Philosophical Problems in Logic. [REVIEW]P. M. R. -1971 -Review of Metaphysics 24 (3):556-556.detailsThe essays in this volume are based on addresses given during a colloquium on free logic, modal logic, and related areas held at the University of California in 1968. The majority of the contributors are well known for their writings in these fields and their papers are as illuminating as they are technical. In the first paper, Lambert and Bas C. Van Fraassen apply free logic to several controversies in quantified modal logic. One of these isPutman's argument that (...) 'Nothing is both red and green all over' can be had as a theorem of modal logic. Lambert and Van Fraassen provide a counter example to this claim and then show that the argument only holds in systems allowing possible individuals. Jaako Hintikka's essay also deals with 'free' modal logics in much the same way as Hintikka's other papers and discusses some of the criticisms of Quine of the entire enterprise of quantified modal logic. In another paper, H. Leblanc and R. K. Meyer provide truth-value semantics for the theory of types and hence an alternative semantic structure for functional calculi of any order. In addition to these essays, there are papers by R. Thomason and Dana Scott on modal logic, J. Vickers on probability logic, and Peter Woodruff on truth value gaps. To anyone interested in these various areas this collection is sure to be welcome.--R. P. M. (shrink)
Atheism Considered.C. M. Lorkowski -2021 - Palgrave MacMillan.detailsAtheism Considered is a systematic presentation of challenges to the existence of a higher power. Rather than engage in polemic against a religious worldview, C.M. Lorkowski charitably refutes the classical arguments for the existence of god, pointing out flaws in their underlying reasoning and highlighting difficulties inherent to revealed sources. In place of a theistic worldview, he argues for adopting a naturalistic one, highlighting naturalism’s capacity to explain world phenomena and contribute to the sciences. Lorkowski demonstrates that replacing theism with (...) naturalism, contra popular assumptions, sacrifices nothing in terms of ethics or meaning. Instead, morality ultimately proves more important than religion and does not rely on it. Appropriate for classroom use, this book is meant to cultivate understanding, tolerance, and fruitful dialogue between believers and nonbelievers. (shrink)
Distinguishing Characteristics of Corruption Risks in Iranian Construction Projects: A Weighted Correlation Network Analysis.M. Reza Hosseini,Igor Martek,Saeed Banihashemi,Albert P. C. Chan,Amos Darko &Mahdi Tahmasebi -2020 -Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (1):205-231.detailsThe construction industry consistently ranks amongst the highest contributors to global gross domestic product, as well as, amongst the most corrupt. Corruption therefore inflicts significant risk on construction activities, and overall economic development. These facts are widely known, but the various sources and nature of corruption risks endemic to the Iranian construction industry, along with the degree to which such risks manifest, and the strength of their impact, remain undescribed. To address the gap, a mixed methods approach is used; with (...) a questionnaire, 103 responses were received, and these were followed up with semi-structured interviews. Results were processed using social network analysis. Four major corruption risks were identified: procedural violations in awarding contracts, misuse of contractual arrangements, neglect of project management principles, and, irrational decision making. While corruption risks in Iran align with those found in other countries, with funds being misappropriated for financial gain, Iran also shows a strong inclination to champion projects that serve the government’s political agenda. Root cause identification of corruption risks, namely, the noticeable impact of authoritarianism on project selection in Iran, over criterion of economic benefit or social good, is a significant outcome of this study. (shrink)
Nine principles for assessing whether privacy is protected in a surveillance society.C. N. M. Pounder -2008 -Identity in the Information Society 1 (1):1-22.detailsThis paper uses the term “ surveillance ” in its widest sense to include data sharing and the revealing of identity information in the absence of consent of the individual concerned. It argues that the current debate about the nature of a “ surveillance society” needs a new structural framework that allows the benefits of surveillance and the risks to individual privacy to be properly balanced. To this end, the first part of this article sets out the reasons why reliance (...) on the current framework of data protection or human rights legislation, or on the current regulatory regime does not necessarily protect privacy. The second part sets out nine principles that can be used to assess whether individual privacy is comprehensively considered when surveillance policy is developed. These principles are applied to surveillance in the UK to identify the structural improvements that could create an effective balance. These principles are not legislative proposals but provide a means of exploring possible deficiencies in information law governance and, in particular, Parliament’s role in scrutinising the executive and the powers needed by a regulator when engaging with the Parliamentary process. As most European countries adopt a democratic, human rights framework, it is suggested that these principles are not limited in an application in the UK environment. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. (shrink)
Rawlsian Objectivity.C. M. Melenovsky -2018 -Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4):545-564.detailsIn a 1981 letter to H.L. A. Hart, John Rawls sketches a view of moral objectivity that substantially differs from that of contemporary constructivists. The view he describes does not rely on constitutive features of agency as Korsgaard's does, and it does not bottom out in a form of realism as Scanlon's moral theory does. Instead, Rawls's view grounds objectivity on the fundamental conceptions that could be shared in wide reflective equilibrium. Constructivism grounds objectivity in a kind of intersubjectivity, and (...) Rawls finds the relevant kind of intersubjectivity in the alignment between fundamental convictions. This article develops this Rawlsian view of objectivity and highlights its strengths. (shrink)
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