Works by Clinton Tolley
40 found
Order:
1 filter applied
- The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach.Clinton Tolley -2013 -Kantian Review 18 (1):107-36.There has been considerable recent debate about whether Kant's account of intuitions implies that their content is conceptual. This debate, however, has failed to make significant progress because of the absence of discussion, let alone consensus, as to the meaning of ‘content’ in this context. Here I try to move things forward by focusing on the kind of content associated with Frege's notion of ‘sense ’, understood as a mode of presentation of some object or property. I argue, first, that (...) Kant takes intuitions to have a content in this sense, and, secondly, that Kant clearly takes the content of intuitions, so understood, to be distinct in kind from that possessed by concepts. I then show how my account can respond to the most serious objections to previous non-conceptualist interpretations.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure[email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New ApproachVolume 18, Issue 1Clinton Tolley DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000313Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle[email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New ApproachVolume 18, Issue 1Clinton Tolley DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000313Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New ApproachVolume 18, Issue 1Clinton Tolley DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000313Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations.Clinton Tolley -2017 -Synthese:1-30.I argue for a new delimitation of what Kant means by ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’, on the basis of the intermediate, transitional place that Kant gives to cognition in the ‘progression [Stufenleiter]’ of our representations and our consciousness of them. I show how cognition differs from mental acts lying earlier on this progression—such as sensing, intuiting, and perceiving—and also how cognition differs from acts lying later on this progression—such as explaining, having insight, and comprehending. I also argue that cognition should not be (...) confused with ‘knowledge [Wissen]’, insofar as knowledge represents the culmination of a separate orthogonal progression of acts of ‘holding-true’. Along the way, I show how having in focus the specific progression from representation, to consciousness, to cognition (and beyond) allows us to better appreciate the architectonic significance of the progression of Kant’s analysis in the first Critique (and beyond), and also helps to illuminate the unity of Kant’s account of cognition itself across its variety of (empirical, mathematical, philosophical) forms. (shrink)
- Kant on the Nature of Logical Laws.Clinton Tolley -2006 -Philosophical Topics 34 (1-2):371-407.
- (1 other version)Kant on the Content of Cognition.Clinton Tolley -2012 -European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):200-228.I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic (...) are of a much more Fregean bent than has traditionally been admitted or appreciated. I conclude by providing a sketch of how a better grasp of Kant's views on cognitive content in general can help bring into sharper relief what is, and what is not, at stake in the recent debates over whether Kant accepts a particular kind of cognitive content—namely, non-conceptual content. (shrink)
- The Generality of Kant's Transcendental Logic.Clinton Tolley -2012 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):417-446.
- Kant on the role of the imagination (and images) in the transition from intuition to experience.Clinton Tolley -2019 - In Gerad Gentry & Konstantin Pollok,The Imagination in German Idealism and Romanticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27-47.In this chapter I will argue against both of these interpretations and will begin to develop an alternate account of imagination in experience. Against those who minimize imagination’s role, I will highlight the distinctive contribution of the imagination to experience. In particular, I will foreground the specific role that the imagination plays in making possible the distinct mental act, intermediate between intuition and experience, that Kant calls “perception [Wahrnehmung]” as the “empirical consciousness [Bewußtsein]” of appearances (cf. B207). Because perception involves (...) images essentially (cf. A120), and because Kant understands experience itself to be a “synthesis of perceptions” (cf. B218), this strongly suggests (against minimalists) that experience, too, will incorporate images into the manner in which it allows us to cognize physical objects. By highlighting the contribution of imagination prior to experience, my own account, therefore, overlaps in part with the readings that seek instead to maximize the role of imagination. Against maximalists, however, I will argue that imagination contributes only in (and after) the transition from intuition to perception, rather than already being at work in the stage of intuition itself. More specifically, I will argue that Kant takes the activity of imagination to make perception possible by acting on already-formed intuitions in order to bring about the consciousness of them, rather than to bring the intuitions about in the first place. I will also argue that this synthesis of intuitions should be kept distinct from the activity of understanding. (shrink)
- The difference between original, metaphysical, and geometrical representations of space.Clinton Tolley -2016 - In Dennis Schulting,Kantian Nonconceptualism. London, England: Palgrave. pp. 257-285.
- Between ‘perception’ and understanding, from Leibniz to Kant.Clinton Tolley -2016 -Estudos Kantianos 4 (2):71-98.
- California Phenomenology.David Smith,Clinton Tolley &Jeffrey Yoshimi -2019 - In Michela Beatrice Ferri & Carlo Ierna,The Reception of Husserlian Phenomenology in North America. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 365-387.We survey the development of “California Phenomenology”, both as a philosophical movement originating with Dagfinn Føllesdal’s formulation of a Fregean, analytic reading of Husserl in the late 1950s and 1960s, and as an evolving network of philosophers working throughout California, who have met under the auspices of several groups in a more or less continuous way since that time. We trace the history of these groups in detail, provide an overview of debates that occurred between “West Coast” approaches to Husserlian (...) phenomenology and other approaches, and survey the broad panorama of more recent work. (shrink)
- Mini-symposium on Kant and cognition.Eric Watkins,Marcus Willaschek &Clinton Tolley -2020 -Synthese 197 (8):3193-3194.No categories
- (1 other version)The Relation between Ontology and Logic in Kant.Clinton Tolley -2016 -Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 12:75-98.
- Kant and the Normativity of Logic.Clinton Tolley -2008 - In Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra, Guido Antonio de Almeida & Margit Ruffing,Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. De Gruyter. pp. vol. 5, 215-227.
- Bolzano and Kant on the Nature of Logic.Clinton Tolley -2012 -History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (4):307-327.Here I revisit Bolzano's criticisms of Kant on the nature of logic. I argue that while Bolzano is correct in taking Kant to conceive of the traditional logic as a science of the activity of thinking rather than the content of thought, he is wrong to charge Kant with a failure to identify and examine this content itself within logic as such. This neglects Kant's own insistence that traditional logic does not exhaust logic as such, since it must be supplemented (...) by a transcendental logic that will in fact study nothing other than thought's content. Once this feature of Kant's views is brought to light, a much deeper accord emerges between the two thinkers than has hitherto been appreciated, on both the nature of the content that is at issue in logic and the sense of logic's generality and formality. (shrink)
- Hegel and Kant on reason and the unconditioned.Clinton Tolley -2017 -Hegel Studien 50:131-141.
- The Place of Logic in Kant's Philosophy.Clinton Tolley -2017 - In Matthew C. Altman,The Palgrave Kant Handbook. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 165-87.This chapter spells out in detail how Kant’s thinking about logic during the critical period shapes the account of philosophy that he gives in the Critiques. Tolley explores Kant’s motivations behind his formation of the idea of a new “transcendental” logic, drawing out in particular how he means to differentiate it from the traditional “merely formal” approaches to logic, insofar as transcendental logic investigates not just the basic forms of the activity of thinking but also its basic contents. Kant’s understanding (...) of both of these logics directly factor into the first Critique’s more general project of the critique of reason in particular, as not just a capacity for a certain kind of thinking (inferring), but as a possible source of a priori cognition. (shrink)
- Kant on the Generality of Logic.Clinton Tolley -2008 - In Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra, Guido Antonio de Almeida & Margit Ruffing,Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. De Gruyter. pp. 431-442.
- The Context of the Development of Carnap’s Views on Logic up to the Aufbau.Clinton Tolley -2016 -Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 18:187-212.
- Hegel on the Relation Between Logos and the Science of Logic.Clinton Tolley -2024 -Idealistic Studies 54 (2):107-135.I begin by distinguishing, in Hegel’s writings, between the subject-matter of the science of logic, and the science of logic itself. I then argue for an interpretation of the subject-matter of logic in terms drawn from the ancient Greek discussions of logos, discussions which Hegel himself exposits at length and applauds in his lectures on the history of philosophy, and which Hegel directly alludes to, at key moments, in the course of presenting the subject-matter of logic in his own voice. (...) Drawing on the fact that logos, in this tradition, is at once ontologically pervasive while also something which in itself does not involve consciousness or self-consciousness (and so is not essentially ‘psychological’ or ‘spiritual’, in Hegel’s sense of these terms), I argue against recent attempts to cast Hegel’s logic as about something which is first, foremost, and essentially self-conscious (‘apperceptive’), and in favor of a more straightforwardly metaphysical interpretation of logic, one according to which logic treats its subject-matter (logos) in a way that is ‘neutral’ with respect to whether it is realized in spirit or in nature. I conclude by returning to the significance of distinction between logos itself and the philosophical science of this subject-matter for Hegel’s broader system. (shrink)No categories
- Hegel’s Conception of Thinking in his Logics.Clinton Tolley -2018 - In Sandra Lapointe,Logic from Kant to Russell. New York: Routledge.
- Frege's Elucidatory Holism.Clinton Tolley -2011 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):226-251.Abstract I argue against the two most influential readings of Frege's methodology in the philosophy of logic. Dummett's ?semanticist? reading sees Frege as taking notions associated with semantical content?and in particular, the semantical notion of truth?as primitive and as intelligible independently of their connection to the activity of judgment, inference, and assertion. Against this, the ?pragmaticist? reading proposed by Brandom and Ricketts sees Frege as beginning instead from the independent and intuitive grasp that we allegedly have on the latter activity (...) and only then moving on to explain semantical notions in terms of the nature of such acts. Against both readings, I argue, first, that Frege gives clear indication that he takes semantical and pragmatical notions to be equally primitive, such that he would reject the idea that either sort of notion could function as the base for a non-circular explanation of the other. I argue, secondly, that Frege's own method for conveying the significance of these primitive notions?an activity that Frege calls ?elucidation??is, in fact, explicitly circular in nature. Because of this, I conclude that Frege should be read instead as conceiving of our grasp of the semantical and pragmatical dimensions of logic as far more of a holistic enterprise than either reading suggests. (shrink)
- Husserl’s Philosophy of the Categories and His Development toward Absolute Idealism.Clinton Tolley -2017 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):460-493.In recent work, Amie Thomasson has sought to develop a new approach to the philosophy of the categories which is metaphysically neutral between traditional realist and conceptualist approaches, and which has its roots in the ‘correlationalist’ approach to categories put forward in Husserl’s writings in the 1900s–1910s and systematically charted over the past few decades by David Woodruff Smith in his studies of Husserl’s philosophy. Here the author aims to provide a recontextualization and critical assessment of correlationalism in a Husserlian (...) vein. To this end, the author presents, first, the reasons why, later in his life, Husserl himself found his earlier treatment of categories philosophically naive, and why he increasingly advocated for a more genetic-teleological account. The author then draws upon arguments made a century earlier by Schelling and Hegel, in criticism of Fichte, to point up what might remain philosophically unsatisfying about even the post-correlationalist genetic position of the later Husserl, in light of the pronounced trend in Husserl’s own development, on the questions of reason and spirit, toward absolute idealism. (shrink)
- Subject, Soul and Person in Kant: Questions for Katharina Kraus.Clinton Tolley -2022 -Kantian Review 27 (3):483-489.Kraus’s book is a rich and systematic examination of Kant’s account of the different dimensions of the metaphysics, epistemology and phenomenology of the ‘self’ that pertains to human subjectivity. Here I explore some of the different meanings that Kraus associates with the term ‘self’ on Kant’s behalf, asking for further clarification as to her interpretation of the terms ‘subject’ (‘the I’), ‘soul’ and ‘person’, in particular. I also raise some critical questions concerning Kraus’s account of the nature and limitations of (...) the ‘real’ use of the concept of the soul in particular, in light of passages throughout the Critical period in which Kant seems to allow for a relatively unproblematic application of the term to whatever being it is that possesses the various psychical faculties – a being which he also seems to allow is an object of experience (and hence cognition). (shrink)
- (1 other version)The Subject in Hegel’s Absolute Idea.Clinton Tolley -2018 -Hegel Bulletin 1:1-31.
- The New Anti-Kant.Sandra Lapointe &Clinton Tolley -2014 - London, UK: Palgrave. Edited by Sandra Lapointe.Finally available in English, Príhonský's New Anti-Kant is an inescapable book for anyone interested in Kant's Critical philosophy. It provides a concise and systematic recapitulation of Bolzano's insightful, trenchant criticisms of Kant, and provides a fresh window into historical developments in 19th century post-Kantian philosophy.
- Bolzano and Kant on the place of subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre.Clinton Tolley -2012 -Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):63-88.Throughout his career, Bolzano presents his account of knowledge and science as an alternative to 'the Critical philosophy' of Kant and his followers. The aim of this essay is to evaluate the success of Bolzano's own account—and especially, its heavy emphasis on the objectivity of cognitive content—in enabling him to escape what he takes to be the chief shortcomings of the 'subjective idealist philosophy'. I argue that, because Bolzano's own position can be seen to be beset by problems that are (...) both recognizably similar to, and possibly even worse than, those that he takes to afflict Kant's account of the elements of our knowledge, Bolzano's attempt to fully overcome the alleged vices of Kant's idealism by 'extruding' semantic content from the mind must be judged to be less than satisfactory. (shrink)
- Entre sens et non-sens: Benoist sur l'explication realiste de l'intentionalite.Clinton Tolley -2010 -Philosophiques 37 (2):491-98.
- From 'facts' of rational cognition to their condition : metaphysics and the analytic method.Clinton Tolley -2021 - In Peter Thielke,Kant's Prolegomena: A Critical Guide. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Export citation
Bookmark - Kant and the idea of a system of logic.Clinton Tolley -2025 - In Gabriele Gava, Thomas Sturm & Achim Vesper,Kant and the systematicity of the sciences. New York: Routledge.Export citation Bookmark
- Representation, consciousness, and mind in German idealism.Clinton Tolley -2018 - In Sandra Lapointe,Philosophy of mind in the nineteenth century. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francs Group.Export citation Bookmark
- The Concept of Humanity in Kant's Transcendental Philosophy.Clinton Tolley -2022 - In Karolina Hübner,Human: A History (Oxford Philosophical Concepts). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- The emergence of a phenomenology of spirit : 1910-1922.Clinton Tolley -2023 - In Kristin Gjesdal,The Oxford handbook of nineteenth-century women philosophers in the German tradition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Hegel's Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic, by Karen Ng. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley -2022 -Mind 132 (528):1151-1160.Karen Ng’s book is a clearly written, ambitious, well-organized, and in many respects very successful attempt to provide a new orientation for readers of Hegel’.
- The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley -2018 -Philosophical Review 127 (3):399-403.
- Richard L. Mendelsohn, The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley -2006 -Philosophy in Review 26 (1):49-52.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Pierre-Jean Renaudie, Husserl et les catégories: Langage, pensée, et perception, Vrin, Bibliothèque d’Histoire de la Philosophie, 2015, 253 pp, € 24.00, ISBN: 978-2-7116-2635-9. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley -2018 -Husserl Studies 34 (1):93-100.
- Review: Dickerson, Kant on Representation and Objectivity_. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley -2004 -Philosophy in Review 24 (6):405-407.
- Review: Melnick, Arthur,Themes in Kant's Metaphysics and Ethics. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley -2005 -Philosophy in Review 25 (3):196-198.Export citation Bookmark
- Kant's Elliptical Path. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley -2015 -Philosophical Review 124 (4):578-582.
- P. Garavaso and N. Vassallo, Frege on Thinking and its Epistemic Significance. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley -2017 -Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
- Sandra Lapointe , Bolzano's Theoretical Philosophy: An Introduction . Reviewed by. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley -2014 -Philosophy in Review 34 (1-2):87-90.
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server or OpenAthens.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
 Email |  RSS feed |
Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Home |New books and articles |Bibliographies |Philosophy journals |About PhilPapers |API |Contact us |Code of conduct
PhilPapers logo byAndrea Andrews andMeghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see ourterms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).Use of this site is subject toterms & conditions.
All rights reserved byThe PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-5b9ff6f457-cbsf4 uwo