Works by Carl G. Hempel
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| Carl G. Hempel [153] | Carl Gustav Hempel [26] |
- Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Carl Gustav Hempel -1965 - New York: The Free Press.
- Philosophy of natural science.Carl Gustav Hempel -1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
- Aspects of scientific explanation.Carl G. Hempel -1965 - In Carl Gustav Hempel,Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: The Free Press. pp. 504.
- (1 other version)Studies in the logic of explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel &Paul Oppenheim -1948 -Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the function (...) and the essential characteristics of scientific explanation. In the present essay, an attempt will be made to shed some light on these issues by means of an elementary survey of the basic pattern of scientific explanation and a subsequent more rigorous analysis of the concept of law and of the logical structure of explanatory arguments. (shrink)
- Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel -1967 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.
- The function of general laws in history.Carl Gustav Hempel -1942 -Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):35-48.The classic logical positivist account of historical explanation, putting forward what is variously called the "regularity interpretation" (#Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation), the "covering law model" (#Dray, Laws and Explanation in History), or the "deductive model" (Michael #Scriven, "Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations"). See also #Danto, Narration and Knowledge, for further criticisms of the model. Hempel formalizes historical explanation as involving (a) statements of determining (initial and boundary) conditions for the event to be explained, and (b) statements of (...) general laws that imply that whenever events of the kind described in (a) occur, an event of the kind to be explained will take place. He admits that in practice historians rarely explain historical events in this way, but instead give only fragmentary "explanation sketches." Such sketches can, however, be "scientifically acceptable," providing it points to where "more specific statements" are to be found (351). An interesting aspect of the article is its "late" positivist, proto‑Kuhnian assertion that "the separation of 'pure description' and 'hypothetical generalization and theory construction' in empirical science is unwarranted" (356). But Hempel does not work out the wider implications of this important conclusion. It is also worth noting that he himself was not much interested in the philosophy of history; other authors took up his model and discussed it within that context. Usefully discussed by #Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 1:112‑17. (shrink)
- Studies in the logic of confirmation (I.).Carl Gustav Hempel -1945 -Mind 54 (213):1-26.
- Studies in the logic of confirmation (II.).Carl Gustav Hempel -1945 -Mind 54 (214):97-121.
- Science and Human Values.Carl G. Hempel -1965 - In Carl Gustav Hempel,Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: The Free Press. pp. 81-96.
- Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel.Carl G. Hempel,Donald Davidson &Nicholas Rescher (eds.) -1970 - Dordrecht,: D. Reidel.Reminiscences of Peter, by P. Oppenheim.--Natural kinds, by W. V. Quine.--Inductive independence and the paradoxes of confirmation, by J. Hintikka.--Partial entailment as a basis for inductive logic, by W. C. Salmon.--Are there non-deductive logics?, by W. Sellars.--Statistical explanation vs. statistical inference, by R. C. Jeffre--Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice, by R. Nozick.--The meaning of time, by A. Grünbaum.--Lawfulness as mind-dependent, by N. Rescher.--Events and their descriptions: some considerations, by J. Kim.--The individuation of events, by D. Davidson.--On properties, by (...) H. Putnam.--A method for avoiding the Curry paradox, by F. B. Fitch.--Publications (1934-1969) by Carl G. Hempel (p. [266]-270). (shrink)
- The theoretician's dilemma: A study in the logic of theory construction.Carl G. Hempel -1958 -Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:173-226.
- Provisoes: A problem concerning the inferential function of scientific theories.Carl Gustav Hempel -1988 -Erkenntnis 28 (2):147 - 164.
- Inductive inconsistencies.Carl Gustav Hempel -1960 -Synthese 12 (4):439-69.
- Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science.Carl Gustav Hempel -1972 - In Hempel Carl Gustav,International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. University of Chicago Press.No categories
- Comments on Goodman's ways of worldmaking.Carl G. Hempel -1980 -Synthese 45 (2):193 - 199.
- (1 other version)Problems and changes in the empiricist criterion of meaning.Carl G. Hempel -1950 -11 Rev. Intern. De Philos 41 (11):41-63.The fundamental tenet of modern empiricism is the view that all non-analytic knowledge is based on experience. Let us call this thesis the principle of empiricism. [1] Contemporary logical empiricism has added [2] to it the maxim that a sentence makes a cognitively meaningful assertion, and thus can be said to be either true or false, only if it is either (1) analytic or self-contradictory or (2) capable, at least in principle, of experiential test. According to this so-called empiricist criterion (...) of cognitive meaning, or of cognitive significance, many of the formulations of traditional metaphysics and large parts of epistemology are devoid of cognitive significance--however rich some of them may be in non-cognitive import by virtue of their emotive appeal or the moral inspiration they offer. Similarly certain doctrines which have been, at one time or another, formulated within empirical science or its border disciplines are so contrived as to be incapable of test by any conceivable evidence; they are therefore qualified as pseudo- [p. 42:] hypotheses, which assert nothing, and which therefore have no explanatory or predictive force whatever. This verdict applies, for example, to the neo-vitalist speculations about entelechies or vital forces, and to the "telefinalist hypothesis" propounded by Lecomte du Noüy. (shrink)
- A purely syntactical definition of confirmation.Carl G. Hempel -1943 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):122-143.
- Maximal specificity and lawlikeness in probabilistic explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel -1968 -Philosophy of Science 35 (2):116-133.The article is a reappraisal of the requirement of maximal specificity (RMS) proposed by the author as a means of avoiding "ambiguity" in probabilistic explanation. The author argues that RMS is not, as he had held in one earlier publication, a rough substitute for the requirement of total evidence, but is independent of it and has quite a different rationale. A group of recent objections to RMS is answered by stressing that the statistical generalizations invoked in probabilistic explanations must be (...) lawlike, and by arguing that predicates fit for occurrence in lawlike statistical probability statements must meet two conditions, at least one of which is violated in each of the counterexamples adduced in the objections. These considerations suggest the conception that probabilistic-statistical laws concern the long-run frequency of some characteristic within a reference class as characterized by some particular "description" or predicate expression, and that replacement of such a description by a coextensive one may turn a statement that is lawlike into another that is not. Finally, to repair a defect noted by Grandy, the author's earlier formulation of RMS is replaced by a modified version. (shrink)
- On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth.Carl Gustav Hempel -1934 -Analysis 2 (4):49 - 59.
- Aspects of scientific explanation.Carl G. Hempel -1965 - New York,: Free Press.No categories
- (1 other version)A definition of "degree of confirmation".Carl G. Hempel &Paul Oppenheim -1945 -Philosophy of Science 12 (2):98-115.1. The problem. The concept of confirmation of an hypothesis by empirical evidence is of fundamental importance in the methodology of empirical science. For, first of all, a sentence cannot even be considered as expressing an empirical hypothesis at all unless it is theoretically capable of confirmation or disconfirmation, i.e. unless the kind of evidence can be characterized whose occurrence would confirm, or disconfirm, the sentence in question. And secondly, the acceptance or rejection of a sentence which does represent an (...) empirical hypothesis is determined, in scientific procedure, by the degree to which it is confirmed by relevant evidence. (shrink)
- Rational Action.Carl G. Hempel -1961 -Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35:5 - 23.
- On the Nature of Mathematical Truth.Carl G. Hempel -1964 - In P. Benacerraf H. Putnam,Philosophy of Mathematics. Prentice-Hall. pp. 366--81.
- Turns in the evolution of the problem of induction.Carl G. Hempel -1981 -Synthese 46 (3):389 - 404.
- Implications of Carnap’s Work for the Philosophy of Science.Carl Gustav Hempel -1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp,The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill.,: Open Court. pp. 685--709.No categories
- Valuation and objectivity in science.Carl G. Hempel -1983 - In Robert S. Cohen & Larry Laudan,Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum. D. Reidel. pp. 73--100.
- The white shoe: No red Herring.Carl G. Hempel -1967 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3):239-240.
- Some remarks on `facts' and propositions.Carl G. Hempel -1935 -Analysis 2 (6):93-96.
- Beiträge zur logischen Analyse des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs.Carl Gustav Hempel -1934 - Jena,: Universitäts-Buchdruckerei G. Neuenhahn.
- (1 other version)Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist.Carl G. Hempel -1973 -Synthese 25 (3-4):256 - 268.
- Hans Reichenbach remembered.Carl G. Hempel -1991 -Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):5 - 10.
- Homage to Rudolf Carnap.Herbert Feigl,Carl G. Hempel,Richard C. Jeffrey,W. V. Quine,A. Shimony,Yehoshua Bar-Hillel,Herbert G. Bohnert,Robert S. Cohen,Charles Hartshorne,David Kaplan,Charles Morris,Maria Reichenbach &Wolfgang Stegmüller -1970 -PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:XI-LXVI.
- The Verifiability Theory of Meaning.Hans Reichenbach,Carl G. Hempel &Gustav Bergmann -1952 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 17 (2):134-136.
- Selected philosophical essays.Carl Gustav Hempel -2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Richard C. Jeffrey.Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-1997) was one of the preeminent figures in the philosophical movement of logical empiricism. He was a member of both the Berlin and Vienna circles, fled Germany in 1934 and finally settled in the US where he taught for many years in New York, Princeton, and Pittsburgh. The essays in this collection come from the early and late periods of Hempel's career and chart his intellectual odyssey from a rigorous commitment to logical positivism in the 1930s (when (...) Hempel allied himself closely with Carnap) to a more sociological approach close in spirit to the work of Neurath and Kuhn. The collection brings together essays which have up till now been difficult to find, four of which are appearing in English for the first time. Cumulatively they offer a fresh perspective on Hempel's intellectual development and on the rise and demise of logical empiricism. (shrink)
- A Logical Appraisal of Operationism.Carl G. Hempel -1958 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (3):354-356.
- Über den Gehalt von Wahrfcheinlichkeitsausfagen.Carl G. Hempel -1935 -Erkenntnis 5 (1):228-260.
- Aspekte wissenschaftlicher Erklärung.Carl Gustav Hempel -1977 - De Gruyter.No categories
- The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality.Carl Gustav Hempel -2001 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by James H. Fetzer.Editor James Fetzer presents an analytical and historical introduction and a comprehensive bibliography together with selections of many of Carl G. Hempel's most important studies to give students and scholars an ideal opportunity to appreciate the enduring contributions of one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century.No categories
- Provisos: A philosophical problem concerning the inferential function of scientific laws.Carl Gustav Hempel -1988 - In Adolf Grünbaum & Wesley C. Salmon,Limitstions of Deductivism. University of California Press, Berkeley, Ca. pp. 19Ð36.
- Reply to David L. Miller's comments.Carl G. Hempel &Paul Oppenheim -1948 -Philosophy of Science 15 (4):350-352.Like a number of other authors, Miller uses the term “emergent” interchangeably with “unpredictable” and employs it as a property term, i.e., in contexts of the form “Event E is emergent.” As we showed in our article, however, predictability and unpredictability as well as emergence are relations; they can be predicated of an event only relatively to some body of information. Thus, a lunar eclipse is predictable by means of information including data on the locations and speeds, at some particular (...) time, of the celestial bodies involved, and the laws of celestial mechanics plus certain principles of optics; it is unpredictable on the basis of, say, alone. Consequently, the phrase “Event E is unpredictable” is incomplete, and hence meaningless, in much the same sense as the expression “Straight line l is parallel.” Similar observations apply to the term “emergent,” which is frequently used to characterize events which, in a sense examined in detail in our article, are not explainable by a micro-structure theory. (shrink)
- Reflections on Nelson Goodman’s: The Structure of Appearance.Carl G. Hempel -1953 -Philosophical Review 62 (1):108-116.
- (1 other version)Vagueness and logic.Carl G. Hempel -1939 -Philosophy of Science 6 (2):163-180.As is rather generally admitted today, the terms of our language in scientific as well as in everyday use, are not completely precise, but exhibit a more or less high degree of vagueness. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the consequences of this circumstance for a series of questions which belong to the field of logic. First of all, the meaning and the logical status of the concept of vagueness will be analyzed; then we will try to (...) find out whether logical terms are free from vagueness, and whether vagueness has an influence upon the validity of the customary principles of logic; finally, the possibilities of diminishing the vagueness of scientific concepts by suitable logical devices will be briefly dealt with. As starting point for the subsequent considerations we choose the clear and stimulating analysis of the concept of vagueness which has recently been carried out by Max Black ([1]) and which has suggested the considerations of this paper. (shrink)
- [Omnibus Review].Carl G. Hempel -1957 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (3):325-325.
- Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel: A Tribute on the Occasion of His Sixty-Fifth Birthday.Donald Davidson,Carl Gustav Hempel &Nicholas Rescher (eds.) -1970 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.The eminent philosopher of science Carl G. Hempel, Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and a Past President of the American Philosophical Association, has had a long and distinguished academic career in the course of which he has been professorial mentor to some of America's most distinguished philosophers. This volume gathers together twelve original papers by Hempel's students and associates into a volume intended to do homage to Hempel on the occasion of his 65th year in 1970. The papers (...) are grouped around the unifying topic of Hempel's own interests in logic and philosophy of science, the great majority dealing with issues on inductive logic and the theory of scientific explanatio- problems to which Hempel has devoted the bulk of his outstandingly fruitful efforts. With the approach of 'Peter' Hempel's 65th birthday, an editorial committee sprang into being by an uncannily spontaneous process to prepare to commemorate this event with an appropriate Festschrift. The editors were pleased to receive unfailingly prompt and efficient coopera tion on the part of all contributors. The responsibility of seeing the work through the press was assumed by Nicholas Rescher. The editors are grateful to all concerned for their collaboration. ALAN ROSS ANDERSON PAUL BENACERRAF ADOLF GRUNBAUM GERALD J. MASSEY NICHOLAS RESCHER RICHARD S. RUDNER TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V PAUL OPPENHEIM: Reminiscences of Peter 1 w. v. QUINE: Natural Kinds 5 JAAKKO HINTIKKA: Inductive Independence and the Paradoxes of Confirmation 24 WESLEY c. (shrink)No categories
- The old and the new ‘Erkenntnis’.Carl G. Hempel -1975 -Erkenntnis 9 (1):1-4.In this first issue of the new Erkenntnis, it seems fitting to recall at least briefly the character and the main achievements of its distinguished namesake and predecessor. The old Erkenntnis came into existence when Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap assumed the editorship of the Annalen der Philosophie and gave the journal its new title and its characteristic orientation; the first issue appeared in 1930. The journal was backed by the Gesellschaft f r Empirische Philosophie in Berlin, in which Reichenbach, (...) Walter Dubislav, and Kurt Grelling were the leading figures, and by the Verein Ernst Mach in Vienna, whose philosophical position was strongly influenced by that of the Vienna Circle; a brief account of these groups, and of several kindred schools and trends of scientific and philosophical thinking, was given by Otto Neurath in his 'Historische Anmerkungen' (Vol. 1, pp. 311-314). As Reichenbach noted in his introduction to the first issue, the editors of Erkenntnis were concerned to carry on philosophical inquiry in close consideration of the procedures and results of the various scientific disciplines: analysis of scientific research and its presuppositions was expected to yield insight into the character of all human knowledge, while at the same time, the objectivity and the progressive character of science inspired the convection that philosophy need not remain an array of conflicting 'systems', but could attain to the status of objective knowledge. As a student in Berlin and Vienna during those years, I experienced vividly the exhilarating sense, shared by those close to those two philosophical groups, of being jointly engaged in a novel and challenging intellectual enterprise in which philosophical issues were dealt with 'scientifically' and philosophical claims were amenable to support or criticism by logically rigorous arguments. The 'logical analyses' and 'rational reconstructions' set forth by adherents of this program often made extensive use of the concepts, methods, and symbolic apparatus of contemporary symbolic logic, whose importance for philosophy was the subject of Carnap's article, 'Die Alte und die Neue Logik', which appeared in the first issue.. (shrink)
- Empirical Statements and Falsifiability.Carl G. Hempel -1958 -Philosophy 33 (127):342 - 348.1. Object of this note . In his lively essay, “Between Analytic and Empirical,” , Mr. J. W. N. Watkins challenges the empiricist identification of synthetic statements with empirical ones by arguing that there exists an important class of statements which are synthetic, i.e. not analytically true or false, and yet not empirical. I find Mr. Watkins's arguments very stimulating, but I do not think they provide a sound basis for his contention. In the present note, I wish to indicate (...) what seem to me the principal flaws in Mr. Watkins's reasoning, and to make some additional comments on the issues raised by his discussion. (shrink)
- Science Unlimited?Carl G. Hempel -1973 -Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 4 (3):187-202.
- Logical positivism and the social sciences.Carl Gustav Hempel -1969 - In Peter Achinstein & Stephen Francis Barker,The Legacy of Logical Positivism: Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins University Press.No categories
- A note on the parodoxes of confirmation.Carl G. Hempel -1946 -Mind 55 (217):79-82.
- On a claim by Skyrms concerning lawlikeness and confirmation.Carl G. Hempel -1968 -Philosophy of Science 35 (3):274-278.In his article [5], Brian Skyrms adduces some generalizations which, he claims, receive no confirmatory support from their positive instances even though all the predicates they contain are well entrenched in Goodman's sense. Invoking the principle that “a generalization is lawlike if it is capable of receiving confirmatory support from its positive instances”, he claims that his examples “provide striking demonstration of the fact that the lawlikeness of a hypothesis is not a simple function of the projectibility of its constituent (...) predicates.” I think the claim is of great interest; but I will try to show that Skyrms's argument fails to establish it because it presupposes an unwarranted assumption which raises a problem of general importance for confirmation theory. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
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Jussi Suikkanen
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