Works by Caspar Hare
34 found
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| Caspar Hare [34] | Caspar John Hare [1] |
- Take the sugar.Caspar Hare -2010 -Analysis 70 (2):237-247.(No abstract is available for this citation).No categories
- Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?Caspar Hare -2007 -Ethics 117 (3):498-523.This is about the rights and wrongs of bringing people into existence. In a nutshell: sometimes what matters is not what would have happened to you, but what would have happened to the person who would have been in your position, even if that person never actually exists.
- Why Aren’t I Part of a Whale?David Builes &Caspar Hare -2023 -Analysis 83 (2):227-234.We start by presenting three different views that jointly imply that every person has many conscious beings in their immediate vicinity, and that the number greatly varies from person to person. We then present and assess an argument to the conclusion that how confident someone should be in these views should sensitively depend on how massive they happen to be. According to the argument, sometimes irreducibly de se observations can be powerful evidence for or against believing in metaphysical theories.No categories
- (1 other version)On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects.Caspar Hare -2003 - Dissertation, Princeton UniversityIn this dissertation I spell out, and make a case for, egocentric presentism, a view about what it is for a thing to be me. I argue that there are benefits associated with adopting this view. ;The chief benefit comes in the sphere of ethics. Many of us, when we think about what to do, feel a particular kind of ambivalence. On the one hand we are moved by an impartial concern for the greater good. We feel the force of (...) considerations of the form: 'all things considered, doing...will make things better overall'. On the other hand we are selfish. We feel the force of considerations of the form 'doing...will make things better for me.' And it appears as if these sorts of considerations often conflict. Often by doing what makes things better for me I do not make things better overall, and vice-versa. But egocentric presentism is capable of resolving this conflict. As an egocentric presentist I can think both that considerations of the greater good always count in favor my doing what's good for me, and that considerations of the greater good always count in favor of other people doing what's good for them. ;Another benefit comes in the sphere of metaphysics. As an egocentric presentist I can make sense of some otherwise perplexing puzzles about personal identity over time, by combining a non-reductionist view about who I will be, with Parfitian reductionism about personal identity over time and a lean physicalist ontology. (shrink)
- Self‐Reinforcing and Self‐Frustrating Decisions.Caspar Hare &Brian Hedden -2015 -Noûs 50 (3):604-628.
- The Limits of Kindness.Caspar John Hare -2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.Caspar Hare presents a bold and original approach to questions of what we ought to do, and why we ought to do it. He breaks with tradition to argue that we can tackle difficult problems in normative ethics by starting with a principle that is humble and uncontroversial. Being moral involves wanting particular other people to be better off.
- Should We Wish Well to All?Caspar Hare -2016 -Philosophical Review 125 (4):451-472.Some moral theories tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals (...) may compose an interaction with a group. (shrink)
- Obligation and Regret When There is No Fact of the Matter About What Would Have Happened if You Had not Done What You Did.Caspar Hare -2011 -Noûs 45 (1):190 - 206.It is natural to distinguish between objective and subjective senses of.
- Self-Bias, Time-Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time.Caspar Hare -2007 -Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):350-373.This is about the metaphysics of the self and ethical egoism. It can serve as a preview for my manuscript-in-progress below.
- Time – The Emotional Asymmetry.Caspar Hare -2013 - In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke,A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 507–520.In this chapter on time‐the emotional asymmetry, the author addresses two questions concerning future‐bias. The first is with respect to the sorts of things are people future‐biased. Do people want all things that they regard as bad to be in the past, or just some of them? Second, are people justified in being future‐biased? The second question has received a good deal of attention from philosophers. The author aims to survey different answers to the question, and to give a sense (...) of how things presently lie. A section presents some poor arguments for future‐bias, including discussions on the shrinking block theory of time. It is also said that, even if four‐dimensionalism is false, a charge of arbitrariness can be leveled at future‐bias. Finally, the chapter presents a discussion on some incoherence arguments against future‐bias. (shrink)
- A puzzle about other-directed time-bias.Caspar Hare -2008 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):269 – 277.Should we be time-biased on behalf of other people? 'Sometimes yes, sometimes no'—it is tempting to answer. But this is not right. On pain of irrationality, we cannot be too selective about when we are time-biased on behalf of other people.
- Obligations to Merely Statistical People.Caspar Hare -2012 -Journal of Philosophy 109 (5-6):378-390.
- Realism About Tense and Perspective.Caspar Hare -2010 -Philosophy Compass 5 (9):760-769.On one view of time past, present and future things exist, but their being past, present or future does not consist in their standing in before‐ and after‐relations to other things. So, for example, the event of the signing of the Magna Carta is past, and its being so does not consist in, or reduce to, its coming before the events of 2010.In this paper I discuss arguments for and against this view and view in its near vicinity, perspectival realism. (...) I suggest that perspectival realism is a better view than tense realism. It shares the principal virtues, but not the principal vices, of tense realism. (shrink)
- Risk and radical uncertainty in HIV research.Caspar Hare -2017 -Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (2):87-89.
- Perfectly balanced interests.Caspar Hare -2009 -Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):165-176.
- Index.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 111-114.No categories
- 10. Laurence Thomas, The Family and the Political Self Laurence Thomas, The Family and the Political Self (pp. 580-585).Richard J. Arneson,Robert E. Goodin,David Schmidtz,Agnieszka Jaworska,Caspar Hare &Lionel K. McPherson -2006 - In Laurie Dimauro,Ethics. Greenhaven Press.
- Rationality and the distant needy.Caspar Hare -2007 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (2):161–178.This is my argument for the claim that morality is very demanding indeed. In a nutshell: being consistent is harder than you think.
- Torture – Does Timing Matter?Caspar Hare -2014 -Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):385-394.
- Acknowledgments.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press.No categories
- 5 A Problem about Personal Identity over Time.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 57-72.
- Contents.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press.
- 4 Clarifications.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 41-56.No categories
- 3 Egocentrism and Egocentric Metaphysics.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 19-40.
- Introduction.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press.No categories
- Notes.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 99-106.No categories
- References.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 107-110.No categories
- 7 Skepticism and Humility.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 91-98.No categories
- 1 Self- Interest and Self- Importance.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 1-8.No categories
- 2 Time- Bias and the Metaphysics of Time.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 9-18.
- The ethics of morphing.Caspar Hare -2009 -Philosophical Studies 145 (1):111 - 130.Here's one piece of practical reasoning: "If I do this then a person will reap some benefits and suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits outweigh the costs. So I ought to do it." Here's another: "If I do this then one person will reap some benefits and another will suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits to the one person outweigh the costs to the other. So I ought to do it." Many influential philosophers say that there is something (...) dubious about the second piece of reasoning. They say that it makes sense to trade-off costs and benefits within lives, but not across lives. In this paper I make a case for the second piece of reasoning. My case turns on the existence of morphing sequences—sequences of possible states of affairs across which people transform smoothly into other people. (shrink)
- 6 The Solution.Caspar Hare -2003 - InOn Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Princeton University Press. pp. 73-90.No categories
- Bradley , Ben . Well-Being and Death . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 224. $60.00 (cloth). [REVIEW]Caspar Hare -2011 -Ethics 121 (4):797-799.
- Review of Saul Smilansky,Ten Moral Paradoxes. [REVIEW]Caspar Hare -2009 -Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5).
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
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Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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