived. (Philosophy).
The headless woman illusion and the defence of materialism.David Malet Armstrong -1968 -Analysis 29 (2):48--9.detailsThe paper tries to rebut an objection to materialism. Anti-Materialists have argued that mental processes do not appear to be mere physical processes in the brain, And that secondary qualities such as sounds do not appear to be mere vibrations in the air. So materialists must admit that introspection and perception involve at least the illusion of the falsity of materialism. Using the headless woman illusion as a model, It is shown how the illusion is generated, And that it is (...) exactly what we ought to expect even if materialism is true. (shrink)
What makes induction rational?David Malet Armstrong -1991 -Dialogue 30 (4):503-11.detailsIn this paper I put forward what I think is a new approach to the problem of induction. I sketched the approach in brief sections of a book published in 1983. The same idea had occurred to the English philosopher John Foster and he presented it in a paper at about the same time.