Results for 'Daniel Stephen Brooks'
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- Levels of Organization in the Biological Sciences.DanielStephenBrooks,James DiFrisco &William C. Wimsatt (eds.) -2021 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.The subject of this edited volume is the idea of levels of organization: roughly, the idea that the natural world is segregated into part-whole relationships of increasing spatiotemporal scale and complexity. The book comprises a collection of essays that raise the idea of levels into its own topic of analysis. Owing to the wide prominence of the idea of levels, the scope of the volume is aimed at theoreticians, philosophers, and practicing researchers of all stripes in the life sciences. The (...) volume’s contributions reflect this diversity, and draw from fields such as developmental biology, evolutionary biology, molecular biology, ecology, cell biology, and neuroscience. The book presents wide-ranging novel insights on causation and levels, the hierarchical structure of evolution, the role of levels in biological theory, and more. (shrink)
- Inconsistent with the data: Support for the CLASH model depends on the wrong kind of latitude.Darren Burke,Danielle Sulikowski,IanStephen &RobertBrooks -2017 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40.
- Levels of Organization in Biology.Markus Eronen &DanielStephenBrooks -unknown -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Levels of organization are structures in nature, usually defined by part-whole relationships, with things at higher levels being composed of things at the next lower level. Typical levels of organization that one finds in the literature include the atomic, molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, organismal, group, population, community, ecosystem, landscape, and biosphere levels. References to levels of organization and related hierarchical depictions of nature are prominent in the life sciences and their philosophical study, and appear not only in introductory textbooks and (...) lectures, but also in cutting-edge research articles and reviews. In philosophy, perennial debates such as reduction, emergence, mechanistic explanation, interdisciplinary relations, natural selection, and many other topics, also rely substantially on the notion. -/- Yet, in spite of the ubiquity of the notion, levels of organization have received little explicit attention in biology or its philosophy. Usually they appear in the background as an implicit conceptual framework that is associated with vague intuitions. Attempts at providing general and broadly applicable definitions of levels of organization have not met wide acceptance. In recent years, several authors have put forward localized and minimalistic accounts of levels, and others have raised doubts about the usefulness of the notion as a whole. -/- There are many kinds of ‘levels’ that one may find in philosophy, science, and everyday life—the term is notoriously ambiguous. Besides levels of organization, there are levels of abstraction, realization, being, analysis, processing, theory, science, complexity, and many others. In this article, the focus will be on levels of organization and debates associated with them, and other kinds of levels will only be discussed when they are relevant to this main topic. (shrink)
- Book Notes. [REVIEW]Jeremy D. Bendik‐Keymer,ThomBrooks,Daniel B. Cohen,Michael Davis,Sara Goering,Barbara V. Nunn,Michael J. Stephens,James C. Taggart,Roy T. Tsao &Lori Watson -2003 -Ethics 113 (2):456-462.
- Kinship intensity and the use of mental states in moral judgment across societies.Cameron M. Curtin,H. Clark Barrett,Alexander Bolyanatz,Alyssa N. Crittenden,Daniel Fessler,Simon Fitzpatrick,Michael Gurven,Martin Kanovsky,Stephen Laurence,Anne Pisor,Brooke Scelza,Stephen Stich,Chris von Rueden &Joseph Henrich -2020 -Evolution and Human Behavior 41 (5):415-429.Decades of research conducted in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic (WEIRD) societies have led many scholars to conclude that the use of mental states in moral judgment is a human cognitive universal, perhaps an adaptive strategy for selecting optimal social partners from a large pool of candidates. However, recent work from a more diverse array of societies suggests there may be important variation in how much people rely on mental states, with people in some societies judging accidental harms just (...) as harshly as intentional ones. To explain this variation, we develop and test a novel cultural evolutionary theory proposing that the intensity of kin-based institutions will favor less attention to mental states when judging moral violations. First, to better illuminate the historical distribution of the use of intentions in moral judgment, we code and analyze anthropological observations from the Human Area Relations Files. This analysis shows that notions of strict liability—wherein the role for mental states is reduced—were common across diverse societies around the globe. Then, by expanding an existing vignette-based experimental dataset containing observations from 321 people in a diverse sample of 10 societies, we show that the intensity of a society's kin-based institutions can explain a substantial portion of the population-level variation in people's reliance on intentions in three different kinds of moral judgments. Together, these lines of evidence suggest that people's use of mental states has coevolved culturally to fit their local kin-based institutions. We suggest that although reliance on mental states has likely been a feature of moral judgment in human communities over historical and evolutionary time, the relational fluidity and weak kin ties of today's WEIRD societies position these populations' psychology at the extreme end of the global and historical spectrum. (shrink)
- Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment.H. Clark Barrett,Alexander Bolyanatz,Alyssa N. Crittenden,Daniel M. T. Fessler,Simon Fitzpatrick,Michael Gurven,Joseph Henrich,Martin Kanovsky,Geoff Kushnick,Anne Pisor,Brooke A. Scelza,Stephen Stich,Chris von Rueden,Wanying Zhao &Stephen Laurence -2016 -Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113 (17):4688–4693.Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Al- though these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating circumstances influence (...) moral judgments. Although participants in all societies took such factors into account to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment. (shrink)
- Assessing responsible innovation training.Bernd Carsten Stahl,Christine Aicardi,LaurenceBrooks,Peter J. Craigon,Mayen Cunden,Saheli Datta Burton,Martin De Heaver,Stevienna De Saille,Serena Dolby,Liz Dowthwaite,Damian Eke,Stephen Hughes,Paul Keene,Vivienne Kuh,Virginia Portillo,Danielle Shanley,Melanie Smallman,Michael Smith,Jack Stilgoe,Inga Ulnicane,Christian Wagner &Helena Webb -2023 -Journal of Responsible Technology 16 (C):100063.No categories
- Ramist Dialectic in Leibniz's Early Thought.Stephen H.Daniel -2009 - In Mark Kulstad, Mogens Laerke & David Snyder,The philosophy of the young Leibniz. Stuttgart: Steiner. pp. 59-66.
- The Nature of Light in Descartes' Physics.Stephen H.Daniel -1976 -Philosophical Forum 7 (3):323.Export citation
Bookmark - Teaching Recent Continental Philosophy.Stephen H.Daniel -2004 - In Tziporah Kasachkoff,Teaching Philosophy: Theoretical Reflections and Practical Suggestions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 197-206.An explanation of how to organize and teach a course in recent continental thought, including treatments of the major figures in critical theory, hermeneutics, structuralism, deconstruction, psychoanalytic feminism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and postmodernism. Reprint from *In the Socratic Tradition: Essays on Teaching Philosophy*, ed. Tziporah Kasachkoff (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).Export citation Bookmark
- Wittgenstein on Field and Stream.Stephen H.Daniel -1977 -Auslegung 4:176-98.
- Interpretation in medicine: An introduction.Stephen L.Daniel -1990 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 11 (1):5-8.Export citation Bookmark
- Incoming Editor’s Note.Stephen H.Daniel -2006 -Berkeley Studies 17:3.A quick introduction to my becoming the editor of *Berkeley Studies* in 2006.No categories
- The Philosophic Methodology of John Toland.Stephen H.Daniel -1977 - Dissertation, Saint Louis UniversityExport citation Bookmark
- The Hermit Philosopher of Liendo.Daniel Kading &I. K. Stephens -1952 -Philosophical Review 61 (1):127.No categories
- The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards: A Study in Divine Semiotics.Stephen HartleyDaniel -1994 - Indiana University Press.An examination of Edwards’ ontology and his ideas on creation, God, sin, freedom, virtue, and beauty.
- Montréal Conference Summaries.Stephen H.Daniel &Sébastien Charles -2012 -Berkeley Studies 23:54-57.In June of 2012 scholars from Europe and North America met in Montreal to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the publication of George Berkeley's *Passive Obedience*. In this articleStephenDaniel summarizes the English presentations, and Sébastien Charles summarizes the French presentations, on how Berkeley invokes naturalistic themes in developing a moral theory while still allowing a role for God.
- Metaphor in the Historiography of Philosophy.Stephen H.Daniel -1986 -Clio: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History 15 (2):191-210.
- Vico's historicism and the ontology of arguments.Stephen H.Daniel -1995 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (3):431-446.Vico's historicist claims (1) that different ages are intelligible only in their own terms and (2) that the certainty and authority of history depend on its narrative formulation seem at odds with his doctrines of ideal eternal history and divine providence. He resolves these issues, however, in his treatment of ideal eternal history by using the distinction between the certain and the true to show how rhetorical expression generates meaning in and as history. Specifically, by appealing to an ontology that (...) informs the propositional logic of the early Stoics and the ideas of Peter Ramus and his followers, Vico treats historical events as legal pronouncements and grammatical reformations of syntax. In this way he displaces the predicate logic of ancient and modern thinkers who treat rhetoric as a mere embellishment of argumentation. (shrink)
- Editor’s Note: The Karlsruhe Conference: Highlights, Prospects.Stephen H.Daniel -2009 -Berkeley Studies 20:3-4.Export citation Bookmark
- Some Conflicting Assumptions of Journalistic Ethics.Stephen H.Daniel -1992 - In Elliot D. Cohen,Philosophical Issues in Journalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 50--58.
- George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy.Stephen H.Daniel -2021 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.This book is a study of the philosophy of the early 18th century Irish philosopher George Berkeley in the intellectual context of his times, with a particular focus on how, for Berkeley, mind is related to its ideas. It does not assume that thinkers like Descartes, Malebranche, or Locke define for Berkeley the context in which he develops his own thought. Instead, he indicates how Berkeley draws on a tradition that informed his early training and that challenges much of the (...) early modern thought with which he is often associated. Specifically, the book indicates how Berkeley's distinctive treatment of mind (as the activity whereby objects are differentiated and related to one another) highlights how mind neither precedes the existence of objects nor exists independently of them. This distinctive way of understanding the relation of mind and objects allows Berkeley to appropriate ideas from his contemporaries in a manner that transforms the issues with which he is engaged. The resulting insights--for example, about how God creates the minds that perceive objects--are only now starting to be fully appreciated. (shrink)
- A philosophical theory of literary continuity and change.Stephen H.Daniel -1980 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):275-280.
- Berkeley's Semantic Treatment of Representation.Stephen H.Daniel -2008 -History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (1):41 - 55.
- Ethical Theory and Journalistic Ethics.Stephen H.Daniel -1982 -International Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1):19-25.
- Myth and Rationality in Mandeville.Stephen H.Daniel -1986 -Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (4):595-609.Bernard Mandeville's early work *Typhon* reveals how his *Fable of the Bees* can be understood not only as an extended commentary of an Aesopic fable but also as a form of mythic writing. The appeal to the mythic in discourse provides him with the opportunity to give both a genetic account of the development of language and social practices and a functional account of the the socializing impact of myths (including classical ones). The artificial distinction between treating Mandeville's writings as (...) exclusively philosophy or literature is overcome by means of his identification of the mythic origin of meaning and rationality. (shrink)
- Myth and the Grammar of Discovery in Francis Bacon.Stephen H.Daniel -1982 -Philosophy and Rhetoric 15 (4):219 - 237.
- Postmodernity, Poststructuralism, and the Historiography of Modern Philosophy.Stephen H.Daniel -1995 -International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):255-267.Well-known for its criticism of totalizing accounts of reason and truth, postmodern thought also makes positive contributions to our understanding of the sensual, ideological, and linguistic contingencies that inform modernist representations of self, history, and the world. The positive side of postmodernity includes structuralism and poststructuralism, particularly as expressed by theorists concerned with practices of the body (Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze), commodity differences (Adorno, Althusser), language (Derrida), and gender (Kristeva, Irigaray). Though these challenges to modernity do not privilege subjectivity, they suggest (...) provocative new strategies for appreciating the work of thinkers from Bacon to Kant. (shrink)
- The Narrative Character of Myth and Philosophy in Vico.Stephen H.Daniel -1988 -International Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):1-9.
- John Toland: His Methods, Manners, and Mind.Stephen HartleyDaniel -1984 - McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP.This study is the first sympathetic philosophical treatment in English of the complete works of John Toland (1670-1722). ProfessorDaniel presents Toland as a champion of religious toleration and civil liberty whose writing is important because it brings.
- Berkeley on God's Knowledge of Pain.Stephen H.Daniel -2018 - In Stefan Storrie,Berkeley's Three Dialogues: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 136-145.
- Myth and modern philosophy.Stephen HartleyDaniel -1990 - Philadelphia: Temple University Press.A study of the historiographic significance and use of mythic or fabular thinking in Bacon, Descartes, Mandeville, Vico, Herder, and others.
- The patient as text: A model of clinical hermeneutics.Stephen L.Daniel -1986 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 7 (2).The art of interpretation has traditionally been an integral part of medical practice, but little attention has been devoted to its theory. Hermeneutics or the study of interpretation has grown as a methodological interest primarily within the humanities. Borrowing from the medieval fourfold sense of scripture, which organizes interpretive activity both logically and comprehensively, I propose a hermeneutical model of clinical decision-making. According to the model, a patient is analogous to a literary text which may be interpreted on four levels: (...) (1) the literal facts of the patient's body and the literal story told by the patient, (2) the diagnostic meaning of the literal data, (3) the praxis (prognosis and therapeutic decisions) emanating from the diagnosis, and (4) the change effected by the clinical encounter in both the patient's and clinician's life-worlds. The model is illustrated through application to a medical case. (shrink)
- Seventeenth-Century Scholastic Treatments of Time.Stephen H.Daniel -1981 -Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (4):587-606.
- The Philosophy of Ingenuity: Vico on Proto-Philosophy.Stephen H.Daniel -1985 -Philosophy and Rhetoric 18 (4):236 - 243.
- New interpretations of Berkeley's thought.Stephen HartleyDaniel (ed.) -2008 - Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books.In this set of previously unpublished essays, noted scholars from North America and Europe describe how the Irish philosopher George Berkeley (1684-1753) continues to inspire debates about his views on knowledge, reality, God, freedom, mathematics, and religion. Here discussions about Berkeley's account of physical objects, minds, and God's role in human experience are resolved within explicitly ethical and theological contexts. This collection uses debates about Berkeley's immaterialism and theory of ideas to open up a discussion of how divine activity and (...) human experience are reconciled in a recurring appeal to the laws of nature. In that context, objects in the world are linked to one another by means of the perceptions and affections whereby minds come into being. The laws of nature thus become crucial for Berkeley in revealing how objects are unintelligible apart from being apprehended by minds that are themselves connected to one another in virtue of their ideas. -/- Overall, the essays indicate that, for Berkeley, our apprehension of the world as real depends on recognizing how the world expressed by our ideas is not a mere aggregate of disconnected bodies but is rather an integrated unity of the things we experience. This provides an antidote against the loss of unity created by Descartes' isolation of the self from nature and Locke's account of objects in terms of simple, discrete ideas. -/- In juxtaposing discussions of Berkeley's later writings with his earlier works, this volume shows not only how, for Berkeley, mind is intrinsically linked to things in nature as the principle of their determination in law-governed ways, but also how minds are practically related to the objects of the physical world, one another, and ultimately God. (shrink)
- Introduction.Stephen H.Daniel -2007 - In Stephen Hartley Daniel,Reexamining Berkeley's Philosophy. University of Toronto Press.
- Berkeley's Rejection of Divine Analogy.Stephen H.Daniel -2011 -Science Et Esprit 63 (2):149-161.Berkeley argues that claims about divine predication (e.g., God is wise or exists) should be understood literally rather than analogically, because like all spirits (i.e., causes), God is intelligible only in terms of the extent of his effects. By focusing on the harmony and order of nature, Berkeley thus unites his view of God with his doctrines of mind, force, grace, and power, and avoids challenges to religious claims that are raised by appeals to analogy. The essay concludes by showing (...) how a letter, supposedly by Berkeley, to Peter Browne ("discovered" in 1969 by Berman and Pittion) is, in fact, by John Jackson (1686-1763), controversial theologian and friend of Samuel Clarke. (shrink)
- Edwards, Berkeley, and Ramist Logic.Stephen H.Daniel -2001 -Idealistic Studies 31 (1):55-72.I will suggest that we can begin to see why Edwards and Berkeley sound so much alike by considering how both think of minds or spiritual substances notas things modeled on material bodies but as the acts by which things are identified. Those acts cannot be described using the Aristotelian subject-predicatelogic on which the metaphysics of substance, properties, attributes, or modes is based because subjects, substances, etc. are themselves initially distinguishedthrough such acts. To think of mind as opposed to matter, (...) or of acts of mind as opposed to mind itself, is already to assume the differentiation enacted by thoseacts. I argue that even though Edwards and Berkeley refer to distinctions such as mind vs. matter, they think that it is important to avoid treating mind, its acts, and its objects in terms of subject-predicate logic or substance metaphysics. (shrink)
- Berkeley's Non-Cartesian Notion of Spiritual Substance.Stephen H.Daniel -2018 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 56 (4):659-682.As central as the notion of mind is for Berkeley, it is not surprising that what he means by mind stirs debate. At issue are questions about not only what kind of thing a mind is but also how we can know it. This convergence of ontological and epistemological interests in discussing mind has led some commentators to argue that Berkeley's appeal to the Cartesian vocabulary of 'spiritual substance' signals his appropriation of elements of Descartes's theory of mind. But in (...) his account of spiritual substance, Berkeley focuses much more than Descartes on the intrinsic relation between mind and its ideas and less on the nature of mind as such. This makes it difficult to justify the claim that mind is... (shrink)
- Berkeley's Christian neoplatonism, archetypes, and divine ideas.Stephen H.Daniel -2001 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2):239-258.Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes explains how God perceives and can have the same ideas as finite minds. His appeal of Christian neo-Platonism opens up a way to understand how the relation of mind, ideas, and their union is modeled on the Cappadocian church fathers' account of the persons of the trinity. This way of understanding Berkeley indicates why he, in contrast to Descartes or Locke, thinks that mind (spiritual substance) and ideas (the object of mind) cannot exist or be thought (...) of apart from one another. It also hints at why Gregory of Nyssa's immaterialism sounds so much like Berkeley's. (shrink)
- The harmony of the Leibniz-Berkeley juxtaposition.Stephen H.Daniel -2007 - In Pauline Phemister & Stuart Brown,Leibniz and the English-Speaking World. Springer. pp. 163--180.
- Berkeley on God's Knowledge of Pain.Stephen H.Daniel -2018 - In Stefan Storrie,Berkeley's Three Dialogues: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 136-145.Since nothing about God is passive, and the perception of pain is inherently passive, then it seems that God does not know what it is like to experience pain. Nor would he be able to cause us to experience pain, for his experience would then be a sensation (which would require God to have senses, which he does not). My suggestion is that Berkeley avoids this situation by describing how God knows about pain “among other things” (i.e. as something whose (...) identity is intelligible in terms of the integrated network of things). This avoids having to assume that God has ideas (including pain) apart from his willing that there be perceivers who have specific ideas that are in harmony or not in harmony with one another. (shrink)
- Berkeley's stoic notion of spiritual substance.Stephen H.Daniel -2008 - In Stephen Hartley Daniel,New interpretations of Berkeley's thought. Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books.For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley's notion of mind differs from Locke's in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, Berkeley redefines what it means for the mind to be a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of 17th century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. This view of mind, I (...) conclude, is definitely not the bundle theory that some critics have portrayed it as being. (shrink)
- Berkeley on God.Stephen H.Daniel -2021 - In Samuel Charles Rickless,The Oxford Handbook of Berkeley. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 177-93.Berkeley’s appeal to a posteriori arguments for God’s existence supports belief only in a God who is finite. But by appealing to an a priori argument for God’s existence, Berkeley emphasizes God’s infinity. In this latter argument, God is not the efficient cause of particular finite things in the world, for such an explanation does not provide a justification or rationale for why the totality of finite things would exist in the first place. Instead, God is understood as the creator (...) of the total unity of all there is, the whole of creation. In this a priori argument, we should not focus on the specific objects that God creates, for that requires that we think that God knows each finite thing as distinct from every other. Rather, we should recognize how God creates all things in creating the complex, infinite totality of finite perceivings, each of which exists in virtue of the distinctions and relations it expresses. (shrink)
- Descartes on Myth and Ingenuity / Ingenium.Stephen H.Daniel -1985 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):157-170.
- Hermeneutical clinical ethics: A commentary.Stephen L.Daniel -1994 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 15 (2).Essays by Thomasma and ten Have recommend hermeneutical clinical ethics. The use Thomasma makes of hermeneutics is not radical enough because it leaves out basic interpretation of clinical practice and focuses narrowly on ethical principles and rules. Ten Have, while failing to notice that the hyperreality of clinical ethics is a feature of all language, rightly distinguishes four characteristic parameters of a thoroughgoing interpretive clinical ethics: experience, attitudes and emotions, community, and ambiguity. Suggestions are made for implementing hermeneutical ethics in (...) clinical teaching. (shrink)
- Berkeley and Spinoza.Stephen H.Daniel -2010 -Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 135 (1):123-134.There is a widespread assumption that Berkeley and Spinoza have little in common, even though early Jesuit critics in France often linked them. Later commentators have also recognized their similarities. My essay focuses on how Berkeley 's comments on the Arnauld-Malebranche debate regarding objective and formal reality and his treatment of god's creation of finite minds within the order of nature relate his theory of knowledge to his doctrine in a way similar to that of Spinoza. On estime souvent que (...) Berkeley et Spinoza ont peu en commun, même si les premières critiques jésuites en France les ont souvent liés. D'autres commentateurs ont également reconnu leurs similitudes. Mon essai se concentre sur la manière dont 1 / les remarques de Berkeley sur la discussion entre Arnauld et Malebranche concernant la réalité objective et formelle et 2 / son traitement de la création par Dieu des esprits finis dans l'ordre de la nature mettent en relation sa théorie de la connaissance et sa doctrine de la liberté dans une manière semblable à celle de Spinoza. (shrink)
- Objective-format testing in philosophy.Stephen H.Daniel -1981 -Metaphilosophy 12 (1):96–112.
- Senior Editor’s Note.Stephen H.Daniel -2007 -Berkeley Studies 18:2.Export citation Bookmark
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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