Ch'um ch'unŭn tokkaebi: ton kwa maŭm ŭi kwan'gye rŭl saenggak handa: Kim Chi-ha kyŏngje esei.Chi-ha Kim -2010 - Sŏul-si: Chaŭm kwa Moŭm.details1. 하나가 여럿에게 가는 길 - 2008년 11월 동아시아 경제공동체포럼 기조강연, 인천 드림시티에서 2. 물 - 마음과 돈과 물의 시대에 부쳐 3. 님 - 획기적 재분배의 이원집정제에 관하여 4. 도깨비 - ‘신의 우물’ 근처에서 춤추는 가난한 도깨비 이야기 5. 혁신 - 중국의 혁신은 ‘법혜월’과 같은 화엄개벽의 여성!
Categorization and representation of physics problems by experts and novices.Michelene T. H. Chi,Paul J. Feltovich &Robert Glaser -1981 -Cognitive Science 5 (2):121-52.detailsThe representation of physics problems in relation to the organization of physics knowledge is investigated in experts and novices. Four experiments examine the existence of problem categories as a basis for representation; differences in the categories used by experts and novices; differences in the knowledge associated with the categories; and features in the problems that contribute to problem categorization and representation. Results from sorting tasks and protocols reveal that experts and novices begin their problem representations with specifiably different problem categories, (...) and completion of the representations depends on the knowledge associated with the categories. For, the experts initially abstract physics principles to approach and solve a problem representation, whereas novices base their representation and approaches on the problem's literal features. (shrink)
Buddhist formal logic.R. S. Y. Chi -1969 - Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.detailsThis work is primarily an interpretation of Indian Logic preserved in China.
From Stabilizer to Enhancer: Effective Engagement Strategies for Secondary Stakeholders in Corporate Social Responsibility. Di Fan,Chengyong Xiao,Xun Tong,Yan Shao &T. C. E. Cheng -forthcoming -Business and Society.detailsCorporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives targeting primary stakeholders are recognized for their potential to increase shareholder value (i.e., value enhancers). In contrast, CSR initiatives aimed at secondary stakeholders, such as local communities, are often regarded as value stabilizers—reducing variability in value without significantly boosting it. Drawing on instrumental stakeholder theory, we argue that community development initiatives (CDIs), an important CSR practice directed at secondary stakeholders, can enhance shareholder value when combined with effective engagement strategies. We posit that firms can strengthen (...) positive shareholder value by engaging in long-term or business-related CDIs. Additionally, we propose that firms with strong social management capabilities can achieve greater increases in shareholder value through CDIs. Our findings suggest that secondary CSR, traditionally seen as a stabilizer, can be developed into an enhancer through effective stakeholder engagement strategies, providing clear and actionable guidance for managers to engage in secondary CSR in a financially effective way. (shrink)
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Ch'ŏndo wa inpŏp: chŏnt'ongpŏp esŏ ch'ŏnin habil = Heaven road (Natural Dharma) & human law.Chi-su Kim -2023 - Kwangju Kwangyŏksi: Chŏnnam Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'an Munhwawŏn.detailsChe 1-p'yŏn. Ch'ŏndo wa inbŏp (inbŏpch'ŏn) -- 1. Kodae Chungguk ŭi inbŏpch'ŏn ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 2. Sŏnjin sidae ch'ŏnmyŏnggwan ŭi chŏn'gae -- 3. Sŏnjin sidae chŏnt'ong chaeigwan -- 4. Kunju wa minbon : Sŏnjin sidae kunju, minbollon kwa chŏhang, hyŏngmyŏng sasang -- 5. Ch'ŏndo ŭi naeyong kwa inbŏp ŭi panyŏng - Che 2-p'yŏn. Hangsang kwa pyŏnhwa -- 1. To ŭi hangsangsŏng kwa pyŏnhwasŏng -- 2. Pŏp ŭi hangsangsŏng kwa pyŏnhwasŏng -- 3. Pŏpchesasang hangsang kwa pyŏnhwa -- 4. Ch'im Ka-bon kwa (...) Yang Kye-ch'o ŭi pyŏnbŏmnon pigyo -- Che 3-p'yŏn. P'yŏnghwa ŭi pŏp kwa yebang pŏphak : punjaeng ŭi p'yŏnghwa haegyŏl kwa yebang. (shrink)
Khō̜khīan čhāk khwāmkhit rư̄ang khon.Lūangtā Chī -1995 - [Bangkok]: Libœ̄tī Phrēt.detailsOn Buddhist ethics for better conduct of life.
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(1 other version)Is Popper's falsificationist heuristic a helpful resource for developing critical thinking?Chi-Ming Lam -2007 -Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (4):432–448.detailsBased on a rather simple thesis that we can learn from our mistakes, Karl Popper developed a falsificationist epistemology in which knowledge grows through falsifying, or criticizing, our theories. According to him, knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, progresses through conjectures that are controlled by criticism, or attempted refutations . As he puts it, ‘Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us understand the difficulties of the problem which we are trying to solve. This (...) is how we become better acquainted with our problem, and able to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory ... is always a step forward that takes us nearer to the truth. And this is how we can learn from our mistakes’ . Since criticism plays such a crucial role in Popper's falsificationist methodology, it seems natural to envisage his heuristic as a helpful resource for developing critical thinking. However, there is much controversy in the psychological literature over the feasibility and utility of his falsificationism as a heuristic. In this paper, I first consider Popper's falsificationism within the framework of his critical rationalism, elucidating three core and interrelated concepts, viz. fallibilism, criticism, and verisimilitude. Then I argue that the implementation of Popper's falsificationism means exposing to criticism various philosophical presuppositions that work against criticism, such as essentialism, instrumentalism, and conventionalism; it also means combating what seems a common tendency of humans to be biased towards confirmation. I examine the confirmation bias, to which Popper did not give much attention: its pervasiveness and various guises, some theoretical explanations for it, and the role of teachers in undermining its strength and spread. Finally, I consider the question whether students can and should be taught to use disconfirmatory strategies for solving problems. (shrink)
Peirce's Early Concept of Reality: A Study in His Early Metaphysics.Chi-Chun Chiu -1994 - Dissertation, State University of New York at BuffalodetailsThis dissertation is a study in Peirce's early metaphysics embedded in his writings between 1859 and 1867, which have received scant attention. Its purpose is to unravel his concept of reality and some relevant epistemological notions. Peirce's early metaphysical speculations can be divided into two parts. One is a system which covers thought between 1859 and 1862. The other manifests in lectures and writings between 1863 and 1867. The present study, consisting of five chapters, includes both of them. ;Murray G. (...) Murphey is one of the very few scholars who have attempted to take Peirce's early theories of knowledge and reality seriously. Thus the first chapter delineates his general interpretation of Peirce's first system, as a base for further discussions in the next two chapters. The second chapter clarifies Peirce's notion of metaphysics and then criticizes Murphey's understanding of Peirce's view of metaphysics. Similarly, the task of the third chapter is twofold: on the one hand, focusing on the epistemological and metaphysical issues, it provides an exposition of Peirce's system in detail and shows that some of his philosophical doctrines can be traced back to that system; on the other hand, it critically examines Murphey's interpretations of Peirce's texts and demonstrates that they involve misunderstandings or are one-sided. The fourth chapter scrutinizes Peirce's early writings on logic, which is regarded as a branch of semiotic and the foundation of metaphysics. It first elucidates Peirce's unpsychological view of logic as well as his notion of symbol and then discloses his theory of individual and diachronic view of knowledge therein embedded. Furthermore, Peirce's thesis that the function of a proposition is to reduce the impression to unity is investigated. Finally, it sums up the epistemological and metaphysical significance of Peirce's logical theory above expounded and, especially, specifies the fundamental tenets of Peirce's concept of reality implicitly involved in his early semeiotical approach to logic. The last chapter is simply a brief conclusion, roughly adumbrating Peirce's later doctrine of reality and how, in many aspects, it is foreshadowed by his early thought. (shrink)
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