Results for 'Daniel C. Zeitlen'
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- Mood regulation as a shared basis for creativity and curiosity.Daniel C.Zeitlen,Karen Gasper &Roger E. Beaty -2024 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 47:e117.We extend the work of Ivancovsky et al. by proposing that in addition to novelty seeking, mood regulation goals – including enhancing positive mood and repairing negative mood – motivate both creativity and curiosity. Additionally, we discuss how the effects of mood on state of mind are context-dependent (not fixed), and how such flexibility may impact creativity and curiosity.
- Daniel C. Dennett Autobiography Part 3.Daniel C. Dennett -2008 -Philosophy Now 70:24-25.
- Embodiment and self-ownership:Daniel C. Russell.Daniel C. Russell -2010 -Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):135-167.Many libertarians believe that self-ownership is a separate matter from ownership of extra-personal property. “No-proviso” libertarians hold that property ownership should be free of any “fair share” constraints, on the grounds that the inability of the very poor to control property leaves their self-ownership intact. By contrast, left-libertarians hold that while no one need compensate others for owning himself, still property owners must compensate others for owning extra-personal property. What would a “self” have to be for these claims to be (...) true? I argue that both of these camps must conceive of the boundaries of the self as including one's body but no part of the extra-personal world. However, other libertarians draw those boundaries differently, so that self-ownership cannot be separated from the right to control extra-personal property after all. In that case, property ownership must be subject to a fair share constraint, but that constraint does not require appropriators to pay compensation. This view, which I call “right libertarianism,” differs importantly from the other types primarily in its conception of the self, which I argue is independently more plausible. (shrink)
- Forms of Labor Utilization in the State Economy of Sumer in the Second Half of the Third Millennium B. C.Daniel C. Snell &Dzh M. Sharashenidze -1991 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 111 (4):837.No categories
- Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett -1991 - Penguin Books.Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
- Joint perception: gaze and social context.Daniel C. Richardson,Chris N. H. Street,Joanne Y. M. Tan,Natasha Z. Kirkham,Merrit A. Hoover &Arezou Ghane Cavanaugh -2012 -Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
- An investigation of reasoning by analogy in schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder.Daniel C. Krawczyk,Michelle R. Kandalaft,Nyaz Didehbani,Tandra T. Allen,M. Michelle McClelland,Carol A. Tamminga &Sandra B. Chapman -2014 -Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
- (1 other version)Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett -1978 - MIT Press.This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.
- Review ofDaniel Clement Dennett:Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett -1986 -Ethics 96 (2):423-425.
- Fodor on imagistic mental representations.Daniel C. Burnston -2020 -Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):71-94.: Fodor’s view of the mind is thoroughly computational. This means that the basic kind of mental entity is a “discursive” mental representation and operations over this kind of mental representation have broad architectural scope, extending out to the edges of perception and the motor system. However, in multiple epochs of his work, Fodor attempted to define a functional role for non-discursive, imagistic representation. I describe and critique his two considered proposals. The first view says that images play a particular (...) kind of functional role in certain types of deliberative tasks. The second says that images are solely restricted to the borders of perception, and act as a sort of medium for the fixing of conceptual reference. I argue, against the first proposal, that a broad-scope computationalism such as Fodor’s renders images in principle functionally redundant. I argue, against the second proposal, that empirical evidence suggests that non-discursive representations are learned through perceptual learning, and directly inform category judgments. In each case, I point out extant debates for which the arguments are relevant. The upshot is that there is motivation for limited scope computationalism, in which some, but not all, mental processes operate on discursive mental representations. Keywords: Computational Theory of Mind; Mental Representation; Perception; Mental Image; Jerry Fodor Fodor e le rappresentazioni mentali come immagini Riassunto: La concezione della mente di Fodor è rigorosamente computazionale, ossia le entità mentali di base sono rappresentazioni mentali “discorsive”. Le operazioni su queste rappresentazioni hanno un fine architettonico ampio, che va fino ai confini della percezione e del sistema motorio. In periodi diversi del suo lavoro, Fodor ha proposto due modi per definire un ruolo funzionale per la rappresentazione non-discorsiva come immagine. Tratterò criticamente entrambi. Per il primo, le immagini giocano un particolare tipo di ruolo funzionale in certi tipi di compiti deliberativi, mentre, per il secondo, sono relegate unicamente ai confini della percezione, agendo come medium per fissare il riferimento concettuale. Contro il primo sosterrò che un computazionalismo così ampio come quello di Fodor rende le immagini in principio funzionalmente ridondanti. Contro il secondo sosterrò che l’evidenza empirica suggerisce che le rappresentazioni non-discorsive vengono apprese percettivamente, agendo direttamente sui giudizi di categorizzazione. In entrambi i casi considererò gli argomenti più rilevanti nel dibattito corrente. Si vedrà che ci sono buone ragioni in favore di un computazionalismo più limitato, in cui alcuni processi mentali operano su rappresentazioni mentali discorsive. Parole chiave: Teoria computazionale della mente; Rappresentazione mentale; Percezione; Immagine mentale; Jerry Fodor. (shrink)
- Matter and Mechanism In Kant’s Critical System.Daniel C. Kolb -1988 -Idealistic Studies 18 (2):123-144.The essay examines kant's treatment of mechanisms and mechanical science in the major works of kant's critical period. it is argued that kant's conception of mechanism as a science must be understood through the distinctive elements the critical idea of nature developed in the "critique of pure reason" and the "critique of judgement". rather than appearing as a champion of the sufficiency of classical mechanics, kant emerges as one puzzled about the very intelligibility of the basic concepts of a mechanical (...) science. he ultimately maintains that the coherence of mechanical science derives from the regulative idea of systematic unity. (shrink)
- Nietzsche as Sophist.Daniel C. Shaw -1986 -International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (4):331-339.No categories
- Économie antique: Prix et formation des prix dans les économies antiquesEconomie antique: Prix et formation des prix dans les economies antiques.Daniel C. Snell,Jean Andreau,Pierre Briant &Raymond Descat -2000 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 120 (3):482.No categories
- Metaphor From the Ground Up: Understanding Figurative Language in Context.Daniel C. Strack -2019 - Lexington Books.Cross-referencing neurobiological knowledge with the invariance hypothesis, relevance theory, and frame semantics, Metaphor from the Ground Up: Understanding Figurative Language in Context unifies metaphor theory, fundamentally rethinks “context,” and moves linguistics into the twenty-first century.
- Data graphs and mechanistic explanation.Daniel C. Burnston -2016 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 57 (C):1-12.It is a widespread assumption in philosophy of science that data is what is explained by theory—that data itself is not explanatory. I draw on instances of representational and explanatory practice from mammalian chronobiology to suggest that this assumption is unsustainable. In many instances, biologists employ representations of data in explanatory ways that are not reducible to constraints on or evidence for representations of mechanisms. Data graphs are used to exemplify relationships between quantities in the mechanism, and often these representations (...) are necessary for explaining particular aspects of the phenomena under study. I argue that this kind of representation is distinct from representing laws or generalizations, and its primary purpose is to convey particular types or patterns of quantitative relationships. The benefit of the analysis is two-fold. First, it provides a more accurate account of explanatory practice in broadly mechanistic analysis in biology. Second, it suggests that there is not an explanatory “fundamental” type of representation in biology. Rather, the practice of explanation consists in the construction of different types of representations and their employment for distinct explanatory purposes. (shrink)
- Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Gilbert Harman &Daniel C. Dennett -1980 -Philosophical Review 89 (1):115.
- Imaginação: entre o medo e a liberdade.Daniel C. Avila -2010 -Cadernos Espinosanos 23:135.Medo e esperança aparecem na história da filosofia como problemas situados na dimensão temporal da existência. Espinosa acompanha essa tradição, bem como o uso da filosofia como uma medicina animi, porém reserva para si algumas diferenças. Ressaltando o papel da imagem na constituição de medo e esperança, demarca a via pela qual estes dois afetos são necessariamente produzidos pela limitação da imaginação à duração dos corpos. No entanto, quando livre dos impedimentos à sua potência, a mente é capaz de ordenar (...) e concatenar as afecções do corpo, considerando a si mesma sem relação ao corpo, sob uma nova perspectiva. O tratamento do problema do medo, portanto, não se localiza no tempo presente, mas sim na eternidade. (shrink)No categories
- Copper and Tin: The Distribution of Mineral Resources and the Nature of the Metals Trade in the Bronze Age, with Supplement.Daniel C. Snell &James David Muhly -1978 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 98 (2):150.No categories
- (2 other versions)Perceptual Integration, Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration.Daniel C. Burnston &Jonathan Cohen -2015 - In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos,The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- I. Der Metaphysikbegriff bei Jürgen Habermas.Daniel C. Henrich -2007 - InZwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 19-36.
- Evidence of analogical re-representation from a change detection task.Daniel C. Silliman &Kenneth J. Kurtz -2019 -Cognition 190:128-136.
- (3 other versions)Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett -1968 - New York: Routledge.This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent work in the area.
- Intentions and Inquiry.Daniel C. Friedman -2025 -Mind 134 (533):85-106.This paper defends the Intention Account of Inquiry. On this account, inquiry is best understood by appeal to a ‘question-directed intention’ (QDI), an intention to answer a question broadly construed. This account’s core commitments help meet recent challenges plaguing extant approaches to characterizing inquiry. First, QDIs are the type of mental state central to inquiry, not attitudes like curiosity or wonder. Second, holding a QDI towards a question and acting in service of it constitutes the start of inquiry. Third, controversial (...) norms which mandate a rational inquirer's ignorance towards the answer to her question can be reformulated and defended by appeal to rational constraints on intention. Fourth, instrumental pressures inquirers face are the standard pressures of plan-rationality. In defending these theses, I show that the Intention Account provides compelling explanations to standing challenges, in ways competitors cannot. It does so by advancing understanding of how our epistemic and practical agency are intertwined. (shrink)
- XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation.Daniel C. Dennett -1983 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83 (1):213-226.Daniel C. Dennett; XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 213–226, https://doi.o.
- Altruists, Chumps, and Inconstant Pluralists.Daniel C. Dennett -unknownAnybody interested in evolutionary explanations of social phenomena (and every philosopher should be) will learn a lot from Unto Others. In addition to its cornucopia of fascinating empirical findings from biology and psychology, it is chock full of arresting perspectives, ingenious thought experiments, and clear expositions of difficult-indeed, treacherous-concepts that should be in every philosopher's kit. What philosophers will not learn, however, is the status of group selection in current evolutionary theory, because while Sober and Wilson (hereafter S&W) strive intelligently (...) to clarify and unify the issues, some of their efforts muddy the waters instead. This is mainly due to the lingering effects of ancient feuds and score-settling on both sides. So far as I can see, nobody has yet been able to come up with a judicious overview of the whole scene. Evolutionists love to pick a fight. Why propose a friendly amendment when you can claim to overthrow some major edifice of orthodoxy with your revolutionary idea? And what could be more satisfying than resurrecting a derided heresy? Stephen Jay Gould briefly tried to restore Goldschmidt's "hopeful monster" saltationism as part of his campaign for punctuated equilibrium, which was itself not as revolutionary as he claimed (Dennett, 1995); hardly a year goes by without somebody declaring that something they have discovered is, actually, a genuine instance of Lamarckianism. There is usually a grain of truth, or more, in these dramatic claims. Prions really do constitute a major exception to Crick's Central Dogma about the direction of information flow between DNA and proteins.. (shrink)
- Peirce and Fisher on the place of probability in abductive inference.Daniel C. Sloughter -1996 -Philosophia Scientiae 1 (2):133-142.
- A 'Fine Distinction' on Killing.Daniel C. Maguire -1977 -Hastings Center Report 7 (4):4-4.
- An expanded perspective on the role of effort phenomenology in motivation and performance.Daniel C. Molden -2013 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):699-700.
- Real patterns.Daniel C. Dennett -1991 -Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the (...) effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist. (shrink)
- The International Stance.Daniel C. Dennett -1990 -Ethics 100 (4):891-892.
- Archimedes.Daniel C. Lewis &E. J. Dijksterhuis -1958 -American Journal of Philology 79 (2):221.
- Daniel Dennett: Autobiography, Part 1.Daniel C. Dennett -2008 -Philosophy Now 68:22-26.
- Termination of tonic immobility in chickens by auditory stimulation.Daniel C. Hatton &Richard W. Thompson -1975 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 5 (1):61-62.
- Helen Morris Cartwright, 1931-2006.Daniel C. Dennett &Mark Richard -2007 -Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 80 (5):165 -.No categories
- Jak chronić ludzką godność przed nauką? (przełożył Igor Pokora).Daniel C. Dennett -2015 -Filo-Sofija 15 (28):314-332.No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - Pautas reales.Daniel C. Dennett -1992 -Agora 11 (2):97.No categories
- Susse Traume. Die Erforschung des Bewusstseins und der Schlaf der Philosophie.Daniel C. Dennett &Christian Tewes -2008 -Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (2):451.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett -1971 -Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
- Scientists’ use of diagrams in developing mechanistic explanations: A case study from chronobiology.Daniel C. Burnston,Benjamin Sheredos,Adele Abrahamsen &William Bechtel -2014 -Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (2):224-243.We explore the crucial role of diagrams in scientific reasoning, especially reasoning directed at developing mechanistic explanations of biological phenomena. We offer a case study focusing on one research project that resulted in a published paper advancing a new understanding of the mechanism by which the central circadian oscillator in Synechococcus elongatus controls gene expression. By examining how the diagrams prepared for the paper developed over the course of multiple drafts, we show how the process of generating a new explanation (...) vitally involved the development and integration of multiple versions of different types of diagrams, and how reasoning about the mechanism proceeded in tandem with the development of the diagrams used to represent it. (shrink)
- IV. Hegel: Ursprünge des habermasschen Naturalismus und mögliche Alternativen.Daniel C. Henrich -2007 - InZwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 205-214.No categories
- Jürgen Habermas: Philosoph ohne metaphysische Rückendeckung?Daniel C. Henrich -2007 -Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (3):389-402.Jürgen Habermas behauptet, keine metaphysische Rückendeckung für seine Philosophie in Anspruch zu nehmen. Was aber versteht er unter ‚Metaphysik’, und mit welcher Strategie versucht er, diese zu eliminieren? Der Aufsatz versucht, eine Antwort auf diese Fragen zu entwickeln und gleichzeitig einen Ausblick auf die systematischen Konsequenzen der von Habermas vorgeschlagenen Strategie zu geben. Diese stehen nach Auffassung des Autors in einem Widerspruch zu spezifischen Grundannahmen der Diskursethik.
- Literaturverzeichnis.Daniel C. Henrich -2007 - InZwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 225-241.No categories
- (2 other versions)Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett -1986 -Mind 95 (377):127-129.No categories
- Are Dreams Experiences?Daniel C. Dennett -1976 -Philosophical Review 85 (2):151.
- Cooperation and Shared Inquiry.Daniel C. Friedman -forthcoming -Australasian Journal of Philosophy.We inquire together all the time, yet the norms of such inquiring are poorly understood. Parallels from norms of individual inquiry fall short in accurately characterizing our inquiring together. The need then for an account of inquiring together which provides normative guidance is pressing. This paper unpacks and defends a version of a crucial norm of such inquiry, inspired by Harman (1986), which codifies the kind of evidence necessary for a shared inquirer to permissibly settle her shared question. It is (...) informed by the demands of directed openness between inquirers, characteristic of much shared inquiry activity generally, and shared inquiry specifically. In defending this norm, a general account of shared inquiry is developed, one which sheds light on the complex and surprising relationship between human cooperation and epistemic rationality. (shrink)
- Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett -1976 - In Amélie Rorty,The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
- Kinds of Minds.Daniel C. Dennett -1996 - Basic Books.
- Babbage among the insurers: Big 19th-century data and the public interest.Daniel C. S. Wilson -2018 -History of the Human Sciences 31 (5):129-153.This article examines life assurance and the politics of ‘big data’ in mid-19th-century Britain. The datasets generated by life assurance companies were vast archives of information about human longevity. Actuaries distilled these archives into mortality tables – immensely valuable tools for predicting mortality and so pricing risk. The status of the mortality table was ambiguous, being both a public and a private object: often computed from company records they could also be extrapolated from public projects such as the census, or (...) clerical records. Life assurance more generally straddled the line between private enterprise and collective endeavour, though its advocates stressed the public interest in its success. Reforming actuaries such as Thomas Rowe Edmonds wanted the data on which mortality tables were based to be made publicly available, but faced resistance. Such resistance undermined insurers’ claims to be scientific in spirit and hindered Edmonds’s personal quest for a law of mortality. Edmonds pushed instead for an open actuarial science alongside fellow travellers at the Statistical Society of London, which was populated by statisticians such as William Farr as well as by radical mathematicians such as Charles Babbage. The article explores Babbage’s little-known foray into the world of insurance, both as a budding actuary but also as a fierce critic of the industry. These debates over the construction, ownership, and accessibility of insurance datasets show that concern about the politics of big data did not begin in the 21st century. (shrink)
- Science, philosophy, and interpretation.Daniel C. Dennett -1988 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):535.
- Ways of establishing harmony.Daniel C. Dennett -1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin,Dretske and his critics. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
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Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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