Results for 'Daniel P. Kennedy'
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- The social brain in psychiatric and neurological disorders.Daniel P.Kennedy &Ralph Adolphs -2012 -Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (11):559-572.Psychiatric and neurological disorders have historically provided key insights into the structure-function rela- tionships that subserve human social cognition and behavior, informing the concept of the ‘social brain’. In this review, we take stock of the current status of this concept, retaining a focus on disorders that impact social behavior. We discuss how the social brain, social cognition, and social behavior are interdependent, and emphasize the important role of development and com- pensation. We suggest that the social brain, and its (...) dysfunction and recovery, must be understood not in terms of specific structures, but rather in terms of their interaction in large-scale networks. (shrink)No categories
- Edmund Pellegrino's Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine: An Overview.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2014 -Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 24 (2):105-112.Pellegrino was there at the beginning of the field. In the 1950s and 60s, before there was aKennedy Institute of Ethics or a Hastings Center; before the word ‘bioethics’ itself was coined, Pellegrino was writing articles such as "Ethical Considerations in the Practice of Medicine and Nursing," published in 1964. He was among those who started the Society for Health and Human Values—a precursor organization to the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities. He was the founding editor of (...) the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy at a time when the notion that there was a relationship between philosophy and medicine was foreign to both physicians and philosophers. The authors of the articles published in the very .. (shrink)
- Deliberative democracy and stem cell research in new York state: The good, the bad, and the ugly.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2009 -Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19 (1):pp. 63-78.Many states in the U.S. have adopted policies regarding human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research in the last few years. Some have arrived at these policies through legislative debate, some by referendum, and some by executive order. New York has chosen a unique structure for addressing policy decisions regarding this morally controversial issue by creating the Empire State Stem Cell Board with two Committees—an Ethics Committee and a Funding Committee. This essay explores the pros and cons of various policy arrangements (...) for making public policy decisions about morally controversial issues in bioethics (as well as other issues) through the lens of Deliberative Democracy, focusing on the principles of reciprocity, publicity, and accountability. Although New York's unique mechanism potentially offers an opportunity to make policy decisions regarding a morally controversial subject like hESC research in accord with the principles of Deliberative Democracy, this essay demonstrates its failure to do so in actual fact. A few relatively simple changes could make New York's program a real model for putting Deliberative Democracy into practice in making policy decisions regarding controversial bioethical issues. (shrink)
- Speaking of the value of life.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2011 -Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 21 (2):181-199.The notion of the value of life is often invoked in discussions regarding medical care for the sick and the dying. This theme has figured in arguments about medical ethics for decades, but many of the phrases associated with this concept have received little serious scrutiny. It is true that some philosophers have declared a few commonly used phrases such as “the sanctity of life,” “the infinite value of life,” and “the value of life itself” to be unclear at best (...) or misguided at worst. Their hasty dismissal of these phrases, however, is not the end of the story. I generally agree with this philosophical judgment but for reasons very different from those typically given by others. Moreover, the reasons I wish to .. (shrink)
- Emergency contraception for women who have been raped: Must catholics test for ovulation, or is testing for pregnancy morally sufficient?Daniel P. Sulmasy -2006 -Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 16 (4):305-331.: On the grounds that rape is an act of violence, not a natural act of intercourse, Roman Catholic teaching traditionally has permitted women who have been raped to take steps to prevent pregnancy, while consistently prohibiting abortion even in the case of rape. Recent scientific evidence that emergency contraception (EC) works primarily by preventing ovulation, not by preventing implantation or by aborting implanted embryos, has led Church authorities to permit the use of EC drugs in the setting of rape. (...) Doubts about whether an abortifacient effect of EC drugs has been completely disproven have led to controversy within the Church about whether it is sufficient to determine that a woman is not pregnant before using EC drugs or whether one must establish that she has not recently ovulated. This article presents clinical, epidemiological, and ethical arguments why testing for pregnancy should be morally sufficient for a faith community that is strongly opposed to abortion. (shrink)
- Moral Status, Justice, and the Common Morality: Challenges for the Principlist Account of Moral Change.Kevin E. Hodges &Daniel P. Sulmasy -2013 -Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 23 (3):275-296.The idea that ethics can be derived from a common morality, while controversial, has become very influential in biomedical ethics. Although the concept is employed by several theories, it has most prominently been given a central role in principlism, an ethical theory endorsed by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009).1 This text has become a cornerstone of medical ethics education, an achievement that has been commended by critics and supporters alike. It articulates a system of (...) ethical decision making that is firmly rooted in claims about the common morality. Beauchamp and Childress’s theory of common morality has been both defended and criticized in the bioethics .. (shrink)
- Where were you when PresidentKennedy was assassinated?A.Daniel Yarmey &Maurice P. Bull -1978 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 11 (2):133-135.No categories
- Women and Health Research: A Report from the Institute of Medicine.Anna C. Mastroianni,Ruth Faden &Daniel Federman -1994 -Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 4 (1):55-62.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Women and Health Research:A Report from the Institute of MedicineAnna C. Mastroianni (bio), Ruth Faden (bio), andDaniel Federman (bio)In recent years, claims have been made by segments of the research community and by women's health advocacy groups that clinical research practices and policies have not benefitted women's health to the same extent as men's health. Central to these claims has been an assertion that women have been (...) inadequately represented as subjects of clinical studies and that as a result neither health conditions unique to women—e.g., menopause—nor women's manifestations of health problems affecting both sexes—e.g., heart disease—have been investigated sufficiently.The scientific community, including federal agencies that sponsor and regulate clinical studies, is increasingly responsive to these claims and is taking steps to raise the level of women's participation in clinical studies. Controversy and concern have surrounded these actions, however. Two of the claims that have been made are: (1) that women are more difficult to study than men because of their cyclical hormonal changes; and (2) that conducting gender-specific subgroup analyses would increase the size of study populations, raise the cost of studies, and thereby reduce the number of studies that could be performed with the limited resources available. In addition, controversy over the inclusion of women of childbearing potential and pregnant women has been particularly salient. Concerns have been expressed about avoiding potential harm to existing or potential fetuses and about the possible legal and financial ramifications of such harm. A further concern involves the perceived difficulties in enrolling women in studies and retaining them for the duration of the studies.Against this backdrop, the Office of Research on Women's Health at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in October 1992 to establish the Committee on the Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical Studies. The Committee's charge was to: (1) consider the ethical and legal implications of including women, particularly pregnant women and women of childbearing potential, in clinical studies; (2) examine known instances of litigation regarding injuries to research subjects [End Page 55] and describe existing legal liabilities and protections; and (3) provide practical advice on these issues for consideration by NIH, institutional review boards (IRBs), and clinical investigators.The 16 Committee members came from diverse backgrounds: bioethics, law, epidemiology and biostatistics, public health policy, obstetrics and gynecology, clinical research, pharmaceutical development, social and behavioral sciences, and clinical evaluative sciences.1 Chaired by two of the authors of this article, Ruth Faden andDaniel Federman, and coordinated by the third, IOM Study Director Anna Mastroianni, the Committee met five times over a fourteen-month period, convened a one-and-one-half day invitational workshop, and commissioned several background papers. The Committee's deliberations were complicated by the announcement of new federal policies late in its term. Specifically, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued guidelines (FDA 1993) to replace its 1977 guidelines, which prohibited the inclusion of women of childbearing potential in early phases of most clinical drug trials. In addition, Congress passed the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-43), which contains provisions mandating the inclusion of women and racial and ethnic minorities in NIH-sponsored clinical research. In February 1994, the IOM Committee publicly issued its final report and recommendations, Women and Health Research: Ethical and Legal Issues of Including Women in Clinical Studies, publishing the workshop presentations and commissioned papers in a separate volume.Deliberations of the CommitteeA number of issues arose at the outset as the Committee considered its charge. A few members initially believed that verification of the underrepresentation of women relative to men in clinical studies as a whole was a prerequisite to providing policy recommendations. Others believed that such an examination would be an important contribution to the knowledge base, but that it was not necessary for addressing the Committee's charge. As summarized in the Committee's report, the Committee's research indicated that firm conclusions about the relative underrepresentation of women could not be drawn from the available data because of the lack of systematic information... (shrink)
- The development of children's regret and relief.Daniel P. Weisberg &Sarah R. Beck -2012 -Cognition and Emotion 26 (5):820-835.We often think about the alternatives to a decision that has been made. Thinking in this way is known as counterfactual thinking, that is, thinking about what could have been had an alternative dec...
- Why Justice is Good for Our Health: The Social Determinants of Health Inequalities.Norman Daniels,BruceKennedy &Ichiro Kawachi -2004 - In Sudhir Anand,Public Health, Ethics, and Equity. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 63--91.
- The Astrological History of Māshā' allāhThe Astrological History of Masha' allah.P. Kunitzsch,E. S.Kennedy &David Pingree -1973 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 93 (4):565.No categories
- Tolerance, Professional Judgment, and the Discretionary Space of the Physician.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2017 -Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (1):18-31.Abstract:Arguments against physicians’ claims of a right to refuse to provide tests or treatments to patients based on conscientious objection often depend on two premises that are rarely made explicit. The first is that the protection of religious liberty (broadly construed) should be limited to freedom of worship, assembly, and belief. The second is that because professions are licensed by the state, any citizen who practices a licensed profession is required to provide all the goods and services determined by the (...) profession to fall within the scope of practice of that professional specialty and permitted by the state, regardless of any personal religious, philosophical, or moral objection. In this article, I argue that these premises ought to be rejected, and therefore the arguments that depend on them ought also to be rejected. The first premise is incompatible with Locke’s conception of tolerance, which recognizes that fundamental, self-identifying beliefs affect public as well as private acts and deserve a broad measure of tolerance. The second premise unduly (and unrealistically) narrows the discretionary space of professional practice to an extent that undermines the contributions professions ought to be permitted to make to the common good. Tolerance for conscientious objection in the public sphere of professional practice should not be unlimited, however, and the article proposes several commonsense, Lockean limits to tolerance for physician claims of conscientious objection. (shrink)
- What is conscience and why is respect for it so important?Daniel P. Sulmasy -2008 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (3):135-149.The literature on conscience in medicine has paid little attention to what is meant by the word ‘conscience.’ This article distinguishes between retrospective and prospective conscience, distinguishes synderesis from conscience, and argues against intuitionist views of conscience. Conscience is defined as having two interrelated parts: (1) a commitment to morality itself; to acting and choosing morally according to the best of one’s ability, and (2) the activity of judging that an act one has done or about which one is deliberating (...) would violate that commitment. Tolerance is defined as mutual respect for conscience. A set of boundary conditions for justifiable respect for conscientious objection in medicine is proposed. (shrink)
- Why Justice is Good for Our Health: The Social Determinants of Health Inequalities.Norman Daniels,BruceKennedy &Ichiro Kawachi -2004 - In Sudhir Anand,Public Health, Ethics, and Equity. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 63--91.
- The last low whispers of our dead: when is it ethically justifiable to render a patient unconscious until death?Daniel P. Sulmasy -2018 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 39 (3):233-263.A number of practices at the end of life can causally contribute to diminished consciousness in dying patients. Despite overlapping meanings and a confusing plethora of names in the published literature, this article distinguishes three types of clinically and ethically distinct practices: double-effect sedation, parsimonious direct sedation, and sedation to unconsciousness and death. After exploring the concept of suffering, the value of consciousness, the philosophy of therapy, the ethical importance of intention, and the rule of double effect, these three practices (...) are defined clearly and evaluated ethically. It is concluded that, if one is opposed to euthanasia and assisted suicide, double-effect sedation can frequently be ethically justified, that parsimonious direct sedation can be ethically justified only in extremely rare circumstances in which symptoms have already completely consumed the patient’s consciousness, and that sedation to unconsciousness and death is never justifiable. The special case of sedation for existential suffering is also considered and rejected. (shrink)
- The varieties of human dignity: a logical and conceptual analysis.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2013 -Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4):937-944.The word ‘dignity’ is used in a variety of ways in bioethics, and this ambiguity has led some to argue that the term must be expunged from the bioethical lexicon. Such a judgment is far too hasty, however. In this article, the various uses of the word are classified into three serviceable categories: intrinsic, attributed, and inflorescent dignity. It is then demonstrated that, logically and linguistically, the attributed and inflorescent meanings of the word presuppose the intrinsic meaning. Thus, one cannot (...) conclude that these meanings are arbitrary and unrelated. This categorization and logical and linguistic analysis helps to unravel what seem to be contradictions in discourse about dignity and bioethics, and provides a hierarchy of meaning that has potential normative implications. (shrink)
- Rawls and Environmental Ethics.Daniel P. Thero -1995 -Environmental Ethics 17 (1):93-106.The original position contractarian model of ethical reasoning put forth by John Rawls has been examined as a basis for an environmental ethic on three previous occasions in this journal and in Peter Wenz’s Environmental Justice. In this article, I critically examine each of these treatments, analyzing the proposals offered and identifying their shortcomings. I find a total of seven different proposals in this literature for modifying Rawls’ theory to augment its adequacy or as a ground environmental ethics. The diverse (...) difficulties that arise in attempting to apply Rawls suggest the conclusion that Rawlsian ethics may not be a suitable foundation for an adequate long-term environmental ethics. (shrink)
- Club: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, The.Daniel P. Tokaji -1996 -Nexus 1:47.Export citation
Bookmark - What is an oath and why should a physician swear one?Daniel P. Sulmasy -1999 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20 (4):329-346.While there has been much discussion about the role of oaths in medical ethics, this discussion has previously centered on the content of various oaths. Little conceptual work has been done to clarify what an oath is, or to show how an oath differs from a promise or a code of ethics, or to explore what general role oath-taking by physicians might play in medical ethics. Oaths, like promises, are performative utterances. But oaths are generally characterized by their greater moral (...) weight compared with promises, their public character, their validation by transcendent appeal, the involvement of the personhood of the swearer, the prescription of consequences for failure to uphold their contents, the generality of the scope of their contents, the prolonged time frame of the commitment, the fact that their moral force remains binding in spite of failures on the part of those to whom the swearer makes the commitment, and the fact that interpersonal fidelity is the moral hallmark of the commitment of the swearer. Oaths are also distinct from codes. Codes are collections of specific moral rules. Codes are not performative utterances. They do not commit future intentions and do not involve the personhood of the one enjoined by the code. Recent attacks on oath-taking by physicians are discussed. Two arguments in favor of oath-taking are presented: one on the basis of the nature of medicine as a profession and the other on the basis of rule-utilitarian considerations. No attempt is made to define which oath a physician should swear. (shrink)
- Sternberg's sketchy theory: Defining details desired.Daniel P. Keating -1980 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (4):595-596.
- Teichmann, Roger., Nature, Reason, and the Good Life: Ethics for Human Beings.Daniel P. Thero -2013 -Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):192-193.
- Darwin without Malthus: The Struggle for Existence in Russian Evolutionary Thought.Daniel P. Todes &Alexander Vucinich -1990 -Journal of the History of Biology 23 (3):523-527.
- Christian Witness in Health Care.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2016 -Christian Bioethics 22 (1):45-61.
- Karl Barth’s epistemology: A critical appraisal.Daniël P. Veldsman -2007 -HTS Theological Studies 63 (4).No categories
- The iconic significance of the Psalms as a literary genre for speaking about God: A phenomenological perspective.Daniël P. Veldsman -2011 -HTS Theological Studies 67 (3).No categories
- Wat op dees aarde beteken die einde van tradisionele metafisiese taal oor God? In gesprek met die Nuwe-Testamentikus Andries Gideon van Aarde oor sy verstaan van ‘n postsekulêre spiritualiteit.Daniël P. Veldsman -2011 -HTS Theological Studies 67 (1).No categories
- Whole-brain death and integration: realigning the ontological concept with clinical diagnostic tests.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2019 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):455-481.For decades, physicians, philosophers, theologians, lawyers, and the public considered brain death a settled issue. However, a series of recent cases in which individuals were declared brain dead yet physiologically maintained for prolonged periods of time has challenged the status quo. This signals a need for deeper reflection and reexamination of the underlying philosophical, scientific, and clinical issues at stake in defining death. In this paper, I consider four levels of philosophical inquiry regarding death: the ontological basis, actual states of (...) affairs, epistemological standards, and clinical criteria for brain death. I outline several candidates for the states of affairs that may constitute death, arguing that we should strive for a single, unified ontological definition of death as a loss of integrated functioning as a unified organism, while acknowledging that two states of affairs may satisfy this concept. I argue that the clinical criteria for determining whole-brain death should be bolstered to meet the epistemic demand of sufficient certainty in defining death by adding indicators of cerebro-somatic dis-integration to the traditional triad of loss of consciousness, loss of brainstem function, and absence of confounding explanations. (shrink)
- Death Lost in Translation.Daniel P. Sulmasy &Anne L. Dalle Ave -2023 -American Journal of Bioethics 23 (2):17-19.We thank Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland for their article on the dead donor rule (Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland 2023). We would like to take this opportunity to go beyond the dead donor rule in order to r...
- Dignity and bioethics : history, theory, and selected applications.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2008 - In Adam Schulman,Human dignity and bioethics: essays commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. Washington, D.C.: [President's Council on Bioethics.
- Conscience, tolerance, and pluralism in health care.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2019 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (6):507-521.Increasingly, physicians are being asked to provide technical services that many believe are morally wrong or inconsistent with their beliefs about the meaning and purposes of medicine. This controversy has sparked persistent debate over whether practitioners should be permitted to decline participation in a variety of legal practices, most notably physician-assisted suicide and abortion. These debates have become heavily politicized, and some of the key words and phrases are being used without a clear understanding of their meaning. In this essay, (...) I endeavor, firstly, to clarify the meaning of some of these terms: conscience, conscientious action, professional judgment, conscientious objection, conscience clauses, civil disobedience, and tolerance. I argue that use of the term conscientious objection to describe these refusals by health care professionals is mistaken and confusing. Secondly, relying on a proper understanding of the moral and technical character of medical judgment, the optimal deference that the state and markets ought to have toward professions, and general principles of Lockean tolerance for a diversity of practices and persons in a flourishing, pluralistic, democratic society, I offer a defense of tolerance with respect to the deeply held convictions of physicians and other health care professionals who hold minority views on contested but legal medical practices. (shrink)
- A Reassessment of Keat's Otho the Great.Daniel P. Watkins -1986 -Clio: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History 16 (1):49-66.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- B-neurons mediating homeostasis and behavior?Daniel P. Yox -1990 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (2):317-317.
- Terri Schiavo and the Roman Catholic Tradition of Forgoing Extraordinary Means of Care.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2005 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 33 (2):359-362.Media coverage and statements by various Catholic spokespersons regarding the case of Terri Schiavo has generated enormous and deeply unfortunate confusion regarding Church teaching about the use of life-sustaining treatments. Two weeks ago, for example, I received a letter from the superior of a community of Missionary Sisters of Charity, who operate a hospice here in the United States The Missionary Sisters of Charity are the community founded by Mother Theresa, the 20th Century saint whose primary ministry was to rescue (...) dying Untouch-ables from the streets of Calcutta and bring them into her convent where they were washed, sheltered, fed if they were able to eat, prayed for, and cherished. In other words, the sisters gave these poor souls the gift of a death with dignity. The order Mother Theresa founded has continued this ministry, running hospices in the United States and elsewhere for the homeless, the destitute, those dying of AIDS and poverty and drug addiction, and all those dying alone and otherwise unwanted. (shrink)
- Critical Pedagogy and Attentive Love.Daniel P. Liston -2007 -Studies in Philosophy and Education 27 (5):387-392.
- Killing and Allowing to Die: Another Look.Daniel P. Sulmasy -1998 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 26 (1):55-64.One of the most important questions in the debate over the morality of euthanasia and assisted suicide is whether an important distinction between killing patients and allowing them to die exists. The U.S. Supreme Court, in rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, explicitly invoked this distinction, but did not explicate or defend it. The Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals had previously asserted, also without argument, that no meaningful distinction exists between killing and allowing (...) to die. That court had reasoned that if this were so, it would be discriminatory to allow persons on life support to end their lives by removing such treatment, while those who are not connected to life support would be denied similar access to death. (shrink)
- Futility and the varieties of medical judgment.Daniel P. Sulmasy -1997 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 18 (1-2):63-78.Pellegrino has argued that end-of-life decisions should be based upon the physician's assessment of the effectiveness of the treatment and the patient's assessment of its benefits and burdens. This would seem to imply that conditions for medical futility could be met either if there were a judgment of ineffectiveness, or if the patient were in a state in which he or she were incapable of a subjective judgment of the benefits and burdens of the treatment. I argue that a theory (...) of futility according to Pellegrino would deny that latter but would permit some cases of the former. I call this the circumspect view. I show that Pellegrino would adopt the circumspect view because he would see the medical futility debate in the context of a system of medical ethics based firmly upon a philosophy of medicine. The circumspect view is challenged by those who would deny that one can distinguish objective from subjective medical judgments. I defend the circumspect view on the basis of a previously neglected aspect of the philosophy of medicine -- an examination of varieties of medical judgment. I then offer some practical applications of this theory in clinical practice. (shrink)
- Commentary: Double Effect—Intention is the Solution, Not the Problem.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2000 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 28 (1):26-29.
- What is a watershed? Implications of student conceptions for environmental science education and the national science education standards.Daniel P. Shepardson,Bryan Wee,Michelle Priddy,Lauren Schellenberger &Jon Harbor -2007 -Science Education 91 (4):554-578.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Macklin, Ruth. Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in Medicine.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2001 -The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 1 (3):467-469.
- “Reinventing” the rule of double effect.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2007 - In Bonnie Steinbock,The Oxford handbook of bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 114--49.The Rule of Double Effect has played an important role in bioethics, especially during the last fifty years. Its major application in bioethics has been in providing physicians who are opposed to euthanasia with a moral justification for using opioid analgesics in treating the pain of patients whose death might thereby be hastened. It has also prominently been applied to certain obstetric cases. The scope of application of double effect is actually much broader than medical ethics, extending to cover such (...) topics as strategic bombing in warfare. This article, while general in theory, concentrates on its applications in medical ethics. (shrink)
- Science, Pseudoscience, and Science Falsely So-CaIIed.Daniel P. Thurs &Ronald L. Numbers -2013 - In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry,Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 121.This chapter presents a historical analysis of pseudoscience, tracking down the coinage and currency of the term and explaining its shifting meaning in tandem with the emerging historical identity of science. The discussions cover the invention of pseudoscience; science and pseudoscience in the late nineteenth century; pseudoscience in the new century; and pseudoscience and its critics in the late twentieth century.
- Ethical Principles, Process, and the Work of Bioethics Commissions.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2017 -Hastings Center Report 47 (S1):50-53.Shortly after the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues was constituted in 2010 and days before the commission members were to join a conference call to discuss possible topics for their deliberation, Craig Venter held a press conference announcing that his lab had created a synthetic chromosome for a species of mycoplasma and had inserted this genetic material into organisms of another species of mycoplasma (the genes of which had been deactivated), transforming the host species into the donor (...) species. While not overtly claiming to have “created life in the test tube,” Venter's publicity seemed cleverly designed to provoke the media into reporting his discovery in just that way. The resulting uproar caused President Obama to give his new bioethics commission the assignment of investigating the ethics of the emerging field of synthetic biology. The commission went right to work. It formed working groups to deliberate about parts of the report, feeding ideas and language to the staff members who would do the actual writing, and then present the working group suggestions to the commission as a whole for public deliberation at open meetings. One of those working groups was charged with coming up with ethical principles that would guide the analysis. Having served as a member of that working group, I report here on the process by which these principles emerged and reflect upon the suitability of that process for the work of public bioethics commissions. (shrink)
- Simon Stevin's Vita Politica: Pre-provisional Morality?Daniel P. Maher -2017 -Interpretation 43 (2):215-232.Export citation Bookmark
- Killing and Allowing to Die: Insights from Augustine.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2021 -Christian Bioethics 27 (3):264-278.One major argument against prohibiting euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between killing and allowing to die: if we permit patients to die by forgoing life-sustaining treatments, then we also ought to permit euthanasia and PAS. In this paper, the author argues, contra this claim, that it is in fact coherent to differentiate between killing and allowing to die. To develop this argument, the author provides an analysis of Saint Augustine’s distinction between (...) martyrdom and suicide, highlighting the relevance of intention in the assessment of an agent’s actions. As a general matter of ethics, the intentions of agents, not just the outcomes of their actions, matter enormously for drawing distinctions between what is permissible and what is impermissible. Constructing an Augustinian account of this distinction between killing and allowing to die, the author argues that it is coherent to hold that assisted suicide is wrong, while also accepting that it is permissible to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatments. (shrink)
- Putting anxiety in its place?Daniel P. Kimble -1982 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):489-489.
- Diseases and natural kinds.Daniel P. Sulmasy -2005 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (6):487-513.David Thomasma called for the development of a medical ethics based squarely on the philosophy of medicine. He recognized, however, that widespread anti-essentialism presented a significant barrier to such an approach. The aim of this article is to introduce a theory that challenges these anti-essentialist objections. The notion of natural kinds presents a modest form of essentialism that can serve as the basis for a foundationalist philosophy of medicine. The notion of a natural kind is neither static nor reductionistic. Disease (...) can be understood as making necessary reference to living natural kinds without invoking the claim that diseases themselves are natural kinds. The idea that natural kinds have a natural disposition to flourish as the kinds of things that they are provides a telos to which to tether the notion of disease – an objective telos that is broader than mere survival and narrower than subjective choice. It is argued that while nosology is descriptive and may have therapeutic implications, disease classification is fundamentally explanatory. Sickness and illness, while referring to the same state of affairs, can be distinguished from disease phenomenologically. Scientific and diagnostic fallibility in making judgments about diseases do not diminish the objectivity of this notion of disease. Diseases are things, not kinds. Injury is a concept parallel to disease that also makes necessary reference to living natural kinds. These ideas provide a new possibility for the development of a philosophy of medicine with implications for medical ethics. (shrink)
- Quantum retrocausation: theory and experiment: San Diego, California, USA, 13-14 June 2011.Daniel P. Sheehan (ed.) -2011 - Melville, N.Y.: American Institute of Physics.This conference proceedings would be of interest to theoretical and experimental physicists in the areas of foundations of physics, nature of time, foundations of quantum mechanics, quantum measurement, quantum computation. Philosophers of science and physics. Retrocausation, the process whereby the future affects its past, is central to the modern movement to understand the fundamental physical nature of time. This conference volume presents the most recent theoretical and experimental results at the forefront of the nascent field of physical chronology.Export citation Bookmark
- Understanding Moral Weakness.Daniel P. Thero (ed.) -2006 - Rodopi.Why do humans act in opposition to what they take to be the best course of action? Thero (cognitive science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and Adirondack Community College) considers this akrasia within the philosophic tradition, recognizing both weak (satisfying a less strict set of criteria) and strict types. He works through thought from Socr.
- Wechsel-Stil.S. RevDaniel P. Jamros -2010 -The Owl of Minerva 42 (1-2):219-223.In his early, unpublished “Spirit of Christianit y and Its Fate,” Hegel used the term Wechsel-Stil to refer to a st yle of writing he considered inappropriate for the expression of feeling. The term seems to appear nowhere else in German literature, and its meaning has puzzled his readers. My suggestion: Hegel coined the term Wechsel-Stil to render in German the Greek word τροπή (trope). He wanted to say that the figurative language of tropes was not a natural way to (...) put feelings into words. (shrink)
- Easter Faith and History.Daniel P. Fuller -1965No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
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