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Works by D. S. Mannison

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  1.  81
    Lying and lies.D. S. Mannison -1969 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):132 – 144.
  2.  63
    "Inexplicable knowledge" does not require belief.D. S. Mannison -1976 -Philosophical Quarterly 26 (103):139-148.
  3.  29
    A note on S. Noren's "logical types and the identity theory".D. S. Mannison -1972 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (4):569-572.
  4.  36
    Armstrong on trying and intending.D. S. Mannison -1970 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):252 – 255.
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  5.  22
    Caldwell on "pretence".D. S. Mannison -1971 -Mind 80 (317):96-99.
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  6.  41
    Danto on Hintikka.D. S. Mannison -1972 -Philosophia 2 (3):249-255.
  7.  77
    Doing Something on Purpose but Not Intentionally.D. S. Mannison -1969 -Analysis 30 (2):49 - 52.
  8.  55
    Lemmon on knowing.D. S. Mannison -1974 -Synthese 26 (3-4):383 - 390.
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  9.  108
    Matthews on Enjoying Digging.D. S. Mannison -1972 -Analysis 32 (5):173 - 176.
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  10.  64
    Why Margolis Hasn’t Defeated the Entailment Thesis.D. S. Mannison -1976 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):553-559.
    In two recent papers Joseph Margolis has sketched a situation, his characterisation of which involves a denial of the ubiquitous contention that knowing that p is logically sufficient for believing that p. There are not many philosophers who would follow him in this denial of what is most usually taken as the only “natural” way of construing knowledge. If Margolis has not succeeded in constructing a counterexample to the official view, and I do not believe that he has, it is (...) of some importance to understand just why he has failed. No epistemological gain is achieved by meeting Margolis with a question begging reply, as I think has been done by his critic, J.A. Barker.The case the Margolis offers is this:… S may not have thought about P at all, may have thought about Q-which is “significantly” related to P, and believes that Q; on that condition, it is conceivably true that S knows that P. (shrink)
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