Works by D. Locke
97 found
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| Don Locke [77] | Dustin Locke [17] | D. Locke [8] | Dustin Troy Locke [2] |
| Dona E. C. Locke [1] | David Locke [1] |
- Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman &Dustin Locke -2020 -Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.Moral debunking arguments are meant to show that, by realist lights, moral beliefs are not explained by moral facts, which in turn is meant to show that they lack some significant counterfactual connection to the moral facts (e.g., safety, sensitivity, reliability). The dominant, “minimalist” response to the arguments—sometimes defended under the heading of “third-factors” or “pre-established harmonies”—involves affirming that moral beliefs enjoy the relevant counterfactual connection while granting that these beliefs are not explained by the moral facts. We show that (...) the minimalist gambit rests on a controversial thesis about epistemic priority: that explanatory concessions derive their epistemic import from what they reveal about counterfactual connections. We then challenge this epistemic priority thesis, which undermines the minimalist response to debunking arguments (in ethics and elsewhere). (shrink)
- An Explanationist Account of Genealogical Defeat.Daniel Z. Korman &Dustin Locke -2023 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):176-195.Sometimes, learning about the origins of a belief can make it irrational to continue to hold that belief—a phenomenon we call ‘genealogical defeat’. According to explanationist accounts, genealogical defeat occurs when one learns that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between one’s belief and the truth. Flatfooted versions of explanationism have been widely and rightly rejected on the grounds that they would disallow beliefs about the future and other inductively-formed beliefs. After motivating the need for some explanationist account, we raise (...) some problems for recent versions of explanationism. Learning from their failures, we then produce and defend a more resilient explanationism. (shrink)
- Knowledge, Perception, and Memory.Don Locke -1976 -Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):279-280.
- Memory.Don Locke -1971 - Macmillan.
- (1 other version)Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals.Don Locke &Annette Baier -1981 -Philosophical Quarterly 36 (145):571._Postures of the Mind _was first published in 1985. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Annette Baier develops, in these essays, a posture in philosophy of mind and in ethics that grows out of her reading of Hume and the later Wittgenstein, and that challenges several Kantian or analytic articles of faith. She questions the assumption that intellect has authority over all (...) human feelings and traditions; that to recognize order we must recognize universal laws—descriptive or prescriptive; that the essential mental activity is representing; and that mental acts can be analyzed into discrete basic elements, combined according to statable rules of synthesis. In the first group of essays—"Varieties of Mental Postures"—Baier evaluates the positions taken by philosophers ranging from Descartes to Dennett and Davidson. Among her topics are remembering, intending, realizing, caring, representing, changing one's mind, justifying one's actions and feelings, and having conflicting reasons for them. The second group of essays—"Varieties of Moral Postures" - explores the sort of morality we get when all of these capacities become reflective and self-corrective. Some deal with particular moral issues—our treatment of animals, our policies regarding risk to human life, our contractual obligations; others, with more general questions on the role of moral philosophers and the place of moral theory. These essays respond to the theories of Hobbes, Kant, Rawls, and MacIntyre, but Baier's most positive reaction is to David Hume; _Postures of the Mind _ affirms and cultivates his version of a moral reflection that employs feeling and tradition as well as reason. (shrink)
- Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons.Dustin Locke -2015 -American Philosophical Quarterly 52:215-232.According to a number of recent philosophers, knowledge has an intimate relationship with rationality. Some philosophers hold, in particular, that rational agents do things for good motivating reasons, and that p can be one’s motivating reason for -ing (acting/believing/fearing/etc.) only if one knows that p. This paper argues against this view and in favor of the view that p cannot be one’s motivating reason for -ing—in the relevant sense—unless there is an appropriate explanatory connection between the fact that p and (...) one’s -ing. I argue that this view offers a better account of the cases alleged to support the knowledge view. (shrink)
- Quidditism without quiddities.Dustin Locke -2012 -Philosophical Studies 160 (3):345-363.Structuralism and quidditism are competing views of the metaphysics of property individuation: structuralists claim that properties are individuated by their nomological roles; quidditists claim that they are individuated by something else. This paper (1) refutes what many see as the best reason to accept structuralism over quidditism and (2) offers a methodological argument in favor of a quidditism. The standard charge against quidditism is that it commits us to something ontologically otiose: intrinsic aspects of properties, so-called ‘quiddities’. Here I grant (...) that quiddities are ontologically otiose, but deny that quidditism requires them. According to a view I call ‘austere quidditism’, properties are individuated by bare numerical identity. I argue that, as far as ontological parsimony is concerned, austere quidditism and structuralism are on a par. But is austere quidditism a coherent alternative to structuralism? To see that it is, we must get clear on what exactly we mean by ‘property individuation’. What we discover is that structuralism is a counterpart theory for properties, and that austere quidditism is simply the rejection of counterpart theory. I conclude with a methodological argument to the effect that counterpart theory for properties ought to be rejected. This paper begins by situating the debate between structuralists and quidditists within the context of a debate over the epistemic limits of fundamental science. At the center of this debate is David Lewis’s posthumously published ‘Ramseyan Humility’ (2008). In the appendix I explain the precise role of austere quidditism in Lewis’s argument. (shrink)
- Practical Certainty.Dustin Locke -2013 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):72-95.When we engage in practical deliberation, we sometimes engage in careful probabilistic reasoning. At other times, we simply make flat out assumptions about how the world is or will be. A question thus arises: when, if ever, is it rationally permissible to engage in the latter, less sophisticated kind of practical deliberation? Recently, a number of authors have argued that the answer concerns whether one knows that p. Others have argued that the answer concerns whether one is justified in believing (...) that one knows that p. Against both of these, this paper argues that the answer concerns whether p is ‘practically certain’—that is, whether the actual epistemic probability that p differs from epistemic certainty that p only in ways that are irrelevant to the decision one currently faces. (shrink)
- The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke -2014 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.Certain philosophers maintain that there is a ‘constitutive threshold for belief’: to believe that p just is to have a degree of confidence that p above a certain threshold. On the basis of this view, these philosophers defend what is known as ‘the Lockean Thesis ’, according to which it is rational to believe that p just in case it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p above the constitutive threshold for belief. While not directly speaking to (...) the controversy over the Lockean Thesis, this paper defends the general idea behind it—namely, the thesis that there is some threshold such that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence great than that threshold. This paper identifies the threshold in question—not with the alleged constitutive threshold for belief—but with what I call ‘the practical threshold for rational belief’. Roughly, the thesis defended here is that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p that rationalizes engaging in certain types of practical reasoning. (shrink)
- Memory.Don Locke -1971 -Philosophy 47 (181):285-286.No categories
- Darwinian Normative Skepticism.Dustin Locke -2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain,Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Sharon Street (2006) has argued that, given certain plausible evolutionary considerations, normative realism leads to normative skepticism. Street calls this ‘the Darwinian dilemma’. This paper considers the two most popular responses to the Darwinian dilemma and argues that both are problematic. According to the naturalist response, the evolutionary account of our normative dispositions reveals that there was selection for normative dispositions that were reliable with respect to normative truth. According to the minimalist response, the evolutionary account reveals that there was (...) selection of normative dispositions that were reliable with respect to normative truth. This paper argues that the minimalist response is in principle unacceptable, and that the naturalist response faces a very serious difficulty. (shrink)
- Three Concepts of Free Action.Don Locke &Harry G. Frankfurt -1975 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 49 (1):95-126.
- On Debunking Color Realism.Daniel Z. Korman &Dustin Locke -2023 - In Diego E. Machuca,Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 257-277.You see a cherry and you experience it as red. A textbook explanation for why you have this sort of experience is going to cite such things as the cherry’s chemical surface properties and the distinctive mixture wavelengths of light it is disposed to reflect. What does not show up in this explanation is the redness of the cherry. Many allege that the availability of color-free explanations of color experience somehow calls into question our beliefs about the colors of objects (...) around us. We explore how such explanations are supposed to undermine color beliefs, and in particular whether evolutionary considerations have any special role to play. (shrink)
- A partial defense of Ramseyan humility.Dustin Locke -2008 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola,Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Bradford.This chapter argues that we are irremediably ignorant about the identities of the fundamental properties that figure in the actual realization of the true final theory. Of the three published responses to Lewis’s work, each argues that even if Lewis’s metaphysical assumption, the thesis known as “quidditism,” is accepted, we need not accept his epistemic conclusion, the thesis of Humility. The aim of this chapter is to defend Lewis against these critics. Ann Whittle attempts to refute Humility by an appeal (...) to a more lenient account of identification. Following is a defense of Lewis carried by showing that his taxing account of identification is a perfectly good account of at least one perfectly legitimate sense of identification. (shrink)
- Implicature and non-local pragmatic encroachment.Dustin Locke -2017 -Synthese 194 (2).This paper offers a novel conversational implicature account of the pragmatic sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Developing an account I first suggested elsewhere and independently proposed by Lutz, this paper explores the idea that the relevant implicatures are generated by a constitutive relationship between believing a proposition and a disposition to treat that proposition as true in practical deliberation. I argue that while this view has a certain advantage over standard implicature accounts of pragmatic sensitivity, it comes with a significant concession (...) to proponents of pragmatic encroachment. On the account offered here, knowledge attributions have locally-pragmatically-sensitive implicatures because they have non-locally-pragmatically-sensitive entailments. The view thus represents a unique and powerful hybrid of these two approaches to the pragmatic sensitivity of knowledge attributions. (shrink)
- Perception: And Our Knowledge of the External World.Don Locke -1967 - Ny: Routledge.First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
- Evolutionary Debunking and Moral Relativism.Daniel Z. Korman &Dustin Locke -2019 - In Martin Kusch,The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge. pp. 190-199.Our aim here is to explore the prospects of a relativist response to moral debunking arguments. We begin by clarifying the relativist thesis under consideration, and we explain why relativists seem well-positioned to resist the arguments in a way that avoids the drawbacks of existing responses. We then show that appearances are deceiving. At bottom, the relativist response is no less question-begging than standard realist responses, and – when we turn our attention to the strongest formulation of the debunking argument (...) – the virtues of relativism turn out to be vices. (shrink)
- Being universitas: community and being present in times of pandemic.Amanda Fulford &David Locke -2023 -Ethics and Education 18 (1):51-66.This paper considers what is at stake in the idea of universitas – a community of masters and scholars – in the context of the shifting landscape of higher education engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, we consider what it means to be together in a university community. We draw a distinction between the idea of ‘functioning’ as universitas and ‘being’ universitas, arguing that, that while universities have continued to function effectively through the pandemic, (...) something of what it means to be universitas has been lost. We explore, through Marcel’s concepts of disponibilité and indisponibilité (availability and unavailability), presence and communion, what is at stake in our being with others, and participating in their plenitude. We conclude that being bodily present to each other opens up possibilities for realising something of what it means to be universitas as a community of masters, scholars and students. (shrink)
- Reasons, Wants, and Causes.Don Locke -1974 -American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (3):169 - 179.
- The Epistemic Significance of Moral Disagreement.Dustin Locke -2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett,The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 499-518.No categories
- Knowledge Norms and Assessing Them Well.Dustin Locke -2014 -Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):80-89.Jonathan Ichikawa (2012) argues that the standard counterexamples to the knowledge norm of practical reasoning are no such thing. More precisely, he argues that those alleged counterexamples rest on claims about which actions are appropriate rather than on claims about which propositions can be appropriately treated as reasons for action. Since the knowledge norm of practical reasoning concerns the latter and not the former, Ichikawa contends that proponents of the alleged counterexamples must offer a theory that bridges the gap between (...) the two types of claims. I argue, first, that the standard counterexamples do not rest on claims about which actions are appropriate, second, that even if they did, we would not need a theory to bridge the gap between the two types of claims, and, third, that even if we did need such a theory, a plausible theory is on offer. (shrink)
- The Parfit Population Problem.Don Locke -1987 -Philosophy 62 (240):131 - 157.Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons is a long, difficult and fascinating book, inside which three shorter, clearer and better books are struggling to get out. The third of these shorter but better books deals with the problem of Future Generations, and that is the book I want to discuss. In it Parfit tries, but fails, to find a theory—Theory X, he calls it—which will deal with various problems and issues which he develops, and in particular the issue which I will (...) call the Parfit Population Problem, the problem of how many people there ought to be. In this paper I offer not so much a theory as a suggestion as to what the solution might be. (shrink)
- Myself and Others: A Study in Our Knowledge of Minds.Don Locke -1968 - Oxford,: Oxford University Press.
- Beliefs, Desires and Reasons for Action.Don Locke -1982 -American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):241 - 249.
- X*—Natural Powers and Human Abilities.Don Locke -1974 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1):171-187.Don Locke; X*—Natural Powers and Human Abilities, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 74, Issue 1, 1 June 1974, Pages 171–187, https://doi.org/10.10.
- Just what is wrong with the argument from analogy?Don Locke -1973 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):153-56.A reply to hyslop and jackson, American philosophical quarterly, April 1972: I argue that the argument form analogy begs the question, Much as does the inductive justification of induction, Of which it is a version.
- The trivializability of universalizability.Don Locke -1968 -Philosophical Review 77 (1):25-44.R m hare's discussion, In "freedom and reason," fails to distinguish several senses of universalizability. The universalizability in question is not, As hare thinks, That which applies to any judgement with 'descriptive meaning,' and although moral judgements may presuppose principles, These principles need not be universal, Nor 'u-Type,' nor such that they apply to everyone, Nor such that they could be applied to anyone, Nor such that they do except individuals qua individuals--All of which are different. The most that hare (...) shows is that if we make exceptions we must have reasons for making them, Which places no restriction on what these reasons may be. (shrink)
- Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Don Locke -1986 -Philosophical Books 27 (3):178-180.
- Modal Security and Evolutionary Debunking.Daniel Z. Korman &Dustin Locke -2023 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:135-156.According to principles of modal security, evidence undermines a belief only when it calls into question certain purportedly important modal connections between one’s beliefs and the truth (e.g., safety or sensitivity). Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras have advanced such principles with the aim of blocking evolutionary moral debunking arguments. We examine a variety of different principles of modal security, showing that some of these are too strong, failing to accommodate clear cases of undermining, while others are too weak, failing to (...) do their advertised work of blocking evolutionary moral debunking arguments. If there is a security principle that slips between the horns of this dilemma—one that is both viable and debunker-blocking—it remains to be formulated. (shrink)
- How to Make a Newcomb Choice.Don Locke -1978 -Analysis 38 (1):17 - 23.
- The principle of equal interests.Don Locke -1981 -Philosophical Review 90 (4):531-559.
- The Right to Strike.Don Locke -1984 -Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 18:173-202.Only a fool would attempt to discuss the morality of strikes in twenty-five pages or less, and even he will fail. For one thing he can be sure in advance that whatever conclusions he might come to will be ridiculed as outrageous, prejudiced or self-serving by one party or the other. There is, in particular, the accusation that the attempt to discuss in moral terms what is essentially a political issue, is itself an exercise in bourgeois politics disguised as morals, (...) their morals but not ours. But there is also, and more worrying to my mind, the sheer complexity of the issues. This complexity is, however, simply unmanageable in the space available, and I have gone instead for the simple story, in the hope that the essentials will stand out that much more clearly. Whether I have got the right essentials, whether the elegance of the picture compensates for its lack of realism, is something that will have to emerge. (shrink)
- Ifs and Cans Revisited.Don Locke -1962 -Philosophy 37 (141):245 - 256.In this paper I shall be principally concerned with three points arising from Professor Austin's British Academy Lecture on ‘Ifs and Cans’. 1 These points only concern that use of ‘can’ where it is used in the general sense of ‘to be able’ and applied to human beings in respect of actual or possible actions. 2 To some extent, of course, the basic problem is simply what sense of ‘can’ it is which is involved when we talk of possible but (...) not actual human actions, i.e. when we say that a person could do or could have done what he does not or did not do. (shrink)
- The Choice Between Lives.Don Locke -1982 -Philosophy 57 (222):453 - 475.Are there circumstances in which we would be justified in taking one person's life for the sake of others? I am not here concerned with cases of self-defence, or what we might call ‘other-defence’, where one person has to be killed to prevent him taking the lives of others. Nor am I concerned with cases of self-sacrifice, or suicide more generally, or euthanasia; nor with capital punishment, or killing in warfare; nor even, for reasons we shall explore, with abortion. I (...) am concerned with those cases where several people have an equal claim or right to life, the same claim or right which we typically accord to all human beings, but where not all can survive. In short we are faced with a choice, as to who shall live and who shall die. (shrink)
- Role of theory of mind in emotional awareness and alexithymia: Implications for conceptualization and measurement.Richard D. Lane,Chiu-Hsieh Hsu,Dona E. C. Locke,Cheryl Ritenbaugh &Cynthia M. Stonnington -2015 -Consciousness and Cognition 33:398-405.
- Zombies, schizophrenics, and purely physical objects.Don Locke -1976 -Mind 85 (337):97-99.
- The Levels System.Dustin Locke -2023 -Teaching Philosophy 46 (1):1-39.This paper describes an application of mastery learning to the teaching of philosophical writing—an approach I call “the Levels System.” In this paper, I explain the Levels System, how I integrate it into my course, and the pedagogical research supporting the principles of mastery learning on which it is built. I also compare the Levels System to Maryellen Weimer’s “menu approach,” Linda Nilson’s “specifications grading,” and Fred Keller’s “personalized system of instruction.” I argue that the Levels System has many of (...) the virtues of these other systems and some additional virtues of its own. (shrink)
- A Fantasy of Reason: The Life and Thought of William Godwin.Don Locke -1980 - Boston: Routledge.This ‘philosophical biography’ gives an account of Godwin’s life and thought, and by setting his thoughts in the context of his life, brings the two into juxtaposition. It relates Godwin’s views on politics and morality, education and religion, freedom and society, to the events of his life, notably the revolution in France and its impact on radicalism and reaction in Britain and the parliamentary reforms of 1832.
- Why the Utilitarians Shot President Kennedy.Don Locke -1976 -Analysis 36 (3):153 - 155.
- Morality in the Making: Thought, Action, and the Social Context.James L. Jarrett,Helen Weinreich-Haste &Don Locke -1985 -British Journal of Educational Studies 33 (1):92.
- Action, movement, and neurophysiology.Don Locke -1974 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):23 – 42.Action is to be distinguished from (mere) bodily movement not by reference to an agent's intentions, or his conscious control of his movements (Sect. I), but by reference to the agent as cause of those movements, though this needs to be understood in a way which destroys the alleged distinction between agent-causation and event-causation (Sect. II). It also raises the question of the relation between an agent and his neurophysiology (Sect. III), and eventually the question of the compatibility of purposive (...) and mechanistic accounts of human behaviour (Sect. IV). For the two to be compatible it is necessary that, e.g., intentions and brain states be not merely co-existent but also causal equivalents, in a way which allows for the mechanical explanation of teleological states — or vice versa. (shrink)
- Must a materialist pretend he's anaesthetized?Don Locke -1971 -Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):217-31.
- The many faces of punishment.Don Locke -1963 -Mind 72 (288):568-572.
- Causation, Compatibilism and Newcomb's Problem.Don Locke -1979 -Analysis 39 (4):210 - 211.
- Setiya, Kieran. Knowing Right from Wrong.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 184. $45.00.Dustin Locke -2014 -Ethics 124 (3):649-656.
- Problems and Perplexities.Hiranmoy Banerjee,Fred A. Westphal,M. E. Williams,Stephen D. Crites,Don Locke,Robert S. Hartman,Warren E. Steinkraus &Donald W. Sherburne -1962 -Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):133 - 162.
- An Atheist's Values. By Richard Robinson. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1964. Pp.256. Price 28s.).Don Locke -1965 -Philosophy 40 (151):74-.
- Books reviews.Don Locke -1978 -Mind 87 (4):631-633.
- Material Objects. By W. D. Joske. (Macmillan. Pp. vii + 187. 1967. Price 30s.).Don Locke -1968 -Philosophy 43 (164):168-.No categories
- The Necessity of Analytic Truths.Don Locke -1969 -Philosophy 44 (167):12 - 32.The problem of necessity is fundamentally a problem of knowledge: how can we know not just that something is so but that it must be so, not just that a statement is true but that it must be true? The problem arises the moment we make two fairly familiar assumptions: that all knowledge comes, in the end, from experience; and that experience can tell us only that something is so and not that it must be so. From these it follows (...) immediately that there can be no knowledge of necessary truths. Yet obviously we do have such knowledge: we know that bachelors must be unmarried and that the angles of a Euclidean triangle must total 180°. It seems equally obvious that we do not learn such facts from experience, from observing bachelors and triangles, so it seems clear which of the assumptions is mistaken. Whatever may be the success of Locke's attack on innate knowledge, it seems undeniable that we do have knowledge which does not come from experience. We do possess some a priori knowledge, viz. knowledge of necessary truths. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
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Gwen Bradford
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