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Body ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a (...) rubber hand or someone else’s body from the first-person perspective and was touched either synchronously or asynchronously. The main findings: (1) The sense of body ownership was hindered in the asynchronous conditions of both the body-part and the full-body experiments. However, a strong sense of experiential ownership was observed in those conditions. (2) We found the opposite when the participants’ responses were measured after tactile stimulations had ceased for 5 s. In the synchronous conditions of another set of body-part and full-body experiments, only experiential ownership was blocked but not body ownership. These results demonstrate for the first time the double dissociation between body ownership and experiential ownership. Experiential ownership is indeed a distinct type of bodily self-consciousness. (shrink)

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I discuss the so-called “problem of perception” in relation to the Argument from Illusion: Can we directly perceive the external world? According to Direct Realism, at least sometimes perception provides direct and immediate awareness of reality. But the Argument from Illusion threatens to undermine the possibility of genuine perception. In The Problem of Perception (2002), A. D. Smith proposes a novel defense of Direct Realism based on a careful study of perceptual phenomenology. According to his theory, the intentionality of perception (...) is explained in terms of three phenomenological features of perception: phenomenalthree-dimensional spatiality, movement, and the Anstoss. He argues that this account of perceptual intentionality can resist a central premise of the Argument from Illusion, i.e. the “sense-datum inference.” After presenting Smith’s theory, I argue that he fails to distinguish two independent tasks for the direct realist, and that he underestimates the threat of the so-called “sense-datum infection.” My contention is that even if Smith’s theory of perceptual intentionality is correct, Direct Realism has not been saved from the Argument from Illusion. To resist the Argument from Illusion, it is not enough to merely consider how to block the sense-datum inference. The direct realist must also find a way to undermine the sense-datum infection. If so, I suggest, Direct Realism cannot be defended by perceptual phenomenology alone. (shrink)

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I discuss the nature of visual perception from an interdisciplinary perspective. The target of investigation is Tyler Burge’s theory of perceptual anti-individualism, according to which perceptual states constitutively depend on relations between perceivers and the external world. Burge argues that this theory is presupposed by vision science. My goal is to argue that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only theoretical choice. First, I consider the notion of homeostasis and suggest how it may cast doubt on the perceptual norms in Burge’s (...) theory. Second, I argue that many phenomena studied by vision science can be explained without positing Burge’s notions of veridicality and singular representation. Third, I consider some empirical theories and argue that vision science does not uniquely favor Burge’s theory. I conclude that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only framework for understanding visual perception. (shrink)

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According to Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, first-order mental states become conscious only when they are targeted by HOTs that necessarily represent the states as belonging to self. On this view a state represented as belonging to someone distinct from self could not be a conscious state. Rosenthal develops this view in terms of what he calls the ‘thin immunity principle’ (TIP). According to TIP, when I experience a conscious state, I cannot be wrong about whether it is (...) I who I think is in that state. We first suggest that TIP is a direct consequence of the HOT theory. Next we argue that somatoparaphrenia—a pathology in which sensations are sometimes represented as belonging to other people—shows that TIP can be violated. This violation of TIP in turn shows that the HOT theory’s claim that conscious states are necessarily represented as belonging to self is in error. Rosenthal’s attempt to account for pathological cases is found to be inadequate when applied to somatoparaphrenia, and other possible defenses are also shown to be incapable of preserving TIP. We further conclude by suggesting that the HOT theory’s failing in this regard is not a failing that is peculiar to this theory of consciousness. (shrink)

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Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the (...) HOT necessarily representsthe subject as the owner of the state. But, we contend, one of the lessons to be learned from pathological states like somatoparaphrenia is that conscious awareness of a mental state does not guarantee first-person ownership. That is to say, conscious presence does not imply mental ownership. (shrink)

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Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...) judge that “I feel pain,” we are tautologically aware that feels pain is instantiated and that it is instantiated in oneself. Moreover, he contends that this relationship holds not just for bodily sensations, but also for the sense of agency and for visual perception. But we deny that this relationship is tautological; instead, we treat Shoemaker’s principle (IEM) as a hypothesis. We then proceed to show that certain pathological states and experimentally-induced illusions can be adduced to show that IEM describes not a necessary relationship but a contingent relationship, one that sometimes fails to obtain. That we are not immune to error in the way Shoemaker describes has grave consequences for many aspects of his ideas concerning the first-person perspective. In the course of arguing that these empirical phenomena count against IEM, we also show that not only can the content of conscious experience be misrepresented, so too can the subject: that is, not only can the what of conscious experience be misrepresented, so too can the who. (shrink)

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Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We (...) begin by introducing the HOT theory and by indicating why we believe it is open to distinct interpretations. We then proceed to show that it is incapable of handling cases of radical confabulation. Finally, in the course of considering various possible responses to our position, we show that adoption of a disjunctive strategy, one that would countenance both one-component and two-component versions, would fail to provide any empirical or explanatory advantage. (shrink)

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We investigate two issues about the subjective experience of one's body: first, is the experience of owning a full-body fundamentally different from the experience of owning a body-part?Second, when I experience a bodily sensation, does it guarantee that I cannot be wrong about whether it is me who feels it? To address these issues, we conducted a series of experiments that combined the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and the “body swap illusion.” The subject wore a head mounted display (HMD) connected (...) with a stereo camera set on the experimenter's head. Sitting face to face, they used their right hand holding a paintbrush to brush each other's left hand. Through the HMD, the subject adopted the experimenter's first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own 1PP: the subject watched either the experimenter's hand from the adopted 1PP, and/or the subject's own hand from the adopted third-person perspective (3PP) in the opposite direction (180°), or the subject's full body from the adopted 3PP (180°, with or without face). The synchronous full-body conditions generate a “self-touching illusion”: many participants felt that “I was brushing my own hand!” We found that (1) the sense of body-part ownership and the sense of full-body ownership are not fundamentally different from each other; and (2) our data present a strong case against the mainstream philosophical view called the immunity principle (IEM). We argue that it is possible for misrepresentation to occur in the subject's sense of “experiential ownership” (the sense that I am the one who is having this bodily experience). We discuss these findings and conclude that not only the sense of body ownership but also the sense of experiential ownership call for further interdisciplinary studies. (shrink)

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In a recent study (Chen et al., 2018), we conducted a series of experiments that induced the “four-hand illusion”: using a head-mounted display (HMD), the participant adopted the experimenter’s first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own 1PP. The participant saw four hands via the HMD: the experimenter’s two hands from the adopted 1PP and the subject’s own two hands from the adopted third-person perspective (3PP). In the active four-hand condition, the participant tapped his/her index fingers, imitated by the (...) experimenter. Once all four hands acted synchronously and received synchronous tactile stimulations at the same time, many participants felt as if they owned two more hands. In this paper, we argue that there is a philosophical implication of this novel illusion. According to Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) and Legrand (2010), one can experience one’s own body or body-part either as-object or as-subject but cannot experience it as both simultaneously, i.e., these two experiences are mutually exclusive. Call this view the Experiential Exclusion Thesis. We contend that a key component of the four-hand illusion—the subjective experience of the 1PP-hands that involved both “kinesthetic sense of movement” and “visual sense of movement” (the movement that the participant sees via the HMD)—provides an important counter-example against this thesis. We argue that it is possible for a healthy subject to experience the same body-part both as-subject and as-object simultaneously. Our goal is not to annihilate the distinction between body-as-object and body-as-subject, but to show that it is not as rigid as suggested by the phenomenologists. (shrink)

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In “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” Alston argues against Sellars’s position in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) that there is no nonconceptual cognition. According to him, Sellars ignores phenomenal look-concepts that capture the phenomenal character of experience. I contend that the Sellarsian can agree that the phenomenal aspect of looks should be accommodated, but he is not thereby forced to concede a form of the nonconceptual Given. I examine some of Alston’s arguments, especially the Fineness of (...) Grain Argument, for the view that the phenomenal character of experience is both nonconceptual and epistemic. I try to show that none of them can be said to have undermined Sellars’s position. (shrink)

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In this paper, I challenge a specific claim by Tyler Burge that perception delineates the lower border of representational mind and exhibits the most basic form of objectivity. According to this claim, perception is the most primitive type of representation that, when veridical, accurately attributes properties to non-perspective, mind-independent subject-matters. I argue that perception of the external world, especially vision, is not the most primitive type of objective representation. My approach will be interdisciplinary. After presenting Burge’s theory of perception, I (...) show that the current best empirical accounts strongly suggest that how perceivers represent their bodily conditions plays a key role in the biological functions of perception. Then, I argue that the lower border of objective representation is not given by perception, but by body representation. Objective representation does not begin with perception. (shrink)

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Arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi are considered as a potential biotechnological tool for improving phytostabilization efficiency and plant tolerance to heavy metal-contaminated soils. However, the mechanisms through which AMF help to alleviate metal toxicity in plants are still poorly understood. A greenhouse experiment was conducted to evaluate the effects of two AMF species on the growth, Pb accumulation, photosynthesis and antioxidant enzyme activities of a leguminous tree at Pb addition levels of 0, 500, 1000 and 2000 mg kg-1 soil. AMF symbiosis decreased (...) Pb concentrations in the leaves and promoted the accumulation of biomass as well as photosynthetic pigment contents. Mycorrhizal plants had higher gas exchange capacity, non-photochemistry efficiency, and photochemistry efficiency compared with non-mycorrhizal plants. The enzymatic activities of superoxide dismutase, ascorbate peroxidases and glutathione peroxidase were enhanced, and hydrogen peroxide and malondialdehyde contents were reduced in mycorrhizal plants. These findings suggested that AMF symbiosis could protect plants by alleviating cellular oxidative damage in response to Pb stress. Furthermore, mycorrhizal dependency on plants increased with increasing Pb stress levels, indicating that AMF inoculation likely played a more important role in plant Pb tolerance in heavily contaminated soils. Overall, both F. mosseae and R. intraradices were able to maintain efficient symbiosis with R. pseudoacacia in Pb polluted soils. AMF symbiosis can improve photosynthesis and reactive oxygen species scavenging capabilities and decrease Pb concentrations in leaves to alleviate Pb toxicity in R. pseudoacacia. Our results suggest that the application of the two AMF species associated with R. pseudoacacia could be a promising strategy for enhancing the phytostabilization efficiency of Pb contaminated soils. (shrink)

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Recent studies of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have shown that the sense of body ownership is constrained by several factors and yet is still very flexible. However, exactly how flexible is our sense of body ownership? In this study, we address this issue by investigating the following question: is it possible that one may have the illusory experience of owning four hands? Under visual manipulation, the participant adopted the experimenter’s first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own. Sitting (...) face to face, the participant saw four hands—the experimenter’s two hands from the adopted 1PP together with the subject’s own two hands from the adopted third-person perspective (3PP). We found that: (1) the four-hand illusion did not occur in the passive four-hand condition. (2) In the active four-hand condition, the participants tapped their index fingers, imitated by the experimenter. When tactile stimulations were not provided, the key illusion was not induced, either. (3) Strikingly, once all four hands began to act with the same pattern and received synchronous tactile stimulations at the same time, many participants felt as if they had two more hands. These results show that the sense of body ownership is much more flexible than most researchers have suggested. (shrink)

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Self-location—the sense of where I am in space—provides an experiential anchor for one's interaction with the environment. In the studies of full-body illusions, many researchers have defined self-location solely in terms of body-location—the subjective feeling of where my body is. Although this view is useful, there is an issue regarding whether it can fully accommodate the role of 1PP-location—the sense of where my first-person perspective is located in space. In this study, we investigate self-location by comparing body-location and 1PP-location: using (...) a head-mounted display (HMD) and a stereo camera, the subjects watched their own body standing in front of them and received tactile stimulations. We manipulated their senses of body-location and 1PP-location in three different conditions: the participants standing still (Basic condition), asking them to move forward (Walking condition), and swiftly moving the stereo camera away from their body (Visual condition). In the Walking condition, the participants watched their body moving away from their 1PP. In the Visual condition, the scene seen via the HMD was systematically receding. Our data show that, under different manipulations of movement, the spatial unity between 1PP-location and body-location can be temporarily interrupted. Interestingly, we also observed a “double-body effect.” We further suggest that it is better to consider body-location and 1PP-location as interrelated but distinct factors that jointly support the sense of self-location. (shrink)

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The distinction between the first-person perspective (1PP) and the third-person perspective (3PP) has been widely regarded as fundamental and rigid, and many researchers hold that genuine bodily illusions can only be experienced from the 1PP. We applied VR technology to investigate whether this mainstream view is correct. In our experiments, the participants were immersed in a VR environment in which they saw a life-sized virtual body either from the 1PP or from the 3PP. They either passively received tactile stimulations and/or (...) actively interacted with a virtual soccer ball. Our VR system created novel visuo-motor-tactile correlations between the real and the virtual world: when the participant interacted with a real plastic soccer ball, he/she would feel corresponding tactile sensations and see the avatar performing the exact same movements. We found that a clear sense of ownership over the avatar was induced not only in the 1PP condition but also in the Passive-3PP and the Active-3PP conditions. We also observed evidence suggesting that it is possible to experience one’s body-location, 1PP-location, as well as self-location, both from the 1PP and from the 3PP. Together, we demonstrate that there is in fact no fundamental gap between embodied 1PP and embodied 3PP in the virtual world. (shrink)

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Strong Turing Determinacy, or ${\mathrm {sTD}}$, is the statement that for every set A of reals, if $\forall x\exists y\geq _T x (y\in A)$, then there is a pointed set $P\subseteq A$. We prove the following consequences of Turing Determinacy ( ${\mathrm {TD}}$ ) and ${\mathrm {sTD}}$ over ${\mathrm {ZF}}$ —the Zermelo–Fraenkel axiomatic set theory without the Axiom of Choice: (1) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {TD}}$ implies $\mathrm {wDC}_{\mathbb {R}}$ —a weaker version of $\mathrm {DC}_{\mathbb {R}}$.(2) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {sTD}}$ implies that every (...) set of reals is measurable and has Baire property.(3) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {sTD}}$ implies that every uncountable set of reals has a perfect subset.(4) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {sTD}}$ implies that for every set of reals A and every $\epsilon>0$ :(a)There is a closed set $F\subseteq A$ such that $\mathrm {Dim_H}(F)\geq \mathrm {Dim_H}(A)-\epsilon $, where $\mathrm {Dim_H}$ is the Hausdorff dimension.(b)There is a closed set $F\subseteq A$ such that $\mathrm {Dim_P}(F)\geq \mathrm {Dim_P}(A)-\epsilon $, where $\mathrm {Dim_P}$ is the packing dimension. (shrink)

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Resumen: La cuestión hoy en día de la identidad cultural es una manifestación inevitable del progreso económico y social de China en el ámbito de la cultura. Sus raíces se encuentran en el lento desarrollo social de la China moderna y en la invasión de la cultura extranjera, que se manifiesta en la apatía hacia la gran cultura tradicional. El inglés es una lengua internacional de uso común que se habla en todo el mundo. Con la creciente popularidad del inglés, (...) la enseñanza universitaria de este idioma ha acaparado una mayor atención en los últimos años. La filosofía es muy teórica, hipotética y difícil de entender, por lo que los profesores de inglés deben ser hábiles a la hora de movilizar la subjetividad y la creatividad de los alumnos mediante el uso de numerosos y beneficiosos recursos. El inglés es un recurso valioso, y su uso correcto en la identificación cultural puede tener implicaciones educativas imprevistas. En consecuencia, la forma de emplear las ideas de la enseñanza universitaria del inglés para fortalecer la identidad cultural nacional es fundamental para avanzar en el crecimiento general de la enseñanza universitaria del inglés y la construcción de la cultura nacional. (shrink)

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Review by: Johanna N. Y. Franklin The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 115-118, March 2013.

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Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire. ByLiang Cai. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2014. Pp. xii + 276. $85, $27.95.

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Sydney Shoemaker argues that a certain class of self-ascriptions is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. In their “Self-Consciousness and Immunity,” Timothy Lane andCalebLiang question Shoemaker’s view. Lang andLiang present a clinical case and an experiment and argue that they are counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. This paper is a response to Lane andLiang’s challenge. I identify the desiderata that a counterexample to Shoemaker’s view must meet and show that (...) somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion fail to meet those desiderata. Thus, despite being puzzling phenomena, somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion are not counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. (shrink)

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The renowned Sri Lankan scholar Y. Karunadasa examines the Abhidhamma perspective on the nature of phenomenal existence. He begins with a discussion of dhamma theory, which provides the ontological foundation for Abhidhamma philosophy. (The dhamma theory is an Abhidhammic innovation that gives an overview of the bare phenomenon that form this world; it's a theory of real existents.) He then explains the category of "the conceptual" as the Abhidhamma's answer to the objects of common-sense realism. Among the other topics discussed (...) are the theory of double truth (ultimate and conceptual truth), the analysis of mind, the theory of cognition, the analysis of matter, the nature of time and space, the theory of momentary being, and conditional relations. The volume concludes with an appendix that examines why the Theravāda came to be known as Vibhajjavāda, "the doctrine of analysis." Not limiting himself to abstract analysis, Karunadasa draws out the Abhidhamma's underlying premises and purposes--the Abhidhamma provides a detailed description of reality in order to identify all sources of suffering and thereby point to a complete cure for the problem of suffering. (shrink)

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In and Around Maimonides presents eight highly focused studies on Moses Maimonides and those around him.

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We have lost one of the giants of the twentieth century physics when Yoichiro Nambu passed away in July, 2015, at the age of 94. Today's Standard Model, though still incomplete in many respects, is the culmination of the most successful theory of the Universe to date, and it is built upon foundations provided by discoveries made by Nambu in the 1960s: the mechanism of spontaneously broken symmetry in Nature (with G Jona-Lasinio) and the hidden new SU(3) symmetry of quarks (...) and gluons (with M-Y Han). In this volume honoring Nambu's memory, World Scientific Publishing presents a unique collection of papers written by his former colleagues, collaborating researchers and former students and associates, not only citing Nambu's great contributions in physics but also many personal and private reminiscences, some never told before. This book is a volume for all who benefited not only from Nambu's contributions toward understanding the Universe but also his warm and kind persona. It is a great addition to the history of contemporary physics. (shrink)

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