Works by Colin Radford
68 found
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- Knowledge: By Examples.Colin Radford -1966 -Analysis 27 (1):1.
- How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina.Colin Radford &Michael Weston -1975 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 49 (1):67 - 93.
- Utilitarianism and the Noble Art.Colin Radford -1988 -Philosophy 63 (243):63 - 81.Utilitarianism tells us that actions are morally right and good if and to the extent that they add to human happiness or diminish human unhappiness. And—or, perhaps, therefore—it also tells us that the best action a person can perform is that which of all the possible actions open to him is the one which makes the greatest positive difference to human happiness. Moreover, as everyone will also remember, utilitarianism further tries to tell us, perhaps intending it as a corollary of (...) that first, main claim, that the motive for an action has nothing to do with its moral rightness or goodness. But even if, as utilitarians, we accepted the dubious corollary, it would not follow, as many have thought, that utilitarians have no moral interest in motives. For unless, absurdly, a utilitarian believed either that there was never more than a fortuitous connection between on the one hand what we intended to do and on the other what we did and the consequences of what we did, or that, if there were such connections, we could not know of them, he must believe, as a moralist, that the best motive a person can have for performing an action is likely to be the desire to produce the happiest result. Indeed, utilitarians ought to be morally committed, it would seem, to trying to find out as much as they can about the consequences of our actions, e.g. what connections exist, if any, between how we raise children and what sort of adults they grow up to be. (shrink)
- Emotions and music: A reply to the cognitivists.Colin Radford -1989 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47 (1):69-76.
- Fiction, pity, fear, and jealousy.Colin Radford -1995 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 (1):71-75.
- Tears and Fiction.Colin Radford -1977 -Philosophy 52 (200):208 - 213.
- The Incoherence and Irrationality of Philosophers.Colin Radford -1990 -Philosophy 65 (253):349 - 354.
- Does Unwitting Knowledge Entail Unconscious Belief?Colin Radford -1970 -Analysis 30 (3):103 - 107.
- Hoping and Wishing.Colin Radford &J. M. Hinton -1970 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 44 (1):51-88.
- Knowing and telling.Colin Radford -1969 -Philosophical Review 78 (3):326-336.
- Philosophers and their monstrous thoughts.Colin Radford -1982 -British Journal of Aesthetics 22 (3):261-263.
- Radford revisiting.Colin Radford -1988 -Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):496-499.No categories
- Belief, acceptance, and knowledge.Colin Radford -1990 -Mind 99 (396):609-617.
- The Umpire's Dilemma.Colin Radford -1985 -Analysis 45 (2):109 - 111.
- Fakes.Colin Radford -1978 -Mind 87 (345):66-76.No categories
- Analysing" `know(s) that.Colin Radford -1970 -Philosophical Quarterly 20 (80):222-229.No categories
- Muddy waters.Colin Radford -1991 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (3):247-252.
- (1 other version)Comment pouvons-nous être émus par le sort d'Anna Karenine?Colin Radford -2013 -Repha 7:97-107. Translated by Florian Cova & Amanda Ludmilla Garcia.No categories
- Stuffed Tigers: A Reply to H. O. Mounce.Colin Radford -1982 -Philosophy 57 (222):529 - 532.
- The Essential Anna.Colin Radford -1979 -Philosophy 54 (209):390 - 394.Having distinguished essentially fictional characters from inessentially fictional ones and having identified Anna Karenina as an inessentially fictional character, Barrie Paskins solves the problem I posed in ‘How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’ thus: ‘our pity towards the inessentially fictional is, or can without forcing be construed as, pity for those people if any who are in the same bind as the character in the fiction’. Making a similar point in a footnote, ‘our emotions towards (...) fictional characters are directed towards those real people, if any, who are in essentially the same situation’, he continues in the text, ‘This possibility is neglected by Radford and Weston.’. (shrink)
- On Sticking to What I Don't Believe to Be the Case.Colin Radford -1972 -Analysis 32 (5):170 - 173.No categories
- Report on Analysis 'Problem' no. 19.Colin Radford -1983 -Analysis 43 (3):113 - 115.If I am looking at myself in a mirror I am directly facing, do I see myself looking at myself? If so, do I also see myself looking at myself looking at myself – and so on?No categories
- It's on the tip of my tongue.Colin Radford -1978 -Philosophical Investigations 1 (2):70-79.No categories
- Replies to Three Critics.Colin Radford -1989 -Philosophy 64 (247):93 - 97.No categories
- Charlton's feelings about the fictitious: A reply.Colin Radford -1985 -British Journal of Aesthetics 25 (4):380-383.
- I will, if you will.Colin Radford -1984 -Mind 93 (372):577-583.No categories
- Life, flesh, and animate behavior: A reappraisal of the argument from analogy.Colin Radford -1981 -Philosophical Investigations 4 (4):56-64.
- Paradoxes of emotion and fiction.Colin Radford -2001 -Philosophical Review 110 (4):617-620.
- Reply to mr Kenner's the triviality of the red-green problem.Colin Radford -1965 -Analysis 25 (6):207-208.
- On subject terms.Colin Radford -1974 -Mind 83 (330):161-179.No categories
- (1 other version)Recent issues have included.Explaining Action,David S. Shwayder,Charles Taylor,David Rayficld,Colin Radford,Joseph Margolis,Arthur C. Danto,James Cargile,K. Robert &B. May -forthcoming -Foundations of Language.Export citation
Bookmark - The Nature of Criticism.W. Charlton,Colin Radford &Sally Minogue -1982 -Philosophical Quarterly 32 (129):389.
- Can We be Moved by Hanfling's Feelings about Grammar?Colin Radford -1985 -Philosophy 60 (234):532-538.
- Driving to California.Colin Radford -1989 -Philosophical Investigations 12 (4):281-292.No categories
- How Can Music Be Moral?Colin Radford -1991 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):421-438.
- It sticks in my throat.Colin Radford -1979 -Philosophical Investigations 2 (2):67-68.In challenging the implications of my putative counter‐example to Wittgenstein's claim that “It's on the tip of my tongue” (TT) is not the expression of an experience (cf. Philosophical Investigations, p.219)1, Professor Slater writes2 … the obvious way in which to meet the threat to the adequacy of (b1) [which is that the speaker should believe that he may be able to produce the missing word (fairly soon)] is to claim that the utterer of “It's on the tip of my (...) tongue” must not merely believe that he may recall the word fairly soon, he must also believe, i.e., not rule out the possibility that, he may do so without any treatment, i.e., without being prompted by an external source such as cues, pills, or shock, (p.51). (shrink)No categories
- Pain and Pain Behaviour.Colin Radford -1972 -Philosophy 47 (181):189 - 205.What is the connection between pain and pain behaviour? Is it logically necessary, or is it contingent? Or is it too complex to be classified in terms of this Humean dichotomy? Surely it is too complex, for if we say the relationship is a necessary one, we should, apparently, have to deny that there could be pain without pain behaviour, or pain behaviour without pain; yet stoicism and shamming pain occur. If we say that the relationship is not necessary and (...) so contingent, we should have to say that the natural correlate or expression of pain might have been languor or jolly laughter, and, conversely, that wincing, grimacing, writhing, groaning, etc., might have been the natural correlate or expression of sensations quite different from pains. To avoid the first difficulty it could be said that necessary connections need not be invariant. To avoid the second, it might be pointed out that some contingent connections are less contingent than others, and that, in particular, causal relationships need not always be of the external, Humean kind. But even if these observations are correct they are difficult precisely because they attempt to soften and blur a distinction whose hardness and exhaustiveness is constitutive of its clarity and strength. If we modify Hume's law we may do so only after a careful examination of a case which forces us to do so. (shrink)
- Religious Belief and Contradiction.Colin Radford -1975 -Philosophy 50 (194):437 - 444.In the Lectures on Religious Belief Wittgenstein is reported as saying that the non-believer cannot contradict the believer. This claim may seem both to run against our experience, particularly if we are apostates, and to offer a protection to the believer from the most direct criticism. Such claims, and others which are less clear but just as surprising, combine to suggest that much of what Wittgenstein has to say about religion and religious belief is obscurantist, and he acknowledges that some (...) say this of him. (shrink)
- The Power of Words.Colin Radford -1993 -Philosophy 68 (265):325 - 342.The origin of this paper is a problem: I had long been struck by the fact that if my glance happened to fall on a newspaper, a message on a note pad, printing on a label, etc., I would begin to read what was there written or printed—if I could see it and it was in English. If I can see it, and it is in English, I cannot but read what my glance falls on, even if I wish not (...) to do so. So my reading—at least on these occasions and of this brief sort—seemed to be involuntary. The illiterate person, of course, cannot read and, in that way, is not free to read. The person learning to read does not read freely. But the ‘free’ reader is not free not- to read that on which his glance falls. (shrink)No categories
- A causal judgment in criticism.Colin Radford -1976 -Mind 85 (338):209-224.No categories
- Art: The Demolition Derby.Colin Radford -1997 -Philosophy Now 17:10-14.No categories
- Begging principles: The big issue.Colin Radford -2001 -Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (3):287–296.
- Characterizing-Judgments and Their Causal Counterparts.Colin Radford -1971 -Analysis 31 (3):65 - 75.
- Critical Notice.Colin Radford -1982 -Mind 91 (363):441 - 451.No categories
- Driving to California: An Unconventional Introduction to Philosophy.Colin Radford -1996 - Edinburgh University Press.In a series of original and entertaining sketches, short stories, plays and his own 'philosophical autobiography' Professor Colin Radford expounds the nature and importance of philosophy for our everyday lives.No categories
- Fiction, pity, fear, and jealousy + a reply to neill,alex article on fiction and the emotions.Colin Radford -unknown
- Hoping, wishing, and dogs.Colin Radford -1970 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 13 (1-4):100 – 103.Although dogs are almost totally incapable of symbolic behaviour, they can hope, for a dog's behaviour can manifest not only a desire for something but varying degrees of expectation that it will get what it desires; but since they are almost totally incapable of symbolic behaviour, nothing they do can indicate that they both desire something and yet are certain that they will not get it. So the suggestion that dogs entertain idle wishes is, apparently, vacuous, i.e. untestable, or nonsensical. (...) Nonetheless, we can imagine situations in which we would be tempted to say of a dog that it had an idle wish, but since idle wishes so often and typically require language, we should be reluctant to impute it. (shrink)
- Incompatibilities of colours.Colin Radford -1965 -Philosophical Quarterly 15 (60):207-219.
- Knowledge.Colin Radford -1975 -Philosophical Books 16 (2):1-5.
- Knowledge and Evidence.Colin Radford -1991 -Philosophical Books 32 (1):33-37.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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