The Philosophy of Quantitative Methods: Understanding Statistics.Brian D. Haig -2018 - Oup Usa.detailsThe Philosophy of Quantitative Methods undertakes a philosophical examination of a number of important quantitative research methods within the behavioral sciences in order to overcome the non-critical approaches typically provided by textbooks. These research methods are exploratory data analysis, statistical significance testing, Bayesian confirmation theory and statistics, meta-analysis, and exploratory factor analysis. Further readings are provided to extend the reader's overall understanding of these methods.
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How to pursue the adaptationist program in psychology.Russil Durrant &Brian D. Haig -2001 -Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):357 – 380.detailsIn recent times evolutionary psychologists have offered adaptation explanations for a wide range of human psychological characteristics. Critics, however, have argued that such endeavors are problematic because the appropriate evidence required to demonstrate adaptation is unlikely to be forthcoming, therefore severely limiting the role of the adaptationist program in psychology. More specifically, doubts have been raised over both the methodology employed by evolutionary psychologists for studying adaptations and about the possibility of ever developing acceptably rigorous evolutionary explanations of human psychological (...) phenomena. We argue that by employing a wide range of methods for inferring adaptation and by adopting an inference to the best explanation strategy for evaluating adaptation explanations, these two doubts can be adequately addressed. We illustrate how this approach can be fruitfully employed in evaluating claims about the evolutionary origins of language, and conclude with a brief discussion of the future of evolutionary psychology. (shrink)
Method Matters in Psychology: Essays in Applied Philosophy of Science.Brian D. Haig -2018 - Cham: Springer Verlag.detailsThis book applies a range of ideas about scientific discovery found in contemporary philosophy of science to psychology and related behavioral sciences. In doing so, it aims to advance our understanding of a host of important methodological ideas as they apply to those sciences. A philosophy of local scientific realism is adopted in favor of traditional accounts that are thought to apply to all sciences. As part of this philosophy, the implications of a commitment to philosophical naturalism are spelt out, (...) and a correspondence theory of truth is defended by showing how it helps explain various features of scientific practice. The central chapter of the book presents a broad theory of scientific method that comprises the detection of empirical phenomena and their subsequent understanding by constructing explanatory theories through the use of abductive methods. This theory of scientific method is then used as a framework to reconstruct the well-known qualitative method of grounded theory, and to present a systematic perspective on clinical reasoning and case formulation. Relatedly, an abductive or explanationist understanding of methods is employed to evaluate the knowledge credentials of evolutionary psychology. In addition, the conceptual and methodological foundations of a variety of quantitative methods are examined. Exploratory factor analysis and tests of statistical significance are given special attention. (shrink)
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Extending the network perspective on comorbidity.Brian D. Haig &Frances M. Vertue -2010 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):158-158.detailsCramer et al. make a good case for reconceptualizing comorbid psychopathologies in terms of complex network theory. We suggest the need for an extension of their network model to include reference to latent causes. We also draw attention to a neglected approach to theory appraisal that might usefully be incorporated into the methodology of network theory.
Scientific realismwith correspondence truth: A reply to Asay (2018).Brian D. Haig &Denny Borsboom -2018 -Theory and Psychology 28 (3):398-404.detailsAsay (2018) criticizes our contention that psychologists do best to adhere to a substantive theory of correspondence truth. He argues that deflationary theory can serve the same purposes as correspondence theory. In the present article we argue that (a) scientific realism, broadly construed, requires a version of correspondence theory and (b) contrary to Asay’s suggestion, correspondence theory does have important additional resources over deflationary accounts in its ability to support generalizations over classes of true sentences.
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Statistical significance testing, hypothetico-deductive method, and theory evaluation.Brian D. Haig -2000 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):292-293.detailsChow's endorsement of a limited role for null hypothesis significance testing is a needed corrective of research malpractice, but his decision to place this procedure in a hypothetico-deductive framework of Popperian cast is unwise. Various failures of this version of the hypothetico-deductive method have negative implications for Chow's treatment of significance testing, meta-analysis, and theory evaluation.